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ABSTRACT

This set of four publications examines contemporary power relations between persons of European and African descent in Brazil, South Africa, and the United States. Using a comparative and multidisciplinary approach, these publications focus on three democracies with large multiracial and multiethnic populations. "Overview Report," which details findings by the Southern Education Foundation's Comparative Human Relations Initiative, features first-person profiles of outstanding Brazilians, South Africans, and individuals from the United States who are involved in the struggle against racism and reflections of members of the working and advisory groups. "Three Nations at the Crossroads" contains in-depth portraits and accessible historical reviews of the three countries by Charles V. Hamilton, Ira Glasser, Wilmot James, Jeffrey Lever, Colin Bundy, Abdias do Nascimento, Elisa Larkin Nascimento, and Nelson do Valle Silva. "In Their Own Voices" is a topically organized reader featuring articles, quotes, and excerpts from speeches by participants in meetings sponsored by the Initiative. These participants include journalists, educators, and policymakers. "Color Collage" contains occasional papers on issues related to racism and inequality. Each volume contains references. A brochure describing the reports is appended. (SLD)

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

Racism

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Racism

VERVIEW REPORT

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BRAZIL • SOUTH AFRICA • THE UNITED STATES

BEYOND Racism

EMBRACING AN INTERDEPENDENT FUTURE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING AND ADVISORY GROUP 2
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED 3

I. INTRODUCTION 4
In Their Own Voices: Brazilians 8

II. COMING TO TERMS: THE MEANING OF RACE, RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 16
  What is Race? Race is an Idea 17
  What is Racism? What is Racial Discrimination? 18
  Perspectives on Racial Classification 21
  Proving Discrimination 23
In Their Own Voices: South Africans 24

III. IMAGINING OUR INTERDEPENDENT FUTURE 32
  Comparative Lessons for the Future 33
    Disparities of Difference 33
    Comparative Charts 34
    Country Snapshots 36
    Changing Forms of Identity and Racism 38
    Interacting, Interconnected Forces 40
    Downside of Racial Progress 41
    Crime and Responsibility 42
    Creating a Virtuous Circle of Change 42
  Six Global Trends Shaping the New Century 46
    Global Economy and Technological Revolution 46
      Benefits of Equitable Social and Human Development 47
      Inclusion and Diversity Are Good Business 48
      Government Has A Role 48
    Global Demographic Changes 48
      Migration 48
      Population 49
      New Demographic Imperatives for Racial Interdependence 49
    International Human Rights Movements 51
    Women's Global Leadership 53
    Democratization 54
    Peace and Reconciliation 55
In Their Own Voices: Americans 58

IV. THE FUTURE BEGINS TODAY 66
In Our Own Voices: International Working & Advisory Group 70

APPENDICES 83
  Sources for Charts 84
  Photography Credits 84
  Initiative Publications 85
  Selected Bibliography 85
  Acknowledgements 86
  Biographical Notes 87

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STATEMENT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING AND ADVISORY GROUP

All human beings are the same beneath the skin. There are no "inferior" or "superior" races or race-based differences in intelligence, character or worth among the world's peoples. We are all part of the same human family.

Racism is the denial of our shared humanity, a violation of the human rights to which all people are entitled. It is a moral blight, source of festering injustice and serious economic problem.

Wherever racism is found, it is a divisive force. It deprives societies of unity and the cooperation of all of their people in pursuit of the common good. It wastes talent, productivity and lives and contributes to human suffering. It fuels inequality and disparities in power, encouraging abuse and exploitation of vulnerable groups and individuals. It undermines democratic governance, retards economic development, and sets conflict in motion as groups or individuals struggle either to preserve or resist an unfair status quo.

In the future, the world will be even "smaller" than it is today. The lives and well-being of diverse peoples and nations will be increasingly intertwined in a global web of economic, social and political interdependence. If we are to have any measure of peace and prosperity, we will all have to adjust to living and sharing with and learning from people who may not resemble ourselves. Thus we all have a vested interest in developing rules, policies, understandings and values that can protect and affirm everyone's birthright to be free from racism, sexism and other such practices.

We began the Initiative's work with the awareness that for all of their differences, the nations from which we hail – Brazil, South Africa and the United States – throughout their histories have been shaped and deeply affected by "race," racism, sexism and other forms of prejudice. In each, from the beginning, people of European descent and appearance dominated and enslaved people of African descent and their progeny. They relegated their fellow human beings to the status of "property." By law (in the United States and South Africa) or practice (in all three countries), Whites resisted sharing equal rights and opportunities with Blacks. White wealth and advantages accumulated for hundreds of years through exploitation of cheap Black labor, while Black disadvantages deepened. White racism provided a ready excuse for repressive violence and a convenient basis for segmented compassion.

As a consequence of these practices, the three nations are now home to more than 125 million people of African descent or appearance, a disproportionately large number of whom are mired in poverty and lack the skills needed to thrive or compete in the technology-driven workplace and global economy that are coming into being. In Brazil, a society with a complex array of color-based group identities, close to half of the population ("Blacks" and "Browns") have a degree of African descent or appearance, and the majority of these "non-Whites" are poor. In South Africa, which is less than 15 percent White, virtually all of the poor are "Black" or "Coloured." In the United States, African Americans are 13 percent of the population but fully 33 percent of the poor.

Our nations are now at a critical turning point. Buffeted by domestic and international trends and developments, they face the present and future challenge of finding ways to undo the legacy of cumulative disadvantage affecting people of African descent so diligently constructed and maintained in the past. These trends and developments present new problems. But they also can present new opportunities for these democracies to point the way to a post-racist era of progressive human relations.

The challenge of the new era will be to help individuals, institutions, societies and the world move beyond racism by systematically uprooting the attitudes, practices and policies that promote and sustain inequality. Those nations that continue to provide benefits for Whites at the expense of Blacks, women and other vulnerable groups, fail to nurture the talents of all of their people and tolerate or even encourage deep cultural and "racial" divisions, will undermine their competitive edge with other nations and lose credibility with their own people.

It will take a substantial and sustained investment of time, energy and resources by people in Brazil, South Africa, the United States and the international community to bring about these changes. But the simple truth is that our nations and world cannot afford the soaring costs and negative consequences of prejudice.

In the course of our inquiry, we have met many remarkable people and glimpsed their reality. We have learned that, despite their conflicts and diversity, people are more alike than different. We all wish to have decent places to live, open opportunities to learn, help from others when we need it, satisfying and productive work, a measure of good health, the ways and means to care for our loved ones, a sense of protective and equal justice, and peace. These can be attainable goals if we resolve to put the angels of our better natures to work as architects of a more egalitarian, global society.

To some people the aspiration to move beyond racism may seem naive. But without an abiding vision of where we wish to be in the future, a plan to get there, and a commitment to find our way, we will surely fail to make progress. We cannot succeed in moving beyond racism if we do not try.

One of our members, Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, once described the value of a comparative lens for the study of racism and inequality with these words: "It is as if we are in a great, mirrored ballroom. We see ourselves and we see others. There is the shock of recognition. We are them, and they are us."

We can learn a lot by gazing into the mirror, listening and learning and thinking about our diverse efforts to overcome racism. We can plan and work together to change what we do not like if we move with resolve and high purpose.

We do not pretend to have the capacity or wisdom to quiet the world's ancient hatreds nor to reconstruct the world's prevailing attitudes and institutions. But through study of Brazil, South Africa and the United States and sharing some of what we have learned, this work seeks to make a contribution toward a world where prosperity, justice and good will are primary terms for human liberation – and real engines for social and economic progress. The poet William Butler Yeats once wrote, "From our birthday, until we die, is but the winking of an eye." Let us use our time well and for good.

[illegible] Shaun Johnson [illegible] Singh
[illegible] Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro [illegible]
[illegible] Edna Roland [illegible] Thomas
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

January 2000

WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED

[illegible]

[illegible]

Being a woman, a Black woman [illegible] White woman makes a big difference in how we experience racism and prejudice. Racism perpetuates itself through [illegible] of women's minds and bodies.

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Introduction

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> — MARTIN LUTHER KING JR.

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>
> — JAMES BALDWIN



At the beginning of the 20th century, British and Afrikaner forces were engaged in a high-stakes war for colonial domination of the southern region of Africa, most of which is today the nation of South Africa. Black Africans in this territory lacked adequate arms to defend themselves and quickly became pawns in the White power struggle.

Across the Atlantic Ocean, Brazil, the first permanent colony to enslave Africans (in 1538) and the last to abolish slavery (in 1888), made no provision to care for its vast population of poor, uneducated former slaves and their progeny. Seeking a national identity aligned with Portugal, its colonial master, and the rest of Europe, the Brazilian government and ruling elite nurtured a color-coded, class-based society, where Whites monopolized positions of power. Both Africans and indigenous Indians were uniformly poor and voiceless.

Far to the north, in the United States, the Supreme Court coined the phrase, "separate but equal" in *Plessy v. Ferguson*, the 1896 ruling that ushered in an era of legally sanctioned racial segregation and discrimination. Afterward, legal discrimination was confined primarily to the Southern states, but the custom of White privilege reigned virtually everywhere in the country for the better part of the 20th century.

In all three countries, most men believed that all women were subordinate. Women were excluded from voting, many kinds of work for pay and most positions of leadership. For women, whether White or Black, "anatomy" was deemed to ordain "destiny."

The legacy of racism and sexism in all three nations dates back to each country's origins: Colonialism and monarchy ruled Brazil for almost four centuries– from the time seafaring explorers in the early 1500s claimed it for the Portuguese crown. Brazil was the largest and most enduring slaveholding society in the Western Hemisphere, enslaving far more Africans than the United States. During the first four centuries of its existence, enslaved African women and men made up a substantial majority of Brazil's population.

Unintended consequences arose in Brazil. The constant importation of Africans kept a vibrant African culture in play and kindled revolts by the enslaved, most memorably in the late 1500s, when the Republic of Palmares, a community of Africans escaping slavery, grew to more than 30,000 before being overwhelmed by military force in 1695.

Another long-term, social consequence of the huge African population was pervasive, sexual subordination of vulnerable, enslaved African women by dominant White males. White Brazilians, eager to increase their numbers, encouraged miscegenation as a way of "whitening" the population. The country remained majority Black even after slavery was abolished, but the government later banned Black immigration and vigorously promoted and subsidized White European immigration as replacement labor.

Despite appearances of fusion, an ever-widening gulf separated darker and poorer citizens of late 19th-century Brazil from lighter skinned and richer ones. Segregation was never imposed by law, but an intricate weave of social customs and class distinctions draped the descendants of enslaved Africans in tattered threads of perpetual disadvantage.

Brazilian women of African descent, doubly burdened by color and gender, occupied the lowest levels of the paid workforce, largely as domestic servants. White women were more socially and economically privileged than their Black counterparts, but were expected to stay home and have children in keeping with the mores of the time. Both were valued as means of production– Black women for their labor and the children they could produce to serve as slaves and White women for the "racially pure" children they could produce.

South Africa's strategic location on the sea route to the Orient drew Dutch settlers in the mid-1600s and then the British– both to the decided disadvantage of the Black Africans, who suffered grievously from European diseases, land seizures and forced labor. Europeans also instituted slavery, although most of the enslaved were drawn from other parts of Africa or East Asia. The practice neither lasted as long, nor was it as generalized in South Africa as it was in Brazil.

When local White settlers who called themselves Afrikaners and the British learned of the land's rich deposits of diamonds and gold in the latter half of the 19th century, they fought the bloody Boer War for control of the wealth. The Black majority found little, if any, hope of fair treatment from either side. By 1910, when the Union of South Africa was admitted into the British Commonwealth, the English and Afrikaner peoples formed a cross-ethnic, White minority coalition of convenience. While differing on other matters, they agreed on policies and laws that restricted the rights of Black Africans in virtually all areas of public life and used brute force and violence to carry out those policies.

This laid the foundation for the coming era of apartheid. A hierarchy of power and privilege was created in which White men occupied the upper echelons, and White women, afforded fewer rights and privileges, were still economically advantaged over all Black Africans. Like their Brazilian counterparts, Black women were denied equality because of race and gender and were generally viewed and treated as subordinates to Black men, as well.

The American Revolution of 1776, "a people's rebellion," overthrew British colonialism in the United States. But that inspiring triumph hardly obscures White racist practices before and after the war: the systematic annihilation of the indigenous Indian population and the use of African slavery, beginning 150 years before the Revolutionary War and continuing for 80 years. After President Abraham Lincoln freed enslaved Africans and permitted their entry into the Union Army, the Civil War between Southern Whites and the rest of the nation ended with the South's defeat in 1865.

The federal government then spent a dozen years in a largely futile program to "reconstruct" the South. Afterward, Whites in the North and South returned to a policy of states' rights and White supremacy. By the century's end, when the U.S. Supreme Court had chiseled the "separate but equal" myth into the law, the old institution of slavery was effectively replaced by different forms of racism: Ku Klux Klan terrorism, lynching, unbridled White power, state-imposed violence and legalized segregation.

Similar to those in Brazil and South Africa, White American women enjoyed economic advantages over Blacks of both genders but occupied positions subordinate to White men. White women in the United States gained the right to vote in 1920 but did not enter the paid workforce in large numbers until after World War II. Due to economic necessity, Black women worked throughout in much higher numbers in low-wage and low-skill jobs. They were effectively denied the right to vote in the South until the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 became the law of the land.

These are but a few brief glimpses of the historic origins of racism and its frequent companions, sexism and inequality, in Brazil, South Africa and the United States. They illuminate how three nations, located on separate continents, evolved and developed distinct manifestations of racial and gender-based discrimination.

As the 20th century ends, the United States, with a current population of more than 276 million, bears the burden and the glory of its status as the world's richest and most powerful nation and carries still the legacy of a house divided over race. Brazil, with an estimated 166 million people spread over a land mass larger than the contiguous United States, is one of the world's 10 largest economies– but also one of its most unequal societies in terms of the distribution of income and wealth. South Africa's 41 million citizens live under a modern democratic constitution in southern Africa's most highly developed nation, yet Blacks face daunting inequalities left over from the apartheid era.

In spite of their histories– perhaps, at times, because of them– the three nations featured in this report have made some powerful strides toward movement beyond racism in recent years. In 1988, Brazil's long period of military rule and oligarchy gave way to a new democratic government. President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Brazil's freely elected leader, has acknowledged the role of racism and discrimination in maintaining Black disadvantage and White privilege and the need for corrective action. Now, as the new century begins, a vanguard of Brazilian activists has at long last broken the silence that sustained the myth of "racial democracy" in the country, beginning a national debate on these critical issues.

In 1994, in the first inclusive and free elections in their history, South Africans elected Nelson Mandela as their president. Just three years earlier, the African National Congress leader had been released after 27 years of confinement as a political prisoner. In 1999, Thabo Mbeki was chosen as President Mandela's successor in free elections. After almost half a century of mind-numbing racism under the all-White apartheid regime, South Africa has become a democratic republic based on the principles of non-racialism and non-sexism, constitutional government and protection of human rights. Many members of the national Parliament are female, including its speaker. But the legacy of racism, sexism and inequality continue to consign most Black South Africans to desperate poverty and most women to less than equal rights and opportunities.

Beginning in the 1950s, African Americans and their allies spearheaded the movement that toppled legalized segregation and discrimination. The movement established legal and judicial principles of equity that helped clear the way for Blacks, women of all "races" and others to make impressive political, social and economic gains. Today, America has a larger Black middle class and more Black officials than ever before. Black women have narrowed the gap in earnings with White women and achieved levels of higher education greater than those attained by Black men.



These and other momentous changes constitute some of the 20th century's greatest, transcendent and continuing human rights stories. Racism, sexism and other such divisive "isms" are losing their grip in most nations of the world. Emerging is a hard-won consensus, a deeply felt conviction, that notions of racial or male superiority are destructive myths best left in the 20th century's wastebasket. Most people no longer accept White supremacy, a ruling assumption at the beginning of this century, as we move into the next. As the century ends, however, people of African desent are still subject to de facto discrimination, and a disproportionately large number are mired in deep poverty.

Brazil, South Africa and the United States have hardly begun to move beyond racism and sexism to a new plateau of equity, but their achievements provide encouragement and hope for the next millennium. As Archbishop Desmond Tutu has observed, it is impossible "once the desire for freedom and self determination is awakened in a people, for it to be quenched or satisfied with anything less than freedom and self-determination."

Today, in Brazil, South Africa and the United States, the prevailing goals of government have begun to shift from primarily serving the interests of Whites to trying to develop the means for all women and men to build better lives. Basic principles of gender and racial equality are now part of domestic and international law, policy and commerce, endorsed by most governments and people in words, if not always in deeds. A growing number of institutions and efforts foster peaceful relations among nations and between governments and their peoples.

The challenge of the new epoch will be to move individuals, institutions and societies beyond racism and sexism in practice as much as in belief by uprooting institutional arrangements, attitudes, and policies that promote and sustain inequality. The contours of dramatic, transnational developments affecting future efforts are already visible: globalization, migration and demographic shifts, human rights, women's global leadership, democratization, and the yearning for peace and reconciliation. These pose new challenges, opportunities and imperatives and heighten our interdependence.

The challenges are many and not to be understated. Old patterns of hierarchy and racism die hard. Times of rapid and dislocating change, when old norms give way and uncertainty is palpable, can bring out negative feelings, fears, and an "impulse to insularity." Shifting sands can be treacherous. This should tell us all that now is not the time to take anything for granted.

In each country, the story of race relations is still being written. The picture is fluid and dynamic. The words of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. are apt:

Human progress is neither automatic nor inevitable. Even a superficial look at history reveals that no social advance rolls in on the wheels of inevitability.... This is no time for apathy or complacency. This is a time for vigorous and positive action.

IN THEIR OWN VOICES

Rubem Cesar Fernandes is coordinator of the Viva Rio Movement, a comprehensive initiative for the [illegible] revitalization of Rio de Janeiro, once the capital and largest city of Brazil and always its brightest beacon, but beset [illegible] recent years by a succession of calamities. Rubem, a native of the city, returned in [illegible] after eleven years [illegible]

[illegible]

economic discrimination. We are seriously trying to cope with civil rights and civil liberties at the grassroots level for the first time in our history. The union movement and the rights of workers go back to the 1930s, but until now we have never focused explicitly on race or gender or economic class issues.

Now race is finally on the table– but it's still hard to get people engaged. Afro-Brazilian culture is strong and pervasive, and Whites freely participate in it– in the religion, the music, the food. There is no fixed meaning of color; even within the same family there are differences. I always thought of myself and my family as White– until my father went to New York and was identified as colored or Latino. Brazil's racism is very subtle, even intimate; we share virtually everything– except social status and mobility.

The challenges for us now are clear and connected: to uplift the favelas and end their isolation from the rest of the city, to raise the visibility and the status of Blacks and women and all poor people, and to reduce the huge gap between the "haves" and the "have nots." We have to do these things together. It's one thing to pursue separate social or cultural or religious interests– many are attracted to that– but politically and economically, we're all in the same boat, sink or swim. Democracy is not divisible.

Personally, I think we're making real progress, and I'm encouraged. Rio is being revitalized, born again. Brazil as a whole is on the upswing, too. The authoritarian impulse is still strong, but democracy is infectious; people like freedom– and having tasted it, they won't be willing to give it up. This is a very pivotal time in our history.

Zézé Motta

Zézé Motta was catapulted to fame in 1976 when she starred in the title role of Xica, a Brazilian movie drama about the exploits of a heroic slave woman. As one of few Black actresses to attain stardom in Brazil, Zézé has stood out as exceptional proof of how closed the nation's acting profession has been to citizens of African origin. Now, at the pinnacle of her career, Zézé Motta is determined to make the path easier for young Black actors and actresses whose opportunities are limited by racial discrimination:

When I first discovered that we have this problem in Brazil, this racial discrimination, my initial reaction was sadness. I cried a lot. But then I soon realized that crying was not the solution. I had to do something to change the situation.

I had come to Rio with my family from Campos, a small city in the interior, when I was just three years old. Throughout my childhood, I didn't see a lot of discrimination because I was not around many White people. It was not until the mid-1960s, when I was trying to become an actress, that I realized how serious the problem was.

Once, I recall, a commercial I had acted in was rejected by the client because, he said, viewers wouldn't accept advice from a Black woman. They paid me, but they refused to air the commercial. The assumption was that Blacks should only be allowed to appear on the screen as maids, servants– and, in fact, those were the only roles we could get, and directors typically behaved as if they were doing us a favor when they hired us.

But then I was lucky enough to be chosen to play Xica, and that changed everything for me. Looking back, I can separate my life into two chapters: before and after Xica. The movie was a big hit, not only all over Brazil but throughout Latin America and beyond.

Now I have made over 20 films, and I'm on TV, the stage, in commercials– and I sing, too. I have visibility, and so it's harder for those who control things to say "no" to me. But there are still very few Black actors and actresses in this country, and their roles are limited, and their pay is less than that of Whites. So I have become active in trying to call attention to them and to increase their number and their opportunities.

We have compiled a roster of over 300 Black actors and actresses all over Brazil, and we are forming a professional group, like an actors guild, to support their advancement. Also, this year I'm living out a dream with the creation of a theater workshop. We have gone into three of the favelas, where poor people are concentrated– where everyone is "Black," even the Whites– and we have chosen 50 adolescents to spend six months in an intensive training program that we hope will lead directly to acting jobs. This is only a start, but we can build on it, so I'm very excited about this. My hope for our future is in this rising generation.

There is so much to be done. The myth of racial democracy makes it very hard to fight the subtle and sophisticated racism that is so common here. I'll give you a couple of examples. A few years ago, I had a screen romance with a White actor in a telenovela– a television series – and the negative reaction among White Brazilians was widespread and extreme.

And here's another: We have a national law now that makes open discrimination a crime. For example, it's no longer permissible to publish "help wanted" ads for Whites only. So now there are codes. Look in the paper and you'll see this phrase: "Must have good appearance." That's generally understood to mean, "No Blacks need apply." Such exclusions are common– in housing, employment, education, and even public accommodations.

Afro-Brazilians have been held back in so many ways for so long that it's hard to build a movement here. We need to work on our self-esteem, especially among the young. And we have to make alliances with others who are willing to support our cause.

A true racial democracy would be a wonderful thing for Brazil. It would assure the elevation of all cultures in our society, and not the obliteration of any. That's the ideal I want to work for. There are deep divisions here now, obviously, but I'm an optimistic person, so I have hope for the future.

Dulce Pereira



Dulce Pereira was born in the interior of São Paulo state, in a rich agricultural and coffee-growing region sometimes called, "the Brazilian California." Both of her grandfathers once owned farms there but lost their land, in part because of racial discrimination: they were Black men with small holdings, hemmed in by powerful Whites who owned large estates. Dulce, the eldest of four children, saw and felt the painful adjustment her parents had to make as a result of these losses, and came away with a powerful sensitivity to discrimination and injustice:



My mother went to work as a maid, and from the age of ten I often worked with her to help the family. But she and my father had visions of our future, and they saw to it that we kept up in school and stayed connected to the world. We had Japanese and Arab neighbors, and in our Catholic Church there was a progressive priest who inspired me. So in spite of the problems associated with being Black and poor and a girl, I did rather well.

At 16, I passed the American Friends Service examination for its overseas exchange program, and in the fall of 1972 I went to live for a year with a White family in South Milwaukee, Wisconsin. It was a wonderful experience, the turning point of my life. Our social and political interests were very compatible. They had lost a daughter to leukemia, and in some small way I moved into that empty space, and we bonded, they and I. So I have two families now.

After I returned to São Paulo, I moved to Brasília and enrolled in the communications program at the state university there. Later, back at São Paulo University, I did graduate work in broadcasting– and all the while, I remained active in race and gender issues and in the Labor Party. For the past ten years, I have been the director of a public affairs interview program on television.

I'm president of the Palmares Foundation in the Brazilian Ministry of Culture. [Palmares was the name of a maroon society in the interior of northeast Brazil in the late seventeenth century.] In the new democratic administration of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, this foundation is the first government response to racism, an acknowledgment that Brazil must come to terms with its history as a racist society. It's an encouraging start, but we have a very long way to go.

Throughout Brazilian history, the African and Indian cultures have been characterized as inferior, while a small minority of European males was guaranteed access to land and wealth. This social pyramid, defined by race and gender, has given us one of the most inequitable societies in the world. To correct that, we have to concentrate on lifting up those in greatest need– and most of them happen to be Black.

Ivanir dos Santos

Ivanir dos Santos was born in a Rio brothel in 1956, and lived there until he was five. Then, in the chaos of a police roundup of prostitutes, he was forcibly separated from his mother and taken away to a government-operated institution for children. He never saw her again. But being Black and poor was not enough to defeat Ivanir. Now, as executive director of CEAP, a non-governmental community development and advocacy organization on behalf of poor and marginalized Brazilians, he uses the story of his own survival to inspire large numbers of today's slum-dwellers:



> I was classified as an orphan, even though I knew that both my mother and my father were alive. He was an auto mechanic who came regularly to see my mother and me. But they took me away from her, and I was given a number– 76– and kept in various detention centers until I was a teenager. Finally, when I was about 14, I went back to the old street corner where I had lived, and some of the prostitutes recognized me. I learned from them that my mother had committed suicide in despair over losing me.
>
> Somehow, in spite of my circumstances, I managed to get through high school and find a job as a graphic artist's assistant. Art, music, and theater were the things I liked best, but I was also very interested in organizing young people like me, people labeled as "problems"– abandoned and neglected children and young adults. I was in my 20's by then, and as I became more socially and politically aware, I gradually realized how much race has to do with these issues. Institutionalized White youths are called children, and the government's intent is to give them assistance– but Black youths in state custody are called minors, and the general prescriptions for them are control and

punishment. Society sees them as delinquents, as untouchables, but I see them as the future, as barefoot, ragged, hungry, abused citizens. When I came to that awareness, I knew I had a calling, a mission in life.

For the past 20 years, I have tried in every way I could to be an activist in the fight against racism and poverty. I qualified by examination for admission to Notre Dame College in Rio, and earned a degree there. I have continued to work in graphic arts and the theater. As a member of the Labor Party, I have run for office several times– most recently in 1996, when I got more than a half-million votes and finished a close third in the race for vice mayor of Rio.

My first responsibility, though, is to the children of the favelas; they are the primary focus of CEAP. Brazilian society has excluded them; they deserve respect, not scorn, and a fair chance to improve their circumstances in life. I have the gift of my experience, my survival, to pass on to the children of the streets. What I have learned, what I have tried to be, is not so much an example to them as an inspiration. Not "be like me," but "fight to rise above this, and then find ways to help those coming along after you."

You see the poor everywhere in Brazil. But the ones you see are not the problem. They are just the tip of the iceberg, a mere sample of the huge underlying crisis that makes a farce of our so-called racial democracy. If the true problem ever comes on the street in full force, this society will fall apart. It is clearly in the best interest of all Brazilians to eradicate inequality and discrimination and injustice now, before a terrible calamity comes to pass.

Zuenir Ventura

Zuenir Ventura has lived all of his life in the state of Rio de Janeiro, being born into a village working-class family in 1931 and moving to metropolitan Rio to stay when he entered college. Today he is one of the city's best-known journalists, a columnist for the newspaper Jornal do Brasil. For most of his career he has written about popular culture, but he attracted wide public notice in 1994 with a book (Divided City) about life inside one of Rio's most notorious slums, Vigário Geral, where 21 people had been killed in a disastrous police drug assault the previous year. His own humble origin gives Zuenir a clear perspective on the close connections between Rio's affluent minority and its legions of beleaguered poor:

My father was a house painter. He and my mother had 11 children, but only four of us survived beyond childhood, and I remember how hard they struggled to make life better for us than it had been for them. I got a degree from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro and thought I might become a teacher, but ended up instead with a job in the archives of a local newspaper. One day I was asked to write something, and that's how I became a journalist.

Rio is like New York– a huge city where people come from everywhere and are transformed. What happens here eventually happens all over Brazil. So the crisis of the favelas, the screaming social inequities and violence, must be taken seriously by everyone. These social problems are so great in Brazil, it's irresponsible and foolhardy to ignore them, to be unconcerned. It's estimated that there are about 600 favelas in Rio, and that at least one-fifth of our 10 million people live in them. Vigário Geral is not small, but by no means the largest, with about 20,000. I started going there a month after the massacre. As outsiders, we have racial and social prejudices, and we're scared of violence, but I tried to shed all of that and be completely open, with no preconceived ideas, so that I could see it with the fresh eye of the chronicler. To my great surprise, I found no deep desire for vengeance there– a lot of grief, a lot of pain and suffering, but also an impulse of survival and even a predisposition toward happiness. I found neighborliness, fraternity, solidarity, a spirit of sharing, and an appreciation of small blessings.

For most people who read my book, this was a revelation. We just don't know. We live near the favelas, next door to them, but they're unknown to us. They've been all around us for a hundred years, but only recently has society's awareness of this social tragedy grown, and only now are we making an effort to change. We heard their music, we saw what a view they had from the hilltops, and we were lulled into complacency. But now we hear the gunshots, and the violence has spread all over the city, and we are forced to realize that this segregation won't work– no security system, no gates and bunkers will protect us. There is no solution except to raise the standard of living in the favelas and integrate them fully into the life of the city.

Consciousness is the first step toward that solution. When enough people are aware and realize what's at stake, there will be a nonpartisan, non-ideological movement for change that will force the city and state to act. If we are to survive, the divided city has to end.

This is in part a racial problem, but it's more complex than that; it's really social and economic apartheid we're talking about. True, the poor in general are Black, but their exclusion is based more on economics than race. You truly can't tell who's Black or White any more, unless a person has very obvious African features and color. I myself am White, I suppose, but like most people, I don't find it easy to talk about this. I learned about racial stereotypes from my mother, who was very light-skinned. When I was a teenager, a Black person came to our house and said, "I'm your cousin," and my mother greeted him as her nephew. What's the lesson in this? Our language is ripe with euphemisms and circumlocutions to avoid it, and we have been somewhat self-delusive and hypocritical. Now, militant politics is forcing us to say what we are. What am I? I'm a Brazilian.

Vera Soares

Vera Soares came out of the University of São Paulo in the late 1960s as an ardent feminist, deeply committed to the struggle against gender bias, but less aware of the extent to which race and class discrimination permeated Brazilian society. Now a teacher and administrator at the university, she is still an activist for women's rights– but with a broader understanding of the central place of Black and poor women in the movement for social reform:

> When I was a student back during the dictatorship, I agreed with the leftist argument that the class struggle was also about gender and race. But race and even class issues were somewhat abstract to us then, because there were so few Black or truly poor students among us. There were many women, though, and for us the gender issue was very concrete; in fact, it was what gave rise to our activism in the first place. All we could see then, incredibly, was gender, not race.
>
> It took twelve or fifteen years– all the way into the late 1980's– for us to finally realize that the feminist movement could never be complete without Black participation. I personally have learned a lot from the Black women I've met. I've learned that if we want the women's movement to be powerful, we have to be united across racial lines. Thanks to those women, I don't have any hang-ups about integration versus separate development. Both are necessary. Blacks have to come together to know their history and find their identity and develop pride, but that shouldn't in any way make them less committed to feminism or democracy.
>
> I don't think it's realistic or practical to pursue political change in Brazil through an all-female or all-Black party. We can't be rigidly separate; social and cultural and political movements have to be flexible and interlocking. Then we can all work together to make the national and state governments serve everyone– male and female, rich and poor, White and Black.
>
> Racial identity is a very difficult and complex issue in Brazil. We have to acknowledge that racial discrimination exists here and make every effort to close the tremendous gap between rich and poor. These two issues are closely intertwined. This country is rich in resources, but so many of its people are poor, and most of them are of African or Indian origin. Also, power is still largely concentrated **in the hands of an elite few White males. If we are to mak[illegible] against these tremendous pro[illegible] develop alliances among women, Blacks, and the poor.**

Benedita da Silva

Benedita da Silva, a lifelong resident of the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, is also one of the most prominent women in contemporary Brazil. She was a co-founder in the late 1970s of the Workers Party [popularly called PT]; she was elected to the Rio City Council in 1982 and to the Federal Chamber of Deputies [lower house] in 1986; she narrowly lost a runoff election for mayor of Rio in 1992; and she won a seat in the Federal Senate in 1994– becoming only the third Black member of that 81-seat assembly. In 1998, she was elected Deputy Governor of Rio de Janeiro. A tall, forceful, striking figure with a resonant voice, Deputy Governor Benedita has staked out a place for herself at the center of public life as a champion of three under-represented constituencies– Afro-Brazilians, poor people, and women:



> I have lived here in Chapéu Mangueira virtually all of my life; I was born right over that hill [she points], just a couple of miles from here. I designed and built this house myself; it took me over ten years. I could have built it somewhere else, had I wanted to, but I chose to put it here. This is my home community, these are my people. It's just a simple house on a hill, but a real house, not a shanty, modest but comfortable, and big enough to accommodate visitors. I have lots of visitors–just about everyone but the Pope, so far.
>
> Like the vast majority of Afro-Brazilians, I grew up in poverty, the next-to-last of 15 children– and, as it turned out, the only one to go to college. My mother was a laundress, my father a laborer. They were illiterate. Not ignorant, just illiterate. They struggled heroically to make life better for us, but nothing ever came easy; poverty and racial discrimination always held them back. Thanks to them, I got a healthy exposure to three important areas of my life– education, religion, and work– and they also gave me the motivation, the confidence, and the courage to fight hard for those at the bottom.
>
> So my life conditions eventually took me into politics, and, though I have not always been victorious at the polls, I have managed to reach a level of visibility that allows me to be an effective voice for my constituents. It's very natural for me to be visible– I'm big, I'm Black, I'm loud. And because the Black majority in Brazil has always been so invisible– in government, in business, in the universities, on TV– it's especially important now, when we are in transition from dictatorship to democracy, for there to be people like me out there ringing the bell for racial justice.
>
> Racism and the denial of human rights have always been problems in Brazil, but the government and civil society have ignored this, even denied it. We are beginning to hear new expressions of concern from the government about these issues, but not much has actually happened yet. We have to go beyond words and symbols to substance and action. The Black citizens of this country want– we demand– inclusion in Brazilian society at every level. We have much to give to our nation and much to get from it.
>
> I've been to South Africa. I've seen what Nelson Mandela has done for the Black majority there, and for the cause of democracy. We Afro-Brazilians are where they were when Mandela came out of prison: facing the necessity to create and develop new leadership. I think we are at the beginning of something very important, something historic.

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Coming to Terms:

THE MEANING OF RACE, RACISM, AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

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

Why begin with an exploration of the meaning of race? It is a necessary reminder that most of us make judgments every day about others based upon short-hand cues such as perceived "race," but in fact, very few of us could offer a scientifically grounded definition of what the term means. Nor are we often aware that racial classifications and identities are neither uniform nor static around the world. Since there is so little agreement about what constitutes race, it is not surprising that we often waste time arguing about what race, racism and discrimination are rather than tackling the problems these terms describe.

All human beings have multiple identities– as members of nations, communities, families and professions. As men or women, rich or poor, we have "racial identities" and appearances associated with people indigenous to different parts of the world–Africa, Asia, Europe, Australia. These identities may be generated and embraced from within or imposed upon us by others. However constructed, they have force and influence in our lives.

What is Race? Race is an Idea

Race is an idea that early European "scientists" used to categorize differences in appearance in peoples living in other parts of the world distant from their own. Race began, therefore, as a geographically-derived concept. Later, some scientists began to speculate about a hierarchy of capacity or worth associated with various "races." Experiments were conducted to try to "prove" or "disprove" differences in human ability linked to perceived race or appearance with predictable results. Whether due to conscious or unconscious bias, faulty methods, chauvinism or simple error, European scientists concluded that their racial group was "superior" to all others. The notion of European or "White" racial superiority furnished a ready excuse or justification for imperialism, colonialism and conquest.

Over the years, debates and experiments continued as scientists and others argued over the legitimacy of beliefs in racial superiority or inferiority between "Black" and "White" races. Today, the overwhelming weight of modern scientific research and opinion debunks such notions. The consensus among the world's scientists is:

- All human beings, irrespective of superficial appearance, are members of the same species. That is why we can interbreed and produce offspring, irrespective of "race."
- The geographical isolation that gave rise to distinctive "looks" of people from particular parts of the world has given way to integration and interbreeding between and among groups, rendering the idea of geographic races even more unreal.
- The range of variation in human capacity is greater within any particular "race" than between the geographic races.
- Scientists have isolated only minute genetic differences between geographic "races." These differences are not linked to intellectual capacity or character.

What is Racism?
What is Racial Discrimination?

As used in this report and popular parlance, "racism" describes beliefs and acts that deny fundamental equality to all human beings because of perceived differences in "race" or color or appearance. Racial discrimination is racism in action. The Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, promulgated by the United Nations and ratified by Brazil, South Africa and the United States, defines racial discrimination as:

any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the ***purpose or effect*** *of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural and any other field of public life. (emphasis added)*

Positive measures to overcome discrimination, such as affirmative action, are not deemed to be unlawful under the Convention. Indeed, it requires that such policies be adopted to counter the effects of discrimination.

Many people believe that racism is only a matter of personal attitudes, beliefs or conscious intentions. When asked, they may say that they do not "dislike" Black or non-White people. In fact, "some of their best friends are Black." In effect, they reason, "I don't have a problem with race. Therefore, racism must not be a problem." But racism is a problem, a grave problem, evident by the differential distribution of wealth, resources and other indicia of well-being.

Racism and discrimination are not solely matters of conscious personal belief or intentional acts or individual attitude. Racism and discrimination may be embodied in unintended, detrimental consequences that flow from seemingly neutral practices or policies.

Put another way, attitudes and beliefs related to race are embedded in social mores, cultural practices, laws, customs and the ways institutions operate. Racism is not merely a habit of the heart. It may be a habit of industry or a pattern of behavior by individuals, groups or institutions. Intentional and unintentional actions may be racially discriminatory.

This means that an important part of combating racism and discrimination is to find ways to recognize the consequences of personal actions and societal practices and policies that impact different groups and individuals unequally. Since Whites and Blacks start off at different points on the scale in terms of resources, power and well-being, undoing the effects of racism and discrimination may require compensatory efforts in order to create parity in the abilities of the two groups to take advantage of "equal" opportunities.

If human beings can accept that the Earth is round, although our eyes tell us otherwise, why do some people continue to think of themselves and act as if they are "superior" to people of African descent or appearance, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary? Here are some commonly cited reasons:

- **Some people are ignorant.** They don't know what they don't know. In other words, racism is grounded in false ideas and assumptions that cause prejudice.
- **Other people confuse the degree of development of European or "White" nations with "superiority," without considering the role of European colonialism and slavery in retarding African development.** They also do not think about how geographic, spatial and other such related factors affect development in different parts of the world. Yet as Jared Diamond, author of *Guns, Germs, and Steel,* writes: "History followed different courses for different peoples because of differences among peoples' environments, not because of biological differences among peoples themselves."

  Nor do they think about the labor contributed by people of African descent to help develop nations such as Brazil, South Africa and the United States. If they are aware of the wealth of examples of achievement and capacity of Africans and their descendants around the world, they view them as exceptions, not the rule.
- **Isolation and unfounded fears help to perpetuate racial stereotypes and distrust of persons perceived to be "different" from one's self or kin.** Human beings often tend to fear or distrust those whom they do not know.
- **Some people believe that group differentials between Blacks and Whites on standardized test performance measure "nature" or characteristics intrinsic to "race," rather than "nurture."** They ignore or are

KING:
END
RACISM!

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unaware of pervasive evidence of test misuse or bias in test construction and administration. They misunderstand what tests actually purport to measure and don't focus on the limited predictive ability of many tests. They believe that small differences in test scores between some members of each group measure intrinsic differences in group intelligence, rather than test-taking abilities, educational advantages, nutrition, health, environmental and other factors that influence test outcomes. They ignore the fact that many Blacks score higher than Whites on tests.

- **Confusing poverty and lack of education with lack of intelligence is a common failing.** W.E.B. DuBois summed up this problem well: "When men oppress their fellow men, the oppressor ever finds, in the character of the oppressed, a full justification for his oppression. . . The evils most fostered by oppression are precisely those which oppressors would transfer from their system to the inherent character of their victims."
- **Whites who care about fairness but treat others unfairly often cannot face up to what they have done, as Gunnar Myrdal once observed.** Hence, they deny to themselves that they are involved in or are benefiting from wrongdoing by projecting negative feelings onto the parties being wronged. Such "cognitive dissonance" is a powerful psychological defense mechanism.
- **Perhaps the most powerful reason racism persists is simply that many Whites find a belief in the inferiority of Blacks useful or convenient.** Such a belief allows Whites to keep control of power and furnishes them both the reason and method by which to preserve societal privileges and advantages for themselves. Removing people of African descent or appearance from competition preserves White control, irrespective of ethnicity, and may help to avoid or delay White intra-group conflict.

Racism and sexism are often found in combination. Both help White men preserve their place at the top of the social hierarchy over Black women and men and White women. Racism and sexism also help retard broad-based and inclusive movements to maximize the talents of all women. Racism and sexism have doubly burdened Black women. And, by promoting the restriction of White women's freedom in order to maintain "racial purity," racism has been and is the adversary of their freedom and equality, as well as that of Black women.

Of course, not all Whites seek to deny equal rights or respect to Blacks or feel themselves "superior." To the contrary, the struggle to move beyond racism has always involved many different groups and individuals. Many Whites and others have paid a high price for supporting fair treatment for people of African descent. Without the support of some Whites, it is unlikely that the progress made in combating racism's most pernicious effects would have been made.

Unfortunately, however, too many have taken the "easy way out," kept quiet or turned a "blind eye" when faced with unfairness and exploitation. For, as Franklin A. Thomas, a member of the International Working and Advisory Group, has noted, "there is no longer any social dishonor in being self-centered" among many people. It takes courage and independence to go against a society's prevailing sentiment and habits.

Governments have used their power to perpetuate beliefs in White superiority and social dominance and to maintain White privilege, a topic to which we next turn.

Perspectives on Racial Classification

The significant literature on racial classification in Brazil, South Africa and the United States reveals a bewildering array of approaches to the idea of "race" and classification pursued by the governments and peoples of these three nations. It is important to focus on the role of government because, as Columbia University Professor Manning Marable has observed:

> *Any strategy to dismantle racism must recognize the ways that state power has deliberately reproduced racial categories and encouraged and benefited from divisions. Racial categories did not fall from the sky, imposing themselves upon non-European people. They were deliberately, socially constructed and, in the process, the state has always played a decisive and essential role.*

In the United States, while ideas of racial classification have changed somewhat over time, the key idea governing racial identity is the principle of "hypodescent" or the "one drop rule," a blood lineage standard. Using this standard, any person who has a small or measurable degree of African heritage is by law (and common understanding) deemed to be African American or "Black," irrespective of

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actual appearance. This strict standard during the time of slavery ensured that offspring of slave owners and slaves would still be usable as slaves. It may still be useful to some Whites who want to reserve the best jobs, educational opportunities, political offices and other advantages for other Whites and themselves.

Clearly, judging from the rainbow hues of African Americans alone, there has been considerable miscegenation. African Americans are a "mixed race" group, using the geographic definition of race. But irrespective of color or physical appearance, African ancestry in America makes a person "Black." Although Mr. Plessy, in the *Plessy v. Ferguson* case cited earlier, traced 7/8th's of his lineage to Whites and only 1/8th's to Blacks and "looked" White, he was classified as a member of the Black "race" and subject to unequal treatment. Blacks of all shades had "no rights a White man was bound to respect."

In Brazil, the notion of "race" is even more complicated in light of the nation's long history of promoting and encouraging miscegenation. Brazilians sometimes point to this miscegenation or "whitening" to prove the absence of racism or discrimination. To their minds, the fact that interracial sex was encouraged proves that discrimination and racial hatred do not exist. They also assert that since many Brazilians have some degree of mixed heritage, "race," "racism" and discrimination do not exist in Brazil.

But whether called "racism" or not, a growing body of data attests to the fact that both "Blacks" and "Browns" (people who appear to be of African descent) in Brazil are significantly disadvantaged when compared with Whites in terms of health status, mortality, education, employment, earnings and wealth. Blacks and Browns are also dramatically underrepresented among those holding public office, at top echelons of the business community, in media images, or in the higher education establishment. They constitute a disproportionate part of Brazil's poor. And, public opinion research also demonstrates that African appearance is valued less than the European aesthetic and is a source of stigma in many settings.

Instead of using "hypodescent," people in Brazil tend to classify themselves or others based primarily upon physical appearance– hair, phenotype, color or class. You are what you appear to be. Thus, being poor is linked in popular culture with being "Black," and a "White" appearance is associated with resources and higher status. An old expression "money whitens," makes this point. As American civil rights activist Barbara Arnwine observes, "Brazil is not the great racial democracy it makes itself out to be; it is the great pigmentocracy."

To outsiders it seems odd that some Brazilians cite the large numbers of people of mixed heritage as proof that Brazil is a great racial democracy. This equation confuses



"sexual relations" with non-discrimination. To Americans or South Africans, a mixed heritage does not establish the absence of racism and discrimination in hiring, housing or admissions to schools. It does not establish the absence of systems and structures that favor Whites. Instead, such assertions suggest a strong link between sexism and racism in Brazil.

Brazilians sometimes compare their pattern of "race" relations favorably to that of the United States or South Africa. They note with pride that their country does not have a history of legalized segregation or the open, anti-Black "hatred" found in the United States and South Africa. But this view of history does not explain why so few of the advantaged in Brazil are Black or Brown or why dark skin and poverty have come to be accepted almost as synonymous. It ignores the evidence of deliberate efforts after the abolition of slavery to "whiten" the country with European immigration and the biological determinism that was once in vogue. Why in a genuine racial democracy would there be such evident, color-coded power stratification?

Afro Brazilian activists note that the absence of legalized discrimination has perversely discouraged many Brazilians from mobilizing en masse to combat discrimination. Indeed, many Brazilians of all colors deny the presence of discrimination based on "race," color or appearance in their country. Many persons deemed to be "White" in Brazil affirm some degree of African descent in their own backgrounds. They may believe that "race," color or appearance are not problems because they have not been subjected to discrimination. They may feel an affinity to "Black" or "Brown" people and their rich culture of religion, music and foods. This conundrum prompted International Working and Advisory Group member Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro to observe: "The fish does not know that it is in water."

The Brazilian frame of reference is very different from that of many South Africans and Americans, for whom such beliefs seem convenient blind spots that have frozen the unequal status quo. As Archbishop Desmond Tutu once observed in another context: "It is difficult to awaken a man pretending to be asleep."

Under South Africa's apartheid regime, there were few areas of life or enterprise not stratified and classified along racial lines. South Africa created a vast, multi-tiered system of laws, bureaucracies and regulations to control almost all aspects of non-White life in society and apportioned levels of privilege in line with those classifications. The Report of the Study Commission on Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, summed up the apartheid racial classification system this way:

> *Under some statutes, and in general usage, the population is divided into four groups: Whites, Coloureds, Africans and Asians. But the central racial classification law, the Population Registration Act of 1950, which is sometimes described as the cornerstone of apartheid, orders the assignment of every person into three groups: White, Coloured or African. As authored by law, the government has further divided the Coloured classification into subgroups that include the Asians, as well as persons of mixed racial origin. Under another law, the Africans are subdivided into eight major tribal groups.*

In this web of categories, Africans were always at the bottom of all pecking orders, most subject to brutal control and rank discrimination. Dismantling this array of categories is a major priority in post-apartheid South Africa.

Proving Discrimination

A variety of measures are used around the world to document the presence and effects of racism and racial discrimination. Some are quantitative and others qualitative. In our study, we have considered the histories of these nations, social scientific literature and commentary, news sources, reports from international, national and public and private sources, judicial decisions, personal narratives, testimonies and biographies, and media accounts. This report relies upon all of these measures. The bibliography and endnotes in the *Full Report of the International Working and Advisory Group*, as well as other Initiative publications, all provide a sampling of the abundant data available from these sources.



IN THEIR OWN VOICES

Fikile Bam was 23 years old when he was arrested for the first time. Having just completed his bachelor's degree in law at the University of Cape Town, he joined in a protest against the recent massacre by riot police of 69 Black citizens at a passive-resistance demonstration in Langa, a township near Cape Town. He was held without trial for a month, and then released. Three years later, Bam was arrested again, and formally charged with conspiracy to commit sabotage; this time, he was tried, convicted, and sent to Robben Island Prison for ten years. (One of his fellow inmates there was Nelson Mandela.) These two jailings are listed under the heading of "National Service" on the resume of Fikile Charles Bam, who is now president of the Land Claims Court of South Africa.

I was born in Transkei in 193[illegible] and got my early schooling there, at an Anglican mission. After World War [illegible] parents arranged for me to live in Sophia Town, one of the Black townships of Johannesburg, [illegible] education at an Anglican secondary school. The superintendent, Father Trevor Huddleston, [illegible] his church to openly oppose apartheid; at any rate, his school, which was not segregated, [illegible] government in 1956, the year I graduated.

Language always fascinated me. I grew up with Xhosa as my primary indigenous language, [illegible] others, plus English and Afrikaans. History captivated me too, but it was law that [illegible] had been one of my teachers in high school, and my role model. He and Nelson Mandela had [illegible] law firm in Joburg, and I hung around them. They gave me a vision of the law as [illegible] political and social change. They were often in trouble, those two, and by the time Mandela [illegible] was in exile. It was inevitable that all young activists would face that same hard[illegible] anything critical of the government was considered treasonous.

So I was charged and tried, with ten others, in 1963 and sent to Robben Island in April 1964. I include that experience on my resume, because it was a key part of my education. As all of the political prisoners [illegible] Robben Island was our principal university. They let us go in 1974, but I was sent [illegible] Transkei, and when it became a nominally independent Black state, I was declared [illegible] and barred from returning.

My troubles with the police and other authorities continued for several more years. Even after I had completed my legal studies, I had difficulty in gaining my full rights and standing as a citizen and also getting admitted to the practice of law. By the mid-1980s, when the political winds began to shift, I was finally able to apply Oliver Tambo's vision of the law as a positive force for social change. Since then, I have focused my energies on constitutional law, mediation and arbitration, legal services for the poor, and service on various commissions and boards. As president of the Land Claims Court since 1996, I have tried to establish and maintain a reputation for fairness in the court's handling of land claims, of which there are a vast number.

For me, this is not a job but a mission. Imprisonment is a great waste of life– but it is not without positive, though unintended, consequences. It can create a thirst for freedom, truth, dignity– and a passion for justice.

Vincent Booys

Vincent Booys teaches English and history at a public high school in Cape Town's District Six, a neighborhood noted for its racial and cultural diversity until the apartheid government declared it a "White" area three decades ago. All of the residents were forced out, and a square mile of land was bulldozed down to the red soil to "cleanse" it in preparation for the rise of a new all-White community. It never materialized. Only a few school and church buildings were left standing– and they are all that remain today. Booys is one of 28 teachers in charge of almost 1,000 students at the secondary school:

It's called Vuyiseka– that means "Our Joy" in the Xhosa language. This was a school crowded with about 3,000 Xhosa children in the apartheid era, but when District Six was vacated, all of the Blacks were forced into an area known as the Cape Flats, a couple of miles away. There are still no schools for them there. I finished college in 1994– the year of free elections– and joined the teachers union, which was running an informal school here with volunteer teachers and students recruited off the streets in and around the Cape Flats. I volunteered for a month, and then we got permission to keep the school open permanently, so I have stayed.

All of our students are Black, as was the case during apartheid. But when District Six was a residential and commercial area, it was very diverse– Indians, Malays, Jews, Moslems, Africans, all living in harmony. Now there is a movement to revive the district, and that's a very heartening prospect. I never lived here, but I, too, come from that broad category of non-Whites once lumped under the designation "Cape Coloured," and so I can easily identify with their yearning to restore life to this once-vibrant neighborhood. If they succeed, it should also bring diversity to Vuyiseka and other schools.

You can readily see, just by looking at this school, that the legacy of inequality still prevails in our system of education. Too many African children are in understaffed, overcrowded, poorly equipped schools like this one– or not in school at all– and the present government's efforts to address this issue have, up to now, been completely inadequate. There are many other problems that cry for attention, of course– but what could be more important than educating the children?

South Africa has had a very troubled past. As a teacher of history, I know the importance of learning its lessons, of recognizing its problems so as not to repeat them. But it's really the future that needs our attention now. I want very much to be a productive part of the future of this country.

Alex Boraine

Alex Boraine served under Archbishop Desmond Tutu as vice chair of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and he brought impressive credentials to that challenging task. A former clergyman and presiding bishop of the Methodist Church in southern Africa, he was for twelve years an opposition member of the national parliament, and then for eight more years, until 1994, the first executive director of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA). He describes himself as "an African of European descent," his family having lived in the country for generations:

I moved from church administration into national politics in 1974 as a member of the Progressive Party, and by that time I had long since taken a public stance against apartheid and for racial unity. I was ordained as a minister in 1956, the year I finished college at Rhodes University here, and then I went to England for my master's degree at Oxford and on to the United States for my Ph.D. at Drew University in New Jersey. The highlight of my American experience was meeting Martin Luther King, Jr. and going on the Selma March in 1965. So much of that experience spoke to me profoundly about my own country and the desperate need for us to do something about apartheid.

At first I thought the church would be the catalyst for a social and political reformation, but, even though I was elected bishop by a Black majority in 1970, I had come to realize that the political arena was a much more likely place for this drama to be played out. So I took a leave in the mid-70s to run for parliament, narrowly won, resigned my church post, and entered this new career that was to last until 1986, when I left in protest of the military dictatorship of P.W. Botha.

The next phase for me was to join with others in founding IDASA, a non-government organization dedicated to bringing leaders of the African majority and the White minority government to the negotiating table. Our funding came primarily from the international community, where there was strong support for our pursuit of a democratic alternative to the race war that most people felt was inevitable.

After his election in 1994, President Mandela asked me to assist Bishop Tutu with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission [TRC], and I was pleased and deeply honored to do so. I have enormous respect for both men. The Archbishop and I have complemented each other rather well, I think; he is still very close to his church [Anglican], whereas I'm more secular now.

Because of this nation's unbelievable history, it is absolutely vital for us to try to come to grips with what happened– to try to deal with the past rather than be trapped by it. As individuals and as a nation, we need accountability, transformation, healing. We need full disclosure and truth against the lies of the past. The evils of apartheid affected us all. Most White South Africans participated in it, at least indirectly, simply by benefiting from its inequities. So all of us, White and Black, need to express our sorrow, regret, and forgiveness. In just two years' time, the TRC and its staff provided a public forum for more than 20,000 people to come forward and tell their stories. Time constraints kept the commissioners from hearing more than a fraction of the country's disputes, but the number is nevertheless symbolic and meaningful. Whatever happens in the future, this commission will be seen as having made a very significant contribution.

Frene Ginwala

Frene Ginwala, is Speaker of the 400-member South African National Assembly, the nation's first democratically elected parliament. Born of Indian heritage in South Africa, she is a longtime member of the African National Congress and has headed its research department and its Commission for the Emancipation of Women. After the ANC was unbanned in 1990, she returned from thirty years in exile (during which she earned two degrees and qualified as a Barrister at Law in England) to win her parliamentary seat in the historic elections of 1994. Speaker Ginwala is an articulate advocate of the ANC's philosophy of non-racialism:

> The African National Congress strives for an inclusive humanity that is an integral part of the African value system. There is a term for it: "ubuntu," which is a Zulu word meaning community, family, unity. It's more than diversity. To cite an example, our National Assembly is diverse: Many racial and ethnic groups are represented, and about one-fourth of the members are women. But to be non-racial, we must put aside our differences and work in harmony for the good of all. Such changes won't come quickly or easily. I don't believe in miracles. What has happened here since 1994 has required a lot of hard work and a lot of luck– and we still have very far to go.
>
> Non-racialism in South Africa is an ideal to pursue, a goal toward which we must work. We aspire to a society in which race is not a consideration in the making of laws and policies– as, by contrast, it is in regard to affirmative action. But in order to get beyond the past, when racial discrimination was the rule, we must take race into account for the time being. Equality means more than just getting people through the door; it means transforming our institutions from routine dispensers of privilege to routine practitioners of equity.
>
> Many people are impressed that one-fourth of the members of the National Assembly are women– a greater percentage than many long-standing democracies, including the United States and the United Kingdom. The women who serve in our parliament are perhaps less surprised and less impressed; after all, we have been working for some time to integrate the emancipation of women into the liberation struggle. Furthermore, we do not choose to compare ourselves with the United States or the United Kingdom. We believe that 25 percent is only half-way to equal representation.



[illegible]enet Africa

PRESIDENT
NC
MANDELA FOR
PRESIDENT
THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE

Pumla Mncayi

Pumla Mncayi remembers well the forty-acre farm in the Eastern Cape where she spent her childhood in the mid-1950s. "It was very hard, living off the land," she muses, "but you learn to do the best you can with what you have. My father plowed with an ox, and we lived in a prefabricated house made of corrugated metal. We had no money. But it was our farm– my father and my grandmother owned it – and my brother and I had the privilege of going to school, so compared to most Black South Africans in that time, we were well off." Then, in 1966, the government's apartheid policies forced her family to surrender the farm to Whites and move into an all-Black district. It was only the beginning of Pumla Mncayi's lifelong reckoning with injustice:

> It was a nightmare. I was 11 then, and the memory of it is still so vivid. We went part of the way by train, and my father drove the cattle and sheep. It was so hot and dry that some of them died on the way. There was a house for us at the place we had been assigned, a stone house that a German peasant family had lived in, but it had been vandalized and was in terrible shape. I tell you, it threw us back.

I started up from there. Both my parents had gone to school, so they knew how important education was, and they sacrificed to provide it for us. They sent me to live with an aunt so I would have a chance to finish high school, and in 1973, after I matriculated, I enrolled at Fort Hare University in Alice– the alma mater of Nelson Mandela, and the only university for Black students in the eastern part of South Africa.

My mother wanted me to be a nurse, like her, but I longed to become a lawyer. Finally, I settled on social work, and in 1978, I completed my degree and started at the bottom of the ladder as a field social worker in the rural areas around Queensland. It helped that I was fluent in English and Xhosa and had a working knowledge of Afrikaans. My clients were much like my own family had been in 1966: Refugees, poor people uprooted by apartheid. There were so many of them, and I had few resources– just a desk, no phone, no car. I hitchhiked through the countryside, carrying my files under my arm. My monthly salary was only 180 Rand (less than $50 US), about one-third the beginning pay for White social workers at that time.

In the five years I remained in the Eastern Cape, my circumstances gradually improved. I was sent to East London in 1980 (a promotion, I was told, but the pay was not much better), and there I had an office, and [illegible] library con[illegible] were still struggling [illegible] country, and they would remain [illegible] their lives. I did what I could for them, but it was not [illegible], never enough.

[illegible] 3, I got married, and my husband had a job in [illegible] Town, so I moved for the first time to a really big [illegible] nd I tell you, it was a shock. First, the govern- [illegible] ushed me back to the bottom of the ladder. [illegible] old me I was not qualified to be a social worker. [illegible] tongue and accepted this unfair judgment. I said, "Okay, if you won't let me use my professional skills here, then tell me what other jobs are open. I [illegible] whatever there is to be done." They assigned me to Mbekweni township in Paarl, [illegible] about fifty kilometers north of Cape Town. [illegible] lived in a tiny shack there and worked [illegible] poor. My husband was still working [illegible] saw little of each other [illegible] birth to a son, our first of four children.

[illegible] determined never to give up. It worked in my favor that I was willing to do anything, because I became a jack of all trades: advocate, clerk, mediator,

minister. After almost two years at Mbekweni, I was transferred back to Cape Town, and by 1989 I had moved up to be the first Black social work supervisor in the Western Cape. An ecumenical religious organization announced the same year that it was opening a home for neglected and abused children in Crossroads [township] here in the city. I wanted so much to lead it that I gave up my job with the government and was hired to launch the Masikhule ["let us grow"] Children's Home, which at first was nothing but an empty building and the pledge of a small subsidy from the state.

The fate of children living in the streets has always haunted me. We began with a few of these little innocents. One of them was a precious child named Belinda– so bright and responsive, in spite of all that had befallen her. I vowed to fight for her right to an education. Well, to make it a short story, she finished primary in Crossroads, then tested in to a formerly all-White high school and succeeded there. Now she is in college here in Cape Town, training to become a teacher. So you see, Belinda is proof of what can be done, even in the most hopeless circumstances. I tell you, if you give children a favorable environment and let them blossom, they will make you proud.

We grew quickly to a capacity of 80 children at a time, and a staff of 26. I managed Masikhule for seven years, until 1995, and after that I took a succession of short-term administrative posts, trying to help other NGOs [non-government organizations] meet the needs of homeless children. It's a frustrating and thankless task– so many needs and never enough resources. Now, since July 1997, I have been serving as director of the Cape Town regional headquarters of Black Sash, an international social welfare agency providing a variety of support services to racial and ethnic groups suffering discrimination. My husband and I remain deeply involved in the lives of our four children, who are all in school here now.

I feel blessed to have come this far. The Black people of South Africa have known nothing but struggle, and yet it is as if God has compensated by giving us an inner peace. I think it is within us, within our culture. Though someone may wrong you, there is a deep-seated forgiveness. It's not something you learn, like good manners– it's just there. We call it umbuntu. Umbuntu is a teacher– it tells you everything. It opens you to feel, to see need, to act. If you come to my house, a stranger in need, and I don't know you from Adam, I will welcome you and offer you water and rest in the shade. Umbuntu compensates for what you lack, and makes you feel a calmness within. It won't keep you from hate, from rage, whenever you see injustice– but it will let you find it in your heart to forgive and be reconciled.

We need this inner peace desperately now, because South Africa still has so far to go. Politicians are not miracle workers. So many problems remain, threatening to overwhelm us, and people are beginning to lose hope. It seems that we cannot make progress fast enough. I am by nature an optimistic person, but I tell you, I am worried about what will become of this beautiful land, and all the rest of Africa.

Picturenet Africa

Neville Alexander

Neville Alexander first saw Cape Town when he went there to college in 1953. A country boy from the rugged frontier town of Cradock, in the Eastern Cape, he was younger (only 16) and darker ("Coloured" in the argot of the time) than almost all the other students at the University of Cape Town. But he was not their inferior– not if maturity and intelligence counted for anything– and as for political awareness, he was already far ahead, sensitized by White supremacy and the growing discontent of the Black majority. Now, nearly half a century later, Alexander directs a major language research program at the University of Cape Town, having previously earned degrees there and in Germany and done post-doctoral study at Yale University. His long journey has brought him full circle back to the Cape, where he strives with countless others toward the full realization of a new South Africa.

My mother was just one generation removed from slavery. Her mother was one of many Ethiopians brought here to South Africa in the 1880s and sold to British colonists at what is now Port Elizabeth, in the Eastern Cape. My mother was very dark, pitch black, whereas my father was quite light, of mixed parentage. They were devoted to each other. It was from them that I developed at an early age a keen awareness of social injustice.

Growing up in a very crude, rough area that was tightly controlled by the resident White minority, I was taught two very important lessons by my father. First, be wary of Whites, even afraid of them, because they have the power to harm you; and second, don't ever be ashamed of yourself as a "Coloured" person, because you are equal to every other human being, and no label or insult can change that. Those feelings were reinforced by the ideals of brotherhood and equality I absorbed at mission schools operated by the Roman Catholic Church.

Up until 1959, despite apartheid, Blacks and Coloureds with good test scores could get into universities, though there was much segregation within. I managed to get admitted [in 1953], and soon after I got to Cape Town, I joined a left-wing group called the Non-European Unity Movement. I accepted the Marxist class analysis uncritically. My parents' example had made me see the evil of race and class discrimination. So I was programmed, you might say, to become a radical in South Africa.

There was another dimension of the race problem that had not occurred to me until I got to college: it was language. For those who spoke indigenous African languages it was a second feature, along with skin color, that set them apart for discrimination and mistreatment. In other words, language was another way, an easy way, for the White government to reinforce oppression.

I had grown up speaking both English and Afrikaans, and I also got Xhosa, the principal language of the African masses, and studied German at the mission school as well as the university. Then in 1958 I went away for my Ph.D. in German language and literature at the University of Tübingen, and, when I returned three years later, I was ready to focus on the political and cultural dimensions of language, its power as an instrument of social change.

As a high school and college teacher in Cape Town, I became deeply involved in the anti-apartheid movement, so it was not really very surprising that I was one of many Africans to be arrested in that tumultuous time. Trial and conviction followed rather predictably, and I was sentenced to ten years in prison. So in April 1964 I was taken out to Robben Island, which was by then the maximum-security prison where virtually all political resisters were put away. Strange to say, looking back, it was a very enhancing experience; it changed my entire life. Most of the ANC (African National Congress) and PAC (Pan African Congress) leadership was there, and I was privileged to serve my fellow prisoners as a teacher and lecturer.

After my release, I was under house arrest for five years, working in a supermarket and then, finally, teaching again– and always, using language as a powerful link to adult education, public policy, and political activism. I've spent time in Germany and the United States since then, but South Africa is definitely the place for me now. So much is in flux here, and so many inequities remain, but we have an exciting opportunity to restructure the discourse and to redefine ourselves as a united nation of equals.

Multiple identities will always remain, of course, and that's as it should be– but our primary one must be South African, not White or Black or Indian or Coloured or Xhosa. We have this rare chance, this moment in history, to bridge the gap between the races, between the "intelligentsia" and the common people, the rich and the poor. It won't be easy to do, or quick, or painless– but it must be done. This is the most momentous challenge we face. The outcome will not only determine the future of our country; it will greatly influence the whole of Africa, and the rest of the world.

ZIL • SOUTH AFRICA • THE UNITED STATES

Imagining Our Interdependent Future



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As a national and international force, racism has proven to be enormously pliable and enduring. Like "race" itself, racism's ability to mutate into many different forms and faces over time has made it difficult to understand and to upend. In Brazil, South Africa and the United States, the changing nature of "race" and racism sustains a public debate over the extent of continuing discrimination, the effectiveness of remedies to attack it and the proper role of various societal sectors in applying these remedies. At a more complex level, the national debates focus on whether society needs or is obligated to undo the effects of past and present discrimination in different areas of life for people of African descent. The dynamics of both "race" and racism and dramatic, emerging global changes shape these debates. These current and future forces present new challenges and problems, but they also offer new imperatives, directions and possibilities for a future beyond racism.

Comparative Lessons For the Future

Disparities of Difference

In any form, racism usually is found in multiracial societies where it is cultivated as a way of creating and perpetuating economic inequality. As Nobel Prize winning economist Sir Arthur Lewis noted, racism and economic inequality share and exacerbate the same "symptoms" and effects.

In Brazil, South Africa and the United States, disparities of income and assets between the richest and the poorest citizens are among the widest in the world. At the end of the 1990s, Brazil had the world's eighth largest economy and ranked second among the world's nations with the largest gap between rich and poor. Similarly, South Africa has sustained the largest economy on the African continent, ranked 32nd in the world by Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It ranked 4th among the world's economies with the largest differences between rich and poor.

This mal-distribution leaves many people severely deprived and lacking in resources adequate to sustain mind and body. In Brazil and South Africa, 23 percent of the population lives on less than $1 per day.

In Brazil's economy, with a GDP of more than $750 billion, 43 percent of the population survives on just $2 per day, while half the population in South Africa lives each day on that amount or less.

To be sure, what a dollar or two will buy in each country differs. In that sense, deprivation is relative and cross-country measures of poverty do not explain internal configurations of poverty in a particular setting. The fact remains, however, that these rough international measures of deprivation show dramatically the desperate material conditions and poverty in which millions of people of African descent and other poor people live in Brazil and South Africa. In each country, a dollar or two a day doesn't buy much.

In the United States, the globe's largest economy with a GDP of nearly $8 trillion, the economic gap between rich and poor is the largest among the world's industrial nations. Despite a recently brisk economy, almost doubling the rate of world economic growth, America's economic disparity continues.

These massive inequalities reveal and aggravate disparities separating people by "race," color and related appearance. In all three countries, people of African descent are disproportionately found among the poorest, while Whites constitute the large majority of the richest. By virtually every available measure of well-being from infant mortality to life expectancy, from education to earnings– Blacks are significantly disadvantaged in comparison to their White counterparts.


Income Disparities


Living on $1 per Day


Living on $2 per Day

COMPARATIVE CHARTS







Statistical Profile by Race or Color

	BRAZIL	SOUTH AFRICA	USA
Age Distribution Population Below 15 Years of Age			
Black	NA	35%	29%
White	NA	20%	29%
Life Expectancy		Women/Men	Women/Men
Black	62.2	67/60	68.3/60
White	66.2	76/69	75.6/68
Infant Mortality			
Black	62.3	49-53	15.5
White	37.3	10-17	6.6
Educational Attainment	% Illiteracy Rate	% Adult Population with only primary or no schooling	% Adult Population Not a high school graduate
Black	22	52.1	27
White	9	2.4	18
	Average Years of Schooling	% Adult Population with college education	% Adult Population with BA or grad degree
Black	4.2	3.0	12.9
White	6.2	24.1	22.8
Unemployed Rate			
Black	7.7%	29.3%	8.9%
White	6.6%	4.4%	4.2%
High Income Occupation	% as Professionals & Large Property Owners	% as Professionals & Managers	% as Professionals & Managers
Black	1.5 - 1.8	9.1	18.8
White	7.2	27.7	28.5
Low Income Occupation	% as "Non-qualified" Workers	% as "Elementary" Workers	% in Service Occupations
Black	54.6 - 57.8	33.7	22.6
White	40.6	2.9	12.7
Low Earnings & Income	% of Families with Income Below National Minimum Wage	% with Monthly Income Below 1,000 Rand	% Households Below $15,000 Per Year
Black	60	46	40.7
White	34	9.1	21.1
Living Conditions	% Homes with Piped Water	% Homes With Piped Water	
Black	56.1-61.6	27.3	NA
White	84.2	97.6	NA
	% Homes with Sewage or Septic Tank	% Homes with Flush or Chemical Toilet	
Black	49.7	33.9	NA
White	73.6	99.2	NA
	% Homes with Electricity	% Homes with Electricity	
Black	78-81.8	43.3	NA
White	92.1	98.4	NA
	% Homes With Garbage Pickup	% Homes With Garbage Pickup	
Black	47.8 - 53.1	40	NA
White	70.8	90.9	NA

Notes on Statistical Profile:

- For Brazilian data, "Black" includes both "Pardo" and "Preto" as is now the custom in Brazilian census reports. Where a range of Brazilian data is included (e.g., 47.8 - 53.1) for "Black," the first figure is for Preto and the second is for Pardo. Brazil data for "Life Expectancy" are for "persons with less than 4 years of schooling or less."
- For South African data, "Black" includes only "African," not "Coloured" as reported in South African census data.
- For US data, "White" includes people of Hispanic origin who identify themselves as "White."
- Infant Mortality is per 1,000 live births.
- See p.84 for sources.

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

The most commonly spoken first home language in South Africa is IsiZulu, spoken by 23% of the population (the left-most column on the graph), followed by IsiXhosa (18%; second column from the left). Afrikaans (14%) and English (9%), while widely spoken in all provinces, are less frequently used as first home languages than certain of the indigenous languages.

Women's Status

	BRAZIL		SOUTH AFRICA		USA	
DEMOGRAPHICS						
Birthrate (per 1,000 population)	26		35		14	
Total Fertility (average number of births per woman)	2.8		4.1		2.1	
Contraceptive Prevalence (married women)	66%		50%		74%	
Maternal Mortality Rate (per 100,000 live births)	140		83		13	
STATUS						
Date of Women's Suffrage	1932		1930 (White) 1983 (Asian & Coloured) 1994 (Black)		1920	
[illegible]	M: 81%	F: 30%	M: 75%	F: 40%	M: 77%	F: 50%
Female Paid Employment (% of total work force)	28%		36%		41%	
Life Expectancy	M: 62	F: 68	M: 57.5	F: 63.5	M: 72	F: 79
School Enrollment Ratio (1990s)						
Primary	95		97		95	
Secondary	NA		115		95	
Tertiary	100		NA		110	
Literacy	M: 82%	F: 81%	M: 57%	F: 57%	M: 97%	F: 97%

COUNTRY SNAPSHOTS

Brazil

VENEZUELA
GUYANA
SURINAME
French Guiana (FRANCE)
COLOMBIA
Belem
São Luis
Manaus
Fortaleza
Recife
Rio Branco
Salvador
PERU
Cuiaba
BRASILIA
BOLIVIA
Corumba
Belo Horizonte
Vitoria
São Paulo
Santos
Rio de Janeiro
PARAGUAY
CHILE
Pôrto Alegre
ARGENTINA
URUGUAY
300 600 km
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

Human slavery was lawful in Brazil for almost [illegible] years [illegible] the last 110 years. Brazilian [illegible] although the [illegible] today, despite [illegible] Brazil has economic conditions that [illegible] [illegible] shared [illegible].

Total Population: [illegible] million; [illegible] percent [illegible]

Work: Over [illegible] million adults [illegible] outside the home in 1997 [illegible] percent [illegible] employed [illegible] adults [illegible] the protection of labor [illegible]

Poverty: [illegible] percent of [illegible] their income [illegible] Black. 54 percent [illegible] wage income [illegible] income group.

Economic Disparities: The bottom [illegible] percent [illegible] received less than [illegible] percent of the [illegible] 20 percent received [illegible] percent of the [illegible] income disparities were the 2nd largest in the [illegible]

South Africa

After more than 350 years of colonialism and apartheid, the new South Africa guarantees equal rights to all citizens regardless of race or gender. Yet economic conditions in South Africa today remain very difficult for a majority of people, most of whom are Black, and a legacy of vast economic disparities persists.

Total Population: 41 million; 76 percent Black

Work: 7.5 million adults are employed in South Africa. [illegible] percent of the total work force (outside the home) was [illegible] unemployed in 1996. [illegible] percent of the employed [illegible] or less per month.

Poverty: Over [illegible] percent of all South Africans [illegible] national [illegible] in 1996. [illegible] percent [illegible] [illegible] percent of the poor are White.

Economic Disparities: The bottom 20 percent of the [illegible] received less than 3 percent of the national [illegible] top 20 percent received almost 65 percent of the [illegible] income. South Africa's income disparities were the [illegible] in the world during the late 1990s.


ZIMBABWE
BOTSWANA
Messina
NAMIBIA
Pietersburg
PRETORIA
Johannesburg
SWAZ.
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Richards Bay
Durban
De Aar
East London
Saldanha
Cape Town
Mosselbaai
Port Elizabeth

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Greenland
(DENMARK)
RUSSIA
Anchorage
CANADA
Seattle
New York
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Los Angeles
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Hawaiian
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THE BAHAMAS
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GUATEMALA
BELIZE
Puerto Ric

As a British colony and independent nation, the United States maintained slavery for almost 250 years, including more than 90 years after it declared "all men are created equal." No national laws effectively prohibited racial discrimination or segregation until the 1960s. Today the United States is the largest, most prosperous economy in the world, although economic prosperity is uneven and economic disparities remain large.

TOTAL POPULATION: 266 million, 13 percent Black

WORK: Over 7 million U.S. adults actively seeking jobs were unemployed in 1996, less than 5 percent of the eligible population. Black unemployment was virtually 9 percent while the White rate was barely 4 percent. In 1995, almost 20 percent of Black families earned incomes of less than $10,000 while only 6 percent of White families had incomes below $10,000.

POVERTY: The overall rate of poverty in the USA was approximately 13 percent in 1996; white poverty stood at a little more than 11 percent but Black poverty was nearly 30 percent.

ECONOMIC DISPARITIES: The bottom 20 percent of the population in the United States received less than 5 percent of the nation's total income while the top 20 percent received over 45 percent of the nation's income. The United States' income disparities were among the largest in the world in the 1990s.



This pattern of disparity does not suggest all Blacks are disadvantaged or that all Whites are rich. Nor does it negate the role of individual gifts and circumstances– talent, place, resources, gender, timing, and character– in affecting outcomes. Not everyone will attain identical levels of social, political and economic status. Individuality in people and nations affects inequality. For example, Brazil and South Africa are at much different phases of national development than the United States. Poverty and deprivation are far more profound in these developing nations, and their economic resources are far more limited.

What is troubling in these countries are the degree of inequality, its racially identifiable complexion and the frailty of available channels to open opportunities. Race, color or appearance remain "markers" of gross disparities in human well-being.

While there is a variety of comparative indicators used around the world to measure economic inequality and human deprivation, limited comparative racial data exist. Thus, our comparative statistics are incomplete and only roughly comparable, though instructive.



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In a world defined by statistics, the void in comparative racial data has real consequences. It fragments the understanding of racism into a random collection of national and local phenomena. It also allows nations to escape comparative scrutiny and most governments to claim that racial inequality is much less problematic in their countries than others.

For example, at the beginning of the 20th century, when a majority of its residents were probably of African descent, Brazil discontinued the practice of collecting data by "race." Without available racial data, military dictators and democratic leaders over several decades claimed the existence of a "racial democracy" or the virtual absence of racism with full knowledge that no data on racial disparity would contradict them. In addition, without racial data, no studies on economic inequality conducted in Brazil over many years addressed or showed racial inequality. Over time, Brazil became recognized internationally as a nation with class problems but no racial problems. The absence of racial data became proof of the lack of racial disparity and a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Today, the Brazilian government's census asks citizens for information about their own "race." Yet, the amount of data compiled and analyzed by "race" is still quite limited in comparison to the United States and South Africa. Also, Brazil's diversity of racial and color-coded identities, more than 150 in the last census, complicates collection and analysis. By giving "race" many faces, this vast array of self-perceived identities obscures the uniform presence of racism.

Changing Forms of Identity and Racism

On matters related to race, Brazil, South Africa and the United States are becoming more alike. Brazil's myth of the great racial democracy, though challenged, remains influential. Some Brazilians proudly assert that they can't know or understand what racism is because, after all, "one has to be a racist to know what racism is." This sounds familiar to Black Americans and South Africans who are sometimes told by Whites that they (Whites) don't see "race" or "color" and therefore racism is not a problem. Indeed, in South Africa and the United States, there is a growing public conversation about being "non-racial."

In the United States, the idea that "race" is disappearing or becoming irrelevant is linked to a demographic sea change in the composition of the population due to immigration, intermarriage and differential birthrates among various groups. However, the idea that race will no longer matter– at least in the foreseeable future– seems naive in light of the experience in Brazil where color-coded power relations



"New Man Fragment II" by Artis Lane

43

remain intact despite or perhaps because of miscegenation. In any event, it should be noted that of the various minority groups in the United States, African Americans have the lowest rate of interracial marriage. Moreover, the continents and countries from which many new immigrants to the United States have come have their own types of racism. And new immigrants, often eager to assimilate to things "American," frequently emulate the anti-Black attitudes and behaviors of dominant Whites. Some commentators have suggested that in the future, as light-skinned population groups begin to blend, perhaps even including light-skinned African Americans, this will only make the isolation of dark skinned African Americans even more pronounced. Finally, since the structure of anti-discrimination laws in the United States is organized around existing racial "categories," efforts to change or eliminate those categories could effectively immunize unlawful practices from judicial correction by making it more difficult, if not impossible, to prove patterns and practices of discrimination.

In South Africa, efforts to create a super-ordinate identity based on non-racial factors are laudable and necessary. But the resilience of old state-imposed identities suggests that the group disadvantages coterminous with "race" must be taken into account in order to move beyond racism. How to discourage group chauvinism and at the same time use evidence of racial disparities to fashion effective and responsive public policy and target scarce resources is one of South Africa's biggest challenges. Thus far, the South African government remains committed to promoting corrective efforts to redress the legacy of racism, citing non-racialism as the value and aim of its restorative activities.

In the United States, where African Americans are a permanent minority, many Whites continue to oppose compensatory policies to make Blacks "whole," if such efforts have the potential to disadvantage any Whites. Affirmative action and other such measures are under attack but still lawful in the United States, however. In Brazil, where the debate on affirmative action is just beginning in earnest, opponents are already expressing sentiments heard in America or South Africa about alleged "reverse discrimination" or the "balkanization" that affirmative action may cause. These Brazilians also assert that it is impossible to know who the beneficiaries of affirmative action efforts should be since, after all, there is no "race" in the "racial democracy."

In recent years, Brazil has slowly begun to recognize "race" and racism while the United States is coming close to adopting the idea that race should be ignored in order to achieve the ideal "color-blindness." Yet color-blindness, in the sense of inability to perceive color differences, does not and cannot exist among sighted people. People do differ in color and appearance, and human beings will see these differences. These variations are part of the richness of the human species. What to make of the differences– how to act– is something different.

"Race" and color are real influences in the world and the basis of group identities. To ignore the role that identity plays, even identity based on an artificial or arbitrary construct such as "race" or "color," is to deprive people of their history, culture or sense of place and the ability to celebrate part of themselves.

The term "color-blindness" is sometimes used as a metaphor to make the point that color should not govern relationships between individuals or institutions. But invoking the metaphor does not provide guidance about how to achieve a fairer, more inclusive social order or how to transform a color-coded power hierarchy to promote respect for diversity. The metaphor is not an action plan. As Clarence Lusane observes in *Race in the Global Era*, "The ideology of color blindness is a smoke screen for a more dangerous and disturbing mission ... Underneath the progressive notion that race is a social construct and should not matter is an insistence that race will not matter even in circumstances where racial inequities prevail, that is, color blindness becomes racial blindness."

Interacting, Interconnected Forces

There is debate in Brazil, South Africa and the United States over whether inequality comes from "racism" or "class." Proponents of the "class" not "race" school of thought assert that people of African descent are poor because they are poor and lack education, resources and other means by which to gain greater power and privilege. This, of course, does not explain why so many of the poor are Black in the first place.

These arguments about "race" or "class" or "gender" miss a crucial, central point. In the real world, all of these factors interact, overlap and influence outcomes depending upon the circumstances. Thus, there is no one solution or cause to the problems confronting people of African descent. To advance the status of people mired at the bottom of the social, economic and political hierarchy, both anti-discrimination and anti-poverty measures are needed.

Discrimination in these countries will be uprooted only when strong anti-discrimination laws and policies are enforced to make victims whole. Such laws and policies are needed to discourage biased acts, punish those who discriminate, educate those who harbor false ideas about White supremacy and restructure arrangements that unfairly favor one group at the expense of others.

Uprooting poverty and related disadvantage is a necessary companion effort. Poor people, especially those who are stigmatized by their "skins" and/or gender, need access to a range of compensatory policies and opportunities– better education, employment and training, health care, housing, basic services and political power. No matter how problems of disadvantage are defined for people of African descent and appearance– both types of strategies are needed. The only inappropriate and inadequate response to Black disadvantage is to do nothing at all.

Downside of Racial Progress

As people of African descent and appearance become more visible and affluent, Whites can more easily construe the success of a few Blacks as proof that racism and discrimination do not exist. Gloria Steinem, a member of the International Working and Advisory Group, notes, "All some Whites need to see is one Black man in a Mercedes to become convinced that there is no problem of racism." Perception can be more powerful than reality.

In all three countries, Blacks have begun to have a small presence in many sectors and fields from which they have been heretofore largely absent. This is a positive development. But it also means that Blacks will have more venues in which to experience and combat discrimination and more difficulty reaching consensus about where priorities for group activism lie.

To be sure, the growth in the number of better educated, more affluent Blacks means that people of African descent or appearance, as a group, will have more leverage, resources and power than ever before. However, divisions within Black communities in these countries are a real and present challenge. "Divide and conquer" is an old stratagem that retains power in new forms to weaken group resolve to work for change. Professor Christopher Edley Jr. of Harvard University reminds us: "With success, however limited, and the move to become part of the establishment, the revolutionary zeal, the true progressivism that seeks to challenge and change the establishment, becomes compromised."

The increasing isolation of the Black poor from their more affluent counterparts of all races in Brazil, South Africa and the United States has serious consequences for future efforts to combat racism and improve the lives of those living at the margins. It has become fashionable in some circles in the United States to assert that the problems of the Black poor are attributable to the movement of the Black middle class out of poor communities. Such assertions usually are made to suggest that the problems of isolation of the Black poor were caused by and can only be solved by the Black middle class. This is an implicit endorsement of segregated housing and neighborhoods. The fact that White flight usually precedes Black in migration is overlooked. Both Blacks and Whites must find the solution to the isolation of the African American poor.

Black Lives and Identities

Who is there to write the stories of the victims? Such stories will show not only pain and suffering at the hands of White oppressors but the pains and joys experienced in piecing together shattered lives. The opposite of "the story of depraved perpetrators is not necessarily the story of abject cowering and wretched victims. On the contrary, the stories of the victims are the stories of victors inheriting a new land, and in the process, embracing difficult contradictions. How is it that such people, who have suffered so much, continued to strive for coherent lives, raising families, building communities, striving for personal ends? How is it that they were able to forgive some of the assassins? Surely, life testimonies of this nature have the considerable potential to inform a new moral and value system in our country. It is this that offers over the depraved the promise of redemption.

Njabulo S. Ndebele
presentation at CHRI consultation



Crime and Responsibility

In each of these countries, crime is a problem. While "white-collar crime" remains largely the domain of affluent Whites, "street crime," often inspired by drugs, economic hardship, troubled families or lack of opportunity, is associated with poverty– and disproportionately with Black people. It is also the case that the primary victims of street crime committed by Blacks are other Black people.

Whites often register fear of street crime as a reason efforts to desegregate communities or build support for social policies for the direct benefit of people of African descent are not sympathetically supported. This is short-sighted and unfair. As author Ellis Cose responds:

These days no serious thinker in the field of criminal justice would propose that the answer to violent crime among whites is for up-and-coming white executives to make crime prevention their special mission....To contend that we should penalize all members of a racial or ethnic group because some members are engaged in egregious behavior is to enter into a pact with the devil whose evil has no end.

In Brazil, South Africa and the United States, since Blacks are the primary victims of street crime, they are vitally interested and engaged in efforts to combat it. Many Whites are disinclined, however, to support funding for better schools and housing, youth recreation, rehabilitative and training efforts, employment, and other services that would help people of African descent reduce crime and have safer living conditions. Nor are they sensitive to police abuse of Blacks, racism and discrimination in the administration of justice, and the threat that such conduct poses to efforts to promote respect for the rule of law.

Men and women of all "races" have an interest in preventing all types of crime, including freeing their sons from the violence too often associated with false ideas of "masculinity" and their daughters from the tolerance of domestic violence too often expected of women, even when they are its victims. And it must be remembered that racism– the negation of others' humanity and well-being– is one of the most pernicious forms of violence, violence to another's personhood.

Creating a Virtuous Circle of Change

Gunnar Myrdal noted that many processes and factors in societies contribute to a hierarchy of power based upon race, gender, color or appearance. These factors interact and interlock to create a downward spiral of suffering, disadvantage and poverty– a "vicious circle." By the same token, when interventions are made at any point in a vicious circle, they may have catalytic effects on a variety of factors to create a "virtuous circle." In these three countries, there have been and are many ongoing efforts to create such a virtuous circle of change:

Securing a baseline of legal equality and effective remedies for discrimination. Law shapes relations between and among groups and institutions, and can be a source of liberation and resources, if used deftly to deter and punish discrimination and/or promote inclusion of historically disadvantaged groups. Government policies such as affirmative action or corrective action, targeted resources for communities in need and fair law enforcement can help balance power more equitably between Blacks and Whites and rich and poor.

Promoting access to educational opportunities. "Education is the great equalizer," wrote Horace Mann. This is more true today than ever before. Advancement and economic well-being in the modern world are increasingly dependent upon having sophisticated, technological skills in order to compete. For this reason, efforts to address disparities in the funding of education, curriculum reform, teacher training, access to technology, safe schools and helping students who need it the most are matters of highest priority. As the American economist Lester Thurow observes:

> *A successful knowledge-based economy requires large public investments in education, infrastructure, and research and development. . . .For individuals, here are three words of advice: skills, skills, and skills.*

All of us are teachers in the sense that our lives intersect with others who see, hear and sometimes emulate what we do. Better and fairer relations among groups will emerge only when we teach and demonstrate tolerance and compassion, and help young people escape from the hobbling effects of racism too prevalent among their elders.

Gaining access to economic, entrepreneurial, employment and training opportunities. These strategies must be pursued to improve living conditions for people of African descent or appearance and redress imbalances in power between and among groups. The domestic and international business and investment sectors need to demonstrate decisive, visible leadership in making equitable development and diversity a priority. Leaders must be willing to experiment with new ways to accommodate expanded workforce diversity, implement programs to encourage a genuine "meritocracy," and reward managers who undo old systems of exclusion. It is a matter of the "bottom line."

Using political power and participation. Influencing policy development and electing candidates of choice is a fundamental way of harnessing public power to promote equity. While political power has limits and its reach and capacity to undo racism should not be oversold, it is a means of enabling people to shape the policies and values that will govern their lives and those of their neighbors and to rivet attention on the duties and obligations of all to work together for the common welfare.

Challenging the media to provide better and more in-depth coverage of issues, needs and contributions made by people of African descent or appearance. The media can help to undercut stereotypes, present more accurate pictures of groups unfamiliar with one another and gain public support for and understanding of the need to overcome discrimination and poverty. The media are not neutral bystanders to race relations. They interact with, shape and amplify inter-group perceptions, beliefs and policies. Media companies are at their best when they illuminate, rather than titillate, and when their leaders consciously strive to promote balance in coverage and inclusion in staffing and readership. International Working and Advisory Group member Shaun Johnson notes: "Editing recently a newspaper in Cape Town, I had to ask: How are we going to bring people from the majority into the newspaper? Affirmative action is not an academic subject for us. It's every single morning."

Appealing to moral authority. Religious leaders have a special role in support of reformation of attitudes, policies and practices grounded in prejudice and discrimination. Racism and discrimination violate fundamental precepts of faith traditions around the world. Religious institutions and their leaders have often been the voice of conscience and fairness in these countries and need to revivify their leadership on matters of racial and social justice. Brazil, South Africa and the United States need a worthy moral compass to chart a positive future course.

Using the arts to speak to our sensibilities as human beings. The arts reach hearts and transform ideas, minds and our sense of self. They can build bridges between and among communities. Through artistic expression, film, dance, music, drama, poetry, literature, visual media and others– people can be drawn together to see and appreciate the gifts of diversity and our shared humanity.

Engaging, supporting and promoting the use of human rights values and instruments. This is the wave of the future. Globalization is creating new imperatives to fashion international responses to the constellation of economic, social and economic problems affecting people and nations. International approaches and organizations are complementing national efforts to end discrimination and inequality based on race or color, gender and other superficial characteristics.

Individuals and institutions of civil society are involved in all of these efforts, often pressing government, business, and other sectors for better and more effective responses to social ills such as racism, sexism and poverty. These institutions take diverse forms: trade unions, religious institutions, colleges and universities, consumer organizations, civic organizations, public interest law and policy institutions, and professional associations, among others. All constitute a means to help people of all walks of life participate in making the decisions that affect their lives and promote substantive democracy.

Susan V. Berresford, president of the Ford Foundation, describes five lines of work in which the Foundation is involved to address racism and inequality in Brazil, South Africa and the United States:

- Challenging myths about group difference and disadvantage;
- Helping people establish links between the need for change and ideals embodied in domestic and international instruments;
- Opening up systems and institutions to create opportunities;
- Helping to promote awareness of and to preserve the artistic and cultural contributions of excluded groups; and
- Supporting organizational change efforts.

This agenda, if embraced by other civil society institutions, governments and businesses, could make a significant contribution to efforts to move beyond racism.

Unfortunately, many civil society institutions, government agencies and businesses reflect antiquated and exclusionary social mores and practices. They need to explore ways of becoming contemporary, more inclusive, and representative of all segments of their nations. They cannot lead efforts to overcome racism, sexism, discrimination and other forms of disadvantage if they do not themselves embody their nations' tapestry of diversity.

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Affirmative Action

Affirmative action or "corrective action," as it is termed in South Africa, has become a subject of contention and considerable misunderstanding in all three countries. People argue about the legitimacy and effects of using "race" to target remedies. Opponents charge that affirmative action "balkanizes" people, is an act of "reverse discrimination," elevates "race" over merit and stigmatizes beneficiaries. Proponents counter that racial disparities and unequal treatment are the real divisions between individuals and groups that affirmative action attempts to remedy. Supporters also assert that corrective actions create inclusive environments for people with comparable abilities and fair measures of merit, where heretofore "white skin" was a main requirement for the enjoyment of opportunity.

Affirmative action is a concept that subsumes many different types of policies, programs and efforts— both voluntary and legally mandated— to correct the effects of individual or systemic discrimination. It is designed to "make whole" diverse groups, including women and/or persons of African descent, to foster integration. Since no solution to centuries-old societal discrimination will be perfect or without downsides, the question is whether, on balance, the benefits of affirmative action measures to redress racial discrimination outweigh potential costs.

We think that they do. Data in the United States establish that affirmative action has played a signal role in opening up opportunities for African Americans, women of all races, Latinos, the disabled, Asian Americans and others. And despite continuing criticism, affirmative action programs and policies continue in force in the United States. Increasing numbers of employers, for example, support the diversity in workforce composition that affirmative action inspires, noting that it promotes innovation and creativity of value in the competitive global economy.

Affirmative action is not a panacea for all of the ills created by discrimination. In South Africa, the enormous scale of what economist Francis Wilson calls the "hidden economic inheritance"— the aftermath of apartheid's state-imposed poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, crime and despair— reveals the limitations of relying on affirmative action as the sole method of change. Neville Alexander asserts that his fellow citizens have a "right to insist on historical redress rather than affirmative action— a secular transfer of resources from those who have dominated to those who have been dominated." It is an insistence on "a survivor's justice."

Fashioning an argument akin to Alexander's, professor john a. powell notes that while affirmative action in the United States has benefits, it uses a paradigm of victim and victimizer as its warrant and to delimit the scope of the remedy provided. "Transformative action," a concept proposed by powell, by way of contrast, would shift the focus from specific "identifiable victims" to the broader array of anti-democratic and anti-meritocratic structures and policies that sustain patterns of white dominance and black disadvantage. "Transformative action... must expose and address both racial subordination and privilege," powell says, "and therefore dismantle racial hierarchy."

In Brazil, South Africa and the United States, where poverty and race intersect profoundly, affirmative action can be an important, effective tool. It is one of many types of remedies needed to combat discrimination and release the talents of all of the people in these three nations.



SIX GLOBAL TRENDS

Amid the current dynamics of "race" and racism, six emerging global forces are vying to shape the future. While some threaten to divide and impoverish, properly directed, these forces offer new possibilities to increase social justice and enlightened self-interest. They are creating the outlines of a future in which norms of inclusion and interdependence will become economic and practical necessities.

- Global economy and technological revolution
- International human rights movements
- Democratization
- Demographic shifts
- Women's global leadership movements
- Peace and reconciliation movements

Global Economy and Technological Revolution

Around the world, technology and economic trends are creating a more integrated, dynamic and interconnected world and a "global economy" that is growing by leaps and bounds, creating new transnational markets for financing and consumption and a new global movement of labor, capital, equipment and knowledge. Since 1980, for example, the volume of international monetary transactions has grown by more than 2000 percent. Each day an average $[illegible] is transferred across national boundaries.

Technology-based industries are driving international economic growth. New technical knowledge and skills are becoming a minimum requirement around the world for everyone—from assembly line worker to [illegible], from secretary to CEO. Recently, the World Bank declared that "knowledge has become perhaps the most important factor determining the standard of living..."

Current trends provide only a partial outline of the future global economy. The potential for both benefits and dangers looms large. On one side, the globalizing economy can spread ideas, ideals, information and innovations rapidly among nations. It can raise standards of living across the globe by deepening trade and investment in the world's poorer regions.

Two Perspectives on Globalization's Downside

What is government's strategy? Globalization has forced the country to adjust, as has the pressure on us by the International Monetary Fund. Brazil is paying its foreign debt — but we have a huge internal debt, too. It is the largest in our history, and there is not the political will to tackle it. Instead, the government believes simply that the way forward is to let economic growth and the free market diminish social inequality. It is opening up the country to foreign capital and to privatization. These will only make things worse for the socially excluded.

Benedita da Silva, presentation at CHRI Consultation

Globalization poses a new and modern danger. It is ironic that the very moment when political forces in South Africa move toward equality, economic forces of globalization are moving toward greater inequality. Jimmy Carter made a speech in Johannesburg last year and said that the greatest new force to contend with, as we move into the 21st century, is globalization. "We are going to have to see how we can shape globalization to our benefit," he said.

Francis Wilson, presentation at CHRI Consultation

At the same time, to maximize profits, global companies can more easily shift jobs and investments away from nations that protect workers and their environment to countries operating with few safeguards. Some studies suggest the global economy has helped widen inequality by rewarding a relatively small number of highly skilled workers and entrepreneurs while poorly trained workers and the unemployed fall behind. These ill effects are particularly troubling for Brazil, South Africa and the United States, where inequality in income, wealth and power between Blacks and Whites is already pronounced.

Free global markets also can experience "free fall." For example, the economic crisis in 1997 began in Asia and spread rapidly. It returned millions of Asian and Russian workers to poverty, cut in half the total value of Brazilian stocks, caused South Africa's stock market to decline by almost a third, and sharply increased consumer prices, unemployment and international debts in Brazil, South Africa and several other industrializing nations.

While presenting divergent prospects and options, both the opportunities and dangers of a global economy suggest a shared future. Different nations– and different people within the same nation– are becoming more interdependent. As countries compete and cooperate in global markets, they are sharing more common interests and problems.

With technology-driven movements of capital and work, nations will increase their growth and productivity in the new global economy only as they develop comparative, economic advantages stemming from higher levels of education and skill among most workers. In the future, the engines of economic growth will be productivity and innovation, which will enlarge only as nations improve the knowledge and skills of an inclusive workforce.

As the global economy grows, the economic costs of racism will become more evident and significant for everyone in nations like Brazil, South Africa and the United States. In the past, these costs have been measured primarily in terms of denied opportunities for victims of racial discrimination. It was possible for Whites and others to benefit from the availability of cheap labor when the nations' economies were rooted in and driven by low-skill and agrarian pursuits. This is no longer the case.

Racism's effects on the productive capacity of Brazil, South Africa and the United States are already substantial. Based on a past model developed by the President's Council of Economic Advisors, international economist Jonas Zoninsein estimates that all three nations could gain a combined increase in economic productivity equal to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the world's 15th largest economy by uprooting racial discrimination.

This is only a rough approximation, but it brings into focus an undeniable fact: past and current racism in the areas of education, training and employment diminishes an entire nation's economic, competitive capacity. Racism remains a tool of economic privilege for Whites to exploit Blacks, but it is not an effective method for advancing an entire nation's economic development.

The Benefits of Equitable Social and Human Development

Because of global competition, people of all "races" in Brazil, South Africa and the United States will increasingly suffer the economic costs of exclusion when people of African descent remain poor, unemployed, underemployed and undereducated. For this reason, equitable social and human development is a basic standard for future human progress and increasingly an essential strategy for long-term economic development.

Economic growth is an important means for national development and human welfare– not an end unto itself. Brazil's President Fernando Henrique Cardoso puts the matter eloquently: "Inherent in the ideal of progress is equity, seen as the convergence of standards of equality of opportunities– or social justice."

"Social development is good economics" and "social programs are superb investments in future economic growth," declares economist Nancy Birdsall, former director of the World Bank's policy research division. Voicing the analysis of an increasing number of economists around the world, Birdsall concludes that investments in the health, education, sanitation and nutrition of the poor lead to "higher income and more economic growth– and to more education, health of this generation and the next."

In this new era of global interdependence, the poverty, poor health and under-education of people of African descent in the United States, Brazil and South Africa are economic liabilities. The development of their talents and skills is a matter of national interest, economic necessity, and fundamental fairness. In the decades ahead, the global economy will reinforce what our collective morality affirms: Everyone is better off when altruism, considering and treating others with fairness, is a decisive factor in economic life.

Inclusion and Diversity Are Good Business

As operating business values, inclusion and diversity are important to corporate success in the global economy. Xerox Corporation chairman Paul Allaire states, "Workforce diversity…adds value to our business." Robert D. Haas, chairman of Levi Strauss & Company, adds, "Race relations remains a critical factor…."

A diverse workforce also can create a more productive and dynamic workforce. "Companies with strong records for developing and advancing minorities and women," noted the United States government's Glass Ceiling Commission in 1995, "will find it easier to recruit… Companies whose cultures are hospitable to minorities and women will find it easier to retain those employees" without the high costs of excessive recruitment and turnover.

Diversity can improve the bottom line by helping to promote innovation, attract new business and establish new markets at home or abroad. While diversity doesn't automatically work, empirical studies agree that business "creativity thrives on diversity." In a 1999 global survey, a majority of chief executives ranked "multicultural experience" as the most important trait for their managers.

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The emergence of significant, diversely populated markets for goods and services within the United States, Brazil, and South Africa– and throughout the world– makes racial diversity a premium tool for understanding and developing new markets. One estimate projects that non-Whites will constitute three-fourths of the potential growth in consumer markets around the world over the next half-century.

Government Has a Role

"The first requirement of government," writes U.S. Assistant Secretary of Labor Bernard Anderson, "is to adopt economic policies that support the steady, balanced growth which is essential to reducing income inequality in a market economy." While respecting free markets, government economic policies will need to encourage inclusion as a profitable economic asset, punish racial discrimination as morally wrong and assure national investments in future human capital and social development for their nations to compete internationally for goods, services, capital and trade.

Governments form the front line. At all levels, they possess the power to make and enforce laws, to establish priorities and set policies, to adjudicate disputes fairly, and to amplify or muffle the voice of the people. In matters pertaining to race and opportunity, governments can be either liberating or oppressive– but rarely only neutral.

Global Demographic Changes

Changes in human migration and population shape the world in ways governments and economies cannot. In the next century, they will create new imperatives to undo racism and reduce inequality between peoples of European and African descent in Brazil, South Africa and the United States.

Migration

Approximately 100 million people today live in countries where they were not born. A fifth of the globe's migrants are refugees, but the vast majority are human beings seeking better work and wages to provide for their families. In the United States, one out of every 10 persons among 276 million people is foreign-born. In South Africa, the number of immigrants is unclear, but disputed estimates range from a half million to 4 million people. They include permanent immigrants, war refugees and the largest group, unauthorized workers. In Brazil, immigration remains only a small part of the vast nation's changing demography, although internal migration has helped to transform the country from rural to urban. Forty years ago, 55 percent of Brazilians lived in rural areas. Today, less than 20 percent live there.

Population

As the new century begins, the Earth will be home to more than 6 billion people. It took almost 4,000 years for humankind to produce the first billion. It took only 12 years to add the most recent billion. Although the world population growth rate has begun to slow, it remains almost twice as high in the developing world, including Brazil and South Africa, than in industrialized countries such as the United States. People of African descent generally have a higher birthrate than Whites who, as a group, live longer. In South Africa, for instance, the birthrate among Africans is three times higher than that of Whites.

New Demographic Imperatives for Racial Interdependence

These trends will change the face of each nation. By the end of the 21st century, Whites will not likely be a numerical majority in Brazil or the United States and Africans will remain the overwhelming majority in South Africa. In each nation, a growing number of the reduced White population will be elderly, while most new, young workers will be non-White.

These changes will affect economic and social relationships. In 1998, there were 3.4 workers for every retiree in the United States. Within 40 years, because of population changes, the ratio is expected to drop to 1.8 workers for every one pensioner. This ratio is of critical importance to America's future elderly since current workers pay taxes to finance the government's existing Social Security programs and universal health care for the aged. It explains why both the U.S. Social Security system and Medicare are projected to face bankruptcy in little more than 30 years. This declining ratio also threatens private pensions and individual retirement plans, since they depend on the U.S. companies' growing earnings and stock prices.

The mathematics also embody a racial division. The majority of retirees in 2040 will be White. Most of the new American workforce will be non-White. Within 40 years, each non-White worker on average must possess the productivity and earnings of almost two current workers to sustain existing benefit levels for future White Social Security beneficiaries.

Economic Inequality

Steady economic growth stimulates job creation and tight labor markets, which lead to higher wages as employers compete for workers. By steady economic growth I mean a rate greater than [illegible] percent per annum. In addition, there are many secondary effects of strong growth which reduce income inequality. One is that the bargaining power of trade unions to negotiate wage increases will be strengthened. Another is the greater likelihood that the government will be able to raise minimum wages. Any negative employment effects from raising the minimum wage will be ameliorated by strong economic growth. Also, in a growing economy, workers tend to transfer from the informal to the formal market economy.

Other benefits flow from steady, balanced economic growth. Public revenues that might be used to invest in human capital tend to be higher because of increased tax collections. Human capital investment tends to increase worker productivity which, in turn, increases the income earning capacity of the workforce and leads to higher wages. For all these reasons, a steadily growing economy narrows the earnings gap between higher and lower wage segments of the workforce.

The relationship between economic growth and the reduction of income inequality is not just theoretical but is based on actual United States experience. African Americans bear a relationship to the American economy much like that of the caboose on the train. When the train speeds up, the caboose speeds up, and when the train slows down, the caboose slows down. But in the natural order of things, the caboose never catches up with the engine. Economic growth reduces income inequality, but economic growth alone won't produce a desirable level of parity in the distribution of income. Something more is required: specific government policies designed to reduce income inequality directly. In other words, if market forces simply take their course, income inequality will decline but not enough to achieve a desirable level of equality in the distribution of income among people of different racial groups.

Those who insist that government [illegible] [illegible] market forces will solve the problem fail to take into account the pervasive impact of racism. Racism denies people the opportunity to develop and use their talents to contribute to society. Racism blocks access to a good education, a good paying job, starting a business, and participating in the growth of the economy. Although some degree of economic inequality is necessary in a market economy, economic inequality should not be based on race. The goal of the government through public policy should be to eliminate economic inequality.

Bernard Anderson
[illegible]

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In South Africa, demographic trends will create a different social order but a similar economic relationship between the elderly (both African and Whites) and young Africans. Today, people over age 60 are the fastest-growing group among South Africans. One out of seven White South Africans is 60 or older, compared with one out of every 20 Africans. By 2025, one out of every four Whites will be 60 or older, in comparison with one out of every 12 Africans.

These changing ratios mean that, within three decades, South Africa's declining workforce– comprised mostly of young African workers– will need to climb to productivity and earning levels that can support private and public pensions for almost twice as many White and African elderly as today.

Aging trends also threaten to aggravate Brazil's pension problems, already a primary cause of the nation's current financial crisis. Despite a rising number of elderly, Brazil's pension systems are inequitable. In [illegible] 3 million government pensioners received almost as much money as 18 million retirees from private employment. At the same time, payroll taxes for Social Security in Brazil have become as high as 20 percent of [illegible] with the highest [illegible] benefits.

Beginning in [illegible] the federal government incurred a deficit of [illegible] million per month for Social Security benefits. In some deficit-burdened state governments, pension costs account for as much as 20 percent of total revenues. Pension deficits are the largest single item in Brazil's national deficit.

Women's Health and Reproductive Rights

Demographic and women's [illegible] linked. But women's [illegible] too often go unmet, and health [illegible] neglect are devastating [illegible] low economic status of Black women [illegible] levels of infant and maternal mortality [illegible] especially vulnerable. [illegible] important part of any strategy to [illegible] racial equality, promote development [illegible] demographic trends described [illegible]



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Lasting reforms in Brazil's pension systems have proven to be politically difficult. In democratic Brazil, poor workers no longer are willing to be left out of existing Social Security systems, and government beneficiaries are equally unwilling to have coverage or benefits reduced. Yet any political solution will have only a temporary, limited effect if the nation ignores demographic imperatives. Even with a reformed pension system, Brazil's elderly will continue to grow in numbers at a much higher rate than in the past. Unless young Brazilian workers (increasingly non-White) have the education, good health, and skills to generate new levels of national productivity and taxable income, Brazil's pension-related deficits today will likely cause another financial crisis in the future.

In each of the three nations, demographic trends raise two pivotal questions: First, will the predominately non-White workforce of the next century possess sufficient health, education, skills and training to drive a productive and expanding economy that can adequately underwrite the growth of public and private pension funds for a disproportionately large number of White retirees? Second, will the predominately non-White voting-age population in each country be willing to support such pensions for the older White population?

These questions bluntly reveal the new realities of interracial, intergenerational dependence. They bring to the kitchen table of every home in Brazil, South Africa and the United States the new imperative for equitable social investments in young people of African descent.

International Human Rights Movements

The concept that all sentient beings have "human rights" and are entitled to equal treatment and protection is one of the great, transformative ideas of our time. It expresses a common standard of what is expected of all governments and people in an increasingly interdependent world. Finding ways to comply with international human rights standards and values is now part of the world of commerce and international relations as well. As globalizing forces gain strength, issues related to governance, rights and regulation among nations, individuals and groups will require greater attention.

The concern for racial justice is one of the cornerstones of the international human rights movement. Following decades of struggle, the General Assembly adopted the United Nations Charter and, in 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a worldwide response to racism and genocide. For the first time, most of the world's nations recognized that a society's gross mistreatment of its own people posed an international danger that could override national sovereignty.

Through reliance upon and use of international standards, the human rights movement serves as a force to counter racism and offers anti-racist movements forums and mechanisms to expose systematic, racist practices and rally public and private support for change. By the late 1980s, for instance, the United Nations was fully engaged in efforts to end apartheid in South Africa, while governments and people around the world protested and promoted enactment of sanctions. While South Africans who resisted apartheid were the agents of its demise, the international human rights movement formed a circle of vital support.

In the new South Africa, international standards of human rights are woven into the national constitution to incorporate a wide range of civil, political, economic and linguistic rights. The preamble to the new constitution begins with these words: "We, the people of South Africa, recognize the injustices of our past ... and believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it united in diversity." South Africa today represents perhaps the world's most significant experiment in how human rights and racial justice can be a nation's fundamental guide.

The important bond between human rights and racial justice is also evident in Brazil. With the adoption of Brazil's National Programme on Human Rights in 1997, "for the first time in the history of the Republic ... human rights are now assumed as official government policy" and "the Brazilian State is treating racial inequalities as a specific national issue of relevant importance to the nation" as a whole. This program emerged from a combination of influences: renewed Afro-Brazilian activism, exceptional presidential leadership by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, growing disapproval of continuing human rights violations and the expanding strength of Brazil's civil society. In addition, racism and human rights in Brazil have been a continuous focus of international scrutiny and discussion over the last several years.

Although the United States has urged other nations to comply with human rights standards, within the country itself the international human rights movement has played a secondary role. In the coming century, it will likely have a more direct impact. It can add new perspectives to the American meaning of human rights and racial justice, based on world standards, and help pierce the nation's age-old habit of assuming that international standards apply everywhere except within America's borders.

In the new century, human rights will be a significant part of the global context for promoting efforts to address racism and sexism. This will encourage the development of new mechanisms for enforcing human rights. The effort to use international human rights standards to hold Chile's former President Pinochet or Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic accountable for crimes against humanity are examples of what may lie ahead.

As a global imperative in the new century, human rights embody a yearning of people around the world to treat their brothers and sisters as themselves. As Archbishop Desmond Tutu observes:



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No matter how long and how repressive…unjust and undemocratic rule turns out to be, the urge for freedom remains as a subversive element threatening the overthrow of rigid repression….Freedom will break out. People are made for it just as plants tend toward the light and toward the water.

Women's Global Leadership

Overcoming centuries of sexual exploitation and abuse, women of all races have made significant strides toward building a global movement that is today "both an individual right and a community necessity." Women's movements are pursuing gender equality as a fundamental right, simple justice and one of the most effective means for improving an entire nation's standards of living and productivity across boundaries of country, race and ethnicity. In the 1980s and '90s, women's movements around the world succeeded in placing equal rights for women in a human rights context, especially due to a series of United Nations-sponsored women's conferences. Such efforts will increasingly lead nations to recognize both racism and sexism as "different masks of the same sorrow."

Women constitute a majority of the world's population, but as Pregs Govender, a member of South Africa's Parliament, notes, they also "form the majority of the unemployed, illiterate, homeless, poor, violated and most of those who care for the young, the old and the disabled." For this reason, South African activists and Idasa have developed the "Women's Budget," an alternative analysis of the national budget that examines how well the government is allocating resources to meet needs of women, especially Black women. In South Africa and elsewhere, the conditions and opportunities afforded to women are a true measure of how societies are addressing major structural problems of deprivation and exclusion.

In Brazil, South Africa and the United States, women leaders and activists come from diverse heritages, including both White and Black populations, and collaboration is sometimes a complicated undertaking burdened by the history of racism. Ana Maria Brasileiro, a member of the International Working and Advisory Group, observes:

Inside a single gender there is a relationship of subordination. This affects large numbers of women….[T]his raises a lot of questions about the inclusiveness of the women's movements and how to build alliances.

Most women of all races, however, recognize a level of kinship or interdependence in their struggles. In Brazil, South Africa and the United States, women of different races deal everyday with common problems and changes

Sisterhood

[T]he overlooked and most important factor in the power of women as a world political force is the magnitude of suffering combined with the magnitude of women: women constitute not an oppressed minority, but a majority of almost all national populations and of the entire human species. As that species approaches critical mass and the capacity to eradicate all life on the planet, more than ever before in recorded history, that majority of humanity now is mobilizing. The goal not only is to change drastically our own powerless status worldwide, but to redefine all existing societal structures and modes of existence.

– Robin Morgan, *Sisterhood is Global*

Global feminisms enable women worldwide to see themselves as part of a larger movement for change and to acknowledge and accept diversity of perspective, opinion, and priority. Furthermore, a global feminist movement can respond to increased state repression of women, as governments that have lost control over economic systems try to increase control over social and cultural systems, particularly women and families. All governments and cultures devalue women, accept their second-class status, allow the violation of their human rights, and seek to control their lives. These are the patriarchal values that women's movements must confront. The movement must bring women's ideas into society at large, and must bring feminists into the arenas where decisions are made about women's lives. These are the challenges of the feminist future.

– Leslie Wolfe and Jennifer Tucker,
The Challenge of Local Feminisms

including old and new attitudes about gender, reproductive rights, changes in family structure, urbanization, children's education, jobs and joblessness, the invisibility of labor within the domestic sphere, and the disproportionate responsibility to care for children and other family members. In addition, there is the reality of sexual violence, in and out of the home, prostitution, demeaning media imagery, and sexism in language and education.

Nations will achieve equitable economic and social development, sustainable population growth, genuine caring for children and the elderly, and non-violence in their homes and cultures only if they aggressively advance gender equity, which includes integration of traditionally "male" and "female" work spheres. Because of their central role in all aspects of national life, women will command increased attention in the next millennium.

Democratization

In recent decades, the collapse of communism and national struggles for freedom have spurred efforts by people to have democratic governance around the globe. As this century ends, more of the world's people live in at least nominally democratic states than ever before.

Democracy continues to grow in practice and as a global ideal because it offers the most available, powerful means for civil society to prosper and for dispossessed and oppressed people to help shape policies addressing their own needs. Democratic participation also remains the surest route for communities and citizens to enlarge their moral and civic agency. "Man's [sic] capacity for justice makes democracy possible," observed theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, referring in 1960 to all of humanity, "but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary."

Racism undercuts the vibrancy and vitality of democratic governance. "Racism has been the powerful ideology of imperialist policies since the turn of our century," observes philosopher Hannah Arendt. In South Africa, the brutal apartheid government's racial republic of unequals has been toppled, but it left behind vast deprivation and a complex legacy for democratic governance. Under White rule, poor Black South Africans had a civic duty that "focused on making the townships ungovernable," an effective method of resistance that helped to overturn apartheid. The nation now struggles to embed respect for law and governance into its social fabric, build strong institutions, and strike a new balance between democratic government and civil society institutions.

In Brazil, the myth of the great racial democracy continues to distort the meaning of both racism and democracy. Throughout much of this century, even Brazilian military dictators solemnly proclaimed their allegiance to a "racial democracy" while banning civil liberties and all Afro-Brazilian organizations. Today, emerging from its most recent period of military rule, Brazil remains a troubled, young democracy. Favelas have grown outside of urban areas with silent abandon. These vast settlements of the poorest citizens are accepted almost as inevitable and normal. Anonymous, paramilitary "death squads" have used murder and violence to keep the favela's street children out of commercial areas populated by affluent Whites and tourists. Reports of unchecked police force and violence, usually against the poor and non-Whites, are commonplace. More than the rule of democratic law, drugs, crime and violence are too often the governing terms of Brazil's favelas.

Today, leaders in the United States claim the nation as the world's oldest, continuing democracy, but, in truth, America did not become democratic until well into the 20th century when women, African Americans and other groups were legally accorded full rights of citizenship.

Racism continues to endanger America's democratic legitimacy and capacity. A new ecology of poverty has emerged in the United States' poorest areas, where conditions make it virtually impossible for many residents to find real options for self-sufficiency, much less advancement. Recently, the United States became the only democratic, technologically advanced nation where a majority of the poor are children. Like their South African and Brazilian counterparts in bantustans and favelas, these children are captives of rural and urban ghettos, where deprivation, dependency, isolation and violence rule. Their neighborhoods are governed more by drug gangs, police and a dysfunctional local economy than by democratic principles.

As the century ends, the social distance between most affluent Whites and many poor people of African ancestry, especially those in female-headed households, is both profound and disturbing in Brazil, South Africa and the United States. This separation is subverting the core concept of representation —accountability to the "governed" and equal treatment of all citizens. Among the three nations, only South Africa's democratic government appears today to understand the essential link between combating racism amid the poorest citizens and the success of democratic governance for all.

It does not, and cannot, matter in a globalizing economy that each nation's poor may be better off than the poorest elsewhere in the world. Nor does it matter that each nation's poor possess democratic rights denied to their forebears. Like everyone else, the poor measure the progress of their lives more by the status of their fellow

citizens than by the conditions of their own ancestors or another continent's population. This is a part of the human instinct that pushes democracy toward change and progress. Yet, as racialized and sexualized inequalities persist, poor people in Brazil, South Africa and the United States are finding it increasingly difficult to keep alive the hope of betterment and to participate in rational decision-making.

In the next century, racialized disparities will be a prime test for how global democracy can succeed. While democratic values and practices will continue to provide the best human terms for progress, democracy will reach its full force and promise only if it enables nations to replace social estrangement with social justice.

Peace and Reconciliation

Throughout the world, people of all shades and nationalities yearn for peace and reconciliation. It is a human desire rooted, as Cornel West of Harvard University suggests, in hope "whose power arises from the willingness of human beings to engage honestly in a struggle between radical good and radical evil within themselves and others."

Today, racism retains a ready potency for creating deadly conflict. As global distances shrink and international immigration grows, many nations are gaining new, unfamiliar populations whose cultures, languages or mere presence often appear to others as incompatible and even dangerous. These developments threaten to sharply escalate the world's deadly, inter-group conflicts which, as recent history demonstrates, frequently arise from racial or ethnic antagonisms.

Brazil, South Africa and the United States stand at the vortex of these worldwide trends. They represent the world's most important experiments in how open societies of diverse "races" can reconcile disagreements and human differences without violence. Their future will help determine in the coming century whether human diversity will be the engine of social progress or the basis for unremitting, social conflict.

Most nations do not have mechanisms for differing groups to recognize and understand one another or to face the contemporary consequences of a shared past. Around the globe, international tribunals and temporary truth commissions have been the most common means of the 20th century for dealing with the aftermath of some of the world's worst conflicts.



Cape Argus

The Nuremberg Tribunal after the Nazis' defeat in World War II was the first international effort to reconcile past violence by putting leaders on trial for their wartime actions. In recent years, the United Nations has expanded the reach of Nuremberg by authorizing creation of international courts to try individuals involved in genocidal violence in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. In 1998, more than 50 nations signed a treaty in Rome to create a permanent world court to try cases of genocide or systemic crimes against humanity. While important for the rule of law, these judicial bodies can only bring individuals to the bar of world justice after catastrophic conflict. They do not help a society's groups reconcile on just terms before violence becomes widespread.

Truth commissions are an attempt to uncover facts about a past governed through terror, propaganda and violence. At the close of the 20th century, South Africa represents the world's most comprehensive and ambitious experiment in a society's efforts for truth and reconciliation. After the demise of apartheid, the new government established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) with a unique mission to seek and share the truth about apartheid past and to reconcile Blacks and Whites for a workable, shared future.

With limited time and tools, the TRC attempted to create a deep, mutual understanding of the nation's tortured past among all South African people. At an Initiative meeting, TRC Vice Chair Alex Boraine noted that in all segments of his society, the "oppressed and oppressor alike, were imprisoned by the chains with which one group sought to bind the other." Boraine declared that true reconciliation was in everyone's best interest.

The TRC, however, has been attacked as a "witch hunt" by some of the nation's former political and military leaders. Some activists and intellectuals have also charged that TRC "obscured the truth" by focusing exclusively on apartheid's crimes and failing to expose the brutal consequences of its state-imposed poverty and misery.

In late October 1998, the TRC submitted its final report to President Nelson Mandela. After three years of operations, the TRC's voluminous statement of findings provides an eloquent and stunning rendering of the horrors of apartheid and of the complicity of White South African society in tolerating racial evil for ill-gotten, material gains. "Reconciliation does not wipe away the memories of the past...," the report concludes. "It understands the vital importance of learning from and redressing past violations for the sake of our shared present and our children's future... Reconciliation requires a commitment, especially by those who have benefited and continue to benefit from past discrimination, to the transformation of unjust inequalities and dehumanizing poverty."

In the United States, President William Clinton announced in late 1997 the creation of a Presidential Initiative on Race to lead a national conversation about race relations. Noted historian John Hope Franklin was appointed the Initiative's Advisory Board Chair, and the Board held public forums around the nation. In October 1998, less than a month before the issuance of the TRC's report, the Board released its final report. Its lengthy set of recommendations were "intended to preserve the integrity of the principles that lie at the core of our democracy, justice, equality, dignity, respect, and inclusion." By attempting to create a national, "reasoned dialogue and not divisive debate, that ultimately will ease the fault line caused by race," the Board hoped to cultivate the "seeds of racial healing."

In Brazil, as a part of the National Programme for Human Rights, President Cardoso formed an Interministerial Task Force to study and make recommendations about governmental responses to racial discrimination. This is an important first step. Still, truth telling in contemporary Brazil remains primarily the ad hoc work of courageous, persistent activists, a small number of Brazilian scholars and a handful of Afro-Brazilian public officials who face the challenge of bringing racism's victims out of silence. There are periodic, official commemorations of Brazil's era of African enslavement, but most Brazilians respond to these events as remembrances of a distant past with hardly any relevance to present policy or practice.

In all three nations, the limitations of truth telling reflect the difficulties of reconciling race and racism. Columbia University's Charles V. Hamilton suggests that a fundamental problem with truth telling is that "it is not so much the truths of the past that are in dispute, but whether such truths are really relevant to future policies of reconciliation." As Hamilton observes, a growing number of Whites in the United States– and, in fact, in the other two nations – tend to believe that remembering the past stalls their nation's future progress.

Truth telling about each nation's racial past is essential. It is not a direct route to peace and reconciliation. But it is a prerequisite. It is no substitute for social justice, but it is a precondition. Hence, in the new century, nations that abandon truth telling will risk enduring social tensions and civil conflict. These are the undisputed consequences of an unexamined past.

In the future, each nation will need to search for new, effective means to continue truth telling and reconciliation. Each must seek better ways to convey the real effects of the past to present realities. A diverse nation that fails to seek reconciliation and peace through truth telling will corrupt the core of its national morality and destroy its shared public memory. History and current events tell us that these are the nations that ultimately substitute force for reason, aggression for compassion, and might for right.

Our challenge in imagining and in realizing how to move beyond racism is an interdependent task involving personal, societal and global transformation. The world will not combat racism and discrimination effectively unless it progresses with the other parts of the equation for human goodness that have helped to define and create the emerging global consensus of this century. Human rights, democracy, free societies, peace and reconciliation, the advancement of women and other victims of prejudice and discrimination, the uprooting of poverty, the restoration of the sanctity of childhood– all are variously interwoven.

Together, these concerns animate activism and change, creating a force for global morality and collective interest in Brazil, South Africa, the United States and around the world.

On Truth Telling

I believe that truth telling does promote reconciliation. Truth telling has a better chance of promoting reconciliation than lies or deceit or denial. No genuine reconciliation is possible if we build on that foundation. Amnesia may be comforting, but in the end it will prevent reconciliation rather than promote it. There are deep wounds on the body politic, as well as on the minds and spirits and bodies of many individuals in this country. We need to acknowledge the wounds but have to go beyond this truth to the possibility of wounds being cleansed and closed and the victims being restored. It must be stressed as strongly as possible that reconciliation comes at a price. It is never cheap. It is always costly and it is always painful.

Alex Boraine
presentation at CHRI meeting

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

IN THEIR OWN VOICES

Hattie B. Dorsey's minister-father moved his family from New York to Atlanta when Hattie was 16 and the Civil Rights Movement was on the verge of becoming a national preoccupation. By 1971, when she left for new fields of service in California, the movement had rumbled through the South like a tornado and swept on to Chicago, Detroit, Boston, and other cities where racial discrimination was widely thought to be "the South's problem, not ours." After eleven years in the urban West and two more back in New York, Dorsey was persuaded to return permanently to Atlanta in 1984. "It felt more like home to me than any of the other places I had lived," she says. "It was as if I had been sent away to learn, and the time had come to go back and apply the lessons." She is now president and chief executive officer of Atlanta Neighborhood Development Partnership, Inc.

Even though I had spent my first 16 years in New York, it didn't take me long to start calling Atlanta my hometown, and I've gone right on doing that ever since. But I wasn't happy about coming here the first time. The segregation laws were a shock to me. I hated having to sit in the balcony at the Fox Theater, and things like that, but I didn't really understand what it was all about. Race was just becoming a public issue then. As a matter of fact we moved to Atlanta sometime between the *Brown* decision and the Montgomery bus boycott. None of that made much of an impression on me at the time. All I could think about was having to move away and leave my friends in New York.

Looking back on it years later, I was able to see two things very clearly. The first, obviously, was the injustice of forced segregation and protected White privilege, the hypocrisy of it, the waste.

The second was a sense of unity and community that so many African Americans showed inside the walls of segregation. We were all in there together, not only physically but emotionally, psychologically. There was a sense of unity in adversity, and we shared a common purpose: survival. Whatever problems we had—and we had plenty, of course—we were tight with one another, no matter whether we were rich or poor, day laborers or professionals. You saw cooks and housekeepers living on the same block as doctors and lawyers, and housing projects weren't thought of as bad places.

and people who lived in them weren't stigmatized. Segregation harmed everyone, Black and White– but it also forced us to build, support, and care for our own institutions.

What my work is all about now is recapturing that positive climate, regaining that sense of neighborhood and community– not by compulsion, of course, but by choice– with complete latitude to move in, out, up. Instead of running for the suburbs, we're focused on revitalizing old neighborhoods close to the center of the city. Only this time, the force that's driving it is not segregation, but a lot of positive things: economic development opportunities, the convenience of in-town living, neighborhood diversity, the charm of old architecture and craftmanship, the presence of sidewalks and big trees.

The future of America's cities depend on the redevelopment of their old neighborhoods through a partnership of corporate, philanthropic, and government interests. We're making some progress in the heart of Atlanta. People are beginning to see that if the heart isn't sound, the body won't last.

Charles V. Hamilton

Charles V. Hamilton barely remembers leaving Muskogee, Oklahoma, for Chicago in the middle of the Great Depression, when he was five. His parents were separated, and his mother took their three children to live with her brother. Without knowing it at the time, they had joined the greatest domestic migration in American history: the exodus of nearly two million African Americans from the South in the decades of depression and world war (1930-50). Eventually, Hamilton earned four degrees at universities in Chicago. He has taught in the social sciences at half a dozen American colleges and universities (retiring in 1998 from a chaired professorship in government at Columbia University in New York), and written several books, including a biography of Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, a textbook in American government, and *Black Power*, with Stokely Carmichael (Kwame Ture):

Except for a year in the army in the late 1940s, I had spent most of my time in school– Roosevelt University for my bachelor's, Loyola for a law degree, and the University of Chicago for a master's– before I went south to teach in 1957. The civil rights era was beginning to heat up in the wake of *Brown* and Montgomery [the U. S. Supreme Court ruling against segregated schools, and the bus boycott in the Alabama state capital that launched the career of Martin Luther King, Jr.]. I was 27, and intensely interested in racial bias issues. Remembering virtually nothing of my childhood in Oklahoma, on the border of the South, I went to the deep-south state of Alabama eagerly, with a real sense of mission.

My goal was to get to Tuskegee Institute, the famous school opened by Booker T. Washington in 1881, and after brief stops at a couple of other Black colleges, I made it there in 1958. The experience was everything I had hoped it would be, and more. A great social scientist, Dr. C. G. Gomillion, was there, and I worked closely with him, both on the faculty and in the Tuskegee Civic Association, an organization he formed to press for Black voting rights in the local community. He was an incredible human being, and that association with him was the most stimulating and important phase of my education up to that time. One thing it inspired me to do was return to the University of Chicago in 1960 to complete my Ph.D.

There are others reasons why Tuskegee had and still has a special place in my memory. It's where my wife is from, and where I first served as an advisor to the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and began a friendship with the late Stokely Carmichael. He asked me in 1966 to work with him on what was to become *Black Power*, and though we were far apart politically (he was much more revolutionary than I), we kept a strong and warm personal relationship from then until he died of cancer in 1998.

I must have seemed hopelessly moderate to him then, and I suppose he might have that assessment confirmed if we could be together now. I don't think he would share my present view of civil rights in America. You see, I've come to believe that the civil rights era, which lasted for about 25 years– from around the end of World War II through the 1960s– was a movement that succeeded. We defeated American apartheid, put an end to de jure segregation. It was a victory for everyone, Black and White and all others, and it turned this country around for good.

But what wasn't understood until much more recently was this: We won a battle, an important battle, but not the war. The struggle continues, and it won't be finished in our lifetimes. There can be no certain date when we truly will be beyond racism. We simply have to understand that it's a long, slow process. At first I thought the earlier victories went up in smoke in the late 1960s, and the sacrifices were all for naught. But now I think it's very important to acknowledge that a great battle was won in the movement, and it won't be reversed– it's just one step in the gradual diminution of racism and sexism in this country and around the world.

You run the risk of being criticized, and thought to be retrograde, when you say things like that. Some will whisper, "The old man is slipping– he's gone soft." I don't worry about that. I don't shrink from saying I'm more optimistic than I used to be, because I do see things moving, however slowly, in the right direction. It's a process. If you're in it for the long haul, you have to be vigilant, dedicated, constant. You can't afford to get too pessimistic or too optimistic. Patient persistence is not easy, but it's vital.

Elaine R. Jones

Elaine R. Jones traces the beginning of her education back to her family's kitchen table in Norfolk, Virginia. It was there that her mother, a school teacher, taught her father, a Pullman porter, how to read– and, at the same time, their children learned the value of words and ideas and the fine art of debate. "Our parents thought we could do anything," Jones recalls, "so it didn't seem strange to me then– or now– that I knew I wanted to be a lawyer by the time I was eight." That was in 1952, when segregation was entrenched and the postwar stirrings of Black protest had barely begun. Eighteen years later, Elaine Jones graduated from the law school of the University of Virginia– the first Black woman to do so– and soon thereafter she joined the staff of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund in New York (created 30 years earlier by Thurgood Marshall, who would eventually rise to the U. S. Supreme Court). Since 1993, Ms. Jones has been the LDF's director-counsel:

> I went to Turkey with the Peace Corps in 1965, right after I graduated from Howard University in Washington. I never was in the army, didn't serve in Vietnam– but I tell people that the University of Virginia Law School was my war, and my contribution. It steeled me for the challenges ahead. There weren't any other Black women there until my senior year, when my sister and two others came. No two ways about it– those were tough years, serious times. It was in the spring of my freshman year at the law school that Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy were killed. Riots, burning cities, political chaos– who could ever forget 1968?
>
> It's hard to believe that was more than 30 years ago. So much has changed since then, for better and worse. Without a doubt, there's been progress overall. I know I have many more avenues open to me than Thurgood Marshall did when he started the Legal Defense Fund in 1940. But look at the much larger size of our case load now: that ought to tell you something about the present state of racial and social justice in America.
>
> We inch ahead by fits and starts, by trial and error. Old hurdles fall away– Jim Crow segregation is gone– but subtle and sophisticated new forms of discrimination rise up to block the path to equal education, employment, justice. Too many African Americans and other targeted groups are marooned on the margins of this society. That's an unacceptable condition in the richest and most powerful country on earth.
>
> I almost went to work at a big law firm on Wall Street when I finished at Virginia, but it just didn't feel like the right direction for me, so at the last minute I backed

out. After all those years of saying I was going to be a lawyer, I knew very well that didn't mean I wanted to serve the rich and powerful. It had to mean that I wanted to work for people caught up in a daily struggle for survival in this society. So I came over here to LDF, and they put me to work with two other attorneys arguing death penalty cases all over the South. It must have been the right choice for me– I'm still here.

Going to South Africa, seeing Robben Island, where all the political prisoners were kept, meeting people and hearing so many stories of survival and endurance and courage in the struggle against apartheid, all of that was really inspiring to me. It helped me to put our own struggles in perspective.

People of African descent, wherever they happen to be in the world, are as competent, as vibrant and talented, as anyone else. All we really need is opportunity. I want to use my life to help create that opportunity.

I've got two things to offer: first, I understand how the law operates, and how it is often used to limit and control legitimate, lawful opportunities for Black people. My job, as I see it, is to remove those limits.

And the second thing is, I'm a very determined person. I never give up.

Sherry Magill

Sherry Magill has served since 1993 as executive director of the Jessie Ball du Pont Fund of Jacksonville, Florida, a private foundation with a primary focus on religious, educational, and social issues in the American South. She holds two degrees from the University of Alabama and a Ph.D. in American Studies from Syracuse University. In 1998, Dr. Magill and the du Pont Fund were prime movers in the staging a series of a major public conferences ("Unfinished Business: Overcoming Racism, Poverty, and Inequality in the South"). As an eight-year old in 1960, she had moved with her family from the Philippines (her father was in the U.S. Air Force) to a small town in Alabama. Over the next 16 years, that troubled state would have a profound and life-shaping influence on her:

> When people ask me where I'm from, I tell them I grew up inside a triangle connecting Birmingham, Montgomery, and Selma– three of the most important sites in American civil rights history. My childhood and youth, like that of all Southerners of my generation, was lived in full view of a human struggle to fulfill the promises of the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution. These are some of the

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events and images that dominated that decade of my awakening: bus boycotts and freedom rides, the police assault on demonstrators at the Edmund Pettis Bridge in Selma and the march from there to the State Capitol in Montgomery, Governor George Wallace's anti-integrationist stand in the schoolhouse door of the university that was to be my alma mater, the church bombing in Birmingham that killed four little girls, the race riot that erupted in my hometown, the racially-motivated stabbing that disrupted my high school graduation ceremony.

Thanks to the power of television and film, of newspapers and magazines, of the historian's pen, not to mention the power of memory itself– these events and images do not fade easily or quickly. Nor should they. As I have aged, I've come to understand that the accident of my birth as a White child allowed me to experience and witness these events from a safe vantage point. After all, it wasn't my life that was threatened; it wasn't my parents, or my sister or brother, who were laying down their lives. Most of the heroes of that time--the people who fought against oppression, who tried to breathe life into the ideals embedded in our founding documents– were not White like me. They were Black. And yet, I am a direct beneficiary of their sacrifice. They made this country a better place, and gave us all a story of endurance, commitment, and courage to hold up to the world.

It is now our obligation to keep telling the story, to learn anew from each telling, and to pass on to other Americans, new and old, the real lesson of it, which is this: Disaster lies in wait for an America balkanized and stratified along ethnic, racial and economic lines. We in the South should know that best of all, for it was tried here before, in this place that so many of us, Black and White alike, call home. The painful memory of our Civil War almost 140 years ago should tell us, above all Americans, the self-destructiveness and futility of segregation and discrimination. We must be the ones to make real the vision of a place that values and respects the contributions of all its people, that celebrates diversity, and that recognizes our cultural differences as strengths, not weaknesses.



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Studs Terkel

Studs Terkel grew up in an immigrant community on the streets of Chicago before the Great Depression, and has since made an indelible stamp on that teeming metropolis of the American Midwest. He has been, at one time or another, a lawyer, a labor activist, a disc jockey, a soap opera actor, a television master of ceremonies, a sports commentator, a minor star of stage and screen, a radio talk-show host, and, for more than sixty years, a noted writer whose oral history interviews have amplified the distinctive voices of thousands of rank-and-file Americans. One of his books, published in 1992, is *Race: How Blacks & Whites Think & Feel About the American Obsession*:

> The high visibility of such noted African Americans as Michael Jordan, Oprah Winfrey, Colin Powell and others obscures the persistent fact that in the daily course of American life, the Black is still the invisible man, as Ralph Ellison so tellingly portrayed him in his classic 1952 novel by that title.
>
> And we still hear haunting echoes from the lines of Langston Hughes in "The Dream Deferred." During the sixties, the dream, so long deferred, was by way of becoming an awakening. Marches, gatherings, voices from below, and a stirring of national conscience led to the passage of civil-rights laws. It appeared that this nation, White and Black, was on the threshold of overcoming. It seemed prepared, though stubbornly resisted in some quarters, to make the playing field more even. After all, the law was the law, and we prided ourselves on being a law-abiding society.
>
> What we hadn't bargained for, any of us, is how ignorant we are of one another's customs and values, how mindlessly disrespectful– and how hard it is to replace those old habits with newer and more inclusive attitudes of appreciation and acceptance. In order to read other people, to look inside them, you have to know them first. We could start simply by practicing some affirmative civility.
>
> And we need to look honestly at our history. In order for us, Black and White, to disenthrall ourselves from the harshest slavemaster, racism, we must disinter our

buried history. Only then can we cross the Slough of Despond. In John Bunyan's allegory, that stagnant bog was of the spirit– but it is, in an earthly sense, the same patch of swamp that separates slave state from free state. We are all the Pilgrim, setting out on this journey.

John Hope Franklin

John Hope Franklin is one of the most distinguished US historians of the twentieth century. Born in Oklahoma in 1915, educated at Fisk University and at Harvard, he has taught at such prestigious universities as Chicago and Duke, served in many national posts of professional leadership, and written extensively on the South, the African American minority, and the crucible of race in the United States. His celebrated one-volume history of the Black American experience, *From Slavery to Freedom*, has never gone out of print since it was first published in 1947. President Clinton chose Dr. Franklin in 1997 to serve as chair of One America: The President's Initiative on Race.

I was only sixteen when I enrolled at Fisk University [in Nashville, Tennessee] in 1931. Those college years still stand out in memory as a very meaningful and formative period of my life. I learned a lot there– more, in a sense, than I learned later as a graduate student at Harvard. I learned how to study, how to take on adult responsibilities, how to look at life. It was at Fisk that I found my bride– my wife for almost six decades. And, it was there that I began to learn some vital lessons about the pathology of racism– as, for example, in my junior year, when a mob of Whites took a Black man named Cordie Cheek out of a house on the edge of the Fisk campus and lynched him.

Personally and professionally– both as an American of African descent and as an historian– I have been challenged and engaged by the problems of racial injustice ever since those long-ago days of my youth. Without a doubt, race has been the paramount domestic issue in this nation's history.

For almost 200 years before the American Revolution, political and economic leaders, men of European origin, imposed here a culture of racial and ethnic privilege that was locked into virtually every facet of colonial society, to the perpetual disadvantage of all those who were not like them: the native people of the Americas, Africans forcibly imported as slaves, Jews and others seeking religious freedom, and eventually even some latter-day immigrants from Europe. Over time, these inequities came to be focused most particularly on Blacks, for several reasons: their large and rapidly increasing numbers, their identifiable appearance, the cumulative consequences of their lowly status, and of course the indelible stigma of slavery.

The revolution itself was a fight for national independence, not for human freedom. After the United States came into being as a new nation– sustained, ironically, by a soaring litany of egalitarian phrases– the whole theory of superiority and inferiority based on race was further refined and developed to rationalize the institution of slavery. This "birth defect" had inescapable consequences: the nation, thus divided against itself, could not stand, and stumbled in less than 80 years into civil war.

Slavery ended there– but tragically, not the theory of White supremacy or the assumption of White privilege. In fact, the worst was yet to come for the unchained Black minority after the end of slavery and war and a half-hearted attempt by the national government to "reconstruct" the racist and undemocratic society of the South. When the former slaves sought the equal protection of the laws, as promised in postwar amendments to the US Constitution, they were given instead a new theory by the highest courts of the land: "separate but equal" segregation.

It seems fair to say that this tragic development at the turn of the last century [1900] was the low point of life in this country for African Americans and others not favored by the WASP [White Anglo-Saxon Protestant] majority. The early years of the twentieth century were a time of lynchings, riots, religious bigotry, xenophobia, Ku Klux Klan terrorism, and pervasive exploitation of women, children, immigrants, and poor people in general. Not until after World War II would there be significant signs of change.

In 1954, the US Supreme Court handed down a unanimous ruling that overturned the "separate but equal" doctrine and opened the way for the civil rights movement and the many positive changes that have followed– legal, political, economic, social changes. I am by nature an optimistic person, and I certainly find hope and promise in all of these advancements against racism in the past half-century.

But curiously, our nation remains deeply divided in many ways– and it's not just White against Black. We see this rending of the social fabric affecting all racial and ethnic groups, socio-economic classes, religions, political ideologies– men and women, young and old. All this [illegible] misguided theory [illegible]

In the present [illegible] seem to believe [illegible] do anything about [illegible] so there's no point [illegible] them. I don't feel [illegible] the contrary, I think [illegible] time for people [illegible] country to be talk[illegible] openly about the [illegible] and the things that [illegible] fortunate to be [illegible] economic expan[illegible] precipitating forces [illegible] demonstrations [illegible] dominating the [illegible] We will never have a better time [illegible] to fulfill the promise of our de[illegible] ideals.

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

The Future Begins Today

I never lost hope that this great transformation would occur. Not only because of the great heroes I have already cited, but because of the courage of the ordinary men and women of my country. . . . No one is born hating another person because of the color of his skin, or his background, or his religion. People must learn to hate, and if they can learn to hate, they can be taught to love, for love comes more naturally to the human heart than its opposite. Man's goodness is a flame that can be hidden but never extinguished.

–Nelson Mandela

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Nelson Mandela, former President of South Africa, spent 27 years in prison before he emerged without bitterness or a desire to seek vengeance to lead his country into a future beyond racism. His example and words remind us of both our personal responsibilities and the global possibilities for human goodness.

The starkest finding of our review of Brazil, South Africa and the United States is the willingness of many people of European descent to sanction and engage in horrendous acts of inhumanity against persons of African descent when racial exploitation seems to benefit Whites as a group or is believed to be deserved and inevitable due to the depth of racism in the culture. Behind all of the beliefs, fears, confusion, disagreement and rationalizations stands the simple fact that many Whites have not cared about what happens to Blacks because it was more useful, profitable, expedient, or just possible not to care. Perceptions of self-interest have segmented the goodness in people's hearts, minds and actions.

The future is full of uncertainty. The potential of global economic trends to exacerbate inequality and promote conflict is real. Tensions between the more affluent nations of the North and those of the developing South are real. Ethnic and racial conflict can flare up and thrive whenever and wherever imbalances in power or perceived injustices go unredressed. Impoverishment and disregard can grow whenever greed is unchecked. Wherever there is uncertainty, political leaders may be tempted to appeal to human beings' baser instincts. Such times can bring out the "best or worst" in people, institutions and nations.

But each day marks a new beginning. Today, in Brazil, South Africa and the United States, the pendulum of change swings between exclusion and inclusion, sharing and selfishness, hatred and love. With each swing, there are new challenges, dangers, opportunities and choices to be made. Building on the struggles and progress of this century, we have the means to turn the corner of time toward a future beyond racism. It is now a question of will, struggle and organization for, as the words of Martin Luther King, Jr. remind us: "History is the long and tragic story of the fact that privileged groups seldom give up their privileges voluntarily."

We must work together to renew our moral imagination to see how life can be better for all people without the damage and menace of racism. We need to reach a new understanding of individual achievement and social responsibility. We must realize that our advancement as nations, groups or individuals is not a measure of true progress if it only serves to increase the social and economic distance between ourselves and others who fall behind.

Social change is nothing more or less than a mass movement of individuals. It is rarely linear and often comes in small increments over time. What each individual does to combat racism and discrimination is important. No one is without power or means to have a role in this transformation. Each of us has a circle of influence in our families, communities, places of business, churches or governments. We must find ways to use that influence strategically.

In the 20th century, prophetic minorities of people of all races, often isolated and going against the tide of popular belief and opinion, helped to bring into being an emerging global consensus supportive of human rights and against White supremacy and racism. They brought to us all a new awareness of our shared humanity and interdependence. They were people who, in theologian Cornel West's words, mustered "the courage to question the powers that be, the courage to be impatient with evil and patient with people, and the courage to fight for social justice. Such courage rests on a deep democratic vision of a better world that lures us with a blood-drenched hope that sustains us."

The work of these prophetic minorities helped to keep alive a hopeful human spirit across national boundaries and in individual, local work. Their efforts still echo for future generations in the words "Free Nelson Mandela" or "Women's rights are human rights," or "We shall overcome." They knew that "good" human relations are measured by the presence of human goodness and open channels for the constructive resolution of differences and grievances, not the absence of social tensions. They understood that the absence of social tension in unfair societies is only a measure of the repression that exists. As Brazil's Human Rights Minister, José Gregori, says: "Miracles are not partners of people who devote their struggle to human rights....Progress hinges on stubbornness, struggle, resistance, and above all, creativity to tackle issues with indignation and due competence."

There will always be a need and role for prophetic minorities. But, as Manning Marable has written: "The next stage of democratic revolutions must be to constitute new majorities dedicated to challenging all forms of human inequality.



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which are, after all, at the heart of what we still call racism." Or as Vera Soares observes: "....we have to work with all of the concepts from all of the ideologies that have a basis in beliefs of inferiority and superiority." Constituting those new majorities is the work that lies ahead.

In Brazil, the new majorities will need to confront the "myth of the great racial democracy" and, regardless of color, through concrete public and private policies and interventions, join to change the country into a genuine racial democracy where "good appearance" matters less than good deeds, good hearts and good skills. In the new South Africa, the new majorities will need to join together without regard to the old labels of apartheid, to build a dynamic and expanding economy, realize measurable, universal gains in human rights and social justice, tame violence, and merge the goals of political will and economic power. In the United States, the new majorities– comprised of women and men of all colors and classes– will need to work together to wield the nation's immense wealth to create new opportunities for the poor and overcome racial hatred and isolation. They must use their leverage to influence public policy domestically and internationally in ways that loosen racism's hold on their own nation and others as well.

No country will combat racism and discrimination effectively unless it also progresses with the other parts of the equation for human goodness that have helped define and create the emerging global consensus of this century. Human rights, democracy, free societies, peace and reconciliation, the advancement of women and other victims of prejudice and discrimination, the uprooting of poverty, the restoration of the dignity of childhood are all interwoven with the imperative to combat racism.

Racism is not a White or Black problem. It is not a male or female problem. It is a moral, social, economic and practical problem to which all caring and decent human beings have a need and duty to respond. And, whether we acknowledge responsibility for creating the problem or not, we now must share responsibility for resolving it as a matter of national and global self-interest. We must strive to pass on to our children a less dangerous, violent, impoverished and hate-filled world than the one we inherited.

Neglect of racism can never be benign. Left alone, it gains strength. Nor is racism permanent; it can be changed by force of the human spirit and good works.

At the end of the day, our visit to the histories, lives and prospects for improved race relations in Brazil, South Africa and the United States leaves us hopeful about our collective capacities to move beyond racism. But our hope rests upon what each of us is willing to do each day in our lives, in our institutions, in our nations, wherever injustice has taken root. We must act each day as if everything we do matters, and it does. We live in different societies but increasingly in the same world.

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On Hope

[H]ope is not the same as optimism. Optimism adopts the role of the spectator who surveys the evidence in order to infer that things are going to get better. Yet we know that the evidence does not look good. The dominant tendencies of our day are unregulated global capitalism, racial balkanization, social breakdown and individual depression. Hope enacts the stance of the participant who actively struggles against the evidence in order to change the deadly tides of wealth inequality, group xenophobia, and personal despair. Only a new wave of vision, courage, and hope can keep us sane and preserve the decency and dignity requisite to revitalize our organizational energy for the work to be done. To live is to wrestle with despair yet never to allow despair to have the last word.

Cornel West, Restoring Hope

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In Our Own Voices

International Working & Advisory Group

Peter Bell

As President of CARE USA, the international relief and development agency, I never cease to be appalled by the capacity of people to deny the basic dignity and worth of fellow human beings. In Bosnia, Cambodia, Iraq, Kosovo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and too many other parts of the world, we see the devastating effects of one group trying to define itself against another– to dehumanize their members with the ultimate purpose of dominating or even eradicating them. The result is too often mass graves, severed limbs, orphaned children, displaced persons, and deeply held grievances.

At the same time, I am inspired every day by people in those countries and everywhere around the world who reach out to others (regardless of their apparent differences), respect their dignity, support their potential, and affirm the oneness and equality of all human beings. On my better days, I am confident that people of this more enlightened outlook are in the ascendancy. On the worse days, however, I fear that those of the more exclusionary approach may be gaining the upper hand. I have no question that the survival of our ever-shrinking world will eventually depend on the willingness of all people to respect, if not love, one another.

I feel immensely fortunate to have participated in the Comparative Human Relations Initiative over the past three years. Racism is not the only prejudicial construct by which one group seeks to dominate or enslave another, but it has been particularly pernicious in the three countries on which we focused– Brazil, South Africa, and the United States. I hope that readers of the International Working and Advisory Group's report will find value in our arguments and insights. The cold print of the report, however, pales beside the intellectually and emotionally rich experience of working within this racially and nationally diverse group. All of us were privileged to listen to the testimony of a wide array of wise and committed colleagues; to probe important, difficult, and sensitive issues candidly and openly; and to share stories– some, gut-wrenching; others, inspiring– about the struggle to overcome racism.

I cannot adequately summarize in a few sentences all that I have learned through this Initiative. Back in the 1960s, I worked and lived in Brazil for four years, and have kept close to the country ever since. But I have always been per plexed and troubled by the prevailing– often vehement– denial of the existence of racism there, when the evidence to the contrary is so overwhelming. I am heartened by the growing, if still small, group of Brazilians willing to explore the once-forbidden subject of race relations, to speak out against the injustices, and to seek solutions appropriate to their society. I am also encouraged that the democratic government has now acknowledged the problem of racism in Brazil and condemned discrimination as a violation of human rights.

Prior to my participation in this Initiative, I had never visited South Africa. I am still only beginning to learn about the country, but my initial visit there and ongoing dialogue with South African colleagues have been a revelation. I have been deeply moved by the sense of historic moment, the intellectual creativity and democratic fervor, and the combination of impatience and forbearance among political leaders. In addition, I was struck not only by the oppressive poverty but also by the energy and perseverance in the townships on the outskirts of Cape Town. In South Africa, as in Brazil, the prospect for the new democracy will be crucially shaped by how it responds to the postponed hopes of its Black majority.

The Initiative's exploration of race relations in Brazil and South Africa deepened my understanding and conviction about the persistent problems that we face in the United States. While the civil rights movement succeeded in removing legally sanctioned segregation and discrimination from this country, it is clear that the social and economic odds are still stacked against most Black Americans and that they do not yet have a fair shot at the American dream. The promise of millions of Black Americans continues to be dimmed by racism, and each of those individuals has a personal story to tell– a story of violated dignity, hurt feelings, or blocked aspirations.

My participation in the Initiative has underscored for me that it is too early to declare the United States a "color-blind society." By some measures, we have made great progress over the past 35 years, yet racism remains an insidious problem across much of our society, and the complacency and inaction of otherwise well-meaning White Americans is partly responsible. All of us in the International Working and Advisory Group believe that the United States can, and must do better. The stakes for Black Americans, for all Americans, and for the world are very high. Our goal must be to build a nation that affirms the dignity and worth of all its people. To do less is to live on the edge of the abyss.

Ana Maria Brasileiro

In Brazil, for a long time, we wanted to believe that we lived in a racial paradise. While most of us were aware of prejudice, we said, "We are not like the United States. Yes, we share a history of slavery, but here there is racial democracy. There is no segregation. People can be whatever they want to be, can go wherever they want to go..." While we no longer think this, we still pride ourselves on the identity issue, which is very complex. There are thousands of words to describe color– moreno, branco, pardo, escuro, mulatto, negro– and the ways in which people self-identify and are themselves identified depend on context. Once, watching a video about Brazil at Medgar Evers College, a dark Brazilian spoke of himself as White. A Black American woman said, "What did you say?" So the speaker clarified and said, "Oh, of course I am Black..." When the president of Brazil set up a state policy against racism he identified himself as "mulatinho" (a person with a degree of African descent), but he was seen as a White person being demagogic.

Unlike in the United States, where segregation occurs at all levels, in Brazil it is more common at the top than at the bottom. In the favelas and on the beaches there is no segregation, although the majority of those who live in the favelas are among the poorest and darkest. But at university and at fancy restaurants you still see only "White" people. It is not a White/Black difference but more one of less-White/less-less-White, which points up the value of whiteness. Social class plays an important role in defining whiteness.

I was 17 years old, doing a house-to-house census, and I would see a person of mixed ancestry, in a nice house with her husband and kids and I entered her race as White, mainly because of the association with money. Later, in the 1980s, people were asked to self-identity on the census. There was a slogan: "Don't let your color pass blank," playing on the double meaning of branco, as both blank and as White.

How did I become conscious of racism? I was born into a White, middle-class family. My mother came from a Paulista (São Paulo) family, with many past glories but no money. My father was an adventurer, a poet and writer of Italian descent, not openly racist, but racist all the same. I had no friends who were Black. Some had Afro traits, but we all were socially White. The only relationships I had with people other than White were with those working for my family or doing other low-status jobs. With some of them, I have developed a deep, caring and lasting friendship but social distance was– at that time– maintained. Socially, I lived in a White world. How could this have been true in a country where half of the population is non-White?

Early in life I became aware of the disadvantages associated with being the girl in a family of three children. Unconsciously, however, I accepted it as part of my bad luck. I wished I had been born a boy. Later I became aware of how prejudice, discrimination and social segregation worked and, most important, that it could be changed. I began to understand how being a White woman affected my possibilities for broader social interaction. I went to live in Rio where it was a bit better. The warm weather and the beach worked as democratizing forces. The family social control was far away. I made new friends, some of them Afro-Brazilians. More than once I had a first hand experience of being discriminated against while in the company of the "wrong" type of person, especially in middle class restaurants.

With the re-democratization of the country and the expansion of civil society– the Black movement, the feminist movement– things have started to change in Brazil. But we are just in the beginning. There is a lot to be done in terms of legislation and law enforcement, public policies and overall cultural change.

I, therefore, greatly welcomed the opportunity to participate in the SEF "Beyond Racism" Task Force, and these last three years have been an intense learning period for me. They have deepened my commitment to the cause of equality, and provided me with new tools to confront racism and sexism.

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What are the main challenges in overcoming racism? In Brazil, we need to focus on the identity problem, so that we can look at color first, and accept ourselves as who we are. The racial paradise is a myth, but can we not find a way to make it a reality? Somehow in the collective unconscious mind it seems there is an aspiration for equality that goes parallel to the system of racial hierarchy.

Forty years made a tremendous difference in the history of race relations in the United States. Afro-Americans, however, continue to face discrimination and are the target of too much violence caused by racism. A lot of energy has still to be directed to confront this situation. But Afro-Americans have also benefited from times of economic abundance. A significant number of Afro-Americans is now in the upper and middle strata of the social pyramid (something hard to see in Brazil). Only instead of being integrated into one pyramid with mingling at every level, there seems to be parallel pyramids, each divided by class. In the United States, an Afro-American says, you don't have to like me, just respect my rights and me. As Afro-American professionals move into a neighborhood and Whites move out, Afro-American professionals are saying, fine. This segregation that is racial and cultural rather than economic is reproduced at all levels. And this is what I would identify as one of the main barriers to getting beyond racism in the United States in the long run.

A second obstacle has to do with the growing number of people who do not see themselves fitting into the Black/White dichotomy. At one time, the category "Black" was broad enough to encompass all non-Whites. This provided a basis for self-identification, a clear basis on which to mobilize for rights and demand access to services; it provided a sense of community which is absent in the more fluid situation in Brazil. Yet as the situation gets more complex, with Latinos and Asians, the category "Black" is becoming contested. When a significant percentage of the population feels itself outside the Black-White paradigm, it loses its political force. The dichotomy that gave strength to the civil rights movement and to affirmative action, as well as to the embrace of cultural symbols, is now in question.

In South Africa, I was very impressed to see that despite all the difficulties, members of the Black majority have been able to establish themselves in power and exercise that power with authority and competence. They face many challenges. When people have been deprived of rights and benefits for so long and now have a government (their government), the demands are many, impossible to meet in the short run. If the government is too harsh on Whites, they will leave, taking their accumulated wealth with them. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission is playing a fundamental role in the healing of society. But it cannot solve the problem of unequal wealth and social privilege. The idea of "reparations" is now being discussed as a way to move toward a more economically equitable society, in an acceptable period of time, without tearing the economic and social fabric of the country.

In all cases, one important dimension for those who are looking "beyond racism" is to consider the interplay among race, class, and gender. Currently, gender is often forgotten. However, being a woman, a White woman or a Black woman, makes a big difference in how we experience racism and prejudice. As Gloria Steinem reminded the Task Force more than once, racism perpetuates itself through the control of women's bodies and minds.

Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro

Despite the positive developments in the democratic transition and consolidation processes, most democracies in Latin America are still far from being capable of assuring liberty and justice for all. Brazil, if we consider the situation of the Afro- descendants in that country– almost half of the population– constitutes one of the most egregious cases. More than one hundred years after the abolition of slavery, the Afro- descendants continue to be subjected to severe inequalities.

In 1997, the Brazilian population was composed by 54% people that declared themselves as White, 5% Black, 40% Brown and 0.5% Yellow and Indigenous. Of course we are aware that the self-attribution of "color" for the demographic census in Brazil is extremely complex: during the Census of 1976, there were registered 136 different "colors." But if the "color" is something that can be disputed, what has become evident from the last demographic data just published in Brazil is the racial inequalities which prevail in the Brazilian society. As a White and intellectual, I think that is the main challenge to moving beyond racism.

We are finishing the 20th century and the White elites, even those who pretend to be progressive and liberal, have been incapable of promoting even the most essential rights of the Black non-elites. Of course, this target is something that must be addressed by the mobilization and organization of the Black people: the strategies and the ways will be decided by the Black community itself. During this extraordinary Initiative, Beyond Racism, I was always trying to address myself as to what White intellectuals, what we must do together with our fellow Afro-descendants.

If we consider the right to education, the right to humane conditions of life, the right to fair salaries or any other social, economic and social rights, the situation of the Afro-descendants in Brazil, as the latest socio-demographic statistics published by the Brazilian government in a good exercise of transparency reveal, the situation of human rights for the Blacks is disastrous. Even if the number of illiterates has been dramatically reduced in the last twenty years, it continues to be much more present among the Afro-descendants than among the Whites: in 1997, 9% of the Whites were illiterate, but 22% for the Black and Brown . The same pattern can be seen if we take into consideration the average number of years in school: for the White that average is 6 years and for the Black and Brown, 4 years. That difference increases even more among the working population. If we consider the monthly family per capita income in 1997, 45% of the Brazilian families lived with incomes of 1 minimum wage (around US$70), but just 34% of the White families were situated at that level, compared to 58% of the Black families and 61% of Brown families.

If we consider working activities, the majority of the Afro-descendants continue in manual labor, as their forebears, the slaves. In 1997, there was a much larger proportion of Blacks and Browns than Whites in agriculture, civil construction and lower services (servants and domestic service). There were 6% Whites in domestic services against 9% Browns and 15% Blacks. The contrast is more dramatic if we consider the employers: 6% Whites, 2% Browns and 1% Blacks. The Afro-descendants are practically absent or present in percentages less than 1% in the highest levels of any career in the public administration. They are not present in effective numbers in any position of power. Rudyard Kipling, the British writer and poet, when he came to Brazil in 1924, wrote that politics in our society was a dangerous game played among the players of an exclusive club. I could say that until today the immense majority of members of this club have been White.

Finally, to conclude this cruel and extremely unjust recent picture, the average income of the working White population was around 5 minimum wages (US$350), and the average income of the Black and Brown was around 2 minimum wages (US$140), that is, less than half the average income of the White. These data confirm a continuing and impressive income inequality between White and Afro-descendants in Brazilian society.

The eternal discussions around the myth of racial democracy and about the benefits of the specificity of Brazilian racism must be overcome by urgent and concrete public policies to improve the condition of the Afro-descendants, immediately. More than all the anthropological or sociological debates about race in Brazil, what counts is to define specific initiatives to address the conditions of life, the access of the Afro-descendants to human rights which have been consistently denied for them in Brazil, even under the brief periods of democratic political organization. The discussions during this Initiative were extremely helpful to us in finding ways to overcome race discrimination by equalizing the content and the application of law among the population, regardless of race, gender and socioeconomic status. This is a target that Brazilian democracy until now was not capable of achieving.

We must state with precision and insistence that the rights of the Afro-descendants are human rights. But it is not sufficient, as several generations of politicians, lawmakers, and lawyers have repeated, to affirm the value of equality. The recognition of Afro-descendants' worth and equality with Whites must be complemented with various protections and policies. Legal rights must enhance the living conditions of the families of the Afro-descendants by legislation– in a more effec tive manner– against racial bias in employment, discrimination in pay and incentives, and violence. That discrimination is dramatically present in the criminal law context: Blacks are more frequently the target of police repression, and color is a powerful instrument of discrimination in the distribution of justice, as the seminal research of professor Sérgio Adorno, co-director of the Center for the Study of Violence, University of São Paulo, has recently demonstrated. People of color confront greater obstacles and have more difficulty utilizing their right to adequate defense. As a result, they are more likely to be punished than Whites, and they tend to receive more rigorous penal treatment.

Moreover, legal rights can contribute toward increasing Afro-descendants' better access to credit and other productive resources, and increased political rights. From a human rights perspective, development efforts must work to eliminate race discrimination through programs and processes that, for example, can help governments to reform legal systems and outlaw discrimination in employment, education, credit services and other entitlements. Efforts must also be made to educate and empower the Afro-descendants and enable their effective participation in development. Government must confront the need to redress the effects of past discrimination against the Afro-descendants.

National and local judiciaries, legislatures and electoral bodies are crucial to the protection and promotion of the human rights of the Afro-descendants. They can ensure the rule and enforcement of the law, helping to establish anti-discriminatory practices and achieve socio-economic, political and cultural equality. An effective executive branch and the office of the Secretary of State for Human Rights, established in Brazil in 1997, can provide leadership in promoting legislation and implementing human rights programs.

In this direction, the initiatives taken by the federal government under the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration to implement specific policies in favor of the Afro-descendants were a decisive step to reverse this continuing denial of the human rights of half of the population of Brazil. In 1996, the Brazilian government launched its National Human Rights Program which proposes several initiatives to promote the interest of the Black population, aimed basically to strengthen individual rights and freedom established by the federal constitution. These proposals could be classified at the same time as anti- discriminatory and attempting to "de-racialize" public policies ascertaining effective equality among Whites and non-Whites, as Peter Fry has pointed out . Among these were the creation of the Interministerial Working Group, created by presidential decree on November 20, 1995, to devise actions and policies for the promotion of the Black population; the support of the Working Group for the Elimination of Discrimination in the Work and Occupation, GTEDEO, created in the framework of the Ministry of Labor. In relation to the legal system, the program has proposed to stimulate, to support the creation and implementation of Black Community Councils, at state and local levels; to criminalize the practice of racism, according to the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure; to disseminate information on the International Conventions, the Constitutional provision and the intra-constitutional legislation regarding racism; and to support the elaboration and publishing of documents that could contribute to the dissemination of anti-discriminatory legislation .

To implement these aims, the program proposes interventions which may strengthen a bipolar definition of race in Brazil and result in implementation of specific policies in favor of Black Brazilians. The government, following a demand from the Black social movements has accepted to instruct the IBGE Foundation, which is in charge of the preparation of the demographic censuses, "to include the item 'color' in all population statistics, data and registries," thus adopting the criterion of considering the members of the Brazilian population as Whites, Browns and Blacks. The National Program on Human Rights states that the government must "support affirmative action of the private sector to promote the Black population," proposing that the government "develop affirmative action to facilitate the access of Blacks to university, professional courses, and technology institutes" and "to devise affirmative policies for the social and economic promotion of the Black population."

These decisions open a new path in the struggle for the promotion of the rights of the Afro-descendants. Some of the most important researchers on race relations in Brazil, among them my dear friend and colleague Peter Fry, have called our attention to the dangers that some of these initiatives will provoke a racialization of social relations and strengthen a bipolar definition of race in Brazil. It is worthwhile to take



these risks because until now the alleged positive aspects of race relations in Brazil– the absence of a strong biological pseudo-scientific racial approach of society, the absence of legal codes for discrimination after the end of slavery, the common practice of mixed marriage and the absence of severe racial tensions– never were able to provide a basis for the promotion of the human rights of the Afro-descendants in Brazil. This trend must be urgently reversed. Undoubtedly, it constitutes an extraordinary progress toward the promotion of those rights that by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso has recognized the multiracial basis of Brazilian society, as he did at the speech where he had announced the Human Rights National Plan: "We wish to affirm, and truly with considerable pride, our condition as a multi-racial society and that we have great satisfaction in being able to enjoy the privilege of having distinct races and distinct cultural traditions. In these days, such diversity makes the wealth of a country."

The acknowledgment of the fact that Brazil is a multiracial society is essential to the promotion of equality. During the seminars and conferences sponsored by this Initiative, Beyond Racism, we were able to compare the Brazilian experience with that of the United States and South Africa. Even if we need to go beyond the arbitrary and impressionistic category of race, to proceed toward that horizon, the Brazilian government or civil society must become aware of a de facto bipolar character of our society– which is clearly demonstrated by the absence of access by the Black population to most human rights. This will not mean the inevitable repetition of the same consequences that racialization had in those societies in different historical contexts. The acknowledgment of these dramatic racial equalities, even with the risk of engendering more conflict– is a positive event in any democracy. It may even seem a paradox, the risk of strengthening a few elements of "racialization" in Brazil, but it is a necessary and inevitable step for the promotion of the rights of the Black population in Brazil in public policy. And by the way, the "racialization" is already present in the extremely high intensity of structural violence– the denial of social and economic rights which has been historically reiterated– which affects the Afro-descendants in Brazil, especially the women, more than any other or social White group. If any social indicator of poverty is taken, those in the worst categories of poverty will always be the Afro-descendants. Poverty, as we strongly believe, is a violation of human rights: the racial inequality which aggravates the poverty of the Afro-descendants is a gross violation of human rights. This community cannot continue to bear the contemplation of the originality of the Brazilian arrangements of race relations, condemned to be submitted to social exclusion and poverty. It is time to endeavor all our efforts, in civil society and in government to promote dramatic social changes. That is the best way to go beyond racism.

Edna Roland

During the last two and a half years, while involved in this Initiative, I have had many changes in my life and learned a lot of things. The Initiative gave me the opportunity to meet some extraordinary people, who have contributed to the renewal of my faith in the invention and capacity of transformation in each of us. It has nurtured my determination to work, in the words of the Brazilian theologian Leonardo Boff, for "symbiotic" liberation, which unites different people in pursuit of justice against "diabolic" freedom, which pits people against one another and against themselves.

I am convinced today that the deepest, diabolic damage caused by racism results in its victims' dehumanization– in racism's historical undermining of Black people's capacity to resist co-optation and the degradation of their own good values. Racism's vilest fruits are a lack of hope and a void of trust and faith in ourselves.

Many who fought for civil rights in the United States are now wondering what is happening to their hard-fought victories, as alarming violence and poverty has grown, especially among Black children. In South Africa, a part of the Black population is increasingly disappointed with the slowness of change away from the conditions of apartheid which ended less than ten years ago. In my own country of Brazil, the gap that separates the "included" and the "excluded" deepens, and the Black movement still lives without the deep roots among its own people and without an alternative political analysis that resonates nationally among members of the Black population and opinion makers. These Brazilian conditions reveal the institutionalized force of the nation's White elite whose ruling ideals and ideologies have dismantled any dissenting voice, while maintaining the world's 8th largest economy at the cost of massive illiteracy and poverty surviving from times of slavery.

Yet now more than ever it is necessary to sing from the soul—to maintain in each one of us the dream of equality and justice. Learning the lesson offered by Cornel West, we must be fueled by hope. The world does not allow us to be optimistic for we cannot be blind to widespread exploitation and exclusion. But, we can have hope–confidence in our own collective traditions and new capacities to visualize and create a better world.

In recent years, South Africa liberated unimaginable creative energies through broad, popular participation when its people changed the unchangeable. Across national boundaries, the new South Africa has become a lighthouse of hope.

Using its glowing light, we need to look within ourselves and beyond the here-and-now, to continue to find in each of us and in others the guiding virtues of "symbiotic liberation" that shares among different people the fruits of a just world. We need to open our minds and hearts to the African Renaissance, an historical and cultural force that can collectively define new possibilities from old traditions. May it emerge and flourish on the African continent and in the Diaspora, strengthening ethical values of a powerful tradition that has in Nelson Mandela its greatest, living symbol, and for all of us the hope of a better world.

Khehla Shubane

I was struck by the fact that historically, race discrimination assumed different forms in the three countries we compared but the outcome of discrimination in all three countries was strikingly similar. In South Africa race discrimination took the form of apartheid. There was no attempt by the government and the White community to hide the fact that Blacks were denied the rights which were available to members of the White community. Leaders of the government were happy to go around the world to justify apartheid. In Brazil it assumed the form of racial democracy. In this form there is a complete denial of the existence of the problem. Race in this rendition does not matter. In the United States race discrimination took the form of segregation in which from a legal viewpoint there was a pretense at the fact that all were equal before the law. This however remained a fiction as Blacks were discriminated against even under a legal regime in which all were "equal" before the law.

In all three societies, violence was critical in underpinning racism. Over time, violence was used to varying degrees to undergird discrimination. Opposition to the racial order was protected by law and thus ultimately by the power of the state.

Those who suffered racial oppression were not only robbed of their political rights to participate in the democratic processes in their own countries, but the disadvantage emanating from race discrimination was all encompassing. It was political, social and economic. The different dimensions of the deprivation are only now becoming apparent in at least two countries, the United States and South Africa, which have resolved the major political dimension of race discrimination. In both societies it is now known that Black people were systematically denied access to education in countries with very fine institutions of learning. This denial of access to education has far reaching implications for a variety of issues including reconstruction, especially in South Africa.

Race discrimination isolated its victims in profound ways. It is shocking that people with such similar experiences never, on an ongoing basis, found it possible to exchange ideas. This continues to be the case.

Even at this stage when it is universally accepted as wrong, racial discrimination remains difficult to talk about even in countries which are rent by the problem. In the United States, generally White people and Black people prefer not to express themselves in each other's presence on racial issues. In Brazil, talking about issues of race is seen as disturbing the racial harmony which exists in the country. In South Africa, talking about race is seen as hankering after the past.

Talking across experiences of the three countries also revealed that numbers are irrelevant to race discrimination. In Brazil, with more or less equal numbers of Black and White people, Black people were not spared the horrors of race discrimination. The overwhelming numbers of Blacks in South Africa relative to Whites did not offer Black people there any protection, nor did the numerical weakness of Black people in the United States assure Whites that they will not be

swamped by Blacks, a concern which was constantly expressed by Whites in South Africa.

In those countries like the United States and South Africa where Black people have made strides in resolving part of the problem, it is clear that a solution lies in a process in which all aspects of discrimination are confronted. Black people in South Africa now have the franchise and control of a large part of the political processes in the country but do not control the economic destiny of South Africa. Even though there has been significant movement toward the deracialization of ownership in the economy, there remains a lot to do. In the United States, the educational achievements of Blacks compare poorly to those of Whites. These are crucial dimensions of discrimination.

Focusing on the most glaring aspect of race discrimination, as oppressed groups have been wont to do, has served to shield other equally important dimensions of discrimination. This is the lesson in the United States and South Africa. It seems the struggle for racial equality in Brazil will make the same mistake. Issues of affirmative action are germane precisely because they were not resolved as part of resolving the question of political aspects of race discrimination.

An important lesson from this is that all dimensions of race discrimination should be tackled at the same time. All exploitative relationships should be opposed as part of the struggle for equality. In the case of South Africa it is clear now that other forms of discrimination did not receive the attention they should have been given. The anti-apartheid struggle should explicitly have been at the same time a struggle against gender and ethnic chauvinism. A staggered approach to tackling these problems ignores the fact that they are often embedded within race discrimination.

Mala Singh

I considered my appointment to the International Working and Advisory Group of the Comparative Human Relations Initiative to be an enormous honor and privilege. It was a unique opportunity to engage with the issue of racism and its associated social evils in the company of men and women who have not only reflected deeply on the causes and consequences of racism and the most appropriate moral and political responses to it, but also fought battles and campaigns against racism.

It is a commonplace observation to note that one's own personal or contextual experience of racism powerfully shapes one's understanding of its scope, its reach and its workings. In the case of South Africa, the persistence of legalized racism in the form of apartheid late into the 20th century left many of us in the country with an understanding of racism as a social phenomenon dominated by the form of the South African variant. Although one was aware of the histories and practices of racism in other countries through a study of scholarly literature, acquaintance with media information and contact with colleagues, for us in South Africa, the local variant was expectedly and powerfully the prism through which racism became most real, both intellectually and emotionally. The CHRI experience, structured as it was by the participation of intellectuals, activists and decision makers on site in each of the three countries, enabled me to locate the South African experience of racism within an understanding of it as a much more globalised phenomenon with a sick variety of forms and shapes. The depth of the analytical exposes of racism, the passion of the struggle against racism and, sadly, the persistence and tenacity of racist imperatives in the United States and Brazil were all matters which I saw more clearly as kindred struggles which were as passionately and bitterly conducted as the fight against a racially ordered society in South Africa. The feeling of the "exceptionalism" of the South African experience of racism was considerably muted by a more substantive understanding of the manifestations of racism in two complex and much larger societies than my own.

Within the context of our different histories, the explicit and implicit resort to racial categories had been used in a variety of legal, institutional and organizational forms to generate relations of domination and subordination which have concentrated power and privilege in the hands of the racially "superior." The complexities and specificities of each of our racial histories was a signal reminder not to find trivial bases for comparison between and among ourselves. But what I also understood was that despite its historical variety, the impact of racism had depressing similarities in the three societies under study—a large political, economic, social and psychological divide between those on different sides of the racial line, and a multitude of interlocking repercussions, many of them crudely explicit but many more deeply subterranean and difficult to eradicate. The steady re-incorporation of South Africa into the global community of nations after the first democratic elections in 1994 and the concomitant requirement to consider and address global concerns fitted in perfectly with the understanding facilitated by the CHRI three country comparative study that racism has a global reach and pervasiveness that is not contained by national boundaries.

One other crucial lesson which was powerfully driven home by my deepening appreciation of the United States and Brazilian experiences of racism was the realization that anti-racist struggles do not end with the appropriate constitutional and legal victories. Anti racist vigilance is a continual need and anti racist strategies have to be conceptualized anew in order to give substance to the form of a non racial democracy, to ensure that new forms of racism do not take root in more sophisticated and complex incarnations but which nevertheless have the same effect of exclusion or subordination. The continuing social stratification in the United States and Brazil in which race and racism are clearly implicated was a salutatory lesson from two countries whose constitutions guarantee equal rights and protections to all their citizens. It was a clear warning to South Africans not to let formal constitutional principles or the evocative nation-building metaphor of the "rainbow nation" obscure the continuing consequences of past arrangements based on racial privilege as well as new mutations of racism in all sectors of the population.

South Africa is faced with a numbing variety of challenges at present in its attempt to construct the parameters of a democratic, just and equitable society and to give content to its noble constitutional and legal commitments. In addressing its internal reconstructive challenges, it also has to take account of its more global responsibilities which comes from being part of the world community. For me, perhaps the most fundamental questions raised by my participation in the CHRI was how South Africa would take its place in the global struggle to ensure that the malignant use of race does not become entrenched well into the 21st century. South Africa as the country with the most recent experience of the struggle against legalized racism has for that reason the most open set of possibilities with regard to the social innovations needed for the creation of an anti-racist society. My hope is that we will be able to rise to this challenge at home - at the level of state and civil society and in both private and public sectors, and that internationally, we will use this experience to take our place visibly and articulately with those in other countries who refuse to let racism continue to disempower and impoverish human beings in a new century as it did in this one.

Franklin A. Thomas

The invitation to join the Southern Education Foundation's inquiry into the state of race relations in Brazil, South Africa and the United States came at an important time in my life. A crossroads of sorts. I was stepping down as President of the Ford Foundation and committed to helping South Africa in its remarkable journey to democracy and healthy economic and social development. I was anxious to deepen my understanding of the roots and persistence of racial prejudice and racial repression in my own country and elsewhere in the world. The personal and societal costs of the attitudes and behavior associated with racism are enormous, and their destructive and divisive impacts on society are increasingly evident.

I was born and raised in the United States, in New York City, of Black immigrant parents from the Caribbean. I have visited both Brazil and South Africa many times over the past 25 years. Each country has special meaning to me: South Africa with its unique recent history of legally mandated racial discrimination and bold present initiative toward equality, Brazil, a country of growing influence in the world, often cited as special because of its high economic potential, extraordinary people, and unique post-slavery official policy toward race.

The project was thus a chance to combine my interest in these three societies into a systematic effort to learn more about the common elements of their histories and the specific efforts of each to address the persistent, divisive and debilitating problem of racial discrimination. The fact that the inquiry would look at the issues through a comparative lens, with colleagues from each of the countries, was an added attraction.

During the process, our work has helped me to think about the three countries as three partially overlapping circles, with the areas of overlap defining the common aspects of each country's racial history; the balance of each circle reflecting the unique, culture-specific part of each country– the qualities that make each special and caution us against excessive generalizations across these societies.

Our group initially addressed the question of how broadly to frame our inquiry. We were aware that many of the roots of racism also nourish sexism and other discriminatory attitudes and were concerned that we not contribute to isolating and thereby weakening the struggles against these other evils to society as we focused our attention on race. We concluded that we would seek to comment on and identify linkages across these categories wherever feasible while maintaining our primary focus on race.

As a crucial part of our work, we have visited each of the countries, observed and listened to people from all walks of life describe their personal realities and experiences with race. We have read the literature, been briefed by experts, heard the music, eaten the food, absorbed the many subtle vibrations unique to each society.

One of the purposes of this personal statement is to tell the reader something about myself and the life experiences I brought to our deliberations.

Some early experiences with racism remain in my memory. Among the earliest is from about age four. I, along with a White neighborhood friend, spent some time together each day riding our tricycles on the sidewalk between our homes. He lived on a side street in a private house. I lived in an apartment on the main street. One afternoon we were out riding and his mother or aunt called him in. We both started to enter his home. He first, me behind him. His mother stopped me saying, "You can't come into our home." Disappointed at being separated from my friend, I went home and later told my mother what had happened. Her response was, "Oh them, you don't need to go there. They are prejudiced." I understood her to mean that they were afflicted with something bad and that I was better off not being exposed to it.

In college at Columbia University, our basketball team, of which I was a central player, was refused service in Morgantown, West Virginia, because one member of our team was Black. The entire team left the restaurant. Our team had similar experiences in Miami, Florida, with restaurants and hotel accommodations.

Also in college at a Reserve Officer Training Corps summer encampment, at Hunter AFB, Savannah, Georgia, there were 235 cadets, only one Black, me. Each summer there was a local debutante sponsored ball given on the air base for the summer cadets. As the dance approached, the local racial segregation custom was apologetically explained to me by one of the base officials– Whites dance with Whites, Blacks dance with Blacks, subtly suggesting that perhaps I would prefer not to attend the ball. When I questioned him why a local segregation custom would be honored on federal property, he came up with another solution: Black officers on the base were asked to arrange a table at the ball, with me as their guest. During the dance, which involved changing dance partners by tapping the cadet on the shoulder, the base officials were extremely nervous. In fact, there were no incidents nor was the racial separation custom adhered to. People were well ahead of the official local policy.

In academic and professional life, I've resisted the tendency of some to explain away their achievements by labeling them as "different" from others of their race. My reaction has been to assert how ordinary I am, noting that there were many smarter and more gifted people of color with whom I had grown up. At the same time, I've found myself always taking the tougher road– letting accomplishments defy the stereotype and speak for themselves.

In general, I've found it important to avoid self-limiting attitudes and to always reach beyond the obvious that was offered or was easy to do. It has also been important to keep my sense of humor and sense of proportion intact. This has allowed me to be somewhat bemused and patient as people discover our common humanity.

Eventually you realize what my mother knew instinctively 60 years ago: racism carries its own penalties for the victim, the racist and the community as a whole.

As we enter the next millennium, I believe it is important to reaffirm a commitment to universal human potential which neither knows nor will accept race-based limits.

Not surprisingly, much of my added learning during the course of this study came from my colleagues. They generously shared experiences from their lives and their reactions to the reports and information we were receiving. In so doing, they helped me see new or deeper dimensions to familiar subjects and re-examine assumptions and other "truths" I thought I knew.

All of this confirmed for me the importance of a comparative perspective and of a diverse group of commissioners.

In Brazil, we were told, and it was evident, that by providing a legitimate forum through which the subject of racial discrimination could get into the public debate, we were performing an important function. By examining that subject in the context of the workplace, education, access to resources and opportunities, we helped Brazilians shed light on attitudes and other obstacles to the realization of the racial democracy they seek and espouse.

In the United States, which has been a beacon for freedom and opportunity for the world for the past 50 years, our complex history of slavery, emancipation, Jim Crow laws, civil rights struggles and legal remedies, posed a challenge to explain and to understand. So, too did the often expressed American fatigue with affirmative action remedies, coming as it does after less than two decades of sporadic efforts to redress the consequences of more than two centuries of legally sanctioned racial discrimination.

In South Africa, there is great optimism over what is possible under its remarkable new Constitution. There is also a growing realism of the enormous tasks it faces to keep faith with the aspirations of the majority of the population that suffered under apartheid and now seek a better life. All of this to be accomplished in the face of a feared worldwide economic slowdown and without alienating the economically powerful White minority. It must also fashion a multiracial, opportunity driven society on the heels of centuries of racial discrimination and officially mandated inequality of opportunity.

For me the commission experience was a powerful reminder that racism takes a toll on all of us, victims as well as others, and that racially discriminatory attitudes and behavior are deeply embedded within our institutions and individual psyches. Often we are unaware of the existence of race-based assumptions and the subtle but powerful influences they exert upon us. As some have rightly observed, through our policies and practices as a nation and, most especially through our individual actions and attitudes, we end up making race every day.

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

BRAZIL • SOUTH AFRICA • THE UNITED STATES

Appendices

Sources for Charts

"Income Disparities," (page 33): rankings of selected nations according to their "Gini co-efficients" which statistically measure income disparities. Source: *Entering the 21st Century: World Development Report,* 1999/2000 (Washington: World Bank, 1999), pp. 238-239; see also "Economic Well-being Indicators: Detailed Poverty Data and Survey Years," OECD, at http://www.oecd.org/indicators/htm/data_pov.htm

"Living On $1 Per Day," (page 33): percent of population in Brazil and South Africa living on the equivalent of $1 or less per day. Source: Ibid.

"Living On $2 Per Day," (page 33): percent of population in Brazil and South Africa living on the equivalent of $2 or less per day. Source: Ibid.

"Brazil Population by Race" (page 34): percent of racial groups in Brazil. Source: Synthesis of Social Indicators, "IBGE, 1996 see also http://www.ibge.gov.br/english/noticias/1trim99/pres1003A.HTM for English summary.

"USA Population by Race and Ethnicity" (page 34): percent of racial groups and Hispanics in USA. Source: computed from "Resident Population by Race, Hispanic Origin, and Single years of Age: 1995," *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1996,* U.S. Printing Office, 1996.

"South Africa Population by Race" (page 34): percent of racial groups in South Africa. Source: *The People of South Africa: Population Census, 1996.* Census in Brief. Statistical South Africa. Report No. 1: 03-01-11(1996).

"Home Languages in South Africa," (page 35): percent of persons speaking each language as their first language. Source: Ibid.

"Comparative Statistical Profile: Grouped by Race or Color, Brazil, South Africa, and USA," (page 34). Source: IBGE 1996; see http://www.ibge.gov.br/english/noticias/1trim99/pres1003A.HTM for English summary; Abdias do Nascimento and Elisa Larkin Nascimento, "Dance of Deception: a Reading of Race Relations in Brazil," CHRI paper, 1999; Nelson do Valle Silva, "Extent and Nature of Racial Inequalities in Brazil," CHRI paper, 1999; *The People of South Africa: Population Census, 1996,* Census in Brief, Statistical South Africa, Report No. 1: 03-01-11(1996); "Women and Men in South Africa," Central Statistics, Statistical South Africa, 1998; "Unemployment and Employment in South Africa," Central Statistics, Statistical South Africa, 1998. Wilmot James, "The Second Republic," CHRI Paper, 1999; Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1996, U.S. Printing Office, 1996; Charles V. Hamilton, "Not Yet 'e pluribus unum': Racism, America's Achilles Heel," CHRI Paper, 1999. Racial designations of "Black" and "White" generally follow each nation's census customs, although "African" is customarily used in South Africa instead of "Black." For Brazil, "Preto" and "Pardo" represent "Black." In instances where a range of data is given for "Black" in Brazil, the first item represents data for "Preto" and the second number represents data for "Pardo." Except for income data for Brazil that covers the year 1988, all data are for years between 1994-1998, as indicated in sources.

"Women's Status" (page 35). Source: Amrita Basu, *The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women's Movements in Global Perspective* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995).

"Brazil" Profile (page 36): "Synthesis of Social Indicators," IBGE at http://ibge.gov.br/english/noticias/1trim99/pres1003A.HTM;" Table 5, *Entering the 21st Century: World Development Report,* 1999/2000 (Washington: World Bank, 1999), pp. 238-239.

"South Africa" profile (page 36): The People of South Africa: 1996, Census in Brief, Statistics South Africa, Report No. 1:03-01-11 (1996); Table 5, *Entering the 21st Century: World Development Report,* 1999/2000 (Washington: World Bank, 1999), pp. 238-239.

"United States" profile (page 37): *Statistical Abstract of the Unites States,* 1996, U.S. Printing Office, 1996; Table 5, *Entering the 21st Century: World Development Report,* 1999/2000 (Washington: World Bank, 1999), pp. 238-239.

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Initiative Publications

The Comparative Human Relations Initiative has developed a number of linked publications that amplify on the themes and ideas set forth in this volume, drawing on original sources, and the voices of the people in these three countries. **Reports include:**

- **Beyond Racism**, an Overview of findings by the Initiative's International Working and Advisory Group, featuring first person profiles of outstanding Americans, Brazilians and South Africans involved in the struggle against racism and reflections of International Working and Advisory Group members.

- **Three Nations at the Crossroads**, in-depth and data-rich portraits and accessible historical reviews of Brazil, South Africa and the United States by Charles V. Hamilton, professor emeritus, Columbia University; Ira Glasser, executive director, the American Civil Liberties Union; Wilmot James, dean, and Jeffrey Lever, South African scholar; Colin Bundy, University of Witwatersrand; Abdias do Nascimento, Rio de Janeiro State Secretary of Human Rights and Citizenship; Elisa Larkin Nascimento, director, IPEAFRO; Brazilian scholar Nelson do Valle Silva; and a comprehensive historical timeline of key events related to race in the three countries.

- **In Their Own Voices**, a topically organized reader featuring articles, quotable quotes, and excerpted speeches by participants in Initiative meetings such as Ellis Cose, journalist; Frene Ginwala, speaker of the South African Parliament; Alex Boraine, vice chair, South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission; Dr. Emmett Carson, president, the Minneapolis Foundation; Gloria Steinem, contributing editor, *Ms. Magazine*; Mahmood Mamdani, professor, University of Cape Town; Njabulo S. Ndebele, visiting scholar, the Ford Foundation; Susan V. Berresford, president, the Ford Foundation; and many others.

- **Color Collage**, occasional papers on issues such as the origins of racism, the role of the media, truth and reconciliation efforts, globalization, economic inequality, the religious community, among others, by authors such as Reid Andrews, professor, University of Pittsburgh; C. Eric Lincoln, professor emeritus, Duke University; James Jennings, professor, University of Massachusetts; and many others.

Books include:

- **Beyond Racism**, Embracing an Interdependent Future, (working title), the Full Report of the International Working and Advisory Group to the Comparative Human Relations Initiative, including detailed citations, sources and annotated bibliography. [forthcoming]

- **The Same Beneath the Skin**, (working title) a comparative anthology, edited by Charles V. Hamilton, Wilmot James, Neville Alexander, professor, University of Cape Town, Antônio Sérgio Guimarães, professor, University of São Paulo, and Lynn Huntley, director of the Comparative Human Relations Initiative which considers educational issues in the three nations, the costs of racism, international remedies, affirmative action "whiteness studies," and future prospects for movement beyond racism in the three nations by recognized scholars and activists. [forthcoming]

- **Tiranda a Máscara: Ensaios Sobre O Rascismo No Brasil (Taking Off The Mask: Essays on Racism in Brasil)**, edited by Antonio Sergio Guimarães, a Portuguese language volume featuring papers by many leading scholars and Afro Brazilian activists. [forthcoming]

- **Grappling With Change**, Yazeed Fakier, author (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers and Idasa, 1998), a look at how South Africans are coping post-apartheid.

- **Between Unity and Diversity**, edited by Gitanjali Maharaj (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers and Idasa, 1999), a reader on post-apartheid nation-building efforts.

All Initiative reports as well as additional, commissioned papers are available on the Internet. To download Initiative reports, papers, and other documents in Adobe Acrobat format (pdf file), find up-to-date information about forthcoming books, or for ordering printed publications, visit the Initiative's website: **www.beyondracism.org** or contact the Comparative Human Relations Initiative, the Southern Education Foundation, 135 Auburn Avenue, N.E., Second Floor, Atlanta, Georgia 30303 (404) 523-0410 (phone) or (404) 523-6904 (fax). For information about receiving printed copies of Initiative publications in South Africa, inquire with the Institute for Democracy in South Africa at its website, **www.idasa.org.za**. Information about the Southern Education Foundation is available through its website, **www.sefatl.org**.

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– **Lynn Huntley**, *Director*
The Comparative Human Relations Initiative

Biographical Notes

Peter D. Bell is the President of CARE, the Atlanta-based organization for international relief and development. Mr. Bell has an undergraduate degree in history from Yale College and a master's degree from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. In the past, he served as President of the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, a private foundation that seeks to improve conditions for the poor and disadvantaged; a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and President of the Inter-American Foundation, an agency that supports grassroots development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Mr. Bell was Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Under Secretary of the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and served for ten years in the Latin America Program of the Ford Foundation. He is Co-Chair of the Inter-American Dialogue, Chair of the Advisory Council to the Woodrow Wilson School, and a Trustee of the World Peace Foundation.

Ana Maria Brasileiro is Coordinator of the Women's Leadership and Representation Program of the InterAmerican Development Bank. She previously served as Chief of UNIFEM's Latin America and the Caribbean Section and Chief of UNIFEM's Women's Political Empowerment Program. She holds a doctorate from the University of Essex in England in political science and a master's degree in public administration from the University of California. She did her undergraduate studies in law and social science at the University of São Paulo and the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. Dr. Brasileiro is well versed in development and gender issues, having worked for UNICEF as a Senior Program Officer. She also served as Professor at the Brazilian School of Public Administration/Fundação Getúlio Vargas; Research Director of IBAM, a Brazilian organization devoted to local government and urban development; and Executive Director of Fundação EDUCAR, a foundation involved in adult education in Brazil.

Lynn Walker Huntley is Director of the Comparative Human Relations Initiative, a project of the Southern Education Foundation. She previously served as Director of the Ford Foundation's Rights and Social Justice Program, among other capacities. A graduate of Barnard College and Columbia University Law School, where she was a member of the *Law Review*, she has served both as Deputy Assistant Attorney General and Section Chief in the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice, Staff Counsel at the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., General Counsel to the New York City Commission on Human Rights, columnist for *Essence Magazine*, and Law Clerk to Federal Judge Constance Baker Motley. She is a member of the Board of the Center for Women Policy Studies, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and the Ethics Board of the National Society of Fundraising Executives.

Wilmot James is a Professor and Dean of the Humanities Faculty at the University of Cape Town. He previously served as the Executive Director of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa. He has taught at the University of the Western Cape, Indiana University and Yale University. He has a doctorate in sociology from the University of Wisconsin at Madison, a bachelors degree from the University of the Western Cape and a masters degree from the University of Wisconsin, where he was a Fulbright Scholar. Professor James is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Ford Foundation, a non-executive director of Independent Newspapers (Cape), and David Philip Publishers (PTY) Ltd. Professor James chaired the Task Team on International Migration for the South African government. He has written extensively about South Africa in a variety of publications.

Shaun Johnson is Managing Director of Independent Newspapers Cape in South Africa, and a member of the worldwide group's International Advisory Board. He was Group Editorial Director of Independent Newspapers, Founding Editor of *The Sunday Independent*, and is the former Editor of the *Cape Argus* and the *Sunday Star*. Earlier positions included Deputy Editor and Political Editor of *The Star*, and Assistant Editor of the *Weekly Mail*. He was also Chief Training Officer at the *Weekly Mail* and wrote the feasibility study for the *New Nation* newspaper in 1980. He was President of the South African Student Press Union. Johnson was born in the former Transkei and educated in Johannesburg, at Rhodes University in Grahamstown, and at the University of Oxford, where he was a South African Rhodes Scholar. He won academic and sporting awards at both universities. In 1993, he published the best-seller *Strange Days Indeed* (foreword by President Nelson Mandela), for which he received the South Africa Education Council's Gold Ink Award in 1995.

Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro is a professor and Director of the Center for the Study of Violence, University of São Paulo. Among other degrees, he received his bachelor's degree in law from the Pontifícia Universidade Católica and doctorate in political studies from the University of Paris. He has served as Rapporteur for the Brazilian National Human Rights Plan; United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burundi; and Visiting Faculty Member at the Kellogg Institute at the University of Notre Dame. He has authored numerous publications, including "Popular Responses to State Sponsored Violence in Brazil" in *The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America, Rethinking Participation and Representation*; "Democracies Without Citizenship" in *NACLA Report on the Americas*; and (with Malak Poppovic) "How To Consolidate Democracy: A Human Rights Approach" in *International Social Science Journal*.

Edna Roland is the Coordinator of Fala Preta, a Black women's health institution in Brazil. She formerly served as the coordinator of the Health Program of Geledés, and a member of its Executive Coordination. A psychologist by training, Ms. Roland was responsible for the design of Geledés' Health Program, a unique first-of-its-kind program in Brazil that brings a combined gender and ethnic perspective to bear in relation to health concerns of Black women in Brazil. Ms. Roland has published numerous articles on issues such as sterilization, population policy, reproductive rights and AIDS. She formerly served as a member of the Director's Council of the National Feminist Network on Health and Reproductive Rights, and the National Commission on Citizenship and Reproduction.

Khehla Shubane is a Research Officer at the Centre for Policy Studies. His undergraduate studies focused on African political science and legal theory, with a minor in industrial sociology. His thesis was entitled "Soweto Rent Boycott." Mr. Shubane was tried, convicted and imprisoned on Robben Island (1976-1982) during South Africa's apartheid era. He was active in the Soweto Civil Association and helped to coordinate the Anti-Community Council Campaign in Soweto. He served on the National Executive Committee of the Azanian Student's Organization, and worked for the Soweto Parents' Crisis Committee to convene the conference at which the National Education Crisis Committee was formed. He is author of numerous publications, including "A Tale of the Two Squirrels: The 1988 Municipal Elections" in *South Africa at the End of the Eighties*; "A Delicate Balance: Reconstructing Regionalism in South Africa" (with R. Humphries); "Representation of Regions in Central Government: A South Africa Perspective" in B. de Villiers and J. Sindane (eds) *Regionalism: Problems and Prospects*. Mr. Shubane serves as a director of SANGONET, Open Society Foundation of South Africa and Rand Merchant Bank.

Ratnamala Singh is a scholar with the National Research Foundation. Previously, she served as the Executive Director of the Centre for Science Development of the Human Sciences Research Council; and Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Durban-Westville, where she earned her Ph.D. She has written numerous publications, including "Kant: Morality and the Right of Resistance," *South African Journal of Philosophy*; "Intellectuals and the Politics of Political Research" in *Transformation*; "The Role of Civil Society in Promoting Democratic Development: Some Aspects of the South African Debate" in *The Role of Voluntary Organizations in Emerging Democracies*; and "The Uses and Abuses of Affirmative Action in South Africa" in *Affirmative Action and Transformation*. She is a member of the Editorial Board of *The South African Journal of Philosophy*, and was the Founding President of the Union of Democratic University Staff Associations; Coordinator of the Task Group on Governance of The National Commission on Higher Education; and the Scientific Committee of the Study Programme on Higher Education Management in Africa of the Association of African Universities. She has been a Visiting Research Fellow in the Southern African Research Program at Yale University and Visiting Professor at Rutgers University.

Gloria Steinem is a writer and Consulting Editor for *Ms. Magazine*, the international feminist bi-monthly that she founded in 1972. She has authored numerous books and articles including, *Moving Beyond Words; Revolution from Within: A Book of Self-Esteem; Outrageous Acts and Everyday Rebellions*; and *Marilyn: Norma Jean*. Her writing has appeared in numerous venues, including *New York Magazine*– a weekly Ms. Steinem helped to found in 1968 and for which she was political columnist. As an organizer, Ms. Steinem has helped to found the Women's Action Alliance; The National Women's Political Caucus; and The Coalition of Labor Union Women. She is President of Voters for Choice, and Founding President of the Ms. Foundation for Women, a national multi-racial women's fund that supports grassroots projects to empower women and girls. She has raised funds and written for many campaigns, especially those of women and candidates of color, and worked for Cesar Chavez's United Farm Workers and other civil rights, peace, economic justice and environmental efforts.

Franklin A. Thomas is a consultant with the TFF Study Group, a non profit initiative focusing primarily on the development process in South Africa. He is a graduate of Columbia College and Columbia University Law School. In the past, Mr. Thomas served as an attorney for the Federal Housing and Home Finance Agency, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and Deputy Police Commissioner in Charge of Legal Matters for the New York City Police Department. Mr. Thomas was President of the Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation for ten years, a community development organization, and President of the Ford Foundation from 1979 to 1996. He served as the Chair of the Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, whose report, *Time Running Out*, was published in 1981 and subsequently updated. Mr. Thomas has received numerous awards and honorary degrees, including the Lyndon Baines Johnson Award, the John Jay and Alexander Hamilton Awards from Columbia College, Columbia University's Medal of Honor, and the Council on Foundations' 1995 Distinguished Grantmaker Award.

Thomas M. Uhlman is President of the New Ventures Group of Lucent Technologies, where he previously served as Senior Vice President of Corporate Strategy, Development and Public Affairs. Dr. Uhlman helped design business strategies for Lucent Technologies and executed business development plans including acquisitions, joint ventures, alliances and new business start-ups. He also managed the company's public affairs activities, which include developing corporate positions on legislative issues and managing relationships with government officials and legislators inside and outside the United States. In 1995, Uhlman joined AT&T as Vice President of Corporate Development after 12 years with Hewlett-Packard Company. At HP, he led the company's activities in worldwide equity investments, strategic alliances and strategic planning. Dr. Uhlman also managed the President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness from 1983-1984 and dealt with the White House and federal agencies to pursue the Commission's recommendations. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science and psychology from the University of Rochester (1968) and a doctorate in political science from the University of North Carolina- Chapel Hill (1975). He has a master's degree in management from Stanford University, and has taught law, public policy and government at the University of Missouri.

Additional copies of this report
are available. For copies or more information,
please contact:

Comparative Human Relations Initiative
The Southern Education Foundation
135 Auburn Avenue, 2nd Floor
Atlanta, GA 30303

Telephone: (404) 523-0410
Facsimile: (404) 523-6904

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An old motto says, "Out of many people, one people." Like the motto, the weaving theme for this publication is made up of different threads and colors, interlacing to create a single pattern of beauty and completeness. It shows that our destinies are inextricably bound.

In the weave, every thread makes a contribution. That intimates that all races bring to the world's stage a vast treasury of distinct ideas, cultural nuances, and social insights that– if creatively woven together– will create a better, brighter and more benevolent world. Alone, the threads aren't as striking. But stitched together, bound by a common goal, the pieces form a great patchwork of unity.

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BEYOND Racism



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HREE NATIONS
AT THE CROSSROADS

AIMS AND AUSPICES

The Comparative Human Relations Initiative is an examination of power relations between people deemed to be "White" or "Black" by virtue of perceived "race" or "appearance" in Brazil, South Africa and the United States. It is an exploration of how racism—the use of superficial characteristics to confer privileges on some people and disadvantage others—operates and is maintained and ways to overcome its consequences.

The focus on Blacks and Whites is not meant to reify "race" nor disregard the experiences of other groups who also suffer from forms of prejudice and discrimination in these countries. To the contrary, the Initiative's work underscores the linkages between all forms of prejudice. There is value in a detailed examination of each piece of the complex puzzle of human relations in these countries, if we are to understand the whole. Ultimately, the solution to racism, sexism and other linked and interacting forms of inequality will be found in broad, multifaceted movements– "new majorities" – to secure the fundamental human rights of all people. The Initiative's overarching aim is to contribute to diverse efforts to develop fairer societies in which race, gender, ethnicity, color and other superficial markers of identity are not used to allocate societal goods, benefits, rights and opportunities.

Brazil, South Africa and the United States were selected for comparison because each has a large and disproportionately poor population of persons of African descent or appearance, and a history of legal and/or informal denial of equal enjoyment of rights and privileges to such persons. While these countries are at different phases of development and each has exceptional characteristics, all are increasingly affected by common trends and transnational developments that are reshaping dynamics of inter-group relations and forcing redefinition of identities, priorities and interests. These trends are creating new levels of global interdependence and imperatives for stepped up efforts to move beyond racism.

Begun in 1995, the Initiative is a project of the Southern Education Foundation of Atlanta, Georgia, U.S.A., a non-profit organization, in collaboration with the Institute for Democracy in South Africa, the Office of the Dean of the Humanities Faculty of the University of Cape Town, and an informal coalition of groups and individuals in Brazil. The Initiative involved several hundred scholars, activists, governmental officials and private sector representatives in meetings in Atlanta (April, 1997), Rio de Janeiro (September, 1997) and Cape Town (March, 1998).

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For copies or more information please contact:

Comparative Human Relations Initiative
The Southern Education Foundation
135 Auburn Avenue, 2nd Floor
Atlanta, GA 30303
Telephone (404) 523-0410 • Facsimile (404) 523-6904
www.beyondracism.org • www.sefatl.org

BRAZIL • SOUTH AFRICA • THE UNITED STATES

Racism

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Introduction

One of the limitations of much of the literature related to inter-group relations is that it is often very particularistic. We examine the trees without realizing that they are part of a forest. Comparisons allow us to discern broad trends, suggest fresh explanations for old problems, and cast familiar issues in a different light. In the global era into which the world has entered, we believe that the field of comparative studies will burgeon.

There are no simple answers to the questions set forth above. Here we can remind the reader only generally of the reasons why these nations form the basis of the comparison. It is, of course, true that these nations are exceptional, differing in history, culture, composition, resources, geography, and phases of development. But they bear a family resemblance.

- Each has a democratic form of governance premised upon accountability and responsiveness to the interests of all of the governed.
- All are powerful regionally and globally and must adapt to the rapidly changing world.
- The world community of nations looks to all three to provide leadership.
- All have in the past sanctioned the enslavement of people of African descent or appearance– in Brazil for over 370 years, in the United States for over 240 years. While in South Africa, slavery was not as widespread or long-term, in all three nations the institution created a cultural mold and an economic and political reality in which Whites were expected to be dominant, while Blacks and Browns and their offspring were expected to assume subservient positions.
- In all three countries, people of African descent or appearance were and, to varying degrees, still are denied rights and treatment equal to that taken for granted by most Whites. The difference in treatment is due to present de facto discrimination and/or the cumulative effects of past disadvantages and discrimination.
- Myths and false ideas to explain, sustain and justify racial inequality and the concentrated impoverishment of people of African descent or appearance have become part of the White-dominated culture of each nation.
- As a consequence of these factors, among others, people of African descent in these nations are disproportionately numbered among the poor and marginalized.

Brazil, South Africa and the United States also face a common set of international trends that will impact on them and have the potential to make them even more alike: the technology-driven, globalizing marketplace; immigration and demographic shifts; and human rights and women's rights movements. In the global information age into which all are entering, these trends promise to heighten communication, proximity and interdependence among peoples of diverse colors, races and ethnicities within nations and between and among nations.

In all three nations, poverty and race/color-based discrimination interact with and help to shape relations between people of European descent or appearance and their darker-skinned counterparts. The link between discrimination and poverty is seen most clearly and readily in South Africa where little time has elapsed between apartheid's end and the beginning of substantive democracy. The continuing effects of apartheid era policies and practices that deliberately under-invested in Black education, training, housing, employment, health care and other services and over-invested in such benefits for Whites are visible. Clearly, measures both to combat discrimination and alleviate poverty are needed in order to dismantle the dual system.

In Brazil, where slavery ended in 1888, without the subsequent practice of de jure segregation and racial discrimination, the passage of time allows many Brazilians to deny the presence of past or present racial discrimination against Afro Brazilians. A myth of "racial democracy" that ignores White privilege or conflates it with capacity or merit has taken hold. In the United States, where de jure segregation and discrimination ended less than 50 years ago, the intergenerational transfer of disadvantages and advantages between Blacks and Whites and current racial discrimination are often overlooked by or invisible to Whites. Since the exercise of power by Whites is normative, "skin privileges" they enjoy may be taken for granted.

What is disheartening in the United States and Brazil is that many policy makers and analysts spend their time arguing about whether "class" or "racial discrimination" is the problem, when clearly both operate in diverse combinations to foster inequality. Anti-discrimination and poverty alleviation measures are both needed and would benefit the nations as a whole. It is not a fair criticism of anti-discrimination measures to say that they have not solved the problem of poverty nor of poverty-alleviation policies to say that they have not eliminated racial discrimination. But in Brazil and the United States, debate on these propositions provides a ready excuse for some to decline to support any response to racial discrimination, poverty or inequality. In South Africa, there is an awareness of the need for both approaches, where the economic climate in the nation and shortages of skilled workers– legacies of apartheid– are retarding economic progress.

In the new global economic era, racism and discrimination are no longer functional. At earlier stages of history, having large numbers of poor and uneducated people of African descent to exploit as sources of cheap labor may have been beneficial to elite groups. This is no longer the case.

In a real sense, discrimination and racism are passe. They have outlived their economic utility. No nation can any longer "afford" to waste the talent and productive capacities represented by large African descent populations. In the highly charged, global marketplace, nations with large numbers of people who are uncared for, unemployed, undereducated, unskilled, and impoverished are at a decided disadvantage. Why would investors or multinational corporations wish to put their funds at risk in nations where there are high crime rates, a poor quality of life, social instability, police violence, inadequate health care, and governments that cannot fulfill their first obligation: to provide for the essential well-being of their people?

Finding ways to develop this productive capacity through constructive investment in human capital is a priority of the first magnitude and a matter of national and international interest. In the past, racism and discrimination may have been a way to enrich elite members of the population. In the future, racism and discrimination will increasingly hamper the ability of nations to achieve or sustain economic growth and development for the benefit of all of their people.

One of the most powerful and transcendent ideas of the 20th century is that all people—irrespective of color or race or gender or other superficial traits—have fundamental human rights. The idea of human rights is now part of the world of commerce and law. It affects relations between and among governments. And it creates an entirely new set of obligations that governments must meet in order to be in compliance with international standards. Brazil, South Africa and the United States will increasingly find their national persona, economic fortunes, and world standing tarnished and harmed by the prevalence of racially identifiable inequality and poverty.

Racism and discrimination– no matter how they are explained or characterized– are a violation of human rights guaranteed by international instruments that the governments of Brazil, South Africa and the United States have ratified. Racism and racial discrimination are violations of domestic and international law.

Racism and discrimination are not simply matters of interpersonal relations or harmless aesthetic preferences. Racism and discrimination are not just habits of the heart. They may be encoded in institutional policies, practices and arrangements that disadvantage one group unfairly and disproportionately based on race or color and privilege another due to race or color. To a large extent, in all three countries, public and private policies and practices that appear to be neutral on their face, but which have an adverse and disproportionate effect on people of African descent or appearance constitute a violation of human rights. The failure to take positive steps in law, policy and practice to ensure the fair and evenhanded distribution of privileges and opportunities across diverse groups constitutes the violation.

A final thought about this volume. At its end, there is a timeline of key events for the three countries. Though not subject to amplification in the text, the timelines make a powerful point. They show that events in each country on matters related to race have to some extent influenced events in others. Freedom movements, in other words, are contagious. The successes in one venue prompt efforts in others. Racial discrimination is an international problem that calls for both national and international responses.

The United Nations has announced its intention to hold a World Conference on Racism in South Africa in 2001. This event, preceded and paralleled by meetings of non-governmental organizations, will furnish a forum for exploring many of the issues and ideas set forth in this volume. It is an important and timely event, coming as it does at the beginning of the new millennium.

It is a reminder that progress has been made in combating racism, albeit at a high price. At the beginning of the 20th century, White supremacy and hegemony were in full force in Brazil, South Africa and the United States. A hundred years later, there is an emerging consensus that the ideology of racial superiority and inferiority has no basis in fact and is unacceptable. The challenge of the new era will be to transform the systems that this old ideology spawned so that they embody the new ideals. Past can be prologue to a future beyond racism, if we honor the commitment of those who have gone before us.



Brazil

Dance of Deception: A Reading of Race Relations In Brazil

By Abdias do Nascimento and Elisa Larkin Nascimento

Introduction

Inequality in Brazil: A General Picture

Table 1: Comparative Data for "Mercosul" Countries

	ARGENTINA	BRAZIL	PARAGUAY	URUGUAY
Area (thousands of km)	**2,737**	**8,457**	**397**	**175**
Population	35,219,612	157,871,980	4,959,713	3,146,200
Gross Domestic Product Per Person	**$5,120**	**$3,370**	**$1,148**	**$6,550**
Domiciles in Poverty	10.0% (urban only)	43.0%	41.0%	7.0%
Literacy	**96.2%**	**79.9%**	**91.2%**	**98.0%**
Child Mortality Rate	25.3	50.2	29.0	24.4
Monthly Minimum Wage	**$400.0**	**$108.00**	**$234.00**	**$88.00**

Source: CEPAL (1995); Cruz (1998), 28-29; GDP in constant 1990 US dollars; deaths per thousand for children under 5; after the February 1999 currency crisis the value of the minimum wage in Brazil dropped to less than that cited here for Uruguay – about $75.00 by the end of 1999; Mercusol is a "common market" in Central and South America.

Table 2 : Distribution of National Income in Brazil, 1960-2000 (in percentages)

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
Poorest 50%	**18**	**15**	**14**	**12**	**11**
Richest 20%	54	62	63	65	64
Inequality index	**3**	**4.1**	**4.5**	**5.4**	**5.8**

Source: IPEA/IBGE, Mantega (1998), 99, projection for 2000.

Table 3: Inequality Index for Brazil, 1981-1995

Proportion of Income for	1981	1985	1988	1990	1993	1995
Poorest 10%	**0.78**	**0.76**	**0.59**	**0.58**	**0.38**	**0.43**
Poorest 20%	2.5	2.4	2.0	2.0	1.8	1.9
Poorest 30%	**5.0**	**4.8**	**4.2**	**4.1**	**4.1**	**4.2**
Poorest 40%	8.4	8.0	7.2	7.1	7.4	7.3
Poorest 50%	**12.9**	**12.3**	**11.2**	**11.2**	**11.6**	**11.6**
GINI coefficient	0.59	0.60	0.62	0.62	0.61	0.61

Source: compiled by the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) with data from the 1996 National Survey of Domicile Samples (PNAD).

Table 4: Composition of Brazil's Gross Domestic Product, 1990-1996 (in percentages)

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Capital	**33**	**38**	**38**	**35**	**38**	**40**	**41**
Labor	45	42	44	45	40	38	38

Source: IBGE and Folha de São Paulo; Mantega (1998).

Brazil in 1999 ranked after only Sierra Leone with the second most unjust income distribution in the world;[6] income concentration consistently has increased over time (Tables 2, 3, and 4). Equally as important as the abject levels of poverty accentuating this inequality are the extravagantly high levels of income held by the rich (Roque and Corrêa, 1998: 3).

Over time the poor not only become poorer but are subjected to ever more subhuman living conditions. While an ostentatious minority elite consumes luxury imports in urban shopping centers, physicians in rural and poor, urban areas are writing prescriptions for rice, beans, and milk to cure one of the diseases afflicting most children: hunger.

Racial Inequality in Brazil

Before dealing with the racial aspect of inequality, one must make clear how racial groups are identified.[7] Official Brazilian census data use two color categories for African descendants: "Preto" (literally, "Black") for dark-skinned and "Pardo" (roughly, mulatto and mestizo) for others. This distinction has proved so arbitrary and subjective as to be essentially useless, yet it leads those unfamiliar with the Brazilian demographic context to mistake the smaller "Preto" group for "Black." It is now accepted convention to identify the Black population as the sum of the Preto and Pardo categories, referred to as "negro," "afro-brasileiro," or "afro-descendente." In English, "Black," "African Brazilian" and "people of African descent" refer to this same sum of the two groups. The "White" and "Pardo" categories are notoriously inflated, and the "Preto" diminished, by the tendency of African-descended interviewees to classify themselves as White or mulatto (Mortara, 1970). This fact is essential to our reading of the information presented below.

Racial hierarchy and segregation are etched indelibly in contrasting landscapes of luxury and privation. African Brazilians in disproportionate numbers live in urban shantytowns called favelas, mocambos, palafitas and so on. To visit Rio de Janeiro's Central Station[8] is to witness dangerously dilapidated trains taking hours to transport overwhelmingly Black workers from the huge metropolitan area called the Baixada Fluminense to their jobs in the capital city, a scene that recalls Black South Africans' commute from segregated townships. The racial contrast between a public school in the Baixada– or in poor suburbs or favelas almost anywhere in Brazil– and a university in a rich area like Rio de Janeiro's Zona Sul very nearly duplicates the difference between a township school and a White university in South Africa. South Africans have Black universities and had them even under apartheid. African Brazilians have nothing comparable.

While the Baixada Fluminense has been ranked by the World Health Organization as the second most miserable poverty pocket in the world after Bombay, its situation is not exceptional in Brazil; similar scenarios are common throughout the country. For this reason, it provides a representative portrait of inequality.

Almost entirely Black, the five Baixada municipalities[9] are also almost entirely sewerless; children play in the stench of open gutters that carry filth through mud-ridden, mosquito-infested streets. They are called "Black gutters" (valas negras), a characteristically racist expression identifying African Brazilian people with the untreated sewage to which they are exposed. Leprosy and epidemics of preventable diseases such as dengue remain largely untouched by public policy in these areas. Seventy percent of Baixada children are severely undernourished. The Baixada rivals South African townships not only in poverty but also in violence; more people are killed there by homicide than by automobile accident.

Extremely unbalanced development levels within this immense nation result in enormous regional differences. Perhaps the greatest gap of social inequality separates dwellers in urban areas from miserably poor, rural populations of which African Brazilians are the majority (IBGE, 1997: 46). If the Baixada Fluminense can be compared to South African townships, Brazil's Northeast and Northern regions could be likened to Bantustans. The undercounted Afro-Brazilian group (the sum of the Preto and Pardo categories), officially about 45 percent of the overall population, is concentrated about 70 percent (Table 5) in these regions. Here, the practice of slavery generally goes unpunished, and semi-slavery is by no means uncommon. Assassinations of rural labor union officials and community leaders are routine matters of impunity: about 1,000 were actually murdered between 1964 and 1986. Countless other deaths went unrecorded (SBPC, 1987).

The tiny Asian group appearing in this table (less than .5 percent) represents the most recent in a series of immigration waves encouraged by the Brazilian government since the late 19th century. Active in agriculture, this mostly Japanese community is concentrated in prosperous rural areas of the Central-West as well as urban centers in the developed Southeast. In the poor Northeast, Asians amount to one-tenth of one percent of the population. Despite their very recent arrival in comparison with Blacks, who have been in Brazil for 500 years, Asians generally enjoy superior access to education, income, occupation and housing. Edson Lopes Cardoso (1999) has noted the contrast between two major urban neighborhoods named Liberty: the Asian one in São Paulo, the capital city of São Paulo State (Southeast region), and the African-Brazilian Liberty of Salvador, the capital of Bahia State in the Northeast. In São Paulo, it seems natural that the streets of Liberty are hung with signs saying "wanted: Oriental office boy" or "Japanese clerk required." No one finds it strange that Liberty banks have Asian tellers or its stores have Asian managers. In Salvador's Liberty, bank tellers and store managers are generally White, while any stated preference for Blacks in hiring, education or access to services is indignantly condemned by Bahian society as racist.

Table 5: Population Percent by Color or Race, 1996

	White	Preto	Pardo	Asian	Native Brazilian Indian
Brazil	**55.2**	**6.0**	**38.2**	**0.4**	**0.2**
Urban North*	28.5	3.7	67.2	0.4	0.2
Northeast	**30.6**	**6.1**	**62.9**	**0.1**	**0.2**
Southeast	65.4	7.4	26.5	0.6	0.1
South	**85.9**	**3.1**	**10.5**	**0.4**	**0.1**
Central-West	48.3	4.0	46.6	0.6	0.5

Source: PNAD (1996); excludes those who did not declare their color.

* In all tables, "Urban North" excludes the rural area of Rondônia, Acre, Amazonas, Roraima, Pará and Amapá States in the northern region.

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Native Brazilian Indians, original dwellers of this land, have been the victims of genocide in myriad forms since colonial times. As a result, they now make up a smaller part of the overall population than Asians, even in the Central-West region where they are most numerous. Living today in hopelessly squalid poverty, deprived of their land and tradition, their youth plagued with suicide in epidemic proportions, Native Brazilians continue their struggle for survival. Over history, they have been alternately despised and romanticized, becoming the symbol of this century's Modernist movement among elite urban artists and intellectuals. Its slogan of cannibalism (antropofagia) is an appropriate image of how White Brazilian society and culture metaphorically "ate up" and digested what they defined as Native Indian and Afro-Brazilian traditions, producing what they defined as a new "syncretic," modern culture. This self-laudatory image was at once self-deluding. While Modernists believed they were rejecting colonial European standards in favor of "more authentic" Native Brazilian and African ones, they in fact understood little if anything of Native Brazilian or African tradition and were merely mouthing slogans newly articulated but Western in essence.

What truly distinguishes Brazil from South Africa or the United States is not so much the nature of social injustice as the ideological dance of deception. Traditionally, analysts have been so enamored of the idea of harmony among races in Brazil as to largely ignore racial inequalities. When acknowledged, they are somewhat unnervingly attributed to what Brazilian intellectuals refer to as "the social question," as opposed to "the racial question." Inequalities of a racial nature are imputed to the historical legacy of slavery, with current or recent discrimination deemed insignificant to their composition. While the existence of "prejudice"– contrary to that of "discrimination"– is recognized, it is seen as merely an aesthetic problem exercising little, if any, influence on social reality.[10]

The power of such ideas, has been so central in the articulation of the Brazilian national consciousness as to endow them with a status akin to taboo. Recently, however, the racial nature of inequality progressively has been demonstrated by social science research,[11] to the extent that today Roque and Corrêa (1998) observe: "two factors of disparity cross over different levels of reproduction of social inequality and have deep roots in Brazilian culture: gender and race."

Gender and Race Disparities

Yet in Brazil the gender distinction cannot be adequately understood without considering race. In the income hierarchy, race is the first determining factor, then gender. White women retain a clearly privileged position in relation to Black men, and Afro-Brazilian women are left at the very bottom of the scale for income and job prestige.

Table 6: Average Earnings by Gender and Race.

White men	6.3
White women	3.6
Black men	2.9
Black women	1.7

Source: IBGE, 1994; expressed in multiples of the monthly minimum wage (the end of 1999, about $75.00)

Income disparities among racial groups exist regionally. Table 7 shows that the North and Northeast, where African Brazilians are the large majority, have the lowest income and economic activity levels in the country, and the highest inequality rates (Gini index).[12] Table 8, which shows average family income by region, confirms that the regions with majority Afro-Brazilian populations are by far the poorest.

Table 7: Income and Inequality Rates by Region

	Average Monthly Income (R$)	Gini Index	Rate of Economic Activity
Brazil	**290**	**0.590**	**59.1**
Urban North	236	0.569	54.9
Northeast	**158**	**0.590**	**57.9**
Southeast	366	0.569	58.1
South	**325**	**0.567**	**64.6**
Central-West	290	0.599	61.6

Source: IBGE, 1997; PNAD, 1996; population 10 years of age or over, with or without income; R$ = Real, Brazilian Currency.

There are also consistent and very significant differences among race or color groups within the regions. For example, in the richer states of the Southeast region, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, the incidence of miserable poverty is two to three times as high among Blacks as Whites (Table 9). In the Northeast, the proportion of Blacks in miserable poverty is a third higher than that of Whites; in the North/Central-West it is more than 60 percent higher.

In Brazil, Blacks generally earn less than half as much as Whites (Silva, 1998). White men earn almost four times as much as Afro-Brazilian women, who earn less than half the value of White women's average income.[13] About 26 percent of Blacks, compared to 16 percent of Whites, earn less

Table 8: Average Family Income, 1996

	Multiples of Minimum Wage 2 or less	2 to 5	5 to 10	10 to 20	Over 20	No income
Brazil	**22.9**	**29.2**	**21.0**	**12.5**	**8.4**	**3.7**
Urban North	23.1	31.4	20.7	12.0	6.4	5.1
Northeast	**40.6**	**30.2**	**11.9**	**5.4**	**3.6**	**5.1**
Southeast	14.1	27.4	25.4	16.6	11.4	2.9
South	**17.8**	**30.5**	**24.9**	**13.9**	**8.7**	**2.6**
Central-West	21.7	32.1	20.0	11.5	8.7	4.3

Source: PNAD, 1996; in multiples of the monthly minimum wage; excluding those who did not declare income.

than the minimum wage, while one percent of Blacks as opposed to four percent of Whites earned more than 10 times the minimum wage. Educated African Brazilians earn less than Whites with the same education, and in higher income brackets Whites receive about 5.6 times more income than Blacks. In all these situations, Black men earn more than Black women do, but White women earn more than Black men do (PNAD 1987).

Table 10 shows that fully twice as many Blacks (Pretos plus Pardos) as Whites live in "miserable poverty," earning only up to one-fourth the value of Brazil's monthly minimum wage. The inverse relation prevails at higher income levels; the proportion of Whites who enjoy higher incomes is three, four, or five times that of Blacks. Only in the groups receiving one-half to one minimum wage group (earning $32 to $75 a month) are differences of race or color less accentuated. About one-fourth of each group– Whites, Pretos and Pardos– appear in this category, a fact that speaks clearly of poverty levels in Brazil. At the next level up, among those earning $76 to $152, the proportion of Whites is twice as high as that of Blacks, a gap that grows as income levels rise.

African-Brazilian women embody the feminization of poverty observed by the women's movement internationally over the last decades. Eighty percent of the employed Black women are concentrated in manual occupations; more than half of these are domestic servants, and the rest are self-employed in domestic tasks (washing, ironing, cooking), among the lowest-paid in the economy. About one in four African-Brazilian female heads of households earn less than half the minimum wage (Castro, 1991). These parameters have remained consistent or have worsened over time.[14] Unemployment statistics, indicating higher unemployment rates among Blacks, suggests that African-Brazilian women account for more than their share of the extraordinarily high rates among women in general.

Table 9: Percent of "Miserable Poverty" by Region and Color, 1998

State/Region	**Color** White	Preto	Pardo
Rio de Janeiro (Southeast)	**6.0**	**12.7**	**13.8**
São Paulo (Southeast)	4.0	12.3	8.7
South	**15.2**	**23.8**	**27.9**
Minas Gerais/Espirito Santo (Southeast)	19.4	37.7	35.1
Northeast	**38.5**	**51.3**	**49.5**
North/Central-West	14.0	26.9	23.2

Source: IBGE/PNAD, 1988; "miserable poverty" includes per capita family income up to 1/4 minimum wage; special compilations, courtesy of Nelson do Valle Silva/ IUPERJ.

Table 10: Per Capita Family Income by Color, 1988

Per Capita Family Income	Color		
	White	Preto	Pardo
Up to 1/4 minimum wage	14.7%	30.2%	36.0%
1/4 to 1/2 m.w.	19.2	27.4	26.8
1/2 to 1 m.w.	24.2	24.9	20.7
1 to 2 m.w.	20.2	12.0	10.6
2 to 3 m.w.	8.2	2.7	2.9
3 to 5 m.w.	6.5	1.6	1.8
5 to 10 m.w.	4.5	0.8	0.9
10 to 20 m.w.	1.5	0.3	0.2
20 or more m.w.	0.3	0.1	0.0
Total	100%	100%	100%

Source: IBGE, PNAD-88; special compilations by Nelson do Valle Silva/IUPERJ, courtesy of Nelson do Valle Silva/IUPERJ; the minimum wage is approximately $150 per month.

Table 11: Unemployment Rates by Sex and Race, 1996

	Total	Men	Women	White	Black*
Brazil	6.9	5.7	8.8	6.6	7.7
Urban North	7.7	6	10.2	6.8	8.2
Northeast	6.3	5.2	7.8	5.7	6.5
Southeast	7.7	6.2	9.8	7.4	8.7
South	5.4	4.5	6.6	5.1	8.1
Central-West	7.9	6.2	10.5	7.6	8.7

Source: PNAD, 1996; percent of population 10 years of age or over, with or without income.

* Preto and Pardo equal "Black" in all tables.

Education Disparities

Not only are Black families disproportionately concentrated among the poor, but their per capita income levels are lower. Thus, more people in the family must work for equivalent household earnings. Children often leave school to "help the family" by cutting sugar cane, working harvests or mines, or selling candy at traffic signals. Illiteracy rates among African Brazilians are more than double those among Whites, and the percentage of Blacks with nine years of schooling or more is almost three times smaller than that of Whites. According to one study, about two-thirds of African-Brazilian children obtain a basic education, whereas about 85 percent of White children do. Once through elementary school, a Black child's chances of going on to secondary school are on the order of 40 percent, whereas a White child's is 57 percent. African Brazilians who graduate from high school have about half the chance of White students to go on to university (Sant'Anna and Paixão, 1998: 112-114.)

The following tables give a picture of education and literacy levels by region, gender and color. Table 12 shows that illiteracy rates are by far the highest in the poor and mostly Black Northeast, where enrollment rates are lowest; differences between men and women are more accentuated there. According to Table 13, differences in education levels are significantly greater between Blacks and Whites than between men and women in all the regions, a fact confirmed by Table 14. Here again, race is more significant than gender. Half as many White women as Black women have only one year or less of schooling, while the difference between White men and Black men is only slightly smaller. In this category, as in all the others, the difference between White men and White women (about 30 percent) is significantly smaller than the Black/White disparity, and the difference between Black men and Black women is even less accentuated. In the group with 11-14 years of schooling, the proportion of Black men and women is about half that of White men and women, respectively. Black women are slightly more present than Black men in the higher education categories, but this gap is negligible when compared with the difference between Blacks and Whites – a whopping six times more in the category for 15 years of education or more.

Table 12: Illiteracy and Enrollment Rates by Region and Gender, 1996

	Illiteracy Rates			Enrollment Rates		
	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
Brazil	14.7	14.5	14.8	91.2	90.6	91.8
Urban North	11.6	11.2	11.9	92.1	92.1	92.2
Northeast	28.7	31.1	26.6	86.4	84.8	88.0
Southeast	8.7	7.5	9.9	94.1	93.9	94.3
South	8.9	7.8	9.9	93.6	94.1	93.0
Central-West	11.6	11.3	11.8	92.9	92.5	93.4

Source: PNAD, 1996; percent of persons 15 years of age or over.

Public education is notoriously inferior in quality to private schooling, which mostly White, privileged pupils attend. Brazil's military regime, which ruled from 1964 to 1985, was largely responsible for creating this situation. The

Table 13: Average Years of Schooling by Gender and Color, 1996

	Total	Men	Women	White	Black
Brazil	5.3	5.2	5.4	6.2	4.2
Urban North	**5.2**	**4.9**	**5.4**	**6.3**	**4.7**
Northeast	3.9	3.6	4.2	4.8	3.5
Southeast	**6.0**	**6.0**	**6.0**	**6.6**	**4.9**
South	5.8	5.8	5.8	6.0	4.3
Central-West	**5.5**	**5.2**	**5.5**	**6.3**	**4.7**

Source: PNAD 1996, persons 10 years of age or over.

Table 14: Adult Years of Schooling by Gender and Color, 1996

Years of Schooling	**Men**			**Women**		
	White	Preto	Pardo	White	Preta	Parda
No school/ less than 1 yr	**16.2**	**24.0**	**23.4**	**11.2**	**25.5**	**21.0**
1 to 3 years	17.0	23.8	25.8	15.7	21.4	23.2
4 to 7 years	**36.6**	**33.9**	**32.0**	**35.5**	**32.3**	**33.7**
8 to 10 years	15.6	11.2	10.5	15.3	11.5	11.5
11 to 14 years	**14.4**	**6.1**	**7.1**	**16.4**	**8.2**	**9.2**
15 or more yrs	6.2	0.9	1.2	5.9	1.1	1.4
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**

Source: PNAD 1996, special compilation by Nelson do Valle Silva/IUPERJ, courtesy of Nelson do Valle Silva/IUPERJ; percent of persons 20 years old or older.

effects of its education policies far outlasted the dictatorship, eroding or destroying the public school system and turning education over to the private, education-for-profit lobby. Quality public education, which did exist before the 1970s, was virtually erased. Today, the public system of primary and secondary education fails to prepare pupils for university, while public university education is available almost exclusively to an elite able to pay expensive tuition at private primary and secondary schools.

Indeed, removing mention of the descendents of India and of "excellent" schooling (even at best, educational standards in Brazil are less than excellent), the following description of South Africa's education system (James, pp. xx) could well have been written to describe Brazil's as:

> *... a schooling system which struggles to enroll all eligible pupils, fails to retain the majority of them to secondary level, and offers them a quality of schooling which varies from the excellent (for a minority) to the abysmal (for the majority). The consequence is a racial pyramid of educational attainment. ... The rapid expansion of tertiary educational involvement by Africans has meant their enrollment in the less technical directions since most schools for African pupils fail to qualify them in mathematics and science. The technical and commercial elite remains predominantly White and Indian as a result.*

Disparities in Mortality and Living Conditions

Life expectancy is shorter among Blacks than Whites, even taking into account differences in income and education levels. While regional differences in infant and child mortality rates are enormous, these rates are significantly higher among Blacks in all regions. Perhaps most compelling are racial disparities in living conditions (sewage, garbage collection, treated water) shown in Tables 18 and 19. Again, they prevail over and above the stark inequalities among regions.[15]

Table 15: Life Expectancy at Birth by Race

	1940/50	1970/80
Whites	47.5	66.1
Non-Whites	40	59.4

Source: PNAD, 1990; compiled by Singer (1995); Bento (1998), 61.

Disparities in Public Images

School curricula and literature generally depict a White Brazil, omitting or distorting the history and culture of Afro-Brazilians. In the same way, the mass media present an image of Brazil that looks Scandinavian, whereas nearly half the population is of African descent even according to distorted, official, statistics. When depicted, African Brazilians are generally stereotyped in subordinate positions. Publicity images with racist connotations have been denounced frequently in recent years.

Stereotype-based discrimination is very concrete in Afro-Brazilian life, especially in the form of police repression. Blacks notoriously are "suspect"; citizens as well as African diplomats, taken for "uppity" Negroes, whose fancy cars could only be stolen, have experienced arbitrary detention. Convictions are disproportionately high among indicted Blacks, only one among countless forms of discrimination

Table 16: Life Expectancy at Birth by Race, Income and Education, 1996

	Income		Education	
	Lowest Levels	Highest Levels	1-4 Years	4 Years or More
Whites	**59.5**	**70.4**	**66.2**	**72.3**
Non-Whites	55.8	63.7	62.2	66.6

Source: PNAD, 1996; compiled by Singer (1995); Bento (1998): 61.

Table 17: Child Mortality Rate by Gender and Color, 1996

	Infant Mortality		Child Mortality	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Brazil	**48.0**	**36.4**	**65.5**	**49.7**
Urban North	45.2	34.6	-	41.6
Northeast	**71.7**	**60.8**	**105.7**	**33.5**
Southeast	27.7	17.2	41.4	74.8
South	**25.2**	**14.8**	**36.2**	**50.0**
Central-West	29.5	19.3	46.1	35.1

	Infant Mortality		Child Mortality	
	White	Black	White	Black
Brazil	**37.3**	**62.3**	**45.7**	**76.1**
Urban North	-	-	-	-
Northeast	**68**	**96.3**	**82.8**	**102.1**
Southeast	25.1	43.1	30.9	52.7
South	**28.3**	**38.9**	**34.8**	**47.7**
Central-West	27.8	42.0	31.1	51.4

Source: PNAD, 1996; mortality for children under 5 is estimated from 1993; all rates per person for every 1000.

Table 18: Sanitation by Race of Heads of Household, 1996

	Treated Water		Sewage Disposal	
	White	Blacks	White	Blacks
Brazil	**81.0**	**64.7**	**73.6**	**49.7**
Urban North	63.0	54.8	56.5	41.6
Northeast	**64.2**	**52.6**	**47.0**	**33.5**
Southeast	89.1	52.6	86.8	74.8
South	**77.0**	**52.6**	**69.2**	**50.0**
Central-West	72.0	76.8	43.6	35.1

Source: PNAD, 1996; "sewage disposal" includes either sewage collection system or septic tank; percent of heads of households.

in the justice system (Oliveira et.al., 1998). Favela dwellers at their homes are routinely invaded by police. Deaths and injuries among innocent bystanders are common. Violence against children and adolescents, internationally recognized since the Candelária and Vigário Geral massacres, victimizes African-Brazilians in 80 to 90 percent of the cases.

While hotly denied in everyday discussion, job and pay discrimination are well-documented realities (PNDH, 1998; Nascimento, 1997-99).[16] Other types of daily discrimination affect Blacks in Brazil as in any segregated society. One current form takes place in banks, where automatic metal-detector doors block out Black customers in situations where Whites routinely would be let in. Also, Afro-Brazilians face frequent, unfounded accusations of shoplifting and exceptionally rigorous demands for identification and documentation when paying by check.[17]

Table 19: Housing Infrastructure by Color, 1996

Housing Conditions	**Color**			**Total**
	White	Preto	Pardo	
Domestic garbage collection	**70.8**	**53.1**	**47.8**	**61.0**
Piped water	84.2	61.6	56.1	72.1
Electricity	**92.1**	**81.8**	**78.0**	**86.1**
Rustic homes, one room or accommodation	3.2	11.9	11.6	7.0
Refrigerator	**81.0**	**58.5**	**54.1**	**69.4**
Television	82.9	64.1	59.4	72.8

Source: PNAD, 1996; courtesy of Nelson do Valle Silva/IUPERJ; percent of inhabitants.

Historical Roots of Inequality

Modern Brazil's beginnings lie in the same process that brought into being countries like the United States and South Africa: the heady expansion of Europe in the 15th century when Portuguese navigators wrenched the lands of indigenous peoples to dominate the wealth and women of the world.

Portuguese and Spanish colonialists sought less to build a home in a new land than to transfer wealth to Europe. Institutionalized rape of non-White women was a fact as basic to structuring these societies as White women's subjugation. From Brazil's beginnings, foreign debt and a production policy based on monoculture and mineral extraction for export set the tone of macroeconomic policies that consistently have bled the nation to this day.

Perhaps the difference that most marks the historical and contemporary presence of Africans in Brazil, compared with the United States, is that Africans and their descendants have constituted the majority of its population, as in the minority White settler regime of South Africa. All of South and Central America have majority populations of indigenous and/or African descent. This fact brings into focus the first agile step in the dance of deception, for the title "Latin" America betrays the imposition, often by violent means, of a European identity on non-Latin peoples. Its companion pirouette, the notion of "discovery" applied to a land of advanced civilizations inhabited over millennia, obscures the process of genocide unleashed against those peoples for centuries. From this process emerged an America that is "Latin" to the extent that its minority White elites have succeeded in repressing its peoples.

Importation of Africans to Spanish and Portuguese colonies began much earlier than in the United States. From 1502 to 1870, South and Central America imported 5.3 million enslaved Africans, with Brazil accounting for 3.6 million. In the same period, some 450,000 Africans were brought into the United States (Chiavenato, 1980). Brazil's relative proximity to Africa meant prices so low that it was more profitable to buy a new African than to preserve a slave's health. Africans generally lasted about seven years, after which they were replaced, a procedure not economically sound in the United States. The Southern United States' image of slave cabins contrasts sharply with colonial Brazil, where the senzala was similar to a landed slave ship, housing hundreds at a time.

Brazil was the last Christian country to abolish slavery in 1888. No measures were taken to integrate new African-descended citizens into the national economy or society. Many stayed on plantations as semi-slaves or moved from senzalas to urban hills, forming favelas. Some of these had earlier beginnings as Quilombos.[18] Santos (1994, 1996) cogently demonstrates how the nature of slavery's abolition is crucial to the interrelated factors causing and characterizing African Brazilians' exclusion from society.

During colonial and abolitionist periods, the non-Latin majority in South and Central America was generally on the order of three-fifths to two-thirds. In 1872 in Brazil, Blacks numbered 6.1 million compared with 3.7 million Whites. Abolition brought panic to the ruling elite, which hurried to set about constructing public policies aimed at rubbing out the "Black stain" and "purifying the nation's racial stock."[19] The goal announced by the Brazilian delegate to the 1911 Universal Races Congress in London was to eliminate African descendants[20] by the year 2012 (Skidmore, 1974: 66). The subjugation of women, both White and Black, was of course key to this sort of policy planning.

These policies had two cornerstones: 1) massive state-subsidized European immigration under laws excluding undesirable races and 2) cultivation of the whitening ideal based on the subordination of women and the slogan "marry white to improve the race." Here the politics of deception stand out in bold relief. Until very recently in academic research, European immigration was considered by respected analysts (e.g. Prado Jr., 1966) as necessary due to a "lack of qualified labor" to compete in Brazil's fledgling industrial economy. Social science, like society, simply obliterated from the employment equation the majority population of emancipated African Brazilians who, enslaved or free, not only had been responsible for highly skilled labor but also had been "qualified" to operate every technological change hitherto introduced in the economy. The fact is that jobs now went to "more desirable" Europeans whose subsidized arrival was intended to contribute to the "improvement" (the whitening) of Brazilian racial stock (Skidmore, 1974).

The majority population of African descent embodied a potential threat to the minority elite's political power that was translated into the discourse of national unity. Combined with notions of pseudo-scientific racism, this discourse established Africanity or Blackness as anti-Brazilian. While Brazil has always had Africans, they were transformed into foreigners by an almost exclusively European definition of "national identity."

Between 1890 and 1914, more than 1.5 million Europeans arrived in São Paulo alone, 64 percent with travel fare paid by the State government (Andrews, 1991). Meanwhile, stigmatized not only as unqualified but also as dangerous and disorderly (Gomes, 1995),[21] Black men were virtually excluded from the new industrial labor market. African-Brazilian women went to work for a pittance– if for anything at all besides board and bread– as cooks, nursemaids, washerwomen, and street vendors. Afro-Brazilian religious communities,[22] led mostly by Black women, made survival and human development possible for Afro-Brazilian people despite police persecution.

Such is the historical backdrop of the severe income, employment, housing and other disparities affecting African Brazilians today. While not generally characterized by legal mandates (albeit numerous laws did explicitly establish racist policies, including the inscription of "eugenics" into the 1934 Constitution), these inequalities clearly constitute a stark reality of de facto segregation.

Whitening, Demography and Color Classifications

In Brazil, as in all of "Latin" America, the culture of whitening (embranquecimento or blanqueamiento) based on the subjugation of women leads the mestiçagem/mestizaje ballet in intricate toesteps around the conviction that Iberian elites created a cordial and harmonious form of race relations (Dzidzienyo, 1971). Closely associated are two corollaries: 1) that slavery there was a more benevolent institution,[23] and 2) that the absence of legalized racial segregation and a constitutional provision of equality before the law were sufficient to evidence a nonracist society. Both notions have had enormous impact not only on the Brazilian popular conscience but also on the country's image abroad.[24]

The very existence of the mestizo population has been taken as a final guarantee against the existence of racial discrimination, in contrast to "truly racist" countries like the United States and South Africa, where the dancers of the racial democracy ballet believe there is no race mixture.[25] Allegations that miscegenation was based on mutual consent for intermarriage or on cordial sexual relations among the races have been unmasked by African-descent writers, who show that it as a function of subordinating Black women since colonial times.[26]

The notion of harmonious relations in a benevolent slave system is not unlike the rosy portrayals of the antebellum South in U.S. literature and cinema classics. But the "Latin" flavor of machismo marks this ideology profoundly, as illustrated in the sweet picture of miscegenation painted, for example, by Pierre Verger (1977: 10). He describes how the White sons of plantation owners

> *... would roam the fields together with the black youngsters who served as their whipping boys but also as their playmates and schoolmates. They adopted African reactions and patterns of behavior. Later on, they would undergo their sexual initiation with the colored girls working in the big house or in the fields, thus infusing elements of sensual attraction and comprehension into their relations with what one has chosen to call persons of different races.*

Sexual abuse against subordinated women is a matter of domination, whether in war (from the Roman legions and Atilla the Hun to Bosnia and Kosovo) or in the maintenance of rule by force in colonial or authoritarian regimes. Miscegenation as its fruit says little about comprehension or attraction among human beings but speaks eloquently of violent control over women. The genius of the Brazilian ideology is to make this violence the meat of self-laudatory discourse in which the White elite purges itself of responsibility for its excesses of oppression.[27] Gilberto Freyre (1940, 1946) is its master. He graphically describes the horrors of torture committed against enslaved Africans, then concludes by leaving such pearls as this one shining against the backdrop of inequality in Brazil:

> *The crossbreeding so widely practiced here corrected the social distance which otherwise would have remained enormous between plantation mansion and slave quarters. What the large-landholding, slaveowning monoculture produced in the way of aristocratization, dividing Brazilian society into classes of masters and slaves, ... was in great part neutralized by miscegenation's social effects. Indian and African women, at first, then mulatto women, the yallers, octoroons and so on, becoming the white master's domestics, concubines and even legitimate wives, played a powerful role in Brazil's social democratization.*

Such ideas are intricately combined with a social hierarchy of color that has been defined by African-American intellectuals of the region as pigmentocracy,[28] in which lighter skin is identified with greater prestige and economic status. Social reward is offered not only for "improving" the race but also for rejecting African identity and assuming European cultural values and criteria of personal beauty.

Central to this problem are the intricacies of discourse around the mulatto woman. Her image as a paragon of beauty in the rosy portrayal of non-racist society has been roundly denounced (Nascimento, 1978; Ramos-Bennett, 1995; Gilliam and Gilliam, 1996; Gilliam, 1998) as a smokescreen and an excuse for sexual exploitation. The ultimate aesthetic ideal in Brazil is really the blue-eyed blonde,[29] who, unlike the mulatto woman, is not stereotyped as easy or loose. As one traditional saying goes: "White ladies for marrying, Black women to do the work, mulatto women to fornicate" (Nascimento, 1977: 46).

The social compulsion to whiteness is a common heritage of colonial regimes, and analysts like Frantz Fanon (1967) and Albert Memmi (1965) have long since revealed its attendant psychological problems. Rather than being seen as one of White supremacism's many faces or as a legacy of colonialism, it is presented as proof positive of Latin anti-racism. The following example (Diegues Junior, 1977) eloquently states the ruling elite's effort to portray Brazil as a White country irrespective of its demographic reality:[30]

> *... the predominance of the white contingent [of the Brazilian population] is evident, since in Brazil even those of mixed race who have a small or large amount of Negro or Indian blood, but without one of these groups' physical traits, are considered white. Which demonstrates the absence of any discrimination of racial nature, in terms of the person's ethnic origin.*

. . . if racism is deemed not to exist, with what legitimacy can its targets' voice be raised?

In Brazilian social science, enormous energies are dedicated to this last proposition: there is an essential difference between rejection of African color and rejection of African origin. The hypodescendancy criterion is considered racist, whereas "prejudice of mark," pigmentocracy's color criterion,[31] is taken as arbitrary and innocent, a purely aesthetic aversion to the darker phenotype (Nogueira, 1955,1959). Theorists dissociate African phenotype from African origin and conclude that Latinos evolved a "more benign" form of prejudice, nonracial in nature.[32]

The whitening ideology has posed a demographic quandary[33] by pressuring census interviewees to declare themselves in the lighter of three official color categories: Branco (White), Preto (Black) or Pardo (mulatto). Statisticians recognize the resulting distortion of population statistics, in which "the preto group loses a great deal, the pardo group gains much more than it loses, and the white group gains a lot and loses nothing" (Mortara, 1970: 458).[34] While official statistics put the sum of Pretos and Pardos at 48 percent, estimates that take into account their distortion by the whitening ideal are closer to 70 or 80 percent. The category Pardo, a catchall group used since 1940 to accommodate the extremely subjective classifications used by Brazilians, is widely recognized as awkward and artificial. Yet when interviewees spontaneously classified themselves, the result was citation of 136 different color categories, reflecting the effort of the lighter-skinned not to be classed in the same categories as those any darker in hue (Vieira, 1995: 27).

Undoubtedly, hegemony belongs to Moreno, a term that gives full rein to the subjective wanderings of Brazilian color consciousness. It can be used to describe very dark Black people or very light mestizos, depending upon the point being made. Generally, the point is to get around saying "Black" (Preto or the more popular Escurinho), even if the person in question can be placed in a range of color variations that most certainly indicate African origin.

This brings us to the real nature of the plethora of color designations: euphemism. The pejorative connotation of words like "black" ("negro," "preto," "escuro") make almost any of these expressions traditionally an insult; thus, considerable effort is made politely to avoid them. The generally pejorative notion of Africanness is carefully weeded out of Brazilian national identity except in very specific instances like music, cuisine, religion, and sports. In these cases, it is defined largely by those who did not create it and where it is displayed as "proof" of racial harmony and tolerance of diversity.[35] Since African identity is still vaguely assessed as a threat to national unity, terms intimately associated with Africanity are avoided partly as a matter of citizenship loyalty.[36] Frequent protests that someone is not Black or of African origin, but Brazilian, are heard.

Voices and Viewpoints

A major consequence of de facto, as opposed to de jure, discrimination is that those excluded lose their voice. Indeed, if racism is deemed not to exist, with what legitimacy can its targets' voice be raised? White spokesmen have assumed and been granted the legitimacy to speak for all. Challenging this procedure traditionally is considered "reverse racism."

The following illustrative exchange (Cadernos Brasileiros, 1968: 70-72) took place between this senior author and Clarival do Prado Valladares, a member of the White Bahian elite who in 1966 represented Brazil at the First International Festival of Black Arts in Dakar and was acting as moderator of a panel on abolition:[37]

Nascimento (N): ... in the Federal Council of Culture, of which the Moderator is one of the members, we do not see one Black representative of black culture.

Valladares (V): But sir, you see in the Federal Council of Culture men very concerned with Negro Culture in Brazil, authors of definitive works.

N: Perfect, but I think the Black people also have the *right, themselves, to advocate their own problems.*

V: The Negro in Brazil is not represented only by pigmentation: the Negro in Brazil is Brazil. ... I believe that I have, more than the most pigmented of people, the consciousness of a Brazil with its Negro values; I have struggled for them and also dedicate myself to the biography of those values. ... If the Federal Council of Culture does not have characteristically a Negro by epiderm, it has someone who is zealously vigilant of Negro culture.

N: Perfect. I think that is formidable and I thank Your Excellency, but this precisely confirms the eternal .... process of Brazilian paternalist racism.

That this issue does not belong to an obsolete, if recent, past was graphically driven home in 1996, when the Ministry of Justice sponsored a groundbreaking event on affirmative action.[38] In the plenary sessions, Brazilian "experts" on race relations, nearly all of them White, joined African-American affirmative action specialists from the United States, to present their contributions.[39] Some of the affirmative action specialists (Gilliam, 1998) found themselves uncomfortably sharing the podium with authors publicly contested by the audience, almost exclusively African-Brazilian intellectuals and militants of the Black movement. Prominent anthropologist Roberto da Matta addressed this audience declaring that racial democracy, even though it had not been fully realized, was "a generous idea. ... After all, all of us have had, from childhood, at least one black friend whose affection we have cultivated throughout our lives." The audience might have asked, "all of who?" Da Matta's statement was a crystal clear expression of the racial identity implicitly assumed by "Brazilian society's" spokesmen when considering questions of race, particularly when speaking from the lofty heights of academic authority.

As Ghanaian scholar Anani Dzidzienyo (1995: 355) has observed: "The success of [Afro-Brazilian] struggle ultimately hinges on the legitimacy of a black perspective in national public discourse." (Emphasis added.)

Correcting the Record

Never has the Afro-Brazilian voice been silenced. The history of Africans' fight for freedom and against discrimination in Brazil is intense and extensive, covering the entire national territory and history,[40] albeit excluded from conventional versions still taught in the nation's schools. While this essay is not the place to document this history,[41] a few reparations are in order to restore the balance in favor of the Afro-Brazilian voice.

Whatever the tendency to invoke the "social question" or the color criterion, race is paramount to African Brazilians; the effect of de facto or color discrimination on their living conditions is equivalent to that of de jure or racial discrimination.[42]

More importantly, as Dzidzienyo (1995: 345) notes: "race relations ... can be understood only in the context of the power relations involved. Indeed, it is precisely the dimension of power and its unequal distribution that frames race relations throughout the Americas." Gains won by the Afro-Brazilian movement in the context of power relations are the heart of the next section, in which recent developments are considered.

New Perspectives

In looking at recent tendencies[43] perhaps the Black movement's most outstanding gain has been progressively legitimating its perspective, namely that the "racial question" is a national issue of citizenship demanding the articulation of specific public policy. Second, while still very far from proportionate, Afro-Brazilian participation in elected and appointed posts of power has increased. Third, racism is viewed increasingly as a question of human rights.

In contrast to the United States and South Africa, where explicit racial oppression gave legitimacy to Black peoples' organized struggles, the racial democracy ideology deprives the dominated population of its base for collective self-defense and self-uplifting. Brazil lacks a tradition of an integrated civil rights movement, a void exacerbated by two major periods of authoritarian rule (1937-1945 and 1964-1985). Mostly White, leftist political leaders fighting to overcome military regimes saw the race question as their last priority and as a threat to the unity of democratic forces.

In 1937, the Brazilian Black Front, a mass civil rights movement based largely in São Paulo (Quilombhoje, 1998), was closed down along with all political parties, banned by the New State Dictatorship in a wave of censorship and repression. In the 1960s, when anti-poverty programs were being implemented in response to the U.S. civil rights movement, Brazil's military dictatorship[44] implemented policies to further concentrate wealth, exacerbating inequality by unleashing brutal repression against opposition forces. Congress was closed in 1968, leftist political leaders went into exile and the race question was defined as a national security matter. Any public discussion was prohibited by decree.

During the two major periods of reorganization of Brazilian democracy (1945-1950 and 1977-1985), Afro-Brazilian movements were active if largely solitary in their campaigns for policy measures to combat racism. As the New State dictatorship gave way to a Constitutional Assembly in 1945, Black organizations unsuccessfully proposed inclusion of measures against racism in the new national charter (Nascimento and Larkin-Nascimento, 1992, 1998). In the 1970s, Afro-Brazilian organizations proliferated across the country. Yet only very recently, in the 1980s and 1990s, have they found solid support among allies in other social movements.

The women's movement is one example. Lélia González (1986) and other African- Brazilian women have documented their experience in the 1970s with a middle-class feminist movement largely insensitive to the race question. In their view, feminism voiced the concerns of White women whose liberation depended largely on the availability of underpaid domestic labor, mostly by Black women. The role of the feminist movement in creating political space in which to exercise the idea of diversity is undeniable. It is also a fact that many African Brazilian women did political work first within the black movement, where their specific concerns led them to organize independently. From this base, a new and richer encounter ensued between organized Black women's groups and the feminist movement. In 1995, African-Brazilian women took visible part in the delegation to the United Nations Women's Conference in Beijing. Recently, Councils on Women's Rights in local, state and federal governments have been created as a result of women's mobilization, bringing gender-specific public policy into focus. Black women slowly are making dents in the overwhelmingly White Council representation, but their presence is still far from proportionate to their percentage in the female population. Nevertheless, their concerns are being recognized as legitimate specific needs, not only in the Councils but by the women's movement as a whole.

> *. . . the racial democracy ideology deprives the dominated population of its base for collective self-defense and self-uplifting.*

With the rise of the Afro-Brazilian voice came self-definition. Color designations were generally replaced by terms that unite rather than divide, like "afro-brasileiro," "negro" (black), and "afrodescendente" (African-descended). The Afro-Brazilian movement and its allies set the standard of using the sum of the official categories Preto and Pardo to quantify the Black population.[45] Whatever the lingering academic fascination with color categories, the fact is that we have named ourselves and moved on to more important work.

Foremost among recent phenomena is the rise of an Afro-Brazilian movement made up of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community leaders actively engaged in labor unions, political parties, Christian churches, religious communities of African origin, cultural organizations, and so on. Raising the "racial question" in each area, often facing opposition and hostility, the Black movement over time won allies and convinced consciences. Perhaps the most visible expression of this trend was the effective substitution of May 13, the anniversary of slavery's abolition, for November 20, the anniversary of Zumbi's death in defending the Republic of Palmares, as the national day of Afro-Brazilian commemoration.[46] The country has followed this lead since the 1980s; now the media, public and private schools, cultural institutions and neighborhood organizations join in celebrating November 20 as National Black Consciousness Day, a change that demonstrates the power of the united Afro-Brazilian voice.

Perhaps the most important social movement of recent years is the Landless Movement (MST). Despite its billing as a recent phenomenon, the MST brings back to the fore an issue that mobilized Brazilians in the early 1960s during João Goulart's presidency.[47] Forty years later, land reform is still a need that has become much more than urgent. Afro Brazilians generally will be among the first to gain from land reform, and the MST leadership has at least rhetorically recognized the need to combat racism, making public reference to Zumbi and the Palmares Republic as models and examples of grassroots freedom struggles.

In addition to progressively discrediting the "racial democracy" myth, which nevertheless still carries great weight, the Afro-Brazilian movement has developed independent community action with important impact. One example is the University Admissions Preparation Courses for Blacks and Poor People, which exist in several states and municipalities. The goal is to increase access of young Afro Brazilians and poor people to higher education. Some have succeeded in getting universities to open subsidized admissions for students from these courses.[48]

Afro-Brazilian participation in the halls of power—political parties, elected offices and government agencies—has grown enormously. In 1982, when the first direct elections were held as dusk fell over the military dictatorship, this senior author was the only African Brazilian sent to Congress with a mandate to represent this population.[49]

Today, while by no means approaching what would be proportionate representation, the weight of the Black voice has been increased. Countless administrative appointments as well as the election of two governors and one vice governor,[50] an ever-increasing number of state and city legislators, three senators and enough congressmen brought together in 1997 an incipient Afro-Brazilian Caucus.[51] Pressure brought by the Black movement through its elected representatives influenced Brazil's South Africa policy in the 1980s and 1990s.[52]

In 1982, the idea of administrative policy geared toward attending to specific needs of the Afro-Brazilian population was generally taken as far-fetched and certainly racist. But with the Black movement's growing and increasingly effective mobilization and political presence (Nascimento, 1985), the idea began to evolve. Advisory bodies were created within government structures and agencies in an increasing number of state and city administrations.[53] On the federal level, the Ministry of Culture created an Advisory Group and then a Commission for the Centennial of Slavery's Abolition in 1988, out of which was born the Palmares Cultural Foundation.

In 1988, the Constitutional Congress approved several measures proposed by the Afro-Brazilian community through its Black elected members. Among others, these provisions established racism as a crime without bail or statute of limitations (Art. 5, sec. XLII); determined the demarcation of the lands of contemporary Quilombo communities (Art. 68, Transitional Provisions); announced the pluricultural and multiethnic nature of the country, providing that the State would protect manifestations of Afro-Brazilian culture among others (Art. 215, para. 1); preserved as national patrimony the sites of former Quilombos and their documents (Art. 216, sec. 5); and mandated inclusion of "the contributions of different cultures and ethnicities to the formation of the Brazilian people" in history courses (Art. 242, sec. 1).

Since 1988, promulgation of federal law 7.716 defining the crime of racism, as well as a plethora of state and municipal laws, many in the area of education, have attested to the movement's growing strength (Silva Jr., 1998).

The assistance to Quilombo communities mentioned in the Constitution (Art. 68, Transitional Provisions) is a policy area that illustrates a certain symbiosis between Afro-Brazilian communities, the Black movement and government response. These communities, found throughout the country, suffer precarious living conditions and threats from surrounding landowners encroaching on their lands, ownership of which is often undocumented. Since the 1988 Constitution incorporated this demand of the Black movement, a few have won legal title to their land and some form of assistance (CEN, 1996: 29-31; PR, 1998: 25-28.)

In 1991, Governor Leonel Brizola of Rio de Janeiro State inaugurated the Extraordinary Secretariat for Defense and Promotion of Afro-Brazilian Populations (SEAFRO), the first and only top-level state government agency created to deal specifically with the articulation and implementation of public policy for the Afro-Brazilian community.[54] However, predictably, opposition arose in the State Legislature under the allegation of reverse racism. Challenges to the constitutionality of the administrative law creating the Secretariat prevented its being made a permanent agency, and it was abolished by the succeeding administration.

This fact underlines the hallmark importance of the creation of Belo Horizonte's City Secretariat for Black Community Issues, inaugurated by Mayor Célio de Castro in December 1998.[55] It was approved by the City Legislature as a permanent agency.

Not until the mid-1990s was affirmative action seriously considered. Its first expression in Brazil, a bill for Compensatory Action presented to the House of Deputies (Nascimento, 1983-86, v. 1), was not widely supported or taken to plenary vote. However, the notion of affirmative action began to take hold, and the bill was reintroduced in the Senate in 1997 (Nascimento, 1997-99, v. 1).

In 1995, national and international celebration of the Zumbi's Third Centennial consolidated the enlarged scope of Afro-Brazilian mobilization, demonstrated in the Zumbi dos Palmares March on Brasília Against Racism, in Favor of Citizenship and Life. A Program for Overcoming Racism and Racial Inequality was presented to the President by the march organization's National Executive Committee; it still stands as a basic synthesis of the Black community's demands (CEN, 1996). Perhaps the highest expression of this moment was inscription of Zumbi's name alongside that of independence hero Tiradentes in the national shrine of Brasília's Pantheon of Freedom.[56]

By 1995, discussion and proposal of anti-discriminatory public policies was the order of the day (Munanga, 1996). On the day of the Zumbi March, responding to its demands, the Federal Government created an Interministerial Working Group for Valorization of the Black Population (GTI). Signing the decree creating the GTI (Silva Jr., 1998: 76), the President made an unprecedented official statement (PR, 1998) recognizing the existence of racial discrimination and the need for concrete measures to combat it. The GTI's mandate is to study, formulate, propose, discuss and articulate executive, legislative and judicial anti-discriminatory public policy measures with the respective government agencies. It also is stimulating private initiative policy, "looking to the development and participation of the Black Population" and "consolidating the Black Population's citizenship."[57]

Underfunded and understaffed, the GTI's prospects for producing significant results are dubious at best. Nevertheless, it has drawn up 46 affirmative action proposals now under government consideration (PR, 1998: 62). One of its most important potential functions will be to enlarge the range of government agencies involved in anti-discrimination policy measures. The Strategic Matters Secretariat held an event on affirmative action, and the Army Ministry has been approached for the reforestation of the site of Palmares, various needs of the Quilombo communities and demarcation of their lands (PR, 1998: 76-77).

Among the most outstanding developments in recent federal government policy is the creation within the Ministry of Justice of the National Human Rights Program (PNDH). It works closely with the GTI and includes in its Proposals for Governmental Action a section on the Black Population made up of 22 short-, medium- and long-term goals (PNDH, 1998: 61). These proposals include support for "positive discrimination" and "compensatory policies" to combat racial inequality and to improve the Afro-Brazilian community's socio-economic status. Indeed, the GTI sponsored a series of seminars on affirmative action, and the Ministry of Justice organized an international event as well.[58]

That the need for affirmative action is being discussed in government circles is an enormous step forward. Unfortunately, the President himself has contributed to the general bias against affirmative action by identifying it with quotas and alleging that it "implies ignoring the evaluation of merit" (PR, 1998: 29-30). This notion is foremost in Brazilian society's resistance to anti-discrimination policy.

Major labor unions have fought this resistance by breaking the traditional leftist taboo that raising the racial discrimination issue would divide the working class. They have created internal agencies whose literature supports anti-discrimination policy (CUT/CNCDR, 1997, 1998).

This development led workers' organizations in 1994 to bring a case before the International Labor Organization (ILO) for noncompliance with Convention no. 111 on Employment Discrimination, ratified by Brazil in 1965. Responding to the ILO citation, Brazil requested technical cooperation. In 1996, the Labor Ministry instituted its Working Group for the Elimination of Employment and Occupation Discrimination (GTEDEO),[59] a tripartite body created with ILO technical support for implementation of Brazil's commitments under ILO Convention no. 111. A Multidisciplinary Working Group was created within the Ministry to "incorporate the question of discrimination into routine actions and activities" (PNDH, 1998). One of the major questions it has addressed is the promotion of equality through collective bargaining (MTb/OIT, 1998). Whether the Working Group will institute concrete measures beyond consciousness raising is an open question.

Inclusion of measures to advance actions against racism in the National Human Rights Program not only characterizes racial inequality as a question of human rights but also characterizes non-discrimination as a citizenship right.[60] In a clear expression of this trend, the Rio de Janeiro State administration, inaugurated in January 1999, created a Secretariat for Human Rights and Citizenship with a policy emphasis on racial inequality.

Strategies and Opportunities

In considering strategies and opportunities, we will divide the discussion into three parts. First we will consider the substance of anti-discrimination policy in Brazil, then the general policy context into which it needs to be inserted. Finally, we will evaluate strategies favoring effective implementation of anti-discrimination policy.

1. Anti-discrimination Policy: Substance

Space limitations prevent detailing each public policy proposal, but certain areas of emphasis are objects of general consensus. The first is acquisition of skills (occupational, technical and academic) and training for anti-discrimination work. In an increasingly technological economy, job and pay discrimination must be combated not only with target programs raising the pertinent issues in the workplace but also with training, specialization and development of labor skills. Moreover, consolidation of recent gains and development of new proposals for anti-discrimination work will be possible only with the training and multiplication of capable community leaders. Programs of this nature are an important initiative.[61]

Intimately linked to this is the second priority: education. Inequality is less a question of initial access to school and more of the means to stay there. Thus, the fight against child labor is primary; it has been addressed in some areas[62] by state aid to families for each child kept in the classroom. Closely associated is the need to educate young people and adults to compensate for earlier lack of schooling and to reduce illiteracy. Education efforts must also include technical and occupational training as well as secondary and university level education. Specific college preparation and admissions programs are needed, including but not limited to existing community efforts and cooperation between universities and NGOs. Public policy must address the need for Afro-Brazilian access to higher education, compensating losses resulting from recent restriction of tax benefits that made possible subsidized college admissions. Also crucial are the reformulation of curricula, an issue partly addressed by development of the new National Curriculum Parameters (MEC, 1998) and critical review of schoolbooks and children's literature, a project partially implemented by the Ministry of Education.

A third priority is communications media. The enormous impact of television and radio on individual and group identity development in modern society is well known. The racist tendencies of Brazilian telecommunications programming were graphically underscored in 1979, when Angola's state television corporation sought partnership with Brazil. The new African state was forced to decline the offer of one of Brazilian Educational TV's most popular programs, based on a traditional children's literature classic,[63] because its racist stereotyping rendered it unfit for viewing by African children. Most Brazilians take the stereotyping so much for granted that they hardly understood the problem. Pressure from the Afro-Brazilian movement has resulted in some, but not enough, reformulation by television networks.[64] The Palmares Cultural Foundation and the GTI established a partnership with the federal government's TVE, producing mini-documentaries, mini-series and programs. The current federal administration has a stated policy to include in its publicity images all groups making up the Brazilian multiracial population. Further efforts must be made to promote the elimination of discrimination in the private telecommunications sector. The specter of censorship, the almost absolute power of one broadcasting monopoly, and the continued prevalence of the "racial democracy" myth (and its corollary aversion to the "politically correct") have fortified a general state of lethargy.

Specific health programs directed to the Black population must take into account not only genetically linked diseases (sickle cell anemia) but those with higher incidence and more concentrated health impact on African Brazilians (mioma, hypertension, occupational diseases). Health issue campaigns (e.g., AIDS, leprosy) designed to reach the Afro-Brazilian public are needed as well as sewage, sanitation and preventive public health care in Afro-Brazilian communities. The current federal administration has taken small steps in the first two areas through seminars and training initiatives for health workers (PR, 1998: 62-71). However, the state of the public health system is deplorable, and monies raised by the special tax levied specifically to fund health care are being flagrantly diverted to other uses (ITM, 1998; Roque and Corrêa, 1998).

As for police violence, experience in São Paulo and in Rio de Janeiro during SEAFRO's existence included courses on discrimination and human rights in police training programs, consciousness-raising campaigns, and creation of special police agencies. This is particularly sticky terrain since the police institution is replete with Brazilians of African descent who have internalized racist stereotypes and are less sensitive than hostile to the issues raised by Afro-Brazilian NGOs and human rights organizations (Silva, 1994).

Finally, the economic base of the Afro-Brazilian community cannot continue to be composed of jobs alone. Except in the Southeast region (particularly São Paulo and, to a lesser extent, Rio de Janeiro), independent Black-owned business is close to nonexistent; the need to stimulate and support the strengthening of Afro-Brazilian capacity to build a sustainable capital base is paramount. Cooperation among African-Brazilian and African-American or African business is a promising perspective.[65]

One problem crosscuts all these areas: the need for reliable data to formulate public policies and evaluate their impact. Inclusion of information on race or color in birth and death certificates and other vital records, hospital and other institutional records, employee records, official documents, etc., is a chief concern (CEN, 1996; Munanga, 1996; PNDH, 1998).

Several forceful suggestions are being negotiated with the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) as it gears up for the 2000 census (Sant'Anna, 1998): that the census item "color" be associated with one on "origin"; that the "pardo" category be reviewed, and the term "negro" (Black) used to complement classifications by color (preta/negra) and origin (negra/africana); that the racial/ethnic composition of the population be recorded in the whole population and not just in samples, as has been the case to date; and that census takers be trained to deal with the race/color question.

2. General Policy Perspectives

While recent advances are considerable, they are far from adequate to deal with the enormous dimensions of inequality in Brazil. In evaluating strategies, three main issues are central. First, the limitations of government action are enormous, particularly at the federal level. Second, the effectiveness of partnership depends on how well citizens watch as NGOs critically evaluate the progress and effectiveness of government policy on all levels. Third, Brazilian society still strongly resists anti-discrimination programs and the very discussion of racism as an issue. More broadly, it also resists discussion and action on human rights itself, a proposition generally identified with the idea of pampering criminals.

Two dynamically related dimensions emerge: the need to strengthen the voice of NGOs to influence government action and the need to shift government priority in the direction of effective policies that eliminate inequality. Policy restructuring is needed on two fronts: 1) policies to combat hunger, poverty, income inequality and inequalities in general living conditions (housing, health care, education, sanitation, running water), and 2) policies that deal directly with racial inequality (such as those discussed in the previous subsection).

The first group of policies would specifically benefit African Brazilians, by far the majority of the poor and needy. However, it has been amply demonstrated (ITM, 1998; Roque and Corrêa, 1998) that macroeconomic policies recently approved by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and pursued by the federal government are entirely inadequate for reaching this goal. Monetary stabilization based on maintenance of the highest interest rates in the world (around 50 percent), fiscal reform anchored in privatization of lucrative state enterprises and the general dismantling of the state, cuts in social spending and massive dismissal of civil servants, denationalization of the economy and concentration of capital, stimulation of imports against exports– all these policies result in stagnation, unemployment and corrosion of national productive capacity. This occurs in a context of cuts in government-provided services, particularly the already underfunded and deteriorating public health and education systems. Monies unavailable in the federal budget are improvised by imposing supposedly temporary levies like the CPMF,[66] while official budget money is used to support failing banks.[67] Social security and pension benefits, whose real value has diminished, are now further taxed and restricted. The current devaluation crisis only underscores the artificiality of this administration's much-applauded "success" in combating inflation; it was already clear in 1997/98 that overall inequality indexes had increased since 1993 (Roque and Corrêa, 1998) and that these policies favored transnational capital rather than Brazilian enterprise, economy or employment (Salomão and Gonçalves, 1998).

Brazilian society still strongly resists anti-discrimination programs and the very discussion of racism. . .

Macroeconomic strategies favoring growth are not enough to reverse this situation; policies supporting national production and export are needed. Land and agrarian reform are urgent, immediate needs, including restriction of impunity in rural violence. Implementation of minimum income programs is imperative. Since 1991, two bills proposing minimum income programs were introduced in Congress; neither has reached a vote. Of 80 state and municipal programs proposed, four are in effect, only one on a permanent basis.[68] If minimum income proposals meet resistance, hope is small indeed for complementary redistributive programs, the need for which is evident in the extremes of inequality exhibited by Brazil.

Continuation of the work of NGOs monitoring economic policies is crucial, particularly the initiatives taken in the context of the Social Development Watch program associated with the United Nations (ITM, 1998).

3. Strategies for Implementation of Anti-discrimination Policy

As for the second group of policies, those dealing with racial inequalities, their positive effect will necessarily be limited in this overall context. Indeed, the PNDH (1998:45) virtually admits this fact by announcing that its work will emphasize civil rights in a context where social and economic rights are severely restricted by social inequality and probably will remain so.

Nevertheless, specific programs responding to the organized Afro-Brazilian community's demands and addressing public policy directed to racial inequality cannot be ignored. A symbiotic relationship has grown between the action of Afro-Brazilian militants and NGOs on the one hand and government policy on the other. The language and measures adopted by government agencies and in laws have been developed largely by the influence of movement NGOs, intellectuals and activists directly participating in their formulation or indirectly contributing through actions and writings. However, their capacity to effectively monitor the concrete application of these measures is severely limited by lack of financial means, personnel and infrastructure.

Thus, important strategies for the Afro-Brazilian movement will be: securing sufficient political weight to guarantee the continuity of the gains made in state policy, including the maintenance and development of government agencies and programs already created at municipal, state and federal levels;[69] involving new government resources (infrastructure, personnel, agencies) in anti-discrimination programs; and implementing effective legislation. The greatest challenge will be overcoming societal resistance to human rights and affirmative action policies.

Further empowerment of Afro-Brazilian organizations themselves must accompany these strategies, for the effectiveness of government agencies' work depends on critical and cooperative participation of labor unions, professional organizations, NGOs and community groups. They in turn must use the agencies' existence and the material they produce to legitimate and advance the goals of local programs. Indeed, the most visible result of agencies' work to date has been production of useful material (e.g. PNDH, 1998; PR, 1998; MTb/OIT, 1998; MEC, 1998).

Among the most formidable obstacles to effective policy change is the lack of strong, well-organized political parties capable of translating the demands of social movements into executive and legislative action. Democracy in Brazil is greatly impaired by the continued power of corrupt local strongmen and entrenched elites.

The role of anti-discrimination law has been questioned (Dzidzienyo, 1995) in a society where the existence of rhetorical but ineffective legal norms has never guaranteed racial equality. The laws inscribed in the new Brazilian social order have a definite role but not as a result of their effective enforcement. Rather, they constitute a resource and a weapon in the hands of organized civil society to help implement the victories it has won that result in formulation of state policy. Also, legislation reflects progress in and tools to continue the task of overcoming societal resistance to the need for anti-discrimination measures. The international context is particularly important in this respect: the already visible action taken to implement ILO Convention 111 can be seen as a model for new initiatives.

In the end, the role of community organizations undoubtedly will remain a strategic imperative. It will be, as it has been, the African-Brazilian people themselves who push governmental and non-governmental institutions toward measures to build equality.

Perhaps in this respect, the "racial democracy" myth can be seen optimistically as a relative takeoff advantage. In societies where civil rights victories have changed institutional structures, the difficulties in denouncing and combating discrimination tend to become similar to those faced by the Afro-Brazilian movement to date. Denial of the racial nature of inequalities, appropriation by conservative forces of the discourse of equality, and allegations that anti-discrimination policy constitutes "reverse racism" led one of the present authors years ago to question whether post-Bakke[70] forms of discrimination in the United States were similar to Brazilian ones (Larkin-Nascimento, 1980). Similarly, democratic South Africa is now facing the need for state policy to address de facto racial inequalities with the legal structures of apartheid no longer intact; the demands of those excluded are urgent indeed. These situations are familiar to Afro-Brazilian activists, who insist upon devising ways to gain ground nevertheless.

In Brazil, the "racial democracy" legacy renders as onerous as in the United States the burden of proof of discrimination required to justify or generate public policy, while condoning the non-accountability of White society for past racism observed in the United States by our colleague Charles Hamilton (pp. 89-91). Likewise, the cynical stigma he observes against the "politically correct" is prevalent here. These elements may be countered in South Africa by the vivid memory and international condemnation of apartheid, which leave less room for doubt as to the need for and basic fairness of affirmative action policy. More important, however, is the political dimension: as the voting and party majority in South Africa, Africans are formulating and carrying out public policy. By its nature, this situation implies that limitations imposed by the political power equation are less constraining than in the United States or Brazil. Thus, while the Afro-Brazilian movement has made great gains, it is still true here, as in the United States, that "... race relations are simply not a top priority on the national agenda" (Hamilton, pp. 89-91). To the extent that the African-Brazilian majority overcomes the effects of the racial democracy taboo, it will place its concerns increasingly on that agenda. But there is still, indeed, a long road to walk.

Directions

While the dance of deception still carries great weight in social relations of everyday life, it seems certain that Brazil is moving toward a time when invocations of its multiracial nature will be reformulated in terms that reflect a legitimate Afro-Brazilian self-definition. Political action has resulted in victories including substantive changes in government policy, legislation, and academic evaluation. These actions further strengthen the Afro-Brazilian voice, which increasingly has commanded its own choreography in partnership with organized civil society. Undoubtedly, this development is changing the face of Brazilian society and its discourse. While eradication of inequality is still a remote possibility, recognition of the need to address its specific dimensions is a necessary step toward making viable the policies necessary to achieve that goal.

Conclusion

W.E.B. DuBois announced in 1903 that this would be the century of the color line. Indeed, these hundred years have witnessed the worldwide efforts of Africans to end the sundry forms of domination that characterize racism, colonialism and their legacies lately expressed in neo-liberalism and globalization. Africans worldwide played a crucial role in the development of international human rights and of international law and solidarity. The rise and progress of these two tendencies has marked the world indelibly.

The new millennium will increasingly witness the rise of the Afro-Brazilian voice and that of African peoples in the Americas, Asia and Africa. Their participation in human development will doubtlessly demonstrate the force and weight of their potential to overcome the obstacles of race discrimination.

APPENDIX

The following tables present additional data on racial inequalities in Brazil.

Table 20: Sanitation and Electricity Conditions, 1996

	Treated Water	Sewage System	Septic Tank	Garbage Collection	Electricity
Brazil	**74.2**	**40.3**	**23.3**	**87.4**	**92.9**
Urban North	59.7	8.9	39.7	64.7	96.8
Northeast	**56.2**	**15.3**	**22.4**	**72.9**	**81.7**
Southeast	86.5	69.0	13.9	92.9	97.8
South	**77.0**	**14.0**	**52.6**	**95.6**	**96.8**
Central-West	65.5	15.0	11.3	89.2	93.2

Source: PNAD, 1996; percent of domiciles with service.

Table 21: "Miserable Poverty" by Color and Sex, 1988

Head of Family's Sex	**Color**		
	White	Preto	Pardo
Male	**14.6**	**30.5**	**36.2**
Female	15.4	28.9	34.9

Source: IBGE/PNAD, 1988; special compilations, courtesy of Nelson do Valle Silva/IUPERJ; percent of each group; see Table 9 for definition of "miserable poverty."

Table 22: "Miserable Poverty" by Color and Educational Level

Head of Family's Educational Level	**Color**		
	White	Preto	Pardo
No schooling/ less than 1 year	**35.0**	**45.9**	**53.9**
1 & 2 years	25.5	34.5	42.3
3 & 4 years	**13.3**	**21.4**	**26.4**
5 & 8 years	8.1	13.5	16.2
9 years & more	**1.4**	**2.9**	**5.3**

Source: Ibid.

Table 23: "Miserable Poverty" by Color and Number of Dependents, 1988

Number of Dependents in Family	Color		
	White	Preto	Pardo
0	**4.2**	**9.4**	**10.2**
1	6.2	11.1	15.6
2	**8.5**	**17.6**	**20.9**
3	13.1	27.4	30.9
4	**21.3**	**38.6**	**40.9**
5	31.5	42.8	54.3
6	**46.9**	**65.1**	**60.7**
7 to 10	65.8	75.1	71.0
11 and more	**88.0**	**95.2**	**84.2**

Source: Ibid.

Table 24: "Miserable Poverty" by Color and Age of Head of Family, 1988

Age of Head of Family	**Color**		
	White	Preto	Pardo
Up to 29	**14.6**	**31.0**	**32.1**
30 to 39	15.6	34.2	39.1
40 to 49	**14.9**	**30.5**	**39.0**
50 to 59	12.5	24.6	29.3
60 or more	**12.7**	**23.7**	**29.8**

Source: Ibid.

[redacted]

Table 25: Percent of Positive Responses to the Question: "Have you ever worked?" by Sex and Color

Age	Men			Women		
	White	Preto	Pardo	White	Preta	Parda
9	6.2	12.3	12.0	0.0	3.0	2.5
10	9.5	9.6	26.4	3.5	1.5	7.0
11	8.9	2.2	28.4	5.6	0.0	9.2
12	18.8	26.6	34.1	7.3	15.1	14.6
13	27.6	30.9	51.5	20.7	28.2	19.0
14	32.0	45.1	19.8	23.3	26.2	20.4
15	39.0	48.9	60.5	23.9	26.8	34.6
16	57.4	75.1	70.9	34.0	60.4	37.9

Source: PPV, 1996/97; compiled by Nelson do Valle Silva/IUPERJ; courtesy of Nelson do Valle Silva/IUPERJ.

END NOTES

[1] Ivan Van Sertima (1976) provides a detailed, minutely researched presentation of this circumstance.

[2] Excluding Alaska and Hawaii.

[3] In square miles, Brazil's area is 3,286,470 as opposed to South Africa's 471,442.

[4] Celebrated expression of Pero Vaz de Caminha, scribe of Pedro Álvares Cabral, in the first letter written to the Portuguese Court from Porto Seguro (in what is now Bahia State).

[5] English-language title of Nelson Pereira dos Santos' classic film *Vidas Secas* on life in the poorest desertified areas of the Brazilian Northeast.

[6] World Bank, *World Development Report*, 1999-2000.

[7] We have always taken the stand that race is not a biological but a socially and culturally constructed reality, which makes it no less grounded in fact. What changes is the scientific location of the fact (social rather than biological).

[8] The train and bus station serving the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan area made famous by the award-winning film *Central do Brasil*.

[9] São João de Meriti, Duque de Caxias, Nova Iguaçu, Belford Roxo, Nilópolis. The data cited are taken from the report of the World Health Organization Seminar held in São Paulo (1991).

[10] Literature supporting this kind of analysis ranges from works like Gilberto Freyre's sustaining the notions of "racial democracy" and "Lusotropicalism" (1940, 1946, 1963, 1959) or Donald Pierson's *Negroes in Brazil* (1967) to Oracy Nogueira's notion (1955, 1959) of "prejudice of mark" as opposed to that of "origin," which grounded the aesthetic prejudice theory. Other expressions of this line of thought, emerging from the political and ideological left, emphasized that indictment of racial discrimination would constitute a peril to the harmonious unity of the working class.

[11] Florestan Fernandes (1964, 1972); Carlos Hasenbalg (1979); Lúcia Elena Garcia de Oliveira, Rosa Maria Porcaro and Tereza Cristina N. Araújo (1981); Nelson do Valle Silva (1998); contributors to Peggy Lovell's study (1991).

[12] Possibly, the extremely high Gini index in the Central-West region reflects the concentration there of the Native Brazilian Indian population.

[13] Oliveira, Porcaro and Araújo, 1981; Gonzalez, 1986; PNDH, 1998; IBGE, 1994. In São Paulo, the most highly developed city in the nation, White workers' average hourly wage according to the 1980 IBGE Census was equivalent to less than 48 U.S. cents; for Blacks it was less than 25 cents.

[14] Oliveira, Porcaro and Araújo, 1981; Gonzalez, 1986; Lovell, 1991; Silva, 1998.

[15] Health indicators are not generally available by race or color. Official data on medical visits to health care facilities (IBGE, 1999) show that "in the North Region only one annual visit per inhabitant can be accounted for, [while] in Southeast Region this average is 2.8 visits per inhabitant per year, bearing evidence that there are strong regional inequalities in the distribution." As for the availability of hospital beds, "The North Region (with 2.3 beds per 1,000 inhabitants) and the Northeast Region (with 3.1) are not as well served as the Southeast, South and Central West Regions, with over 4 beds per 1,000 inhabitants."

[16] Countless incidents of job discrimination also are left undocumented by victims or witnesses who judge it more expedient not to confront the issue for fear of offending the discriminator and suffering some consequence, such as losing the inferior pay or position offered, or being taken to the courts in lawsuit for slander.

[17] Having already presented the normal documents, Rio de Janeiro City Councilwoman Jurema Batista's official City Council identification recently was refused upon one of these extraordinary demands. The incidents cited are taken from a collection of newspaper clippings from 1997 and 1998 furnished by CEAP.

[18] Maroon societies or communities founded by escaped and rebellious slaves or ex-slaves.

[19] Such proposals go back to early colonial times and were subscribed by Latin abolitionists. Fray Alonso de Sandoval defended whitening as the solution to the "black stain" in his 1627 work *El Mundo de la Esclavitud Negra en América* (Bogotá: Empresa Nacional, 1956). José Antonio Saco, eminent 19th century Cuban historian, exclaimed: "We have no choice but to whiten, to whiten, to whiten, and so to make ourselves respectable." (apud. Larkin-Nascimento, 1981:130).

[20] Both the "black race" and "*métis*" (mixed-bloods) are cited textually in the delegate's statement.

[21] Gomes (1995) studies the revelation of such stereotypes in anthropological and anthropometric technique implanted in Rio de Janeiro and Bahia police institutes in the 1930s.

[22] *Terreiros* of Candomblé, Xangô, Macumba and other African-derived religions as well as Catholic brotherhoods.

[23] Pierson (1967: 45,76) characterized slavery in Brazil as "ordinarily a mild form of servitude."

[24] A classic expression of this conscience and its irony before his-

torical fact is the following statement made by Brazilian diplomat José Sette Câmara (1974: 14) at a time when international authorities were reviewing abundant evidence of racist atrocities committed by the Portuguese in African colonies seeking independence: "Portuguese colonialism is different. The absence of racial discrimination, the ease of miscegenation, the disposition of the colonial Whites to stay, to grow and prosper with their new lands, exist in the Portuguese [African] colonies as they existed in Brazil. The Africans themselves recognize all these positive peculiarities of Portuguese colonization."

[25] A fine example of this discourse comes from the ranks of Brazilian diplomacy. Ambassador Guilherme Figueiredo (1975) describes Brazil to the largely African audience of a Seminar against Apartheid as a multiracial country "free of racial problems," race mixture having "prevented the problems of racial discrimination" from existing. He contrasts Brazil's "anti-racist formation, its miscegenation" to the United States, whose 25 million Blacks he judges to be "almost without mixture, almost always pure."

[26] Nascimento, 1977, 1978, 1980; Carneiro, 1997; Sant'Anna, 1998; Gilliam, 1998. The objective of Iberian colonialism being to extract wealth rather than to settle a homeland, White women were not initially brought from Europe. African women became the permanent and compulsorily available sexual property of White masters, perhaps in greater numbers but exactly as they did in segregationist White settler regimes like South Africa and the United States.

[27] Such sleight of hand is found today in commonplace encounters with innocent White Brazilians: "Me, racist? When I was a baby, I nursed at the breast of a black nanny..."

[28] Report of the 2nd Congress of Black Culture in the Americas (Panama, 1982).

[29] Beauty contests traditionally exclude Black and mulatto women, hence the initiative of the Black Experimental Theater in the 1940s and 1950s to organize beauty contests among them (Nascimento, 1997).

[30] In 1966, the Ministry of Foreign Relations published an English-language introductory book titled *Brazil* 1966, in which it informed, under the heading "Color: the majority of the Brazilian population is made up of Whites, the percentage of persons of mixed blood being minute."

[31] The "one drop" rule: any amount of African blood classifies one as Black.

[32] Suggestion that the color criterion, grounded in rejecting non-European peoples and extolling whiteness, is deemed an implicitly imperialist kind of reverse racism favored by African-Americans from the United States. See the exchanges among Fry (1995), Hanchard (1994, 1996) and Gilliam (1998).

[33] This is true not only in Brazil but also in other "Latin" countries (Larkin-Nascimento, 1980).

[34] In a survey (Hasenbalg and Silva, 1993) where interviewers classed respondents according to the traditional census categories "*brancos*," "*pretos*" and "*pardos*," the respondents also classed themselves substituting the options "*mulato*" and "*moreno*" for "*pardo*." Less than half of those identified as *Pretos* so classed themselves: 18.3 percent declared themselves White, and 28.9 percent said they were mulattos.

[35] While the living, dynamic weight of Afro-Brazilian cultural influence on the country is cited routinely to support racial democracy theories, Dzidzienyo (1995: 348) remarks: "Here lies a fascinating contradiction: between the incorporation into the legitimate national arena of erstwhile African-derived religious, cultural, and social traditions once considered societally or politically subversive because of their 'primitive' provenance, and the absence of a corresponding insertion of Afro-Latin Americans into areas and structures of power and privilege from which they have traditionally been excluded."

[36] An interesting example is the controversy around the martial art of capoeira, which involves a whole school of thought, called *regionalista* that rejects out of hand the idea of capoeira's African origin, claiming it was developed wholly in Brazil. When asked why capoeira could not have an African origin, one *regionalista* stated to this junior author that "everything seems to come from outside, don't we have the right for at least one thing to be Brazilian?"

[37] On the qualification of Brazil's representation at this festival, see Abdias do Nascimento, "Open Letter to the First World Festival of Negro Arts," *Présence Africaine* English edition 30: 58 (1966).

[38] The International Seminar on Multiculturalism and Racism: the Role of Affirmative Action in Contemporary Democratic Societies (Brasília, July 1996).

[39] Credit should be given to Professor Hélio Santos, Dr. Carlos Moura and others who made efforts, to some extent successful, to have African Brazilians included in the program.

[40] Moura (1972), Freitas (1982, 1985), Lima (1981), Morel (1979), Nascimento and Larkin-Nascimento (1992, 1997).

[41] See the essay "Reflections on the Afro-Brazilian Movement, 1928-1997," prepared by the present authors for the Comparative Human Rights Initiative (Nascimento and Larkin-Nascimento, 1997).

[42] This fact was driven home in a much-discussed incident in 1993, when Ana Flávia Peçanha de Azeredo was barred from the social elevator on racial grounds (Veja, July 7, 1993). A light-skinned mulatto and daughter of Albuíno Azeredo, then governor of Espírito Santo State, she was barred as Black–"*negra*"– and identified herself as Black. Her social status made it clear that this was not a case of racially neutral "social" discrimination against the poor. This incident led to much academic discussion around the color criterion versus hypodescendancy in Brazil (Hanchard, 1994b; Fry, 1995; Hanchard, 1996).

[43] For a more detailed account of this material, see Nascimento and Larkin-Nascimento, 1997.

[44] In 1964, President João Goulart was deposed in a U.S.-supported military coup that became viciously repressive, especially after the Institutional Act of 1968. In 1985, the Congress chose the first civilian president in indirect election, but democracy was not fully re-established until direct presidential elections were held in 1989.

[45] The need for statistical information was seen to outweigh in importance the distortions attributed to the whitening factor.

[46] May 13th is now defined as a day of reflection on the false nature of abolition. Zumbi was the last elected leader (king) of the Republic of Palmares, a conglomeration of maroons – quilombos– located in the Brazilian Northeast (today's State of Alagoas). With a peak population of about thirty thousand, enormous for the period (1595 to 1695), Palmares repeatedly fought off Portuguese, Dutch, and Brazilian colonial expeditionary forces sent to destroy it over the century during which it existed. Beyond its opposition to the institutions of slavery and colonial rule, Palmares is also a paradigm of the efforts of Africans collectively to reconstruct their lives in freedom in the Americas in organized economic, social, cultural, and political communities. Price, 1996; Moura, 1972; Nascimento, 1989.

[47] During Goulart's administration, democratic and grassroots social movements were very active and land reform was one among several major social programs envisioned by the government in the effort to respond to these movements' demands.

[48] In Rio de Janeiro, the Pontifical Catholic University and others offered some 200 tuition grants.

[49] These elections were for the federal Congress, state governors, and local and state legislatures. The indirect presidential election was held in 1985; Tancredo Neves, elected by the Congress, died days before his inauguration, and Vice President-elect José Sarney took office in his place. Nascimento's campaign in 1982 gave absolute priority to the representation of African people's interests: the fight against racism and racial discrimination and the articulation of positive measures benefiting Afro-Brazilians. His activity in Parliament (1983-1987) maintained these aims as priorities. As Federal Congressman, he presented bills of law proposing affirmative action programs and making racial discrimination a crime with severe sanctions; he also proposed that Brazil end diplomatic and commercial relations with the Apartheid regime in South Africa and in the Afro-Brazilian social movement, over the long run, to the creation of the Palmares Cultural Foundation. Before he took office, there had been members of the Brazilian Congress who could be classed as "African Brazilian" but who did not recognize or identify themselves as such. Instead, they "passed" as whites and represented the interests of the elite or advocated the class struggle in general, denying the existence of racism and the need for anti-discrimination or affirmative action measures in Brazil. In contrast, among the very few African Brazilian legislators who have taken office after Nascimento left the Chamber of Deputies in 1987, most did and do identify themselves as Black and support measures to combat racism.

[50] Governors Albuíno Azeredo of Espírito Santo and Alceu Collares of Rio Grande do Sul were elected by the PDT in 1990. Former Senator Benedita da Silva of Rio de Janeiro took office as Vice Governor in January 1999.

[51] This Caucus has met informally but has not yet developed concerted action on concrete issues.

[52] Nascimento, 1985; see also *Afrodiaspora* 2, 3, 4, and 5 (Rio de Janeiro: IPEAFRO, 1983-86).

[53] The first of these advisory bodies was the São Paulo State Council on Participation and Development of the Black Community, instituted in 1984 by Governor Franco Montoro.

[54] Among its actions were the constitution of a Specialized Police Agency for Crimes of Racism, a public service for attending complaints of victims of racism, workshops and technical training in diversity sensitivity for Military Police, the Strength of Youth project of occupational training for adolescents, teacher training programs in different regions of the State for affirmative educational policy with respect to African and Afro-Brazilian history and culture, and publication of material for use in such programs (Larkin-Nascimento, 1993, 1994).

[55] Secretary Diva Moreira and Adjunct Subsecretary Maria Mazzarella Rodrigues are both militants of Black community movements.

[56] Implementing Senator Benedita da Silva's Bill of Law 27/1995 to this effect (Silva, 1997), Zumbi's name was inscribed on March 21, 1997. The Pantheon of Freedom is a museum located on the Capitol Square (Praça dos Três Poderes) where the Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary branches are seated. The shrine, called the Gallery of National Heroes, contains a huge book sculpted in bronze, whose pages had been inscribed only with the name of Tiradentes himself.

[57] Presidential Decrees of November 20, 1995, and February 7, 1996 (Silva Jr., 1998: 76-81). The decree makes specific mention of competency to act in the areas of research, study and publication of statistics and other information; mobilization of new resources for programs and initiatives benefiting the Black population and optimization of their use; and Black presence in the communications media. The GTI is composed of eight Black movement representatives working with members from nine Federal Ministries.

[58] International Seminar on Multiculturalism and Racism: the Role of Affirmative Action in Contemporary Democratic Societies (Brasilia, July 1996).

[59] Presidental Decree of March 20, 1996 (Silva Jr., 1998: 82-83).

[60] "The Program will deal with *obstacles to full citizenship* that lead to systematic violation of rights." PNDH, 1998: 45, emphasis added.

[61] The Palmares Cultural Foundation sponsored a pioneer course in Capacitation in Public Administration for the Afro-Brazilian Community (Brasília, November 1998).

[62] For example, Brasília, the Federal District.

[63] Monteiro Lobato's *Sítio do Pica-Pau Amarelo.*

[64] See the essays by Antônio Carlos Arruda da Silva and Sueli Carneiro in Munanga, 1996: 121-139.

[65] I Fórum Empresarial das Afro-Américas: Brasil-EUA. Explorando Oportunidades num Mundo Globalizado. Coletivo de Empresários Afro-Brasileiros, Universidade do Estado da Bahia, Morehouse College. Mimeo, 1999.

[66] Contribuição Provisória sobre Movimento Financeiro (CPMF) is a tax on financial transactions intended to fund the public health system.

[67] In 1995-97, the federal government rescued many banks whose outrageously high profit margins had been sustained by financial speculation in an inflationary economy.

[68] Belo Horizonte, Campinas and Vitória are cities with provisional programs benefiting families with children up to 14 years of age, providing a monthly per capita income of R$40.00 (about US$30.00) with the proviso that the children stay in school. Brasília, the Federal District, has a permanent program reaching about 25,000 families.

[69] Brazilian politics are marked by a powerful tradition: incoming administrations tend to eradicate the work of their rivals leaving office, dismantling state agencies and policies created and starting over anew.

[70] In the Bakke case (1976), a White medical student alleged reverse discrimination to strike down an affirmative action university admissions policy and won in the U.S. Supreme Court. This case was a landmark, ushering in an era of discrediting and dismantling affirmative action based largely upon their characterization as "reverse racism."

ABBREVIATIONS

CAAS – Center of African-American Studies.

CEAP – Centro de Articulação das Populações Marginalizadas (Center for Articulation of Marginal Populations, Rio de Janeiro).

CEDEPLAR -Centro de Desenvolvimento e Planejamento Regional (Center for Regional Planning and Development), UFMG.

CEN – Comissão Executiva Nacional, Marcha Zumbi dos Palmares contra o Racismo, a Favor da Cidadania e da Vida (National Executive Committee, Zumbi dos Palmares March Against Racism, in Favor of Citizenship and Life).

CEPAL – Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean.

CHRI – Comparative Human Relations Initiative, Southern Education Foundation.

CNDH – Comissão Nacional de Direitos Humanos (National Human Rights Committee).

CUT – Central Única dos Trabalhadores (Unified Workers' Central).

EPPG – Escola de Políticas Públicas e Governo (Public Policy and Government School), UFRJ.

FASE – Fundação de Órgãos para Assistência Social e Educacional (Foundation for Social and Education Assistance Agencies).

FFCL/USP – Faculdade de Filosofia, Ciências e Letras (Faculty of Philosophy, Science and Letters), USP.

GTEDEO – Grupo de Trabalho para a Eliminação da Discriminação no Emprego e na Ocupação, Working Group for the Elimination of Employment and Occupation Discrimination), MTb.

GTI – Grupo de Trabalho Interministerial para Valorização da População Negra (Interministerial Working Group for Valuing the Black Population), Ministry of Justice.

IBGE – Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics).

ILO – International Labor Organization.

IPEA – Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Institute of Applied Economic Research.

IPEAFRO – Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Afro-Brasileiros (Afro-Brazilian Studies and Research Institute, Rio de Janeiro).

IPHAN — Instituto do Patrimônio Histórico e Artístico Nacional (National Artistic and Historical Patrimony Institute).

ITM – Instituto del Tercer Mundo (Third World Institute), Montevideo, Uruguay.

IUPERJ – Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (University Research Institute of Rio de Janeiro).

MEC – Ministry of Education and Culture, now the Ministry of Education.

MINC — Ministry of Culture.

MNDH – Movimento Nacional de Direitoos Humanos (National Human Rights Movement).

MTb – Ministry of Labor.

OAB – Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil (Order of Attorneys of Brazil).

OIT – Organização International do Trabalho (International Labor Organization).

PNAD – Pesquisa National por Amostragem de Domicílios (National Survey by Domicile Sample).

PNDH — Programa Nacional de Direitos Humanos (National Human Rights Program).

PR – Presidência da República (Presidency of the Republic).

SBPC - Sociedade Brasileira para o Progresso da Ciência (Brazilian Society for the Advancement of Science).

SEAFRO – Secretaria Extraordinária de Defesa e Promoção das Populações Afro-Brasileira (Extraordinary Secretariat for Defense and Promotion of Afro-Brazilian Populations), Rio de Janeiro State Government.

SEF – Southern Education Foundation.

TVE – Televisão Educativa (Educational Television), Federal Government.

UCLA – University of California at Los Angeles.

UFG – Universidade Federal de Goiás (Federal University of Goiás).

UFMG – Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (Federal University of Minas Gerais).

UFRJ – Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro).

UnB – Universidade de Brasília.

USP – Universidade de São Paulo (São Paulo University).

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Extent and Nature of Racial Inequalities In Brazil

By Nelson do Valle Silva

Introduction

attributed to discriminatory practices in the labor market. Contrary to earlier analyses based on data from Rio de Janeiro in 1960 (Silva, 1978), Lovell's work indicates important differences between Pretos and Pardos, with the proportions of income differences between these groups and Whites, attributable to wage discrimination, varying according to region, job sector, and occupational position.

It is natural for differences of this magnitude to spill over into certain areas of life. It is not surprising to note that Brazilians self-identified as Pretos or Pardos are exposed to higher infant mortality rates than Whites. In 1980, infant mortality per thousand live births was 77 for Whites and 105 for Pretos and Pardos combined– a rate that in 1980 corresponded to approximately that of Whites in 1960 (Tamburo, 1987). Pretos' and Pardos' life expectancy at birth is significantly inferior to that of Whites: life expectancy in 1980 was 66.1 years for Whites and 59.4 years for Pretos and Pardos. This difference is close to that of 7.5 years which separated these groupings in 1950 (Wood and Carvalho, 1988: 445). Regarding education, Preto and Pardo children complete fewer years of schooling, even when we control for social origin or average per capita family income (Rosemberg, 1986; Hasenbalg and Silva, 1988: chap. 5).

To understand the extent of racial inequalities in Brazil today, let us consider the most recent data available on the question, furnished by the National Domicile Sample Survey (PNAD) conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) in November 1996. Restricting our focus to adult men, more specifically to heads of family or spouses, and ignoring individuals classified as Asian or indigenous (a minute fraction of the population), we arrive at the following values for average total incomes: R$950 for Whites, R$403 for Pretos, and R$433 for Pardos. In other words, White individuals receive more than double the wages than those earned by Pretos as well as Pardos, with the values for these groups being quite close to each other.

To explain these differences, the usual procedure is to look for other differences– i.e., differences in other characteristics– that could contribute causes for the observed phenomena. In fact, when we examine other correlates, we also observe the existence of marked racial differences with respect to other socioeconomic characteristics of individuals. These same individuals also present differences in educational level in the same direction as income differences (see Table 26). The average level of years of schooling for Whites is 6.25; the corresponding numbers for Pretos and Pardos are 3.81 and 3.96, respectively. Other characteristics show a similar pattern. For example, the average years of schooling among White respondents' parents is 2.96, while the values for the parents of Pretos and Pardos are only 1.33 and 1.57, respectively. Similarly, the rates of occupational status (measured by the metric scale proposed by Silva, 1973 and updated for the 1996 data) for the parents of respondents self-classified as Pretos is 5.58. For the parents of Pardo individuals it is 6.04. For the parents of Whites it rises to 8.66.

Table 26: Selected Socioeconomic Characteristics by Color - Men

Socioeconomic Characteristic	Color		
	White	Preto	Pardo
Years of Schooling	**6.25**	**3.81**	**3.96**
Age of first employment	12.66	12.20	12.01
Per capita family income (R$)	**376.57**	**166.87**	**163.61**
Size of family	3.70	4.05	4.18
Urban residence (%)	**83.17**	**77.79**	**73.19**
Father's years of schooling	2.96	1.33	1.57
Father's occupational status	8.66	5.58	6.04

Source: PNAD 96

The question then is to what extent can these differences explain the observed income differences (or those of happiness, as we suggested before)? To answer this question, one must use complex statistical models that take multiple determining factors into account. This complexity makes this same explanation sound somewhat mystifying and abstruse. In the following sections, I will try to show how social inequalities in Brazil are produced by what we could call "cycles of cumulative disadvantages." For this paper, the explanation must be simplified. We will not use the myriad explicative factors such as those listed in Table 26. This simplification will show clearly the cumulative nature of the process of generation of inequalities.

Social Mobility

When opinions are given on racial inequalities in Brazil, the argument essentially is this: the great majority of people of color who live in poverty today come from families who also were poor in the past. This explanation constitutes the cornerstone of Brazilian racial ideology: the "survival of slavery" or "heritage of poverty." Indeed, this is a very plausible idea and, as we have just seen in the information in Table 26, it has a real empirical foundation. On average, White individuals come from families much better positioned in the social hierarchy, with better-educated parents and a more comfortable social position. So this seems a necessary explanation if we want to consider the real sit uation of racial inequalities in our country. But the question remains: Is this explanation sufficient?

To answer this, I will focus on income differences and will use a conceptual scheme specifying that incomes are achieved via a path characterized by two distinct stages in individuals' lives. The first stage is a process through which people of different social origin (i.e., from families in distinct social positions) obtain positions in the social hierarchy. I will call this process "social mobility" and use the father for the position of origin and the respondent for the current position as the occupational stratum.

The second stage is the phase in which, having achieved a certain position in the occupational hierarchy, this position is converted into monetary gains. Individuals in different positions are capable of commanding different remuneration. However, individuals in the same hierarchical position are capable of commanding different remuneration because of the differential value that the "market" gives to different individual characteristics. In this context, is an individual's color one of these individual characteristics that result in differentiated treatment by the labor market? To this stage of individuals' life cycle I give the name "income acquisition."

Let us begin with the "social mobility" stage. The analysis involved in this essay uses data from the Supplement on Social Mobility of the 1996 PNAD. For definitions of occupational strata used to build mobility flux matrixes, we will adopt the same methodology proposed by Pastore, not only in his pioneer work but in his later works updating it (e.g., Pastore and Haller, 1993). In these studies, he uses six strata based on a metric socioeconomic scale elaborated with data from the 1970 census. The 1996 PNAD is based on a broader, more detailed classification of occupations than the one in the 1970 census. Consequently, the original classification must be made compatible with the 1996 PNAD by allocating the occupations of the new classification to the most adequate groups from the original classification.

Two criteria were adopted for this process. First, in cases where the occupational title is identical in both classifications, allocation to the groups defined in the original work was respected. Second, in cases of new or diverse occupational title, the effort was to find the allocation most adequate in terms of the substantive description of the group (see below) as well as the socioeconomic score of the occupation and the score that characterizes the group.

In Grid 1, I provide a summary description of the different occupational strata defined as well as the average value of the socioeconomic status index (SSI) for 1996, which replicated the procedures adopted for the data from the 1970 census. The occupational grouping follows criteria of "social distance" (measured by the socioeconomic status index), and, therefore, these strata strictly measure differences in socioeconomic position. At the same time, this classification also corresponds to other criteria, particularly the manual/nonmanual distinction and also the rural/urban difference. The form of classification is not inconsequent for the level of results obtained. Although occupational groups 1 and 2 show a relatively similar SSI, the urban/rural dimension essentially distinguishes them. This allows us, by construction, to identify the process of rural/urban migration with upward mobility. In other words, the recent urbanization of Brazilian society coincides with an improvement in the distribution of positions within the occupational structure.

It is also useful to emphasize that intergroup social distances increase as one climbs the social structure, which is a very realistic characteristic, considering what is known about the high levels of inequality in our society. Thus, the average socioeconomic status index of the highest stratum is more than 15 times that of the lowest.

Following the prevailing tradition in social mobility studies in Brazil, we will restrict our sample to male heads of family between 20 and 64 years of age. The exclusion of spouses and female heads of families relates to the nature of the data collected. The information on occupational status of origin in the 1996 PNAD is limited to the occupation of the respondent's father. Thus, in the case of women, the analysis of their mobility would be limited to a comparison with the position of their fathers (not their mothers). Since occupational segregation imposes occupational profiles that are highly differentiated between men and women, a mobility matrix involving comparison of fathers and daughters would result in very peculiar flux patterns, not strictly comparable with those observed for men. Additionally, female participation in the workforce is characteristically self-selective, with a greater tendency to work concentrated at the extremes of the social hierarchy. The option is to eliminate from the analysis women who do not work (and who, therefore, do not have their own occupational status) or impute to these women the occupational status of their spouse (and, in this way, make the comparison with other women fragile). Whatever the solution, introducing procedures with unclear theoretical consequences would tilt the estimate of women's positions, especially in the middle strata.

Now we will examine the current occupational position of individuals according to their self-classification by color and their strata of origin (e.g., the occupational strata of their fathers when the respondent began working).

Table 27: Index of Social Distance for Occupational Groups

Occup. Group	Stratum	Representative Occupations	Average SSI "Social Distance"
1	**Lower low: nonqualified rural workers**	**Peasants and self-employed rural producers without employees; other agricultural workers and cattlemen; fishermen**	**2.90**
2	Upper low: nonqualified urban workers	Self-employed traders; night watchmen; janitors, hodmen, low-level assistants; unspecified manual laborers; street hawkers; domestic servants	6.49
3	**Lower middle: qualified and semi-qualified workers**	**Drivers; bricklayers; automobile mechanics; carpenters; painters and whitewashers; solderers; electricians**	**8.68**
4	Middle: Non-manual workers, low-level professionals and small property owners	Small-property owners in agriculture; administrators and managers in agriculture and cattle raising; administrative and office assistants; equipment repair people; local and traveling salespeople; armed forces enlistees	17.01
5	**Upper middle: Middle-level professionals and middle-sized property owners**	**Cattle raisers; directors, consultants, advisors and heads in public service; administrators and managers in industry and commerce; section heads and chiefs; commercial representatives**	**27.19**
6	Upper high level: Professionals and large property owners	Industrial entrepreneurs; administrators and managers of financial, real estate and insurance firms; engineers; physicians; accountants; university professors; attorneys; armed forces officers	44.06

Table 28: Current Occupational Group by Color

Current Occupational Group	Color of Respondent		
	White	Preto	Pardo
1	**18.5**	**28.8**	**32.4**
2	22.1	25.8	25.4
3	**27.0**	**32.6**	**25.8**
4	15.3	7.6	10.4
5	**9.8**	**3.6**	**4.1**
6	7.2	1.5	1.8
All Groups	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**

Table 29: Father's Occupational Group by Color

Current Occupational Group	Color of Respondent		
	White	Preto	Pardo
1	**49.5**	**58.6**	**64.6**
2	14.1	14.0	11.6
3	**17.7**	**19.5**	**13.9**
4	10.3	5.8	6.5
5	**4.3**	**1.2**	**2.2**
6	4.0	1.0	1.3
All Groups	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**

The differences in the social positioning of individuals by their declared color group are marked and clear compared with the differences observed for other socioeconomic characteristics. Among self-declared Whites, a few less than 19 percent are found in the lowest stratum of rural workers. The equivalent percentage among Pretos is almost 29 percent and among Pardos is almost one-third of the total number of individuals in this color group. On the other extreme, among nonmanual occupations (strata 4 and 6), the percentage of Whites who occupy these strata comes to 32.3 percent; among Pardos the percentage is cut to about half (more precisely, 16.3 percent). Among Pretos it is a little more than one-third of the equivalent among Whites, i.e., only 12.7 percent.

One common way to quantify these differences in percentage distributions is to calculate the so-called "coefficient of similarity," (D) which indicates the percentage of individuals in a distribution that has to be reallocated to other strata in order for the two compared groups to be equalized. In calculating this index for the distributions of Whites and

Pretos, we verify that it has the value of D=19.6. This implies that almost 20 percent of the individuals (i.e., Pretos) would have to be reallocated in order for their social situation to become equal to that of the other group (i.e., Whites). The dissimilarity between Whites and Pardos is also quite close to this value (D=17.2), while the difference between Pretos and Pardos is much more modest (D=7.2).

When we examine the distributions by social origin (Table 28), large differences are also apparent, albeit the differences between Whites and Pretos are smaller than in the case of the current situation, a fact that already constitutes a symptomatic indication.

The next analysis looks at social mobility itself. Grouped according to the person's color, Table 34 in this chapter's appendix shows the matrixes of the individuals' intergenerational occupational mobility that we are analyzing (i.e., men, heads of family or spouses, 20 to 64 years of age).

From these data it is possible to distinguish the type of mobility that color groups experience. The numbers on the main diagonal of the matrixes indicate the quantity of interviewees who have remained in the same occupational group as their fathers. The numbers above the diagonal indicate the volume of upward mobility, while the numbers below the diagonal express downward mobility. Table 30 summarizes this information.

Table 30: Intergenerational Occupational Mobility by Color, 1996

Type of Mobility	Whites	Pretos	Pardos
Upward	52.5%	43.9%	45.5%
Immobility	33.1	42.6	42.4
Downward	14.4	13.5	12.1
All Types	100%	100%	100%

Whites have a significant advantage in terms of upward occupational mobility; a little more than half (52.5 percent) are found in higher occupational groups than their fathers, while this occurs for only 43.9 percent of Pardos and 45.5 percent of Pretos. Both non-White groups experience a higher level, almost 10 percent, of immobility or inheriting the father's status. Finally, the proportion of those with downward mobility is very similar in the three-color groups, oscillating between 12 and 14 percent.

Table 31 presents percentage outflows of interviewees moving from their fathers' occupational groups to their current occupational groups, according to their color.

Table 31: Outflow from Occupational Groups

Occup. Group of Father	Color	Current Occupational Group					
		1	2	3	4	5	6
1	White	33.3	23.1	25.9	9.8	5.1	2.7
	Preto	44.9	22.1	26.4	4.2	1.8	0.6
	Pardo	45.9	23.4	21.0	6.6	2.3	0.8
2	White	4.1	28.7	26.0	20.8	12.0	8.3
	Preto	8.4	37.5	34.8	11.4	4.8	3.0
	Pardo	7.9	36.9	29.6	15.3	7.6	2.8
3	White	2.8	20.8	41.3	17.9	11.4	5.8
	Preto	4.5	28.9	48.9	10.3	6.0	1.3
	Pardo	5.5	24.8	46.3	15.1	5.6	2.7
4	White	4.8	18.6	21.8	26.1	15.5	13.2
	Preto	6.5	29.0	35.5	18.8	6.5	3.6
	Pardo	12.0	28.0	23.9	23.5	7.9	4.7
5	White	7.1	14.1	14.2	20.2	24.9	19.5
	Preto	3.4	20.7	34.5	17.2	17.2	6.9
	Pardo	11.5	23.9	27.3	20.9	12.1	4.2
6	White	1.9	10.0	9.2	19.4	22.7	36.6
	Preto	4.3	8.7	34.8	26.1	8.7	17.4
	Pardo	3.7	21.1	18.9	23.2	15.8	17.4

Note: Values expressed in percentages, each line totaling 100%.

Whatever the occupational group of origin, the current occupational distribution of non-Whites is notably more concentrated in the lower occupational strata. For example, among the sons of Occupational Group 1 (rural workers), the proportion of Pretos and Pardos who inherit the occupational status of their fathers is significantly larger than that of Whites: about 45 percent for both Pretos and Pardos, compared with 33 percent for Whites. In this same group of origin, the proportion of sons who move up to highest strata of 5 and 6 is about 7.8 percent for Whites, 2.4 percent for Pretos, and 3.1 percent for Pardos. These same proportions among those who are sons in group 2 (nonqualified urban workers) is about 20.3 percent for Whites, 10.4 percent for Pardos, and only 7.8 percent for Pretos. On the opposite extreme of the occupational hierarchy, considering the occupational destiny distribution of interviewees who are sons of group 6 (high-level professionals and property owners), the proportion of Whites (36.6 percent) who manage to preserve this position is much larger than both Pardos and Pretos (both at 17.4 percent). This means that persons of color (Pretos and Pardos) born into families with relatively high status are at greater risk of experiencing downward social mobility and losing the positions won by the previous generation.

To summarize the distribution of social mobility opportunities among color groups, non-Whites are exposed to fewer chances for social climbing, difficulties in upward mobility increase along with the level of the stratum of origin, and those born into higher strata are exposed to greater risks of downward mobility.

One way to quantify these differences is to calculate the occupational distribution that Pretos and Pardos hypothetically would have if there were no differences in their chances for mobility in relation to Whites. In other words, non-White groups would experience the same rates of mobility as Whites. Engaging in this exercise, we would come up with the following hypothetical occupational distributions for the current situation of Pretos and Pardos:

Table 32: Hypothetical Distribution by Color without "Racial Differences" in Occupational Groups

Individual's Color	Situation in Hypothesis of Non-difference/ Group Occupational						Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Preto	**21.0%**	**23.0%**	**28.4%**	**14.1%**	**8.3%**	**5.2%**	**100%**
Pardo	22.9	22.8	27.3	13.6	8.1	5.3	100%

Comparing these distributions, using the dissimilarity index D, with the distribution of Whites, we arrive at the values of D=4.8 for Pretos and D=5.4 for Pardos. It is useful to recall that the real dissimilarity observed between the distribution of Whites and Pretos was D=19.6. Thus, in the absence of differences in mobility opportunity, i.e., due exclusively to the fact that Whites and Pretos have distinct social origins, the dissimilarity now is reduced to 4.8 percentage points. This implies that no less than 14.8 percentage points of the total dissimilarity index (i.e., more than three-fourths of that index) are attributable to differences in mobility opportunity between Whites and Pretos, to the detriment of Pretos, as becomes evident on examination of real and hypothetical distributions.

In the case of Pardos, a similar situation is manifest. The total real dissimilarity of D=17.2 is reduced to a dissimilarity of 5.4 percentage points, implying that more than two-thirds of the total dissimilarity is due to differences in mobility opportunity. Once more, this is to the detriment of individuals of color. Clearly, the differences in occupational distributions between Whites and non-Whites are not attributable to differences in family situation of origin but to the extremely unequal distribution of occupational mobility opportunity.

Acquisition of Income

As indicated previously, the occupational strata used to study social mobility were generated based on the socioeconomic level of the occupations allocated to them. The income earned by incumbents in the different occupational titles constitutes the central axis of this socioeconomic position. Put simply, the hierarchy of occupational strata is a hierarchy of incomes associated with the occupations included in those strata. The logic of socioeconomic occupation scales presupposes that income is, basically, an attribute of position in the technical division of labor (i.e., of occupation) rather than the individuals who occupy the position. In neoclassical economic terms, productivity (wage, salary, or income) is a characteristic inherent to the occupational position. However, within a certain level of average occupational productivity, there may be secondary differences in productivity associated with certain individual characteristics, such as education and experience.

Thus, it is not surprising that these occupational strata reflect the notorious and abysmal income inequalities that mark Brazilian society. The last column in Table 33 shows that the average income in the highest stratum is almost 12 times greater than that corresponding to the stratum of the worst socioeconomic situation. Two income differences between successive strata are extremely outstanding and represent eventual class cleavages in the occupational structure. The first separates stratum 1 from the next, indicating the passage from the rural sector to the urban sector, where the difference in income is almost twofold in favor of the urban manual stratum. The second differential is the one placed on the dividing line between the manual and nonmanual strata (strata 3 and 4), where the income differences are practically twofold in favor of the nonmanual stratum. The other differences, also high, are more modest in magnitude.

What interests us most is the differences by color within each occupational stratum. When we compare the income of Pretos and Pardos with that of Whites, whatever the occupational stratum, the differences are very noticeable in size, especially in strata 1 and 5. Even in the stratum where the differential is smallest (stratum 3), the income of Whites surpasses by nearly 40 percent the income of Pardos and Pretos. These values imply that individual Pretos and Pardos find it more difficult to transform their occupational achievement into higher incomes. On the same occupational level, their incomes, on the average, are smaller than that of Whites.

As we noted earlier, Whites on average earn more income than both Pretos and Pardos. But a large part of these differences are not due to the fact that Whites have higher levels of occupational achievement (i.e., they are better positioned in the occupational hierarchy). To estimate the extent of this, we can calculate the hypothetical income of Pretos and Pardos if they had the same occupational return (the same average income per occupational stratum) that Whites receive. With this calculation, we estimate that in the hypothesis of identical returns for Pretos and Whites, Pretos would have an estimated income of R$670. Since Whites' income is R$950 and the real income of Pretos is R$403, we can conclude that a little less than half the difference between Whites and Pretos (49 percent) can be explained by income differences within the occupational strata. A similar calculation for Pardos indicates a hypothetical income of R$687, which also represents a difference of 49 percent of the total difference attributable to unequal returns from occupational achievements.

Table 33: Average Incomes by Occupational Stratum and Color

Occupational stratum	Color			Total Average
	White	Preto	Pardo	
1	315.96	158.12	182.06	239.46
2	577.88	311.75	350.09	473.17
3	644.88	464.99	458.49	567.48
4	1,246.94	717.05	775.80	1,100.78
5	1,877.23	987.32	1,039.20	1,678.49
6	2,919.93	1,805.16	1,940.11	2,772.62
Total	949.66	403.24	432.81	734.18

Note: Average Income in R$

Conclusion

In this paper, I have pursued two complementary objectives. First, I have tried to show the scope and magnitude of the racial differences that permeate our society. I have showed this with respect to characteristics such as social origin, educational and occupational achievement, and especially income. And, as we have seen, this list could be extended to include a broad range of other relevant social characteristics, such as health and mortality. The evidence always points to marked differences that prejudice the groups of people who identify themselves as Pardos or Pretos.

The second objective was to show the cumulative nature of the intergenerational construction of these inequalities. I distinguished two phases in individuals' socioeconomic life cycles: "social mobility" and "income acquisition." For the same stratum of social origin, Pretos and Pardos confront greater difficulties in their process of upward mobility and are exposed to higher levels of immobility. The result is a more modest profile of occupational achievement for these groups that to a limited extent can be attributed to differences in social origin.

Additionally, I have tried to show that, for the same occupational result, non-Whites also experience greater difficulties in transforming their occupational achievement into income. Almost half the differences between Whites and Pretos and Pardos are attributable to the lower levels of monetary return for the occupational achievements of non-Whites. Eventually, if we consider other relevant individual characteristics (such as education and experience) that can still persist within each occupational stratum, this aggregated difference may become more modest. But education, for example, is also a process that is part of individuals' life cycles and, as such, is subject to the same types of disadvantages that prejudice the social progress of non-White groups. It constitutes another possible link in the chain of disadvantages that accumulate during individuals' lives and that subject Pretos and Pardos to living conditions markedly inferior to those of Whites in Brazilian society

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END NOTES

[1] **Pesquisa Nacional por Amostragem de Domicílios, Brazilian** Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).

[2] We do not translate the expressions *Pretos* (literally, Blacks) and *Pardos* (mixed bloods, mulattos, or mestizos) because their meanings differ considerably from those of the English language expressions. Essentially, *Pretos* designates only very dark-skinned Blacks, while *Pardos* refers to a wide range of lighter-skinned mixed-bloods. When referring to the category that in English would be called "Blacks," the sum of these two categories is used. T.N.

[3] SP mean São Paulo; RJ means Rio de Janeiro.

[4] University Instititute of Research on Rio de Janeiro (Candido Mendes University, Rio de Janeiro).

[5] Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics.

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APPENDIX

Table 34: Intergenerational Occupational Mobility of Men 20-64 Years of Age by Color, 1996

	Whites					
	Current Occupational Group					
Father's Occup. Group	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**
1	4,059	2,816	3,149	1,195	623	332
2	**142**	**995**	**902**	**722**	**416**	**286**
3	123	907	1,798	778	496	254
4	**123**	**474**	**553**	**663**	**394**	**335**
5	75	150	151	214	264	207
6	**19**	**98**	**90**	**190**	**222**	**358**
	Pretos					
	Current Occupational Group					
Father's Occup. Group	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**
1	627	308	368	59	25	9
2	**28**	**125**	**116**	**38**	**16**	**10**
3	21	134	227	48	28	6
4	**9**	**40**	**49**	**26**	**9**	**5**
5	1	6	10	5	5	2
6	**1**	**2**	**8**	**6**	**2**	**4**
	Pardos					
	Current Occupational Group					
Father's Occup. Group	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**
1	4,420	2,250	2,022	634	221	75
2	**136**	**637**	**511**	**265**	**131**	**48**
3	113	512	956	312	116	55
4	**116**	**270**	**231**	**227**	**76**	**45**
5	38	79	90	69	40	14
6	**7**	**40**	**36**	**44**	**30**	**33**



South Africa

The Second Republic: Race, Inequality and Democracy in South Africa

By Wilmot James and Jeffrey Lever

Introduction

[illegible]

South Africans and Their Labels

The categorization of the South African population has undergone a number of changes since population censuses were first introduced in the 19th century. From the beginning, classification on the basis of ethnic labels has been the rule. These categories reflected patterns of settlement and immigration that have constituted the current South African population. In their matter-of-fact usage they imply rigidity regarding the population structure which belies a fluid process of population formation. The use of these categories is unavoidable given the fixity that they have come to acquire both in popular consciousness and official business.

The most recent population count in 1996 came up with an unexpectedly low figure of 38 million inhabitants.[5] Of these, it is estimated some 29 million are "African", 5 million "White", 3 million "Coloured" and nearly 1 million "Indian". Here then are South Africa's four "racial groups", otherwise referred to as "population groups", "ethnic groups" and even "national groups". The African majority section of the population comprises the descendants of Iron Age farmers speaking eleven variants of the Bantu language family that dominates the linguistic map of sub-Saharan Africa east of Cameroon.[6] Formerly known under various labels (the awful "Kaffir"[7], "Native", "Bantu" or the more benign "Black") by the European settlers, today it is this African majority which by virtue of electoral dominance and economic deprivation is the focus of developmental aspirations. Here the issue of racial inequality is most acutely posed.

The country's Whites (formerly "Europeans") descend from a melange of Dutch, German and French speakers who fused to comprise the country's Afrikaner population by the 19th century, and from a conglomeration of Britons, continental Europeans and Jewish people. The Britons as the dominant political power in the region placed the stamp of the English language on the country's economic, educational and governmental life.

It is questionable whether one can speak of the Coloured population at all. In this essentially residual category are to be found people of the most diverse descent, including the remnants of the area's most truly indigenous groupings: the pastoral Khoi-Khoi ("Hottentots" and the hunter-gatherer San ("Bushmen").[8] To be "Coloured" in South Africa today is merely to say that one can trace some ancestry from Africa or Asia, or both, and speaks either English or Afrikaans as a home language. That the very notion of a "Coloured people" exists is due to the complex sociology of three centuries of European domination and more recently the classificatory mania of the apartheid regime.

Finally, South Africa's Indian population, established first in the region around Durban, derives from the importation of labor for the sugar fields of Natal in the 19th century from the Indian sub-continent. This population was however drawn from several corners of India and came to comprise both Hindu and Moslem sections. Their seeming outward homogeneity (to the other South Africans) was a myth. It is as appropriate to call these South Africans of Indian descent a "racial group" as it would be to conceive of the variegated peoples of India as likewise one race.

Nevertheless, the broad differences of descent patterns, of partial endogamy (enforced by law for some of the nation's history) and the linguistic variety of the contemporary South African population make continued "racial" consciousness inevitable for the near-term future.[9] The fourfold path of South African racial demography is both a biological fiction and a social reality. That it could have been otherwise is at least conceivable. The introduction of compulsory group categories as part of the apartheid program of the National Party government both entrenched and further reinforced the myriad of social processes by which populations sort and label themselves. Introduced in 1950, the Population Registration Act deepened the ethnicization of the South African population by bestowing an obligatory category on all South Africans. One became perforce after this date a "White", a "Coloured", an "Asiatic", a "Native", with numerous sub-categories appended to allow for the developing, if depraved, ethnic sophistication of government ideologues wishing to conceal a colonial-type domination under a welter of culturalist terms.

In response, major opposition groupings in the apartheid era promoted various conceptions of a de-ethnicized South African nation. Most prominently, the African National Congress adopted the stance of "non-racialism".[10] A future South Africa rid of apartheid was to consist of juridically equal citizens whose descent and appearance would be a matter of at most private concern. By the 1980s, when even the National Party declared its opposition to continued racial discrimination, it was clear that a future political dispensation could not rest on the enforced "racial" classification of the country's population. In July 1991, the Population Registration Act was repealed as part of the wholesale destruction of racially based legislation. All new South Africans would cease to have a racial category endorsed on their certificates of birth. The ensuing years of negotiation and constitution making proceeded accordingly upon a consensus expressing revulsion regarding official ethnic classification.

In this climate it could be expected that South Africa's democratic Constitution would contain no reference to the population categories which had been inflicted upon the nation previously. Finished in 1996, the Constitution is devoid of the old apartheid terminology.[11] The Bill of Rights included in the Constitution declares that "everyone is equal before the law" and that "the state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race."[12] Yet pressing political realities, as the last clause hints at, could not altogether ignore the group contours of South African society. "Unfair" discrimination was outlawed, but not discrimination per se – thus making possible policies of affirmative action and redress on group grounds. Various provisions of the Constitution allude to the reality of population divisions within the wider society: terms such as "communities" and "race" appear here and there. Most notably, the phrases "reflect broadly the racial and gender composition of South Africa" [Section 174(2)] and "broadly representative of the South African people" [Section 193(2)] indicate fleetingly a deep-seated concern with patterns of "racial" inequality bequeathed to the new order by the old regime.

The Constitution also contains, in chapter nine, provision for an elaborately named Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities.[13] Though yet to be established in practice, the formulation assumes– some argue reinforces and politicizes[14] – a division of the population into nomenclatures reminiscent of a sociological cultural pluralism. The nature of the transition, where White social power remained while their political power diminished, created sufficient insecurity in these and other quarters to warrant a body that would mediate the results of a racial past and, it is presumed, smooth a route toward a nonracial future.

As in other societies, therefore, the transition to democracy has not led to the complete submergence of the need to name and classify. With the design of new legislation to hasten processes of occupational mobility on behalf of the previously subordinated population, explicit definitions of the segmented South African population are reappearing. The notion of historically disadvantaged is being given more pointed content: official documents now include for example such appendices as: "Glossary of terms ... Black is a generic term that refers to African, Coloured and Indian."[15] Opposition parties to the ruling African National Congress have decried what they call a "re-racialisation" of the South African scene.[16] But with the current drive to audit, in order to address and eliminate racial inequality, it seems likely that such racial naming will remain prominent in a society constitutionally committed to nonracialism.

Colonial Conquest and the Land Question

By the end of the expansion of Anglo-Afrikaner power at the turn of the 19th century, the descendants of the European settlers had engrossed almost the total surface area of what became in 1910 the Union of South Africa. Some 7.3 percent of the land remained formally reserved for the African majority. The pastoral Khoi-Khoi and the nomadic San had fared worse. The latter had been altogether excluded from formal land occupation. The Khoi-Khoi's descendants, amalgamated to a considerable degree with other elements of the South African population as part of the Coloured group, retained scattered land holdings in the Cape, some of which were officially held by one or other missionary society. The largest of these holdings consisted of the five Namaqualand reserves in the semi-arid northern Cape Province. While their area was considerable– around two and a half million acres– their carrying capacity was minimal, with around 25,000 persons inhabiting them by the second half of the 20th century.[17] Finally, the immigrant Indian population had managed to buy a limited area of agricultural land around Durban and by the 1930s were owner-farmers of some 105,000 acres.[18]

The alarming implications of a society in which a physically and culturally distinct minority owned or controlled, by way of the state, almost all the land in the country were not lost upon the political leadership of the White section. The central problem was clearly the relationship between the numerically preponderant African population– till largely rural and involved in agriculture–and the dominant White landowners. The history of South Africa in the 20th century was to be shaped by the search for a master-policy that would combine land and politics in one grand plan. Land and space were so to be configured that the White minority could retain the lion's share of occupancy while disposing the rest of the population around it in ways which would combine White material advance with Black fragmentation.[19]

The result was, as it were, foreordained. Short of an equitable, mutually agreed partition such as that compelled by India and Pakistan in the late 1940s, there was no way to bring about a semblance of justice and stability on the land question. Every effort of the White minority to bring about a spatial reordering worsened rather than ameliorated the situation. Inequality deepened while the problems became ever more intractable. In both town and country, whole communities were abruptly disrupted, dispossessed, relocated and embittered as a result. Systems of land and housing tenure proliferated, counter-productive to any rational form of agricultural advance or small-scale capital accumulation for the masses of the people. The cities attracted and repulsed in equal measure, heightening a pervasive sense of relative deprivation. Clinging to bankrupt policies, the country's political elites bequeathed a land issue whose resolution remains difficult in the extreme.

The steps to this colossal failure were many and complex. The 1903-1905 Native Affairs Commission met in the aftermath of the Anglo-Boer War, when the unification of the four South African territories into one political entity was imminent. A common line on the "Native Question" was highly desirable for the colonial elites, whose delegates formed the membership of the Commission. There an uneasy consensus emerged around the notion of "segregation". The "basis of Native policy should be the territorial separation of the races."[20] The slender reed on which this massive outgrowing of populations was to lean was the remaining areas reserved for African occupancy – a few large blocs of land such as the Transkei and many scattered areas consisting in cases of not more than a handful of conjoined farmlands. In part these were areas historically the residence of the African indigenes under the wilting system of traditional authorities. Their survival was a matter of great moment for the ideology of segregation – and later of apartheid. Here were authentic "homelands" of Black people that the White polity generously was to preserve and indeed extend.

> *Much of South African history for the 20th century can be written around the story of the homelands . . .*

Much of South African history for the 20th century can be written around the story of the homelands, also variously known as the reserves or Bantustans. They provided the single consistent justification for the elaboration of the order of racial inequality under successive White regimes.[21] In 1913 the Native Land Act decreed that no African could henceforth purchase land outside these African reserves. In order to enhance their viability, they would be extended. This enlargement of the reserves took more than 70 years to come to fruition and resulted in the increase in the area of South Africa allocated to exclusive African ownership from some seven percent in 1900 to around 13 percent by the late 1970s.

The Land Act has rightly been seen as a watershed for the country, reverberating at many levels, both symbolic and concrete. In the famous words of the African writer Sol Plaatje, an eyewitness to these events, "[A]waking on Friday morning, June 20 1913, the South African native found himself, not actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of his birth."[22] The first and most severe consequence of this Act was to evict hundreds of thousands of African dwellers on White-owned land, without any compensatory measure. These people were forced to surrender their tenure of such land based on various arrangements ranging from outright renting to sharecropping and labor tenancy – in return for the unasked right to occupy land in the now "scheduled" Black areas.

The 1913 Land Act set a pattern of dislocation and deprivation that was to characterize all succeeding decades until the 1990s. The Act, for example, had not touched over 300 small freehold areas owned by Africans outside the reserves. These "black spots," as they came to be known, were largely to disappear under a persistent assault by the National Party government after 1948. More immediately, however, the Act set in train processes which led to the destruction of both informal African tenure in the White rural areas, and to the further overcrowding and degradation of the land held by Africans within the reserves themselves.[23] Later measures set the seal on these processes: the Native Land and Trust Act of 1936 made all new land bought for African occupation in the reserves the possession of the state, indirectly under the control of traditional authorities rather than the household occupants.[24] The result has been the sustained fossilization of a land tenure system, which has allowed neither for private ownership and capital formation nor for vigorous promotion of viable small-scale farming.

The Land Acts of 1913 and 1936 finalized the size of the land which White rulers were prepared to surrender to the majority of the population, but not its eventual location. Under the policy of the National Party after 1948, continuing attempts were made to re-configure the outlines of the African reserves and, in the process, to relocate massive numbers of people. It has been estimated that around 2.7 million African people were forced to leave homes in a variety of urban and rural settings to relocate in the areas to which the White government consigned them. In addition to various urban removal measures, these "forced removals" – from White farms (the single largest category), former African freehold areas ("black spots"), and official reserve areas that had shifted to White ownership – figure prominently in the sordid annals of this period of South African history.[25]

Overshadowed by the dimensions of the White-Black land struggle, the smaller Coloured and Indian populations were not allowed to escape unscathed as White politicians and bureaucrats strove to order the map to the tastes of their White constituents. Here the drama was to played out mostly, if not altogether, in the nation's urban areas.

Official urban segregation in South Africa began again with the African population, who from the later 1800s were subjected to various town ordinances establishing "locations" or "townships" where they might reside while in the city milieu.[26] The urban Indian population was next. Successive steps beginning before 1900 (in the Transvaal) began to restrict urban tenure by Indian South Africans to segregated neighborhoods. Various measures culminating in the Pegging Act of 1943 and the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act of 1946 sought to prevent an increasingly prosperous stratum of Indian traders and professionals from buying land in central business districts and traditionally White-occupied suburbs.[27] Directed against the smallest and in a sense most politically isolated group in South Africa, these measures were to wreak immense harm on the fortunes of Indian South Africans. But their historical import is probably to be found in the fact that they had established a precedent and a model which could be taken further after 1948 when the National Party government came to power with a program of sweeping urban segregation, including the ghettoization of Coloured and Indian people.

The passage of the Group Areas Act in 1950 began a drawn-out process of dispossession and relocation. By the time the process had almost exhausted itself in the 1980s, it is estimated that 860, 000 people had been forced out of their homes in the nation's towns and cities, the majority of them Coloured.[28] (This Act was also used to remove an estimated 80, 000 Africans from areas where they had enjoyed at least a tenuous urban status).[29] For the tens of thousands of Indian and Coloured owner-occupiers, traders and tenants involved, the measure was an economic and personal disaster whose consequences are still with us today.

The sharpest edge of apartheid segregation began to blunt from the late 1970s onwards. Various factors contributed to this reversal. Increasingly turbulent African urban masses forced upon a reluctant government a measure of liberalization that resulted in more secure urban tenure through such schemes as 99-year leasehold arrangement in African townships. Squatter settlements, a pervasive feature of urban South Africa, no longer were bulldozed as soon as erected. Coloured, Indian and Black South Africans began in various ways to settle in White areas despite official harassment. In 1985 the government bowed to the inevitable and formally abolished the control over the movement of the African population embodied in the so-called pass laws.[30]

In land and settlement, therefore, the reversal of apartheid began under apartheid. Spatial integration speeded up from the 1980s onwards in the face of an official rearguard action. Nevertheless, these movements in the interstices of society could not undo the work of decades. An active program of positive land and tenure reform awaited the 1990s. In 1991 the de Klerk government repealed the most important land segregation laws with the passage of the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act. Henceforth all South Africans could in principle now work, reside and own land wherever they chose. It was however only with the accession to power of the African National Congress-dominated Government of National Unity in May 1994 that the full weight of the state was thrown behind a major land reform program.

A new Ministry of Land Affairs assumed the responsibility of what on paper was quite radical land reform. The broad objectives of the policy were threefold: redistribution, restitution and land tenure reform.[31] Within these parameters, the policy aimed at achieving the ANC's pre-election promise in its Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) manifesto– to convert 30 percent of South African land holding to Black ownership.[32] Redistribution entailed the purchase of White owned land or the disposal of public land to the targeted Black constituencies. Restitution intended to restore or compensate the victims of the major land dispossessions of the 20th century, in particular the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts, the removal of "black spots" and the Group Areas Act. Land tenure reform aimed at bestowing secure tenure on the millions of South Africans in the former homelands, on White owned farms and in the huge number of informal settlements around the urban areas.[33]

The program has proved complex and frustrating. The Department of Land Affairs itself is understaffed and inexperienced. Its incapacity to proceed with due haste is widely considered the major obstacle in the way of a more effective implementation of the policy. But other major obstacles also loom large: public authorities either have good reason to hold onto land under their control or are loath to cooperate for a variety of reasons. The principle of "willing-buyer, willing-seller" and the acceptance of market prices put land out of reach for the majority of would-be individual purchasers.[34] In these circumstances only very limited gains have been registered. Some 26 000 group and individual claims have been made for restitution to the newly formed Land Claims Court; only a handful have as yet been disposed of. Redistribution has run up against very limited budgets and the small size of the state subsidy which may be granted to households for land purchases (R15,000 - the same amount households in the urban areas may claim). The hopes that had been nourished for the large-scale release of public land have proved more or less illusory. The Director-General of the Department of Land Affairs recently stated that

"[A]lthough the state owns 19 percent of the entire surface of the country, most of it is made up of military bases, nature reserves, dams, coastal zones and land in the former homelands ..."[35]

By mid-1998, it was estimated than less than 1 percent of South Africa's land had been redistributed. More promising had been the progress on the housing front – a separate program under a different Ministry than land policy, but obviously a related issue. Although burdened by administrative incapacity, bureaucratic quagmires and limited state funding, significant progress is being made on fulfilling the ANC's promise to build one million homes by 1999. By February 1998, the government had awarded some 778,000 housing subsidies (at a maximum of R17,500 per household) since 1994. Of these, 600,000 awards had been converted into completed houses. With a delivery system now clearly in place, low-income housing could only but improve.[36] The main beneficiaries have been the poorer, urban African households; their ranks however are estimated at around three million.

The nation remains thus under-housed, with the majority of the African population and a sizeable section of the Coloured population either in shacks or in altogether substandard dwelling conditions. Private land ownership outside of the urban areas remains a largely White affair and the legacy of racial inequality in this sphere seems likely to prove one of the most intractable to solve, short of wholesale appropriation of land. The latter, radical option is supported only by the Pan Africans Congress (PAC), which received about one percent of votes cast in the 1999 general election. Zimbabwe's route of radical land reform measures has demonstrably disabled that country's economic progress, leaving a deep impression on South African policy-makers. We have settled, therefore, for better or for worse, on the slow road of market-oriented land reform.

State and Social Inequality

With the transfer of power to the Government of National Unity (GNU) in May 1994, the ownership of the state itself moved to new hands under the title deeds of a democratic election. This state had accumulated great assets: in land, industry, buildings and a manifold of commodities. Its taxation power, public service jobs and powers of spending through tenders, contracts and agreements were also under new ownership.

The state's immense wealth – for which there appear to be no figures at all – was still only a limited slice of the country's accumulated riches. A protectionist state had overseen the heaping up of wealth in private hands – which were mostly whited. Here again there are no figures generally agreed upon. A recent government document states:

> *The highly unequal distribution of assets contributes to differences in incomes along race and gender lines. Apartheid prevented Africans from owning land. It limited the access of Black people, and especially Black women, to loans, markets and infrastructure, making capital accumulation difficult. Unfortunately, no definitive evidence exists on the ownership of assets by race, gender or class. Estimates suggest that Whites own over nine tenths of all assets in South Africa.*[37]

The figure of nine-tenths may be too high if we take into account the issue of state assets and the increasing indirect participation of Black South Africans in asset ownership through pensions and similar investments. Nevertheless, few will question that this estimate reflects an underlying reality. Private property has accumulated massively for the White minority and modestly for the Black majority. It is worth noting that within the White minority, ownership itself is quite highly concentrated and control of the country's major enterprises even more so. The number of White farm owners, for example, has declined by half since the mid-century, from around 120,000 to 60,000 in 1985 – and of these reduced numbers, a mere 18,000 produced nearly 70 percent of the nation's agricultural produce at that time.[38]

Similarly, the ownership and control of the nation's industrial and commercial enterprises are remarkably concentrated, so much so that South African scholars saw it as conclusive evidence of the monopoly capitalist nature of the South African economy.[39] Depending on the criteria applied, it has been estimated by a leading business analyst that the country's major conglomerate, the Anglo American Corporation, may control as much as 45 percent of the shares on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, although the corporation itself has put the figure at 30 percent.[40]

Precisely how this accumulation and concentration of White wealth came about in the 20th century after the completion of colonial conquest has been the subject of an extended debate in South African social science.[41] On the one side, Marxist-inclined analysts argued that capitalism – and by implication the White business community – sustained or even called forth the racial order, which culminated in apartheid.[42] In the words of a recent labor document indicative of this thinking: "employers collaborated with the apartheid regime from the outset, supported apartheid in all its manifestations and benefited from apartheid capitalism with its exploitative and oppressive nature."[43]

In truth, South African economic progress in the 20th century has been a compound of oppressive exploitation and rational-technical advance. The country's deep-level gold mines, worked until recently by over half a million Black migrant laborers, but with one family, the Oppenheimers, dominating the structure of ownership and control, are a telling example with deep underground operations grafted on to primitive labor and repressive social organization.[44] In a crude but valid sense, White wealth is a product of White political power over land and African labor.[45]

And yet it is much more also. That liberal orthodoxy claims apartheid was economically irrational and set the country on a sub-optimal growth path may be in part a self-serving dogma. But it is also the case that "[C]apitalist economic growth in South Africa has been 'development', not 'underdevelopment'. It has laid the material basis for a large-scale modern state."[46] Unlike one cousin, Portuguese colonialism, South Africa's developmental drive has been brutal but, it happened to leave a worthwhile legacy of material and infrastructure. Unlike another cousin, Stalinist forced industrialization, South Africa's racial development resulted in the growth of strong, if partial, economic institutions like banking and monetary systems.

> *South African economic progress in the 20th century has been a compound of oppressive exploitation and rational-technical advance.*

What is lacking in South African social science is a detailed grasp of not just the overarching structures but the myriad of micro-processes by which the White and, to a more limited extent, the Indian business strata and allied professionals have both accumulated and developed. The latter indeed are remarkable in their persistence: hounded from central business districts and forced into the Group Areas ghettoes, the South African Indian business community has yet survived and expanded.

Their more fortunate White counterparts were able to capitalize on numerous opportunities which White control of the state itself made possible. The colonial enterprise constituted a whole series of programs of affirmative action of a special kind. With the accession to power of the National Party in 1948, nascent Afrikaner elites were able to pursue a two-fold program of occupational advance in the public service and financial advance in the private sector.[47] The Afrikaner component in the civil service doubled in the two decades after 1948. In the private sector,

> *the special relationship of the Afrikaner businessman to political control was of great importance. The Handelsinstituut [trade institute] is, for instance, consulted on legislation pertaining to economic matters and is represented, along with other interest groups, on government commissions, tender boards, and marketing boards. Afrikaner capital also benefited occasionally from government favoritism through the allocation of fishing quotas and mineral concessions and the award of government contracts and accounts. In 1977, for instance, 98 percent of the Department of Information publishing budget of 3 million dollars went to the Perskor group, an Afrikaans publishing house that had several cabinet ministers, including the Minister of Information, on its board. Afrikaner firms have also been aided by a system of interlocking directorates between the state corporations and Afrikaner private capital.*[48]

Within the wider White community, the tax regime for most of the century has enabled the successful to pass down their wealth to their children and often, by use of generation-skipping trusts, to their grandchildren. There are no land taxes on farming land, no capital gains taxes, and an "inadequate system of estate duty... Estate duty has never been taken seriously by Inland Revenue in South Africa."[49] A recent, official commission of inquiry into the taxation system has found a "huge disparity of income and assets between the various groups in South Africa," but has stopped short of recommending any radical, new wealth taxes in the face of international evidence of their apparent ineffectiveness.[50]

The democratic state also inherited an apparatus that skewed one of modernity's greatest assets – education and training – in favor of Whites. Compulsory schooling for Whites to secondary level education had been introduced in the 1920s, whereas the same step for Africans was taken only in the 1990s. Intervening in this period was Bantu Education, introduced by the apartheid government in the 1950s, having the brazenly articulated intention of subjecting all African children of school-going age to an education that trained them only to be unskilled, servile labor. Mission and private schools for Africans, from whence the educated elite of Nelson Mandela's generation came, were closed down. Mixed schools were not an option. Mathematics and science, when they were offered, was by exception under unusual circumstance.

A racial hierarchy of schooling emerged, with Whites as recipients of the best education, equivalent to first world standards, followed by Indians, Coloured people and

Africans last, below even third world standards. Each group had their education administered separately; teachers trained at their respective racial colleges and universities, financed by apartheid's wicked formula of providing the best for those who already had and the worst for those who had little. In 1994, when matters had already improved some, government was spending R5,403 per White school pupil but R1,053 for every Black child in the Transkei, a former homeland now part of the Eastern Cape, the poorest of South Africa's nine provinces. (In 1999 about R6 equaled $1). The cumulative consequence of this unequal system was a desperately undereducated African population.

Table 35: Education of Persons over 20, 1995

	African	Coloured
No Education	2 640 000	182 000
Some Primary	4 495 000	690 000
Some Secondary	7 413 000	1 001 000
Some Tertiary	822 000	102 000
TOTAL	15 370 000	1 975 000

Source: CSS October Household Survey, 1995.

The figures are as unsurprising as they are alarming. Africans make up 92 percent, Coloreds 6, Indians 1 and Whites 0.2 of South African adults who have no education at all. In turn, most of the undereducated Africans are to be found in the more rural and poorer provinces of the Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga, the Northwest and the Northern Province. The majority - 61 percent - of the formally uneducated is women.[51] On the other hand, Whites and Africans are fairly even in the percent that have some level of higher education, though obviously the former are in a demographic minority and the latter in the majority.

Of the challenges facing the democratic government, education is probably the most formidable. A more equitable and better performing system had to be created out of a desperately unequal, segregated and inferior legacy. The scale of required reforms was staggering. Access for African children especially in rural areas had to grow exponentially; new schools needed to be built; teacher pre-service and in-service training improved; new curricula and teaching materials developed; and a single administration crafted out of 14 separate administrations - one for each of the four "racial" groups and the ten homelands - that made up the geo-political legacy of apartheid.

There is no question that matters have improved greatly. Access to schooling for African children has jumped beyond expectations. Since 1994, 2,500 schools have been renovated and 1,000 new ones built.[52] Curriculum 2005 lays the groundwork for improved content, new materials and revised teacher training. The entry of African matriculants at colleges and universities is spectacular. A recent study by University of Cape Town sociologist David Cooper argues that change at the university level is nothing short of revolutionary, with Black students entering universities and technical colleges at a rate that will mirror the demographic ratios of society.[53] A single administration now exists, though the old bureaucracies and their staff have not entirely disappeared.

A recent report of the President's Education Initiative Research Project shows, however, that the good ideas and initiatives are trapped in a system that fails to work properly, compromising quality on a large scale.[54] The first democratic ministry of education failed to rise from the admittedly regressive weight of the past. The growth in sheer numbers should not conceal the fact that the schooling system, nevertheless, struggles to enroll all eligible pupils, fails to retain the majority of them to secondary level and offers them a quality of schooling which varies from excellent for a minority to abysmal for the majority. The rapid expansion of tertiary educational involvement by Africans has meant their enrollment in the less technical directions since most schools for African pupils fail to qualify them in mathematics and science. The technical and commercial elite remains predominantly White and Indian as a result.

It is not surprising to find that the racially based endowment of the nation rears its head in other places, as in the jobs people tend to hold and the personal income they receive. As the main allocation mechanism of current income, the country's occupational structure, together with unemployment rates, is perhaps the most telling single datum for assessing racial inequality. In some ways the reconfiguration of South Africa's occupational and employment hierarchy is the most pressing issue facing the country, as current legislative moves suggest. Table 36 indicates how the most remunerative positions requiring the more advanced skills were distributed in each group in 1995.

As can be seen, Whites and Indians dominate the upper levels of the occupational hierarchy, while Coloreds and Africans are found mostly in the bottom rungs. Respectively, 40.1 percent and 38.8 percent of those who fall into the category "elementary occupation" are African and Coloured.

The need to raise the skills of the South African workforce, and in particular its majority African segment, is urgent, and government is taking a hand (beyond the formal educational sector) with such measures as a Skills

Table 36: Distribution of Race Groups by Selected Occupational Levels, 1995

	African	Coloured	Indian	White
Senior management	**2.9%**	**2%**	**10.7%**	**14.6%**
Professional	2	1.7	6.7	8.4
Technician/related	**9.6**	**6.6**	**11.9**	**18.5**
Clerical	7.8	10.8	20.9	22.5
Service	**11.2**	**11.6**	**13.3**	**10.6**
Craft	10.2	14.3	16	15
Operators	**14**	**12.3**	**12.7**	**3.8**
Elementary Occupation	40.1	38.8	6	1.6

Source: Adapted from CSS, October Household Survey, 1995, Table 2.1.

Development Act. Even this problem pales in comparison, however, with the unavailability of jobs at lower skill levels. Unemployment figures vary according to the criteria applied and the specific survey involved. Again, one of the most trusted sources, the Central Statistical Services 1995 October Household Survey, came up with unemployment rates for those 15 years and older and willing to work of nearly 37 percent for the African population (compared to over 22 for the Coloured, 13 for the Indian and 5.5 for the White groups). These figures are probably valid as orders of dimension and relative size, though their absolute accuracy has not gone uncontested. Many job-seekers in the formal economy find low-paid and often very irregular work in the country's large informal sector– just whether such persons should qualify as unemployed is debatable. But both the size and ethnic complexion of this sector is yet another indicator of the country's vast material inequalities, with an estimated 78 percent of the 1.7 million persons active here found to be African in the 1995 CSS Household Survey.

. . . it is women who keep up the roof of life's cave . . .

About 38 percent of people employed in the formal and informal sectors are women. In the formal sector, 37 percent of women are found in unskilled positions, 20 percent in clerical work and 16 percent in technical and other professions. However, in the informal sector women outnumber men by a ratio of two to one.[55] This sector is the principal source of livelihood for the African majority, and it is women who keep up the roof of life's cave both by being the principal source of income and by taking up the social welfare slack when government does not reach the rural areas of South Africa's poorest provinces where most African women tend to be.

The distribution of skill and employability has been affected by historical emigration and immigration tendencies. On the one hand, White English-speakers who could more easily assimilate in the countries of the Commonwealth, the United States of America and Canada, led skill emigration. Draft-dodgers, conscientious objectors, exiles and those seeking a better life elsewhere made up an impressive list of South Africans who added their value to others' progress, representing as it were apartheid's brain drain. Since 1994, White emigration has proceeded apace, prompting politicians of the democratic regime to both despair and exclaim their anger at how those who benefit from South Africa's relatively low-cost training and development leave at precisely the time when they are needed most and when the going is tough for all and not just for them.

On the other hand, South Africa has had a declining ability to replace skilled emigrants with skilled immigrants. In the 1950s and 1960s, apartheid's racist and anti-Semitic assisted immigration schemes brought Anglo-Saxon and Protestant Europeans in numbers large enough to maintain some balance in population size and skill figures. After the Soweto revolt of 1976 and the unraveling of apartheid in the 1980s the figures began to fall, leaving a net loss of skill, which even the turn to Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s could not reverse.

Indeed, immigration in the late 1980s and 1990s swelled the ranks of the unskilled and semi-skilled. South Africa has always had the benefit of Africa's unskilled and semi-skilled labor in the form of coal and gold mine employment that reached a peak of close to 350,000 foreign workers from Lesotho, Mozambique, Malawi and elsewhere in the 1960s, but the dismantling of apartheid and the introduction of democracy in 1994 attracted a high number of Africans who slipped into the country without proper documentation. There are no proper figures of the scale of this phenomenon. The Central Statistical Services arrived at a figure of 500,000 while the Department of Home Affairs, the ministry responsible for immigration, used a figure of 6 million based on a study conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council, which subsequently has been challenged for its methodological veracity.[56]

Whatever the real figure, African immigration has created tension and in some instances havoc in the employment market. In their various studies, the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) documented that many African immigrants are itinerant, female, entrepreneurs who add economic value as small-scale traders by creating rather than taking away jobs and by performing jobs South Africans have little interest in doing.[57] But there is little doubt that pockets of intense competition over access to jobs and the social services that South Africa does provide are the cause of heightened xenophobia and outright conflict in places where particularly visible cultural differences and language make foreign Africans in South Africa conspicuous.

Beyond employment and unemployment, income differentials have a class and racial character. Income data are notoriously difficult to collect on an accurate and comprehensive basis. South African figures are no exception. However, it is well known that South Africa shares with Brazil the dubious distinction of having one of the highest Gini co-efficients – a measure of income inequality between the richest and the poorest – in the world.[58] The measure is higher than that of India or Russian Federation and, as in other areas of South African life, thoroughly racialized. While the share of national income earned by the Black population has been increasing with time, the White minority still secures the larger portion of the earnings potential of the nation.

In class terms, the top 10 percent of the population earned 50 percent of national income while the bottom 10 earned less than 1 percent. The poorest half of the population, almost entirely African, earned a mere 8.9 percent of national income.[59] Development Bank economist Stephen Gelb observed recently that the South African Gini co-efficient has been falling and that the income differentials within "racial" groups has been rising.[60] Nevertheless, the growing importance of class differentials does not yet alter in any substantial fashion the racial character of inequality or the concentration of deep levels of poverty in African households.

Table 37: Average Annual Household Income by Race, 1990 and 1995 (R000s)

	African	Coloured	Indian	White
1990	20	38	45	117
1995	48	64	87	113

Source: CSS: Earning and spending in South Africa for 12 main urban areas; Rand expressed in thousands; 1990 figures adjusted to 1995 values.

Table 37 provides the latest available overviews by race and is probably as accurate as any. These figures confirm the expected fourfold hierarchy in material inequality. They also indicate the distribution of household income by province; for Africans, the highest income is achieved in Gauteng (where Johannesburg is located) and the lowest in the Northern Cape; for Coloureds, Gauteng is highest and the Free State lowest; for Indians, Gauteng again is highest and the Northern Cape lowest; and for Whites, the Northern Province has the highest and the Free State lowest. Of course, these averages are a mix of population density and the strength of regional economy, as in the case of Whites who have a mix of low population density and a strong, large agricultural economy in the Northern Province.

Racial inequality in household incomes is further illustrated by these facts: 22 percent of households earning R500 ($60) per month are African, in contrast to three percent for Coloured, Indian and White combined; the average White household income is six times that of the average African household income; the poorest 40 percent earned a mere nine percent of the nation's income while the richest 20 percent earned 19 times that of the poorest. South Africa not only has one of the highest income disparities between rich and poor but the disparity also cuts along racial lines, posing the problem sharply.[61]

It is not surprising that household incomes are lower for female-headed compared to male-headed or dual-parent ones. This is particularly the case for African households. Idasa's Shirley Robinson writes, "African female-headed households are generally poorer than urban households are. Non-urban households are likely to be the most vulnerable to poverty as 37 percent as represented in the lowest income quartile and 28 percent in the second lowest income quartile."[62] South Africa's notorious Gini coefficient is buried in the heads of women, particularly African women in the rural areas of the poorest provinces.

Table 38: Average Annual Household Income by Race and Province, 1995 (R000s)

	E Cape	Free State	Mpumalanga	North West	Northern Province	N Cape	Kwa-Zulu-Natal	W Cape	Gauteng
African	17	14	20	21	26	13	24	22	37
Coloured	24	16	30	25	43	18	41	33	53
Indian	58	-	781	-	-	34	61	54	111
White	90	72	82	93	140	79	98	98	118

Source: CSS: Earning and Spending in South Africa: selected findings of the 1995 income and expenditure survey, 1997; Rand expressed in thousands.

Finally, health and welfare indicators, though sometimes highly variable, confirm the general trend– with some significant exceptions where conditions among the poorer section of the Coloured population may be worse than among Africans. Health provision is skewed toward the richer section of the population, as Table 39 indicates. For example, over half the nation's qualified doctors are in the private sector, while medical aid schemes cover only some 20 percent of the population. Health patterns are themselves in great part a function of living conditions, and here again the picture displays the usual marked racial inequalities.

Table 39: Some Key Health Indicators

	African	Coloured	Indian	White
Life Expectancy Age	**64**	**64**	**70**	**73**
Infant Mortality				
Study A	53	52	29	17
Study B	49	36	11	10
Distribution of TB patients	**70%**	**28%**	**1%**	**1%**

Source: South Africa Survey 1996/1997, Life expectancy: p.14; Infant mortality data is per 1000 births in two studies, pp.450-1, TB rates: p.454.

Table 40: Indicators of Living Conditions

	African	Coloured	Indian	White
Indoor Water:				
Urban	**56%**	**80%**	**98%**	**99%**
Rural	**12%**	**44%**	**81%**	**78%**
Indoor Sanitation:				
Urban	42%	70%	97%	99%
Rural	5%	38%	72%	98%

Source: Adapted from South Africa Survey 1996/1997, pp. 803-4; 806-7; 779.

As we know, health indicators are direct products of living conditions. Life expectancy is linked to the quality of nutrition and habits of lifestyle; infant mortality to maternal health and nutrition; and the incidence of tuberculosis, the one disease incidence noted in Table 39, to quality of housing and the nutritional status of populations. Indeed, exposure to life-threatening disease is mediated by critical factors such as access to fresh water supplies, sanitation and primary health care. As Table 40 indicates, these resources are distributed racially and spatially, leaving Africans and African women in particular in the worse position of all. It is in recognition of this that the democratic government gave priority to these items and has already made considerable inroads in altering the balance. For example, progress in swamp clearing and clean water supplies have benefited 3 million people, most of whom reside in rural areas.

It is in the area of infrastructure that the democratic government has made the greatest strides. Beyond water, sanitation systems, new road networks, telephone and electricity connections have incorporated more and more of those excluded in the past. Nearly 2 million electricity connections had been made by 1998, up from 100,000 in 1991 and a million new connections to households by the mid-1990s. It is perhaps safe to conclude that, under even modest economic growth, improvement in infrastructure and basic living conditions is one of the more tractable issues facing the democratic regime, as the electrification program demonstrates.

Racism and Democracy

With the abolition of most racially based laws in 1991, racism in South Africa was officially de-institutionalized. What remains is the phenomenon that some scholars have referred to as "modern racism": sporadic, everyday incidents and rearguard actions in association and community life.[63] Just how pervasive this racism may be is hard to ascertain given its protean and now furtive existence in a formally nonracial state. At the public level there is an ideological consensus on the old ways of racial discrimination. Even the White right wing (except for its most die-hard remnants) concedes that its former dreams of an orderly White paradise in which Blacks will appear only as docile work-hands are now both impractical and illegitimate. But it would of course be naïve to conclude that racism (construed as objectionable treatment on grounds of one's "racial" membership) and racial hostility have disappeared. Formal juridical equality has in some ways inflamed grass-roots "racial" consciousness under circumstances of continued material inequity and new forms of resource competition. Affirmative action policies necessarily drive home the relevance of ethnic background, particularly for those, mainly the "minorities," who feel aggrieved by them.

In view of the country's history, perhaps most remarkable is the absence of sustained mass-based racial conflict. The symbolism of a united nonracial population, so aptly projected by the country's first democratically elected President Nelson Mandela, has worn more than a little thin recently. Yet, it retains basic ascendancy. Amongst the most visible incidents of what might be called communal racism on the part of the formerly dominant White population have been clashes at a small number of high schools, mostly in the smaller towns or in the poorer, lower-middle class suburbs of the major cities. Here however racist resistance has been interwoven with issues of the language (with Black pupils preferring English to Afrikaans), the ability to pay school fees and adolescent tensions. Likewise, some tertiary campuses have experienced racial flare-ups as White students have opposed against Black campaigns on matters such as fees. The latter, however, have also been features of campus life at the almost exclusively Black tertiary institutions.

It seems fair to suggest that consciousness of race remains high in South Africa, but that overt racism has declined considerably. There are continuing reports of rather anomic outbreaks of inter-personal violence, such as the shooting of a Black child by a White farmer early in 1998. This incident, in turn, had to be viewed against a spate of killings of White farm occupants that took on worrying dimensions in 1997. It is an open question to what extent high levels of crime (as in the farm-killings) are in some sense racially based or at least racially justified in the minds of perpetrators. Similarly, the extent to which the economically dominant White section practices informal racial exclusion of an odious kind is not easy to gauge.

In view of the country's history, perhaps most remarkable is the absence of sustained mass-based racial conflict.

Democracy has brought to the fore perhaps the most dangerous, communal cleavage of a racial kind that may shape future South African society. This division is constituted by the political, cultural and economic realities that separate the majority African section from the three minority groups, the Whites, Coloured and Indian segments. Public opinion surveys consistently reveal an almost stable pattern of differences on social and political matters.[64] The two most prosperous sections– Whites and Indians– have increasingly convergent (and conservative) political views, with Coloured people in a middle position. The division is exacerbated by one of the least debated but most consequential social inequalities: the problem of language. Under the constitutional camouflage of equal treatment for the country's 11 official languages, there is a decided advantage in education and business for those with high English-language competence. In this regard, many, perhaps most, home-speakers of one or other of the nine southern Bantu languages (in other words, the African majority) suffer an almost automatic handicap which the country's poor schooling system seems unlikely to eliminate in the medium term.

The historic compromise forged in the pre-1994 negotiations has resulted in both a cultural and economic accommodation to the prevailing contours set by generations of White dominance. In the economic sphere the decision to accept pro tem the pattern of asset ownership– forswearing the ANC's well-known pledge in its key visionary document, the Freedom Charter of 1955, to nationalize the country's "monopoly industries"– has meant that the new regime had to shift its fundamental strategy of socio-economic transformation. If assets could not be transferred at one fell swoop to the people, then other means had to be devised to undo racial inequalities. Since 1994 the efforts of the new government in this regard have largely crystallized around four major goals: poverty alleviation, a steady move to the equalization of state social spending, and, probably of most import, the state-supported restructuring of the occupational and ownership structure of the economy. Given the limited public funds available, the scope for dramatic changes in the profile of racial inequality by way of the first two is anyway limited.

By 1994, the African National Congress had replaced its former quasi-socialist rhetoric with more endearing phrases for both international and local business elites: the Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) and Affirmative Action. Conceived as a kind of super-ministry of development coordination, the RDP as institution has suffered the fate of similar ventures elsewhere. The RDP Ministry closed down in 1996 and the RDP has all but disappeared as an overarching blueprint of socio-economic transformation.[65] Nevertheless, the reform process in the economic arena is far from dead, although transmuted into a host of business plans whose nature does lend them to high-profile political marketing.

By mid-1998 the most compelling slogans with more than symbolic import for the continued siege on White economic dominance were those of affirmative action and Black empowerment. The ANC policy-makers early on had adopted affirmative action as a useful concept to promote its goals of Black advancement while appearing as less than militant revolutionists. In 1994 the ANC activist and Constitutional Court Judge Albie Sachs lucidly sketched the policy dilemmas facing the ANC prior to its assumption of power. A middle way had to be found between a mere political transition to universal franchise and the strategy of a revolutionary confiscation of White-owned assets in a post-apartheid South Africa. "The solution we chose was that of affirmative action" Sachs wrote. "The phrase had no Cold War associations. It was sufficiently open to take on a specific South African content and meaning and yet concrete enough to have an unmistakable thrust in favor of the oppressed. Whatever form might emerge or whatever definition be given, everyone knew what the essence of affirmative action was: it meant taking special measures to ensure that black people and women and other groups who had been unfairly discriminated against in the past, would have real chances in life."[66]

The idea of affirmative action was of course no newcomer to South Africa. Many firms had been paying at least lip service to such a policy since the 1980s, in a form of "anticipatory socialization."[67] Particular emphasis had been placed on the rapid creation of a Black managerial stratum through various company training and advancement programs. The success of these ventures had been very limited, as a penetrating analysis of the 1980s by sociologist Blade Nzimande, (elected in 1998 as General Secretary of the South African Communist Party) demonstrated.[68] Progress in the 1990s had not been markedly better, and a survey in 1997 claimed that "in the three-year period to 1997, the number of black senior managers increased by only 2.3 percent, with a paltry 1.6 percent increase among middle managers."[69]

Skeptical of the capacity of the normal hiring and promotion processes to move towards demographic representativeness, and with the data to back up its beliefs, the ANC-dominated government has increasingly focussed on how to engineer Black occupational advancement through affirmative action policies. Matters will no doubt be more easily arranged in the public sector. A recent White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service envisages affirmative action programs for all civil service departments that will mandate plans including numeric targets for the increased employment of the "historically disadvantaged groups."

More controversial is a similar scheme to be implemented in the private sector through the provisions of an Employment Equity Act, described as the "first major piece of race-based legislation to enter the statute books since our country became democratic."[70] The measure seeks to achieve "employment equity" for "designated groups" (Blacks, women and handicapped people) in all private enterprises employing more than 49 workers. Employers will be required to submit employee profiles together with plans to increase representation of the designated groups at all levels to the Ministry of Labour, which will have wide powers to monitor and induce compliance. No specific quotas are stipulated, but employee representatives such as trade unions will have the right to negotiate and register complaints on the process.[71]

On paper a measure of major import, the Employment Equity Act may of course fall far short of its goals in a system where governmental ambition outreaches its current capacity. In any case, Black economic advancement that rests upon jobs alone cannot be considered in any sense adequate in a modern industrial society. The ownership structure of private property, and especially of productive assets, cannot be sustained in the long run if it is largely monopolized in White hands. Few deny the necessity of change; the question remains as to who will pay the price, and how. Land reform will contribute to this transformation, but only to a limited extent. And for an increasingly urbanized population the demand is for the widening of human and economic capital in the nation's cities and towns.

Dramatically higher rates of participation by Black people in the nation's modern business sector have thus emerged as a priority with much greater clarity than ever before. The means to this goal are at hand: the promotion of Black entrepreneurial investment in the equity market is the most publicized of them. Since 1994 Black-owned or controlled enterprises have increased their share in the capitalization of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange from one percent to around five.[72] The growth of Black business will benefit greatly from the new form of the state: "affirmative procurement" means that Black-owned firms receive preference from the state regarding tenders, procurements and licenses. White-owned firms are encouraged to seek Black partnerships and government policy induces the private sector to look where possible to the use of Black sub-contractors.

To what extent these new developments will lead to the fulfillment of the economic aspirations of the emerging Black elites is by no means clear. It is unlikely, for example, that the leading Black business pressure group, the National African Chamber of Commerce, will see its "3-4-5-6" formula– 30 percent Black representation in directorships, 40 percent in Black equity ownership, 50 percent for Black external procurement and 60 percent of Black representation in management– fulfilled by the its target year of 2000.[73] The progress registered by Black business firms on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange must be qualified by the fact that "most Black economic empowerment deals are little more than investment syndicates taking small equity in firms, only a handful of which are start-ups."[74] Black participation is most evident in the media and publishing sector, but lacking in major manufacturing. The operational capacity of Black-owned firms remains heavily dependent on White management, and much of the money made by empowerment deals has ended up enriching White advisers and brokers. In short, a numerically significant Black entrepreneurial stratum outside of the small business sector has yet to consolidate.

South Africa thus approaches the new millenium with its profile of racial inequality on the material level that was built up over three centuries of White domination largely intact. But the relative success in installing a modern urban industrial economy– for Africa– has meant that the floor on which this inequality rested is subject to shifts over time. Significant segments of the wider Black population have moved upwards and the political transition of 1994 has accelerated this trend. Politically the White minority is now for the first time a true minority group, and economic transformation is now more feasible under a regime of juridical equality and a broad integrative social thrust.

For the medium term, much depends on the ability of the economy to grow and create jobs. South Africa's growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was three percent in 1996/7, 1.5 percent in 1997/8 and is estimated to be one percent for 1998/9.[75] While these growth figures are considerably higher than those achieved in the early 1990s, they fall well below that required by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macro-economic framework accepted by government if not the trade unions as the guiding light of economic and fiscal policy. It is a matter of debate for economists why it is that South Africa is under-performing and why a loss– and not a growth in jobs– are accompanying even modest growth. It seems as if the so-called fundamentals for growth are not yet in place.

Much, too, depends upon the relative stability of political and social life, at present subject to the battering of crime, an economic downturn and the material discontent of broad layers of the population. Short of the mass exodus of the dominant White group, a sharp and sudden reversal of racial inequality was always an unrealistic prospect. The issue remains the extent to which the system can generate business optimism and the economic competence that will attract investment and increase growth. If in the process the state can pursue its current reforms while maintaining a reasonable measure of efficiency, then the diminution of racial inequality becomes feasible.

The Second Republic

When the Government of National Unity came into power in 1994 it embarked on a massive and ambitious agenda of social change. Crudely put, we could say that one part of the agenda was to create and entrench– by constitutional and other means– rights-protection of individual citizens and the other part, to deal with the socio-economic inequality bequeathed by apartheid. On balance, the first period of democratic government was necessarily devoted more to rights-protection, though these noble and important checks against the abuse of apartheid became increasingly in question as government struggled to enforce a human rights regime in the face of a seeming explosion of criminal conduct, much of it rooted in apartheid's other legacy, Black poverty.

Nelson Mandela's leadership gave additional emphasis to reconciliation between the "racial groups," and he appeared particularly concerned about Afrikaners and their place in the new democratic order. The extreme expression of Afrikaner anxiety was the demand for a Volkstaat, made both by the extra-parliamentary paramilitary group named the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (Afrikaner Resistance Movement) and by the parliamentary Freedom Front. The latter was willing to wait a hundred or so years to achieve its goal. A less extreme view is to seek some form of "group" protection through the recognition of so-called minority language and cultural rights.

Though Mandela in his presidential conduct made many– some say too many– overtures to the Afrikaner community, he and his government were insistent that every South African were juridically equal and that no concessions on a group basis were to be made. The presumption of jurisprudence was that strong and enforceable protection of individual rights was enough of a check against potential abuses against a group, particularly one that was seen to be historically responsible for the abuses of apartheid. But the insistence on individual rights required a reading of South African history on the basis of individual and not group responsibility.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established by Nelson Mandela in 1994 to find individual causes for egregious human rights abuses committed during apartheid. Its origins were rooted in two important conferences organized by Alex Boraine under the auspices of the what was then known as the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa (IDASA) and the thinking of some members of the ANC, in particular that of Kader Asmal, Dullah Omar and Albie Sachs.[76] South Africa's Interim Constitution contained a clause, negotiated at Kempton Park, which compelled the granting of amnesty to those who committed serious human rights abuses on both sides of the struggle. A law passed in 1994 established the commission and defined its brief and the final constitution passed in 1995 confirmed its role as one of the many commissions established to support democratic consolidation in the country.

While the TRC was one of many rights institutions– including the Electoral, Gender, Human and Youth commissions– its work dominated South African public life until 1998, when its voluminous report was submitted to then President Nelson Mandela.[77] Over a period of four years South Africa heard the evidence of the many victims of apartheid's atrocities (much less so from victims of the

ANC, PAC and the other liberation organizations' war against apartheid) and the confessions of the perpetrators, again mostly, if not entirely, from the apartheid security machinery side.[78] The unflinching premise of the TRC's work was that amnesty was to be granted on the basis of individual responsibility and truth telling, which is why the cause of blanket amnesty was rejected. On the other hand, by virtue of South African history, most perpetrators were Afrikaners, a fact leading some commentators to mistakenly proclaim the TRC was an Afrikaner witch-hunt, and alienating some leading Afrikaner establishments.

The point of the TRC was to establish individual culpability and so confirm a central principle of the rule of law. It was also to collate a South African memory and so present and cultivate new values of what were to be tolerated as proper, decent public and private conduct among citizens and officials of the state. Beyond that, the TRC was part of a larger set of initiatives designed to promote democratic values and practices, the observance of human rights and the rights of women, and the setting in place of properly functioning democratic institutions. More than anything else, these initiatives were the mark of the Mandela Presidency, the creation and consolidation of what in some quarters are called the democratic "software," reinforced doubly by Mandela's concern with reconciliation between the former enemies and the peaceful co-existence of South Africa's main population groups.

Barely under the surface lurked, now seen, now unseen, the question of the political economy of racial inequality. The issue clearly and increasingly occupied the mind of South Africa's deputy-president Thabo Mbeki who, in becoming South Africa's second democratically elected president, made it a recurring theme of public policy. On becoming president he elevated the delivery of social and public service to a position of pre-eminence. He linked Black poverty to White wealth; and he declared that social and political stability could be achieved only by growth. Finally, he insisted that South Africa's future is part of a putative Renaissance of the African continent.[79]

The complex problems of South Africa belie easy answers. The challenge– to find an appropriate fit between democracy and durable social and economic institutions– is as old as Alexis de Tocqueville, but in a new setting with its own peculiar racial heritage.[80] And yet, as the other chapters in this collection demonstrate, we are not alone in grappling with what WEB DuBois once described as the major problem of the 20th century, the problem of the color line. As we also began this essay, it is an effort to undo centuries of the imprint of colonialism and White supremacy. We hope that somebody will one day describe the 21st century as the end of color lines.

END NOTES

[1] **See Jared Diamond, *Guns, Germs & Steel: the Fates of Human Societies* (New York, 1997)**

[2] See Anthony Marx, *Making Race and Nation: a Comparison of South Africa, the United States, and Brazil* (New York, 1998); also Stanley Greenberg, *Race and State in Capitalist Development* (New Haven, 1990); Gay Seidman, "Oppositional Identities in Brazil and South Africa: Unions and the Transition to Democracy" in Ran Greenstein, ed., *Comparative Perspectives on South Africa* (London, 1998); Steven Friedman and Riaan de Villiers, eds., *Comparing Brazil and South Africa* (Johannesburg, 1996).

[3] Thabo Mbeki, *The Time Has Come* (Johannesburg, 1998).

[4] One of the better single-volume histories of South Africa is Leonard Thompson, *A History of South Africa* (Johannesburg, 1990).

[5] Census '96, Preliminary estimates of the size of the population of South Africa. Prior to this Census it had been thought that a figure of around 41 million was likely. Some population surveys continue to report 41million.

[6] Martin Hall, *The Changing Past: Farmers, Kings and Traders in Southern Africa, 200-1860* (Cape Town, 1986).

[7] Originally a neutral term from the Arabic for the Xhosa-speakers of the Eastern Cape, this word was later generalised to all black people and became a term of abuse which is now "offensive in all senses and combinations" (*A Dictionary of South African English on Historical Principles*, p.342).

[8] Richard Elphick, *Kraal and Castle: Khoi-Khoi and the Founding of White South Africa* (New Haven, 1977).

[9] See Neville Alexander, *One Azania, One Nation* (London, 1979), a work of early significance on the durability of racial and ethnic consciousness.

[10] Thomas Karis and Gwendolyn Carter, eds., *From Protest to Challenge: a Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa*, 1882 – 1990 (Bloomington, 1997)

[11] The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996

[12] The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.

[13] Ibid.

[14] See Neville Alexander "Prospects for a Non-Racial South Africa," *Same Beneath the Skin* (forthcoming).

[15] From the White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service, 1997, Appendix.

[16] "The Death of the Rainbow Nation: Unmasking the ANC's Program of Re-racialisation," *Democratic Party*, 4 February 1998.

[17] Emile Boonzaier, *The Cape Herders: A History of the Khoi-Khoi of Southern Africa* (Cape Town, 1996) pp.123-5.

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[19] M Brown, J Erasmus, R Kingwill, C Murray, and M Roodt, *Land Restitution in South Africa: a Long Way Home* (Cape Town, 1998)

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[28] John Western, *Outcast Cape Town* (Cape Town, 1981 and Berkeley, 1996); Wilmot G. James, "Group Areas and the Nature of Apartheid" in *South African Sociological Review* v.5 no.1 (1992) pp.41-57.

[29] Platzky and Walker, *The Surplus People*, pp.10-11 and p.100.

[30] Stanley Greenberg, *Legitimating the Illegitimate* (Berkeley, 1987).

[31] White Paper on South African Land Policy, April 1997.

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[35] Ibid.

[36] Ian Goldin and Chris Heymans, "Moulding a New Society: The RDP in Perspective" in Gitanjali Maharaj, ed., *Between Unity and Diversity: Essays on Nation-Building in Post-Apartheid South Africa* (Cape Town, 1999) p. 110.

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[45] Christopher Saunders, *The Making of the South African Past: Major Historians on Race and Class.*

[46] Norman Bromberger and Ken Hughes, "Capitalism and Underdevelopment in South Africa" in Butler et al, *Democratic Liberalism in South Africa*, p.204.

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A Rich and Tangled Skein:
Strategy and Ideology in Anti-Apartheid Struggles

By Colin Bundy

Introduction

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recognize some of the less visible and more transient forms of social and political resistance to apartheid. Popular disaffection and collective forms of protest– "informal, often covert, and concerned largely with immediate, de facto gains"– co-existed with more institutional politics– "formal, overt, concerned with systematic, *de jure* change" (Scott 1985, 33). The full history of such grassroots politics remains largely untold because it is barely audible in the records. This chapter hopes to capture at least some of its echoes and their insistent, off-stage susurration.

Watershed Years: the 1940s

There is no doubt that the 1940s mark "a watershed in the development of African politics in South Africa" (Lodge 1983, 1). Resistance quickened and diversified. New bodies were formed, and older ones staked out fresh ideological ground. Political developments included efforts to unify African, Coloured, and Indian political structures or to build radical popular fronts of all races, including Whites; an unprecedented influence attained by the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA); the passive resistance campaign by the Natal Indian Congress in 1946; and the formation of the South African Indian Congress (SAIC). But the greatest long-term significance lay in the revitalization of the ANC and the injection of programmatic urgency delivered by its Youth League.

This quickening of the political pulse during and immediately after World War II was part of a larger history of social and economic change. The South African economy recovered rapidly from the Great Depression because the price of gold rose after 1934. Industrial output and employment rose rapidly, as did Black urbanization. With a quarter of a million Whites diverted into the armed services or war-related occupations, Black workers moved into factory jobs at an unprecedented rate. For a few years, Black real wages grew more rapidly than those of White workers did, and trade union membership and strike action mushroomed. At the same time, the influx of Black workers and their families simply outran the provision of housing, basic services, and infrastructure in urban areas. Overcrowding, privation, and insecurity heightened concerns over the cost of rents, transport, and food. The Smuts government blew hot and cold, announcing restrictions on worker activism that it could not implement and making concessions on pass laws that it could not control.

These stimuli evoked a complex ensemble of popular struggles and movements: strikes, squatter movements, and land occupations– cost-of-living protests that animated whole communities such as the Alexandra bus boycotts of 1940 and 1943-44. In township after township, this welter of pressures from below radicalized local structures such as Advisory Boards and Vigilance Associations. In turn, these impulses affected national bodies such as the CPSA and ANC.

Several hundred African notables founded the ANC in 1912: professional men, traditional leaders, landholders, and businessmen from across South Africa's four provinces. It represented the anxieties and interests of a literate elite: teachers, clerks, journalists, and a handful of doctors and lawyers. Its program was to win rights for Africans within an existing, White-controlled state, and to secure exemption from the color bar for Africans of respectable social standing. Its approach was self-consciously constitutional and cautious. The years 1930-36 saw the ANC at its nadir. Politically conservative, narrowly based socially, and organizationally almost defunct, the movement was ill-equipped to resist the legislation of 1936, which snuffed out the African franchise in the Cape,[2] created new segregated institutions such as the Native Representative Council, entrenched some 87 percent of the total land in South Africa as White-owned, and permitted African ownership of land only in designated 'Reserves' (the geographic forerunners of the Bantustans).

The inability of the ANC to mount any defense against these laws gave birth in December 1935 to a new umbrella organization, the All-African Convention (AAC). Although some elements within the AAC called for a boycott of the new institutions, they failed to carry the day, and the AAC saw out the 1930s with "wordy protests ... delegations, vague calls for African unity, and national days of prayer." (Lodge 1983, 11). In the following decade, the AAC changed its character. It was led by a group of African Marxists, including Isaac Tabata, and it waged a number of campaigns in the Transkei.[3] It affiliated with the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM), a left-wing group strongly hostile to the CPSA and which operated mainly in Cape Town.

In December 1943, at its founding conference, the NEUM adopted a 10-Point Program that called for:

> *The liquidation of the National Oppression of the Non-Europeans in South Africa, that is, the removal of all the disabilities and the restrictions based on grounds of race and color, and the acquisition by the Non-Europeans of those rights which are at present enjoyed by the European [white] population (Karis 1973, 355).*

The 10 points included universal suffrage; free and compulsory education; the guarantee of basic civil liberties; reform of criminal, tax and labor laws; and repeal of the Land Acts to enable a new national division of land.

Matching the more assertive politics of the NEUM's 10-Point Program, the ANC in 1943 also adopted the vocabulary of equal rights for all. The ANC had begun to renew itself as a more credible national body from 1940, with the election of A.B. Xuma as its president. Xuma brought unruly provincial factions to heel, strengthened the authority of the center, and made funds available for full-time organizers at branch level. A new constitution scrapped ex officio membership for traditional chiefs and gave full equality to women members. In December 1943, the ANC at its annual conference adopted an important policy statement, Africans' Claims in South Africa. This document took the Atlantic Charter as a point of departure and spelled out its implications for South Africa. It called for a Bill of Rights that would entrench the following:

> *Full citizenship rights such as are enjoyed by all Europeans in South Africa... the extension to all adults, regardless of race, of the right to vote and be elected to parliament ... the right to equal justice in courts of law... Freedom of movement and the repeal of the pass laws ... The right to own, buy, hire or lease and occupy land... The right of every child to free and compulsory education (Karis 1973, 211-23).*

In April 1944, members who sought a more radical outlook and approach further galvanized the ANC. Some two dozen-founder members of the ANC Youth League (YL) were in their mid-20s or early 30s, and most were university graduates. The most dynamic intellectual leadership came initially from Anton Lembede, who formulated a philosophy of Africanism, at once a romantic nationalism–

> *Nationalism has been tested in the people's struggles and the fires of battle and found to be the only effective weapon, the only antidote against foreign rule and modern imperialism... Africans are the natives of Africa and they have inhabited Africa, their Motherland, from times immemorial; Africa belongs to them (Karis 1973, 317).*

– and a call to psychological emancipation. Lembede believed that African society was being sapped by "pathological phenomena such as loss of self-confidence, inferiority complex, a feeling of frustration, the worship and idolization of White men, foreign leaders and ideologies." (Karis 1973, 318) To counter this, he prescribed "a new and aggressively positive self-image compounded of pride in the past, confident expectations for the future, and an emotional, burning love for the African's God-given blackness" (Gerhart 1978, 58).

Politically, this intensity of emotion translated into impatience with the ANC Old Guard and a promise that the YL would become "the brain trust and power station of the spirit of African nationalism." The YL's main strategic innovation was an advocacy of mass action and civil disobedience. In December 1949, the ANC adopted the YL's Program of Action calling for boycott of segregated political institutions and the use of "immediate and active boycott, strike, civil disobedience, non-cooperation and such other means as may bring about the accomplishment and realization of our aspirations" (Karis 1973, 338). The corollary of this program was that the ANC should seek to become a movement with a mass membership.

For the CPSA, the 1940s were roller-coaster years. The Communist Party entered World War II only a few hundred members strong, with waning African support and vestiges of influence in the trade union movement. By 1943, the party won local government seats in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, and East London. It became the most influential political organization in a number of Transvaal townships. It led the largest African trade unions and played a central role in the 1946 strike by Black mineworkers. And its members held leading positions in the ANC as well as in the Indian Congress movement. But after the war ended, the party fell foul of the Smuts government. In 1947, a number of its activists were charged with sedition– and the May 1948 election of the National Party government led directly to the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act and the party's decision to disband.

Yet in its final months as a legal entity, CPSA arrived at a theoretical position that was to shape ANC politics and the national liberation strategy for the next 40 years. As David Everatt has persuasively argued, party members in the Transvaal "began to evolve a new ideological framework within which, they argued, resistance politics should be analyzed" (Everatt 1991, 43). And the final report of the CPSA Central Committee, in January 1950, envisaged a national movement (presaging the ANC) whose "objective is national liberation, that is, the abolition of race discrimination," distinct from the Communist Party, but cooperating closely with it (South African Communist Party 1991, 211). As we shall see, this was the essence of a more fully formulated alliance formed in the early 1960s.

Defiance, Charter, Africanism, and Sharpeville

The previous section introduced most of the dramatis personae of the liberation struggle: African nationalists of liberal or nonracial and of "orthodox" persuasions;[4] rival movements; African, Indian and Coloured bodies engaging in tentative joint campaigns; socialists and trade unionists; and largely anonymous social movements in townships and countryside. All played their part in the protest politics of the 1950s. During these years, even while the National Party state began to close down the space for legal political action, "the possibilities of mass mobilization and political action existed," and "a series of major campaigns against state policy were organised" (Wolpe 1988, 66-67).

There are a number of accounts of these campaigns,[5] and they will not be recapitulated here. Instead, five developments that shaped the ideologies and strategies of the anti-apartheid struggle will be identified and discussed:

- the reconstitution of liberation politics in the form of the Congress Alliance;
- the reformulation of the vision and aims of the movement in the form of the Freedom Charter;
- the Africanist response to these organizational and ideological shifts;
- popular forms of protest by workers, women, and urban and rural communities; and
- state repression and early experiments in extra-legal resistance.

The ANC edged toward the politics of the Congress Alliance over half a dozen years. The "Doctors' Pact" of 1947 saw Xuma, Naicker, and Dadoo agree to joint action between African and Indian bodies. In 1950, national stay-aways (a form of political strike) were coordinated across ANC, SAIC, trade unions, and other organizations. The Defiance Campaign of 1952, which triggered a dramatic increase in ANC membership and morale, was shot through with the symbolism of concerted resistance by leaders across the country's racial divides. In 1953, this logic culminated in the establishment of the Congress Alliance. This linked the ANC and SAIC with two bodies expressly created to mobilize White and Coloured sympathizers with Congress leadership– the Congress of Democrats (COD) and the South African Coloured Peoples Organization (SACPO)– and with Congress-aligned workers' and women's organizations– the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) and the Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW).

This alliance was open to criticism from various quarters. It was contested by formation of the nonracial Liberal Party in 1953. Led by Alan Paton, the Liberal Party was strongly anti-Communist and bitterly hostile to the COD. The NEUM and other left groupings excoriated the "multi-racialism" of the Congress Alliance for preserving racial divides in its separate structures. And it was disliked by elements within the ANC suspicious of the influence exerted by Whites and Indians on the Congress leadership.

The new Alliance led directly to a campaign of mobilizing its members and its constituent partners around an explicit ideological position. The Congress of the People culminated in the adoption of the Freedom Charter on June 25-26, 1955. Its preamble declared:

We, the people of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know:

That South Africa belongs to all that live in it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of the people... That only a democratic state, based on the will of the people, can secure to all their birthright without distinction of color, race, sex or belief.

> *South Africa belongs to all that live in it . . .*

The other clauses of the Charter combined the language of basic civil rights (all national groups shall have equal rights, all shall be equal before the law, all shall enjoy human rights) with social democratic tenets (the people shall share in the country's wealth, there shall be work and security, the doors of learning and culture shall be opened, there shall be houses, security and comfort). The precise interpretation placed on each of these clauses was minutely debated at the time and subsequently for 40 years, but the overall significance is plain. It committed the ANC to the ideal of nonracialism or an inclusive nationalism, and it yoked universal suffrage to basic demands for redistribution and social equity.

It also precipitated a lasting divide in Black opposition to White minority rule. From the early 1950s, there remained within the ANC adherents of Lembede's Africanist vision. They jibbed at each step toward cooperation with other races, insisted that they were the true defenders of the YL's Program of Action, and revived the slogan "Africa for the Africans." The formal rupture between this grouping and the ANC took place late in 1958, and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) was formed a few months later. The Freedom Charter, and especially its declaration that South Africa "belonged to all," was grist to the mill of those who believed that "multi-racialism" diluted African nationalism. The PAC orthodoxy held that "the African masses constitute the key to liberation and can be organized only under the banner of African nationalism," and it denounced the Congress Alliance as "the 'capture' of a portion of the black leadership of South Africa by a section of the white ruling class" (Karis and Gerhart 1977, 519).

In addition to campaigns and stay-aways mounted by ANC, the 1950s also witnessed a variety of popular struggles—more localized, less formally organized, and in several instances less wedded to legal and peaceful methods. This was especially true of a series of episodes of rural resistance in the areas designated as Reserves. These sought to stave off two forms of intervention by the state: Rehabilitation policies, with implications of cattle culling and land limitation, and implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act, which sought to make chiefs effectively agents of the apartheid state.

Such episodes included the Witzieshoek Rebellion, the Hurutse rising, the Sekhukhuneland Revolt, and the Pondoland Revolt,[6] all of which led to declarations of States of Emergency. Similar turbulence gripped the Zoutpansberg region, the Ngutu district in Zuland, the Ciskei, and Thembuland (Chaskalson 1987). Each incident involved people fighting to preserve a social order under threat of erasure, they opposed chiefs who had accepted their posts on the terms of the Native Affairs Department, and their participants resorted to direct action and violence. They also used petitions, boycotts, lawsuits, and appeals to potential allies, but their tactics were not restricted to these familiar forms. Fences were cut; huts were burned; suspected collaborators were chased off, assaulted, and in some cases killed; and policemen and other officials were attacked.

Even larger numbers took part in a series of protests by African women, especially against the extension of the pass laws to women. The best-known single event was the march by 20,000 women to the Union Buildings in August 1956. This dignified and emotionally charged protest, planned by FEDSAW and the ANC Women's League, involved high-profile leaders such as Lillian Ngoyi, Helen Joseph, Lily Diedericks, and others. Of arguably greater significance was the sustained pattern of more spontaneous anti-pass protests between 1953 and 1958—in several instances linked organically with the rural uprisings described above. One of the most militant campaigns was the outbreak of rural violence in Natal following the slum clearances in Cato Manor in 1959. "Across Natal women attacked Bantu Administration huts, smashed dipping tanks, burnt cane fields and stoned police" (Chaskalson 1987, 55).

There is a tendency in the more hagiographical histories of the struggle to conflate all such activities as instances of Congress Alliance leadership. "Throughout the 1950s, the ANC began in earnest to sharpen the weapon of mass direct action, which took the form of boycotts, mass demonstrations of women and political strikes... There were also peasant revolts all over the country" (Meli 1988, 129). In fact, relations between national organizations and local struggles were tenuous and often contradictory. In many cases, the ANC responded hesitantly and awkwardly to grassroots stimuli. It failed to establish a significant presence in the countryside. And at times, the leadership actually acted to restrain popular energies. It would, in fact, be surprising had this not been the case. The ANC leadership was urban, largely male, and committed to legal forms of struggle. It was not structurally positioned to link effectively with brushfire rural protests or militant women's movements.

Moreover, from mid-decade the Congress Alliance was increasingly hamstrung by state repression. Banning orders immobilized individual activists and leaders. Following the Congress of the People, the state charged 156 Alliance leaders with high treason. Although the prosecution failed to prove a case, the trial dragged on for five years and effectively removed the top echelons of the Congress movement at a moment when large numbers of Black South Africans showed themselves ready to fight for their liberation.

State tightening of controls on extra-parliamentary politics was one aspect of the first (pre-Sharpeville) phase of apartheid. The NP government did not introduce segregation nor invent institutionalized racism. It codified, entrenched, and extended racial discrimination. It ensured exclusively White participation in electoral politics, enforced spatial segregation and control over Africans' movements to cities, divided the labor market more rigidly on lines of race—and harried and punished those who challenged this agenda. The mounting level of social and political control certainly circumscribed the ability of the Congress Alliance, or other bodies, to mount effective large-scale protest activity.

Sharpeville and the Turn to Armed Struggle

The mounting tensions between state repression and mass protest politics reached a bloody climax on March 21, 1960. On the first day of a PAC Anti-Pass Campaign, police fired on demonstrators at Sharpeville, killing 69 people and wounding 200. As a pithy summary recounts:

> *This event sparked strikes and demonstrations throughout the country. The regime wavered but then, to regain control of the situation, invoked the provisions of existing legislation to declare a state of emergency, arrested and imprisoned thousands of political activists, and called out the police and army. The significance of Sharpeville, however, goes well beyond these immediate events (Wolpe 1988, 68).*

The dynamics set in motion by the Sharpeville shootings are clear enough. The state shifted decisively to a more authoritarian mode. It banned the ANC and the PAC, thus defining African nationalist struggles as illegal. Over the next few years, it wrote into law draconian measures– solitary confinement, detention without trial, sweeping definitions of sabotage and treason– and conferred wide new powers upon the police force, particularly the Special [security] Branch. For their part, liberation movement organizations accepted the new terms of struggle by creating clandestine structures and by launching explicitly violent forms of struggle.

Within the Congress Alliance, the Communist Party set the pace. Three years after its banning, the party had reconstituted itself as the South African Communist Party (SACP) and in 1959 announced its underground existence. In December 1960, the party resolved in favor of a sabotage campaign as a prelude to guerrilla war. On December 16, 1961, explosions were detonated in several cities, together with the distribution of a leaflet announcing the formation of Umkonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) or MK. The leaflet must count as one of the more moderate declarations of war ever issued. It recalled a half-century of nonviolent politics and continued:

But the people's patience is not endless. The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices: submit or fight.

That time has now come to South Africa ... we have no choice but to hit back by all means within our power in defense of our people, our future and our freedom... We ... have always sought to achieve liberation without bloodshed and civil clash. We do so still. We hope– even at this late hour– that our first actions will awaken everyone to a realization of the disastrous situation... We hope that we will bring the Government and its supporters to their senses before it is too late (Karis & Gerhart 1977, 716-17).

The MK sabotage campaign was directed against symbolic and economic targets, with strict instructions by the high command that no deaths or injuries should be caused. Some 200 explosions took place, most of them incendiary devices, over 18 months. In July 1963, the MK high command was arrested when police swooped down on Lilliesleaf Farm in Rivonia. MK– unlike the racially separate structures of the Congress Alliance– included members of all races. With the ensuing Rivonia trial, MK was effectively beheaded. The PAC's Poqo movement, which carried out sporadic attacks on White officials and civilians, and also tiny groupings of saboteurs from liberal and left tendencies, were similarly dismembered. More than 3,000 ANC and PAC activists were rounded up and imprisoned. By the mid-1960s, internal resistance largely had been snuffed out. For the next decade, the politics of national liberation were conducted almost exclusively in exile.

Both the ANC and PAC were recognized by the Organization of African Unity as legitimate vehicles of national liberation, and both faced similar challenges. They sought to win diplomatic support and recognition, to develop the capacity to wage armed struggle, to re-establish some internal presence and activity, and to survive in the sour soil of expatriate politics, so often schismatic and demoralized. In all respects, the ANC was markedly more successful. It had several advantages. Prior to Sharpeville, it sent Oliver Tambo overseas to set up an external mission. Tambo demonstrated his capacities as a leader for the next 30 years, gathered around him outstanding lieutenants, and in the SACP the ANC possessed an ally with theoretical, human, and diplomatic resources that were not available to the PAC.

In 1962, the SACP approved a new program, The Road to South African Freedom, which served as its central policy for a quarter of a century– and which also profoundly influenced the ANC in exile. Its defining thesis had been intimated in 1950 but was now spelled out more fully. South Africa combined the worst features of imperialism and colonialism in a single national frontier– Colonialism of a Special Type (CST). The Black population experienced typically colonial forms of national oppression, poverty, exploitation, and political exclusion. This promoted strong national identity with "no acute or antagonistic divisions among the African people." From these premises, the party's immediate task was defined:

The immediate and imperative interests of all sections of the South African people demand the carrying out of ... a national democratic revolution, which will overthrow the colonialist state of White supremacy... The main content of this revolution is the national liberation of the African people.

The ANC, hailed as the bearer of such a struggle, was "representative of all the classes and strata which make up African society" and the vanguard organization of "the national liberation of the African people" (South African Communist Party 1981, 284-315).

By 1965, the ANC, SACP, and MK were in severe disarray. Their leaders were in prison or in exile, their political base in South Africa had crumbled under state pressure, and their potential supporters were intimidated and subdued. The exiled leadership now sought to prosecute the liberation struggle from afar by infiltrating trained guerrillas back into the country via Rhodesia and Mozambique, linking with ZAPU and FRELIMO troops in those areas. None of the three campaigns mounted in 1967 and 1968 succeeded in returning a single MK combatant to South African soil, but the experience undoubtedly hardened the resolve of the ANC in exile.

In 1969, the ANC convened a Consultative Conference at Morogoro in Tanzania, which marked a turning point in the history of the exiled movement. First, the conference permitted criticism of the exiled leadership– particularly from the MK cadres. The leadership (it was charged) had isolated itself from the rank and file and devoted too much time to international work. Second, the conference acknowledged that the ANC's organization within South Africa had been shattered. Such recognition was an essential preliminary to rebuilding an internal presence. Third, Morogoro also restructured the political and military leadership of the ANC by creating a Revolutionary Council, open to non-Africans, in a significant departure from the "multi-racial" practice of the Congress Alliance.

The ANC also adopted a new program at Morogoro, a statement of Strategy and Tactics. This sketched the history of the armed struggle and identified guerrilla war as a "special" and, in South Africa's circumstances, only appropriate form of struggle. It also defined the character and desired outcome of struggle:

> *The main content of the present stage of the South African revolution is the national liberation of the largest and most oppressed group– the African people... [I]t demands ... the maximum mobilization of the African people as a dispossessed and racially oppressed nation... It involves stimulation and deepening of national confidence, national pride and national assertiveness...*
>
> *What is the broad purpose of our military struggle? Simply put, in the first phase, it is the complete political and economic emancipation of all our people and the constitution of a society that accords with the basic provisions of our program– the Freedom Charter (Karis and Gerhart 1997, 387-92).*

In Strategy and Tactics, CST's central tenets were adopted: the national liberation of Africans as the mainspring, guerrilla war as the strategy, and a democratic state with guaranteed rights as the outcome.

In fact, over the next half-dozen years, MK guerrillas made no further incursions. Modest numbers of soldiers trained in Russia and Eastern Europe and were based in camps in Tanzania and Zambia. The first steps were taken to set up a rudimentary underground ANC organization in the country. Some modest progress was made in this direction, signaled by arrests and trials and the surfacing of ANC pamphlets and newsletters. By 1975, the ANC had reactivated a number of cells, especially in Johannesburg and Durban. ANC veterans released from Robben Island between 1972 and 1975– men like Joe Gqabi, Harry Gwala, Martin Ramokgadi, and Jacob Zuma–played a key role. But "the lack of generational depth could be seen in the fact that 77-year-old Ramokgadi was named as the chief internal organizer" at the very moment that Black Consciousness was attracting large numbers of youthful militants (Davis 1987, 28).

These were harsh years for the ANC. Its main achievement was that it persisted. It did not fall apart into factionalism as did other exiled movements, and it won an increasing level of international recognition and support. The real change in its fortunes by the mid-1970s stemmed not from its own efforts but from important developments in the southern African region. First, the geopolitics of the region shifted decisively with the 1974 fall of Caetano's fascist regime, the rapid disintegration of Portuguese control of its African colonies, and the assumption of power by the ANC's old allies, FRELIMO and the MPLA in Mozambique and Angola, respectively. Second, new currents of internal resistance began to flow within the country. The Black Consciousness movement took root and flowered in the early 1970s, a wave of strikes by Black workers and the rebuilding of trade unions saw a renewal of working class political struggles, and the June 1976 youth uprising that began in Soweto detonated explosive new energies.

Black Consciousness, Worker Struggles, and Soweto

The apartheid state never appeared more impregnable than in the second half of the 1960s. Internal opposition was negligible. In the 1966 elections, the NP won 126 of 166 seats. Middle-class Whites dabbled in a spectacular share boom as real growth rates averaged 7 percent a year, and in the hectic high noon of apartheid, South Africa was "regarded by foreign investors as a gold mine (gushed the journal Fortune in July 1972), one of those rare and refreshing places where profits are great and problems small."

This bonanza was underpinned by force. The apparatus of pass laws, influx control, labor bureaus, and forced removals reached Orwellian proportions. This ruthless machinery exacted a terrible cost in political suffering. It also carried a political price tag. It ensured that exclusion, deprivation, and coercion defined the everyday experience of Black South Africans. This drove opposition into new forms, demanded of it new strategies, and helped equip it with a new militancy. These expressed themselves on two axes, both mapped by the course of the apartheid juggernaut. Harshly segregated education incubated a generation of young Black intellectuals whose utter hostility toward the status quo voiced itself as Black Consciousness (BC). The economic boom accelerated the numbers and the shop-floor influence of a militant Black working class.

Bantu education and ethnic universities made the education of Blacks cheaper and separate. But they also created a critical mass of educated young people. Black school enrollment rose from 1 million in 1955 to more than 2.5 million in 1969, and the Black universities created after 1960 produced "hothouse conditions for the growth of a new spirit of resistance" (Karis and Gerhart 1997, 90). Black students walked out of the nonracial National Union of South African Students conference in 1967, when they were housed off campus. Two years later, they formed the South African Students Organization (SASO).

A cluster of talented individuals, including Steve Bantu Biko, who was the most charismatic and influential, led SASO. It initially eschewed confrontation with the state, violent means, and anti-capitalist rhetoric. Instead, it provided an eclectic, intense ideology of psychological emancipation, Black self-reliance, and assertiveness. It drew upon international intellectuals such as Fanon, Cabral, Nkrumah, and Nyerere as well as contemporary American Black Power theorists. SASO's political base was on university and college campuses, but its message ramified through a larger population of high school students and urban youth, creating "an entire generation of energetic leadership" (Karis and Gerhart 1997, 112).

The effervescent BC ideology threw up new structures. In 1972, Black theology groupings launched the Black Community Program as a series of self-help initiatives. That same year, the Black Peoples Convention was founded as a "political movement" whose stated aim was "to unite and solidify the black people of South Africa with a view to mobilizing the masses toward the struggle for liberation and emancipation, both from psychological and physical domination" (Marx 1992, 54). In 1974, SASO held a series of "Viva Frelimo" rallies and attracted immediate state repression, resulting in the banning of some of its leaders and a high profile trial of nine others.

Different dynamics animated the other major vector of opposition in the early 1970s. A trickle of wildcat strikes by Black workers became a flood in 1973, when a rolling wave of stoppages engulfed Durban and other centers in Natal. These strikes were largely spontaneous and lacked identifiable leadership. However, they fused with fledgling advice offices and worker education initiatives to create the impetus for the rapid rebuilding of a trade union movement that was to play a significant role in the defeat of apartheid.[7] The new unions formed in the aftermath of the Durban strikes eschewed overtly political positions. They concentrated on bread-and-butter issues such as wages, working conditions, unfair dismissals, and health and safety matters. This pragmatism won them legal space, ensured them a foothold on the factory floor, and opened the door to negotiation with employers for worker gains. It also meant that a new generation of trade unionists was in place to take advantage of the changed political climate after the storms of the Soweto youth revolt of 1976 (Lewis 1997, 208-09).

The actual events of the Soweto uprising, which began on June 16, 1976, and ebbed and flowed for 15 months, have been described and analyzed at length[8] and need not be rehearsed here. But they did galvanize entire Black communities, uniting them in grief and outrage at the unequal contest between police bullets and school students' stones. They re-created the possibility of mass-based protest politics. They reverberated in major cities and in Bantustans. They linked African protest with Coloured defiance. And they broke the mould of South African politics cast after Sharpeville.

A great deal of ink has been spent to argue the respective contributions to the youth uprising of Black Consciousness and the exiled movements. Without adjudicating between these claims in detail, two conclusions seem clear. First, BC did not organize the Soweto revolt but created the conditions in which it occurred. As Biko put it, "The boldness, dedication, sense of purpose, and clarity of analysis of the situation — all of these are a direct result of BC ideas among the young" (Marx 1992, 70). Second, the ANC had but vestigial links with the Soweto activists but was a major beneficiary. International revulsion at the events ensured greater diplomatic anti-apartheid leverage. More crucially, several thousand young men and women left South Africa determined to avenge fallen schoolmates, to fight back, and to join an organized national liberation force. Overwhelmingly, the militant refugees gravitated toward the ANC. By mid-1978, South African security sources estimated that some 4,000 new military recruits were training in Libya, Angola, and Tanzania.

Decade of Defiance: 1979-89

With hindsight, it now is easier to see how beleaguered the apartheid state was when P.W. Botha became state president in 1978 and his government set out on the deeply ambivalent program labeled "Total Strategy." Botha's presidency was an exercise in authoritarian reform, an attempt to redefine and stabilize the apartheid project. It sought to make certain concessions (and so win new allies in the Black middle class) while insisting on centralizing government security forces to control the direction of change from above. What appeared then as a formidable show of strength (the militarization of society, the role of the National Security Council, the National Security Management System) was also a set of defensive reactions to a treble-layered crisis. The crisis comprised economic recession, internal resistance, and a fundamental shift in the geopolitical balance of power in Southern Africa. By the end of the 1980s, the combined weight of economic decline, internal resistance, and external sanctions proved too great for the White minority regime to bear.

Total Strategy was confronted and outflanked by two decisive developments within resistance politics. One was the emergence of localized, radicalized community-based protest. The other was the re-entry by the ANC from the wings of exile to center-stage domestic politics. While analytically distinct, these trends fused in 1983 in the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF).

In October 1977, the government banned 18 (mainly Black Consciousness) organizations and publications. But the political energies released by the Soweto revolt could not be contained by repression. In 1979, a number of new organizations were formed, including the Congress of South African Students (COSAS), the Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO), the Soweto Civic Association, and the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organization. The moment of civic activism, the "civics," had arrived. During the next few years, township associations, youth and student organizations, women's groups, and others mushroomed. The civics typically grew out of existing residents' associations but quickly distinguished themselves in terms of scale, scope, and vigor. They mobilized larger numbers and did so on more militant terms.[9]

The civics became prominent and ubiquitous vehicles of resistance during the 1980s, typically acting in concert with trade unions and student/youth bodies. Together, they spearheaded a politics of refusal, with a repertoire of consumer, rent, and transport boycotts; rallies; marches; and stay-aways. The continued growth in Black trade union organization and militancy was dramatic. Production losses due to strike activity doubled in 1980 compared with 1979, doubled again in 1982, and doubled yet again in 1985. Strike activity in 1985 was more than 10 times greater than the annual average from 1973-78 (Price 1991, 164). Student protests and school boycotts added further voltage to an already highly charged circuit. Like similar movements elsewhere, student and youth politics were typically militant and dynamic– and by nature impatient, unsophisticated, and inexperienced (Bundy 1987).

In 1983, the Pretoria government unveiled constitutional proposals, designed to create a new tricameral legislature with separate chambers for Whites, Indians, and Coloreds– but excluding Africans entirely. This precipitated the formation in August 1983 of the UDF, an umbrella body of more than 500 organizations. The guidelines for this united front organization stated that it would be dedicated to the "creation of a non-racial, unitary state undiluted by racial or ethnic considerations." Apart from its program:

> *The UDF articulated a 'culture of liberation' in which local struggles for the redress of specific grievances were portrayed as the basic components in a nationwide struggle to end white minority rule... The UDF provided a linkage for ongoing local struggles, not only forward to a 'liberated and democratic' South Africa, but also backward to the tradition of the multi-racial Freedom Charter and the ANC (Price 1991, 180).*

This linkage was evident in the patrons and officers of the UDF and in its campaign to popularize the Freedom Charter, adopted in 1985 as embodying the guiding principles of the UDF. By 1985, the youthful subculture that dominated mass protests had incorporated into its banners and songs an iconography provided by the heroes of Robben Island and the soldiers of MK.

To understand how this happened, it is necessary to pick up the second major theme of this section: how the ANC re-emerged as a major internal political force in the first half of the 1980s. The movement's official, and somewhat formulaic, explanation was to cite the Four Pillars of the anti-apartheid struggle: armed struggle, underground activities, mass political struggle, and international solidarity work. From 1978 on, the ANC leadership placed new emphasis on the need to combine armed activity with legal and semi-legal internal activity to spur "general mass uprisings" (Barrell 1990, 37-40). But the most potent appeal of the ANC to township youth was its resumption of active armed struggle. From 1977-80, more than 80 guerrilla incidents were attributed to MK, and from 1981-84, 192 such incidents occurred. The most spectacular and sophisticated military attacks took place between 1980 and 1982 – the rocket attack on Voortrekkerhoogte, the Sasol and Koeberg explosions, and attacks on fuel depots, rail lines, and power stations. Their psychological impact was probably more important in the long run than the damage they caused. Indeed, by mid-decade, the ANC itself began to refer to such attacks as "armed propaganda."

From about 1978 to 1983, the ANC shifted from defining its armed struggle as guerrilla war to conceiving of "a protracted armed struggle which must involve the whole people and in which partial and general mass uprisings would play a vital role" (Barrell 1990, 41). But in the last quarter of 1984, analysis was overtaken by events. As in other instances during the half-century under survey, "the initial spark ... came from below" (McKinley 1997, 61). On the day that Botha's tricameral Parliament was installed, the townships in the Vaal Triangle (Sebokeng, Sharpeville, and Boipatong) began the conflagration. Residents attacked municipal buildings and killed local councilors. They set up roadblocks and barricades and attacked police with petrol bombs and homemade weapons. From September 1984 until late 1986, mass political activism took on a quasi-insurrectionary character. The relatively disciplined stay-aways peaked in November 1984, when more than 1 million workers and most school students paralyzed the industrial Transvaal for two days. However, more confrontational, less organized, more violent, and less coherent forms of struggle increasingly superseded such tactics.

In January 1985, the ANC in Lusaka issued a call to "make the apartheid system more and more unworkable and the country less and less governable."

Price characterizes two linked but distinct processes at play during these turbulent two years: "chaos" and "transformation." The first involves the obliteration of established authorities; the second the emergence of embryonic forms of new authority – local alternatives to state power (Price 1991, 191-92). The UDF and its affiliates strove to harness transformational energies such as street committees, alternative structures of local government, educational programs for boycotting students, and the like. The urgent rhythm of the toyi-toyi[10] orchestrated the street fighting, the people's courts, self-defense units, and vigilante structures. There was no mistaking the prominence of youthful zealots in many of the areas where resistance was most intense. "It was children who built the roadblocks, children who led the crowds to the administrative buildings, children who delegated spokespersons, and children who in 1984 told the older folk that things would be different, that people would not run away as they had in 1960" (Lodge and Nasson 1991, 76). Analysts since have argued the extent to which this call was responsible for or merely in response to the mass mobilization of mid-decade. For Davis, it was the exiled movement that had embedded "a nationwide infrastructure of anti-apartheid resistance":

> *Responsibility for the radical intensification of protest must be assigned largely to the ANC... It had expanded, professionalized and safeguarded a network of below-ground cells capable of sparking political mobilization activities above ground (Davis 1987, 113).*

In contrast, Murray was more skeptical of the capacity of the ANC to control, let alone precipitate, mass internal protest. He endorsed a journalist's assessment: "What is taking shape across the country, without any help from Moscow and very little from Lusaka, is a loosely organized, radical mass movement of youngsters who operate outside any law and without identifiable leadership." The ANC's call for ungovernability did not initiate the uprising but sought to be associated with it (Murray 1987, 232). Neither Davis nor Murray capture the two-way dynamics between popular struggles and organized political leadership. While the tempo and geography of the rolling insurrection was defined from below by local struggles, the ANC's underground operatives acted strenuously to link such flash points, to provide an ideological and programmatic coherence, and to subsume particular grievances under the rubric of national liberation.

Heightened resistance was met by intensified repression. The state imposed a partial state of emergency in 1985 and then a second, more stringent state of emergency in June 1986 (renewed annually for the next four years). More than 25,000 people were arrested and detained without trial. Activists were beaten, tear-gassed, and peppered with buckshot. The South African Defense Force troops occupied many townships. National Security Management System securocrats drafted shadowy vigilante allies, armed them, and set them upon UDF structures. In Natal, virtual civil war was waged between forces allied with the UDF/ANC on one hand, and the Inkatha Freedom Party and the state, on the other. The UDF was beheaded of leadership, its campaigns were fragmented, and many of its followers intimidated or demoralized.

Yet if the state had managed to reimpose a shaky peace by force majeure, it had suffered as much if not more than the liberation forces. Capital flight and sanctions intensified. The currency collapsed, and an international credit squeeze ensued. Elements of the White establishment effectively deserted the government. Delegations of big business, Afrikaner intellectuals, church leaders, and others made highly publicized trips to Lusaka and Dakar to meet with ANC leadership. The NP lost support to its left and right, and splits opened in the cabinet. In 1989, these led to the unceremonious dumping of President Botha and his replacement by F.W. de Klerk.

In short, there was by the late 1980s what an exiled academic identified as an "unstable equilibrium" (Wolpe 1988, 103). The South African state remained militarily powerful but was becoming politically weak. It could repress but not persuade. The liberation movement led by the ANC remained politically powerful but militarily ineffectual. The exiled leadership acknowledged in 1987 that its expectations of an insurrectionary seizure of power were untenable. The state was unable to reimpose legitimacy from above, and popular forces were unable to seize power from below– and both came to a reluctant recognition of this stalemate.

. . . the achievement of an "economic order which shall promote and advance" the well being of all is not something that can be legislated or wished into being.

In March 1989, a handwritten letter by Nelson Mandela was delivered to President Botha and to the ANC headquarters in Lusaka. Its crucial section proposed that:

The key to the whole situation is a negotiated settlement, and a meeting between the government and the ANC will be the first major step towards lasting peace in the country... Any other approach would contain the danger of an irresolvable stalemate.

By the end of the same year, De Klerk had ended the State of Emergency, dismantled the National Security Management System, permitted mass rallies and marches, and released Walter Sisulu and other Rivonia leaders. On February 2, 1990, at the opening of Parliament, De Klerk announced the unbanning of the ANC, PAC and SACP and committed the NP to negotiations. De Klerk's speech and Mandela's letter voiced the same logic. Together, they are the foundation documents for the negotiated settlement that culminated in the democratic elections of April 1994.

The ANC entered those negotiations with clear statements of its basic positions. The Harare Declaration of August 1989 resonated directly the Freedom Charter in calling for "a new constitutional order based upon the following principles":

- South Africa shall become a united, democratic and nonracial state.
- Its entire people shall enjoy common and equal citizenship and nationality, regardless of race, color, sex, or creed.
- All of its people shall have the right to participate in the government and administration of the country on the basis of a universal suffrage.
- All shall enjoy universally recognized human rights, freedoms, and civil liberties, protected under an entrenched bill of rights.
- South Africa shall have a new legal system that shall guarantee equality of all before the law.
- There shall be created an economic order that shall promote and advance the well being of all South Africans (Johns and Hunt Davis 1991, 305-6).

The extended negotiations of 1990-94 have been narrated extensively elsewhere.[11] They involved concessions and compromises by all parties. But the new legal and political order and the Constitution finally adopted in 1997 are indeed democratic and nonracial, dedicated to the protection of civil liberties, and unambiguously committed to the formal equality of all its citizens. However, the achievement of an "economic order which shall promote and advance" the well being of all is not something that can be legislated or wished into being. It remains the major challenge confronting the ANC government under the presidency of Thabo Mbeki.

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed 50 years of struggle that culminated in unseating the world's most notorious minority rule based on racial domination and replacing it with a democratic and nonracial order. But what patterns emerge from this history? One is obtained by a teleological reading– an ascription of the outcome to the struggle as a whole. Julie Frederikse, for example, celebrates a "popular democratic, and nonracial, tradition" that gave rise to a mass movement dominating resistance politics and claims that "non-racialism runs like an unbreakable thread throughout the movement's history" (Frederikse 1990, 6).

In fact, the history of national liberation is more complex and contradictory than is supposed by the motif of a single seamless thread. A skein of complementary and competing threads might be a more apt metaphor. First, the ANC's own arrival at the nonracialism of the Harare Declaration involved a complicated journey with staging posts of intense Africanism and "multi-racial" practices. Only at its Kabwe conference in 1985 was the ANC's National Executive Committee opened to members of all races. Nonracial rank-and-file membership dates from Morogoro in 1969. Second, at various moments, individuals and organizations that explicitly repudiated nonracialism as a mobilizing basis gave crucial impetus to anti-apartheid struggles. Third, nonracialism has meant different things to different people within the same organizational and ideological traditions at different times. They will surely continue to do so in current debates over affirmative action, Black empowerment, and what it means to be African.

Other patterns are discernible to those who view the same history through the lens of ideological certitude. If one is concerned that the Congress Alliance has essentially fought against apartheid over the years and failed to sustain a similar struggle against capitalism, then an entirely logical argument can be pressed. "The ANC-led struggle for the liberation of South Africa has ignored the very people in whose name that struggle was conducted ... the bottom line is that the ANC has failed its mass constituency." This also can be demonstrated for each decade under review (McKinley 1997, xi, 135). The mirror image of this position is available when the lens is reversed. If one is concerned that the ANC has been highjacked by the SACP, then their relationship resolves itself into one in which the SACP regarded the ANC mainly "as a pool from which to recruit" its own key cadres. In the process, this transformed the ANC "from a broad-based nationalist movement– which it was from 1912 to 1960–into something more closely resembling a socialist party" (Ellis and Sechaba 1992, 6, 201).

Finally, one of the most widely accepted patterns of resistance history is that which takes literally the claims of political organizations that they "speak for the people" or "represent the people." At best, this is convenient shorthand; at worst, it is mystification. Political movements affect their members and potential supporters in ways that defy straightforward formulae. They can inspire people, confuse them, and disappoint them. Similarly, popular struggles can confirm national programs, confound them, lag behind or outpace them, or largely escape them. This chapter has accorded pride of place to organized forms of national liberation. They have directed and led the struggles over the decades, acting as instruments of political centralization. But it has also attempted to indicate moments when the pace was set and the agenda modified by city dwellers and rural people alike– when history was made by the anonymous many, and when the struggle for human rights and personal dignity was conducted by precisely those whose rights and dignity were most at risk.

END NOTES

[1] In the 1950s, the African National Congress entered a form of united front politics (the Congress Alliance), and the 1955 adoption of the Freedom Charter was the defining moment and most durable programmatic statement of the anti-regime mobilization of that decade. In the 1980s, the term Charterist was used widely by United Democratic Front activists both to proclaim and to mask their allegiance to the banned and exiled ANC.

[2] The Act of Union in 1910 entirely excluded Africans from three provinces from any part in common electoral politics. In the Cape Province, African men who met certain property and educational qualifications remained on the common voters' roll.

[3] See Colin Bundy, "Land and Liberation: Popular Rural Protest and the National Liberation Movements in South Africa, 1920-1960" in Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido, *The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa* London: Longman, 1987, especially pp. 266-275, for an account of AAC and ANC activities in the Transkei during the 1940s.

[4] The distinction is set out in Gerhart 1978, 11-13.

[5] See, e.g., Kuper 1957; Lodge 1983; Karis and Gerhart 1977; Meli 1988; Fine and Davis 1990.

[6] The existing literature was well surveyed in Chaskalson 1987. The most important study of rural resistance since then is Delius 1996.

[7] See Baskin 1991; Friedman 1987; Maree 1987.

[8] See Hirson 1979; Brookes & Brickhill 1980; Kane-Berman 1978; Moss 1982; Bonner and Segal 1998.

[9] For a vivid insider account, see Mayekiso 1996.

[10] The toyi-toyi was a quasi-military dance-step, probably derived from MK camps. It first appeared in South Africa in the early 1980s and rapidly became a ubiquitous signature of protests and rallies.

[11] See Sparks 1994; Ebrahim 1998; Marais 1998.

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The United States

Not Yet "E Pluribus Unum": Racism, America's Achilles' Heel

By Charles V. Hamilton

Introduction

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Allowed." "Gentiles Only" signs were common in rental and employment ads. In some instances, these anti-ethnic acts simply went unchallenged and were tacitly accepted until a burgeoning civil rights movement for protection of African Americans was launched. In other instances, the ethnic groups formed their own socioeconomic, communal associations that helped them negotiate the worst practices of a prejudicial society. In addition, one historian noted: "However prejudiced White Anglo-Saxons were in practice, they were ashamed to endorse nativism [anti-foreign, anti-Catholic, anti-Semitic, anti-Negro] in principle. Equally important, an expanding economy in an under-populated country required a steady influx of new hands. Immigration alleviated the labor shortage, and economic need overpowered moral and aesthetic repugnance." [2]

. . . most Americans do not see race relations as a top priority.

All of this, obviously, was a delicate, subtle process. No one assumed that national identities would disappear immediately, but such identities should not be a hindrance to success through individual enterprise and capitalist competition. The delicacy was magnified by the fact that African descendants in this new land of opportunity were at the same time experiencing precisely different circumstances. They and their forebears came as property, not seeking property. They were not expected to be self-reliant. Rather, dependency was a requirement of their residence. The open, competitive market– either their accumulation of assets or their ability to market their skills in fair competition – never applied to them.

Needless to say, immigrants from Asian countries were closer to African descendants than European in terms of their legal and economic conditions. What remained distinctive about the African Americans, of course, was the mode of entry. They came as property and had to spend centuries establishing their sheer humanity as a matter of law before they could begin to function as citizens.

Little wonder that a society with such a fractured, differential history of group relations and experiences would have a serious problem dealing with such a lofty motto as "e pluribus unum." Various groups view that phrase from their own experiential vantagepoint. To some it is a reasonable reflection of reality, not quite complete, but in time will likely become so. To others, it is a source of understandable cynicism and frustration, especially when counseled by the more privileged– White and Black– to behave with patience, perseverance and forgiveness.

One lesson learned is that America's Achilles' heel is not so easily dispatched.

What's To Be Done and How: The Necessity for Coalitions

Discussions and actions on race, racism and race relations continue in the United States as the country moves into the 21st century. "The problem of the color line," aptly described by W.E.B. Du Bois in 1903, appears to be no less intense now as it was when he wrote those words over 90 years ago.[3] Americans of all races and ethnic identities continue to grapple with seemingly interminable problems, albeit different now in many significant ways– politically, socially and economically. Even as debates persist over how to identify racial groups (or, indeed, whether race per se is a relevant category or simply a "socially constructed" one with no scientific justification), the causes of racial disparities and the remedies to be pursued in overcoming those inequalities, the country has seen a plethora of conferences, studies, reports and calls for constructive action. All this is taking place even as there is evidence (cited later) that most Americans do not see race relations as a top priority. A familiar mantra accompanying these activities asserts that on the one hand progress has been made, but on the other hand "there is more to be done."

It is precisely what constitutes this future action ("what's to be done") that bedevils and dominates the current status of race, racism and race relations in the United States. No one denies the more than 300 years of legally sanctioned slavery, segregation, and discrimination of Blacks. A crucial debate, however, is how important that legacy is or should be. No one denies that Blacks in the United States were deliberately subordinated and denied opportunities to advance. The people who perpetrated these acts were openly explicit and unapologetic in their intent. A critical debate now centers around at least two current themes. First, since there are no longer constitutional and legal restrictions requiring or permitting such restrictions, why is there a continuing need to give protection to the former "victims?" Second, the current discussions include far more groups than occupied attention until only a few decades ago. What about non-Black groups (e.g., immigrants from places other than Africa); women who were also denied constitutional and legal rights; homosexuals; senior citizens; and the physically handicapped?

Thus, the current situation in the United States has seen the growing arena of groups, in addition to African Americans, who have come forth to claim their status as legitimate beneficiaries of a civil rights movement started essentially in the name and interest of Blacks. In a sense, this movement unleashed a host of frustrations and indignities experienced by other groups in the society. As logical as this development might seem, it has not been without its opponents.[4] And, important to understanding how the future is likely to unfold, this new dimension of expanded claimants significantly affects the development and success of political movements attempting to combat continued racial discrimination. In other words, there is little prospect in the near future of successful efforts to deal with race without corresponding efforts to deal with sexism and socioeconomic inequalities that cross racial and ethnic boundaries. A recent survey published by the Southern Regional Council concluded:

> *Americans are more supportive of public policies designed to offer help based on economic status than those targeted at racial minorities. The class versus race edge prevails regarding government spending priorities, affirmative action programs, and general policies to improve socioeconomic conditions.*[5]

. . . virtually everyone mouthed "e pluribus unum," but they also winked. The "unum" really meant only under certain, quietly understood circumstances.

This latter point has been a bone of contention for some time. Earlier, some observers fervently argued (even in the worst years of legal oppression) that the main problem was "not race but class." Put simply, race was a camouflage, a disguise to hide an intent to wage a carefully crafted "class war" against all of the poor. Thus, if the White poor could see Blacks as their enemy, they would divert their focus away from the real cause of their own lowly plight, namely the White affluent. This argument persists today, but its progressive proponents are currently more sophisticated in conceding the independent role of racism in this complex situation, notwithstanding the passage of laws prohibiting overt discrimination. At least, the current analyses— from across the political spectrum— tend to recognize that race and socioeconomic status are simultaneously important factors in dealing with existing economic disparities in the society.

The urge to subordinate race to class was also motivated (even if ever so subtly) by the notion that if race/racism was given a prominent position, the matter would likely not be sufficiently treated. Antagonistic racial feelings (historically intertwined with sexual relations) were so deeply embedded that many people simply felt such issues were beyond the bounds of rational public discourse. Racial fears were not what "polite" company talked about openly, as Gunnar Myrdal observed in his study of this country's "dilemma."[6] These were matters best left unprobed for fear of uncovering a hard core of animosity, fear, almost "innate" abhorrence of "the other," the different, and especially the "dark heathen" and the desire "to be with one's own kin and kind" Better then to avoid (if not to deny) the issue by clothing it in other forms such as economic conditions and the need for education. This way, society could more comfortably (and that is exactly the appropriate word) deal with policies aimed at helping all people afflicted with common problems (unemployment, poor health, bad education, etc.). These were acquired, not ascriptive problems. They did not require people to focus on things that seemed immutable (such as physical racial features). They also permitted another more comfortable mind-set— namely, a focus on individual effort. If one applied oneself, worked hard, played by society's rules, did not dwell on racial discrimination based on a group's identity, but strove to improve one's own talents in a competitive society, the American system of egalitarianism and individual merit would reward such behavior— in time.[7] Wasn't this, after all, one of the important lessons of other identifiable groups (especially the European immigrants) coming to this country and faced with dire conditions of discrimination? Was it not the lesson inspired by Jews, Asians (especially the "model minorities"), Irish, Italians and many others? They relied on tightly knit communal associations, complained little or not at all about overt discriminatory practices (in some cases adopting such practices to their own self-help endeavors), and slowly lifted themselves as individuals and as members of a group.

Whether this was a way to avoid (or deny) the centrality of the Black/White conundrum, this attitude very likely was a powerful one in influencing (in fact, politicizing) how Americans thought about racism and race relations. And equally as likely, still do. They extrapolated out— not from the idealistic words of the Declaration of Independence or Constitution— but from their own historical and current experiences. They were assimilating into the American way of receiving those different from themselves. And to a large extent, if this approach worked for them, then why not for others? To be sure, virtually everyone mouthed "e pluribus unum," but they also winked. The "unum" really meant only under certain, quietly understood circumstances. How was the process orchestrated? The answer: by not raising too loudly the obvious dominance of one element, while the various "many" took whatever opportunities they could get to improve their lot. This was America's pragmatic way of coming to terms with its internal contradictions– with its Achilles' heel.

Precisely because of this persistent proclivity to dodge issues of racism and prejudice, no useful discussion should proceed without recognizing the need to address how issues are framed and organizations mobilized to confront the multiple problems of racial, economic and gender inequities still plaguing society. In other words, what is to be done will be determined by a serious consideration of how to articulate the "solutions."

This current reality will be complicated by the different historical experiences of the various groups and, particularly important, the differential political power of the groups. The latter point speaks to the crucial matter of forming political alliances so necessary for building effective strategies in policy-making circles. Needless to say, the finite resources available in attempts to ameliorate unequal conditions aggravate this problem.[8] Under any configuration of political-economic power, African Americans are a clear minority and as a group are likely to remain so. Unlike South Africa or even Brazil, sheer numbers cannot be a particularly encouraging factor in the African-American calculus of what is to be done. Thus, they must seek to form coalitions with others who have similar interests and needs or who have a need to seek support from the group at any given time for their own special interests. This will be difficult for a variety of reasons. Except under the most unusual circumstances will those who have more give up willingly even a portion of what they have to those who have much less. Moral, philosophical arguments in the face of entrenched self-interests are valuable but should not be taken as inevitably controlling.

The rest of this essay attempts to respond to these complex, difficult and perennial matters.

What Has Been Done and Why: Pressure at Home and International Vulnerability

What have been the primary historical developments that have shaped the current reality? This question obviously focuses attention on the accelerating struggle against racism over the last half century. It is impossible to overlook or underestimate the rising protest movements– in the courts, legislatures, and executive branches– that raised the society's consciousness of and receptivity to the demand of justice and opportunity. These efforts were tedious, halting, at times violent, and in many important instances successful. They successfully ended de jure segregation, greatly extended voting rights to places (especially in the South) correctly described as "closed societies," and opened up several arenas of socioeconomic activity previously off-limits– in the public and private sectors. The stories of these developments have been told often and well. To be sure, accounts disagree on the relative weight given to various forms of protest action. Hardly surprising. Some accounts lean heavily toward the efficacy of the constitutional/legal challenges pursued through the courts, noting the significance of redefining and overturning long-held constitutional precedents (such as the "separate but equal" doctrine allowing legal segregation).

This period represented perhaps the greatest display of liberal coalition politics in modern American history. The civil rights movement activated not only Black Americans but liberal religious, labor, youth (especially on college campuses) and multi-racial civic organizations as well. Many conducted protest campaigns in their own local communities, raised funds for support of voter registration drives and other anti-segregation efforts, joined important lobbying in Congress, and were a viable presence in tense areas of conflict. Organized labor was an important source for support funds and providing numbers for protest marches and other activities. Many local unions in the North were especially helpful, but some were also part of the problem. Many local craft unions practiced racial discrimination well into the 1960s in apprenticeship programs and in various other ways. This caused a constant battle between civil rights leaders and national labor leaders. The latter were officially on record in support of civil rights but maintained that they could not (and would not attempt to) expel locals who pursued discriminatory practices and openly excluded Blacks. This punishment was a test of commitment called for by civil rights leaders, but without success. The coalition of labor and civil rights forces was a crucial one, but one constantly characterized by friction between "friendly allies."

Civil rights groups always supported the basic aims and policies of organized labor– the right to organize and bargain collectively, union shops, minimum wage, improved working conditions, and broader benefits– and they clearly recognized the value of the labor movement, politically and economically. At the same time, several very important union affiliates were unapologetically segregated. (This was truer of the craft unions than of the industrial unions). Roy Wilkins of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) summed up the reality:

It must be understood that all organized bodies have their primary and secondary purposes. The primary purpose of the NAACP is to combat discrimination against Negroes. The primary purpose of labor organizations is to protect the wages, hours, and working

> *conditions of its members. Civil rights activity for them is desirable but must be secondary. Inevitably these differences in emphasis will produce tensions in greater or less degree.*[9]

And so they did, but no one misunderstood that organized labor and civil rights forces were essentially in the same liberal/progressive camp. Their main common constituencies came from the working classes– Black and White.

Another major force was the religious community. The Black church had always been important in organizing and leading protests as far back as the struggle for the abolition of slavery. The church was a central (in many instances the only) meeting place for civil rights groups, and Black ministers were natural leaders to turn to. If a large part of the civil rights struggle was the moral argument supporting universal human rights and dignity, one could expect religious institutions to be key participants in making that case. Especially important were prominent white leaders – Christians and Jews– who joined nationally and locally. All the religious activity symbolized the prospect of interracial harmony, non-violent protest, and the ultimate possibility of achieving what was frequently called "the beloved community."[10] This religious imprimatur gave the struggle not only a strong moral stance but also a kind of "softer," more forgiving, more reconciling, less antagonistic edge than could be found in a sheer politico-economic power struggle. It spoke of loving one's enemy, not of permanent anger. It served to remind the larger society of the basic humanness of the goals sought. Not that these arguments were always readily or universally accepted or believed by racist opponents who often had their own religious interpretations justifying separation of the races.

In the final analysis, the religious/moral component of the civil rights struggle in the United States, at its peak in the 1960s, was a crucial factor on the national and international scene.

Some observers note the critical role played by mass protest movements, which provided not only the issues but the drama that brought into sharper focus the injustices frequently talked about in quasi-private, polite forums or courtrooms. This view is quick to emphasize the importance of mass media in communicating these dramas.

In 1963, President John F. Kennedy was candidly, if cryptically, admitting as much in commenting on the effects of the violent reactions of the Birmingham, Alabama, police to the peaceful civil rights demonstrations in that city. After the Commissioner of Safety, Eugene "Bull" Connor, ordered dogs and fire hoses turned loose on marching protesters, media pictures were on front pages and television screens throughout the world. In a meeting a few weeks later at the White House with civil rights leaders, Kennedy commented that opinion of Connor should not be too harsh because, in his own way, he had done a lot for civil rights that spring. The moral outrage that erupted nationwide provided a more receptive atmosphere for the President to submit a stronger civil rights bill to Congress (which later passed as the Civil Rights Law of 1964). A vast national and international audience was getting, really for the first time, constant living-room exposure to the depths of feelings, frustrations and aspirations of thousands (who very likely represented millions more) who were no longer prepared to suffer the indignities of American apartheid quietly.

These were definitely dynamic events, accompanied by stimulating oratory calling on the country to live up to its high ideals of freedom, justice and opportunity. All these phenomena helped politicize and mobilize a major national constituency for changing the old order. Even the "long hot summers" of urban rioting in the 1960s served to highlight the growing frustrations, notwithstanding the possibility, as some commentators asserted, that many of the rioters were likely as motivated by criminal opportunities for looting and personal gain as they were by the chance to make a political statement. Strongly condemned as lawless, the riots certainly found voices of understanding among policymakers and opinion leaders who, while calling for an end to the rioting, knew that something more than promises had to be delivered. Indeed, laws were passed– good ones. Changes did occur– important ones. Study commissions were appointed (nationally and locally) and, invariably, acknowledged that "more needs to be done" to redress legitimate grievances.

The early to mid-1960s was a period of enormous socioeconomic political change in the country. Major civil rights laws and social policies were enacted. In a sense, this period was more liberal and progressive than the New Deal of the 1930s. The 1960s not only dealt with economic issues; it provided the legislative framework for dismantling legal apartheid and extending political rights that the New Deal left intact. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 were seminal pieces of legislation for this country.

In addition, in the wake of the trauma from the assassination of President Kennedy, President Lyndon B. Johnson announced a new thrust at reducing poverty in the country. This War on Poverty (Economic Opportunity Act of 1964) was accompanied by a prolific output of liberal legislation. In the 89th Congress– 1965 to 1967– 181 bills of the 200 Johnson requested were passed. There were major new health care provisions attached to Social Security (Medicare) and for the poor (Medicaid), aid to elementary and secondary education with provisions for additional grant money to poorer school districts, work-study grants for college students, model cities funds for community development projects, rent supplements for needy tenants, aid to urban mass transit systems, support for the arts and humanities and environmental protection laws.

The Johnson administration labeled this bevy of liberal public policy activity as policies in pursuit of "The Great Society." And, indeed, for a brief time, there was enthusiastic and spirited activity in desolated, isolated communities– North and South. The most public attention focused on the "community action" programs of the War on Poverty. The law promised to have "the maximum feasible participation" of persons in the communities to be served; that is, participation in decision-making on how the incoming federal funds would be spent. Several problems quickly developed, which were not entirely unpredictable. First, political control of the local organizations planning and implementing the programs (budget-making, hiring personnel, designing programs) would be an issue in many places. These local battles were not always racial, but were also power struggles between groups and individuals eager to reap the spoils of the incoming federal largess. Second, the programs mostly emphasized providing social services to the poor, whereas some policy-makers wanted a War on Poverty that put far more emphasis on creating real public sector jobs for people in the poor communities. This issue was connected to a third problem: money. The national budget for the endeavor was annual, subject to approval each year, which made long-term planning and attracting first-rate officials precarious at best. And, of course, complaints were made that too little money was appropriated for the task, given the enormous socioeconomic problems throughout the country.[11]

However, a number of successful individual programs resulted from this burst of liberal activity. "Head Start," early education programs for poor preschoolers, proved to be very beneficial overall. Health programs for poor mothers and infants helped many young people get a healthy start in life. School lunch programs fed many children who came to school hungry through no fault of their own. Job Corps programs for the young gave work experience. These successes were easily overlooked or undermined, however, by the more glaring internecine fights and charges of fraud and corruption. And as in most ambitious undertakings, there were just enough proven cases of fraud and ineptness to arm conservatives who never agreed with the basic philosophy of governmental assistance in the first place.

Whatever the faults and weaknesses of particular anti-poverty programs, those programs acknowledged that society was committed to helping provide opportunity to the less fortunate. On both fronts– civil rights and social welfare– the Great Society, if only for a brief time, made more than salutary efforts to doing something tangible in the struggle to achieve "e pluribus unum."

It was also a time, unfortunately, when the country was becoming increasingly involved in the Vietnam War, competing not only for federal budget funds, but for attention from social activists who had been helpful in the anti-segregation movement. As the country seemed to be, if ever so painfully, coming to grips with its racial anxieties at home, it was beginning to unravel over a questionable venture in Southeast Asia that would prove as demoralizing and confrontational at home as any phenomenon since the Civil War.

These developments culminated in the 1960s, and that heightened period of social protest movements has not reappeared since. In fact, a perceptible backlash began in the late 1960s. Many people concluded that reforms had gone too far, too fast. Now that laws were on the books clearly prohibiting segregation and discrimination, individuals now needed to spend time less time protesting and more time preparing themselves to take advantage of the opportunities these laws opened up. The past was behind us; those horrible days were over. No longer would society have to contend with decisions (public or private) made on the basis of racial identity. If before, people were treated as members of subordinated groups, this would and should now give way to treatment of people on the basis of individual merit– all people.

Therefore, in the midst of the dynamic decade of the 1960s, when some civil rights proponents suggested what they meant by "more needs to be done," their ideas met a wall of resistance that persists three decades later in debates over affirmative action. Looking at the history of segregation and continuing racism, Whitney M. Young Jr. of the National Urban League proposed in 1963 a limited period of five years for paying special attention to those subject to past American apartheid. He envisioned an effort in the United States similar to the post-World War II U.S. Marshall Plan to help rebuild war-torn Europe. Thus, he called for a "Domestic Marshall Plan." He argued that this was fair and sound policy. Otherwise, how else could the nation overcome centuries of deliberate and successful policies of deprivation and denial? To him, this was a stark reality.[12] It was as real as the need to deal with the consequences of weakened European countries. He emphasized the need for "better housing (and) more jobs," stating:

If we embark upon a five-year program to end slum conditions, for example, people would see visible signs of change after the first year, and they would believe that the nation really means to end slums and they know that they too will have decent housing in a mea-

surable and short period of time. Only such a timetable will convince the ghetto population that conditions are changing and riots can only retard advances.[13]

Young and the National Urban League were not then (or now) perceived as one of the more "militant" or "radical" protest groups. Far from it. The organization had an established reputation of working with corporate and government authorities on a cooperative, almost conciliatory, basis. Coming from such a "respectable" source, the Domestic Marshall Plan idea could not be labeled as the "extremist" position of an "irresponsible" source. In the summer of 1967, following riots in Newark, Detroit and several other urban areas, Time magazine carried a picture of Young on its cover. Many commentators noted the helpless, almost irrelevant role of most established civil rights leaders like Young. A caption over Young's picture virtually conceded this conclusion. It quoted Young as saying: "You got to give us some victories."[14]

It was an agonizing plea of recognition that Black leaders who were attempting to serve as a bridge between the impoverished and the establishment were in an unenviable position. They were unable to respond to the needs of the poor without the cooperation of the establishment who had resources to legitimate their leadership roles.

Notwithstanding the pleas and the precariousness of some Black leadership, the response to Young's Marshall Plan was quick and predictable. Neither was its rejection only from racial bigots but from some people otherwise sympathetic to the civil rights cause. A White civil rights supporter strongly disagreed with Young in language familiar in today's affirmative action debates:

Compensation for Negroes is a subtle but pernicious form of racism. It requires that men be dealt with by society on the basis of race and color rather than on the basis of their humanity. It would therefore as a public policy legalize, deepen, and perpetuate the abominable racial cleavage that has ostracized and crippled the American Negro.[15]

Neither did this person think it was fair to penalize those Whites for the sins of their forefathers:

It leaves the descendants of the exploiters a guilt they cannot cancel and with the descendants of the exploited a debt they cannot collect... Slavery corrupts ambition and self-reliance; so too does patronizing social status.[16]

While recognizing the importance of social movements, one should also consider two other critical phenomena in thinking about developments that have shaped the current reality: 1) the World War II fight against Nazism and fascism and 2) the Cold War struggle between communism and American democratic capitalism. Causal connections in such analyses should be made cautiously, but it is reasonable to assume that these events provided an international context that facilitated the argument and activism against American apartheid and racism.

As to the first– the fight against Nazism and fascism– the United States entered the war against dictatorial regimes that were avowedly at variance with any semblance of respect for democratic ideals. Germany was blatantly anti-Semitic and racist. It made no attempt to hide its views on these issues.

At the same time, civil rights advocates lost no opportunity in pointing out the irony of the United States proclaiming a doctrine of Four Freedoms and denouncing dictatorships while maintaining a rigidly segregated society on its own soil. There could be no escape from the embarrassing contradictions. African American newspapers kept up a steady attack on segregated U.S. military units, lynchings and all other vestiges of American racism. The banner of the "Double V" (victory abroad and victory at home) was raised in every possible circumstance– editorials, speeches, war bond rallies, letters to public officials, cartoons (depicting Adolf Hitler and segregationist Senator Theodore Bilbo of Mississippi as two of a kind). Civil rights protesters against discrimination in hiring at defense plants marched in picket lines with placards that read: "Hitler Must Run This Plant– They Don't Employ Negroes." In one instance, the FBI sought advice from the Department of Justice regarding letters from Black soldiers printed in The People's Voice, a New York City Black newspaper owned and edited by the Rev. Adam Clayton Powell Jr. The soldiers complained bitterly of racist treatment overseas. The FBI wanted to know if publication of such letters constituted seditious acts.[17] Many civil rights activists were not deterred, however, in their criticisms. Reporting to a meeting of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 1944, Executive Secretary Walter White told of his visits to military installations overseas:

I wish it were possible for me to tell you truthfully that the alchemy of war and fighting to destroy Nazism had transformed the racial behavior in the armed services overseas. I cannot do so. We have merely transplanted to other lands the American pattern, both good and bad ... Basically, the root of all our difficulties overseas is in insistence on racial segregation.

As long as our government insists on segregation in an army and navy allegedly fighting for democracy, the chasm between the races will be perpetuated and broadened with resultant bitterness on both sides.[18]

America's official responses were, at best, tortured and uncomfortable. Understandably so. Racial bigotry in Nazi Germany or segregated America could not be defended in a society that put great stock in distinguishing itself from its enemy on the grounds of freedom, justice and respect for integrity of individuals. At the least, the war heightened the dilemma of the American Creed, and it was not surprising that Black military personnel returned from the war even more determined to pursue the second "V."

The onset of the Cold War presented yet another international context for the struggle against racism. The United States and the Soviet Union became locked in an ideological struggle for the next 45 years. In the United States, communism replaced Nazism/fascism as the premier enemy. Newly independent nations, especially in Asia and Africa, became targets of persuasion to adopt one ideological regime or the other. (This competition had strategic as well as moral, philosophical consequences.) But as long as the United States presented the democratic/capitalist face with a disfiguring racist blot, it could hardly go into that struggle fully armed. There remained too many imperfections to legitimate its claim of moral and socioeconomic superiority. A nation that trumpeted the desirability of a free-market society but maintained closed labor and housing markets based on race was vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy at the least. Again, few American officials could honestly deny this, and some did not try. In 1946, as the Cold War battle lines were becoming increasingly apparent, then Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated:

A nation that trumpeted the desirability of a free-market society but maintained closed labor and housing markets based on race was vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy at the least.

> *... the existence of discrimination against minority groups in this country has an adverse effect upon our relations with other countries. We are reminded over and over by some foreign newspapers and spokesmen that our treatment of various minorities leaves much to be desired. While sometimes these pronouncements are exaggerated and unjustified, they all too frequently point with accuracy to some form of discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin. Frequently, we find it next to impossible to formulate a satisfactory answer to our critics in other countries; the gap between the things we stand for in principle and the facts of a particular situation may be too wide to be bridged. An atmosphere of suspicion and resentment in a country over the way a minority is being treated in the United States is a formidable obstacle to the development of mutual understanding and trust between the two countries. We will have better international relations when these reasons for suspicion and resentment have been removed.*[19]

Such statements from important sources are matters of record. Precisely how influential they were in any given instance is difficult to establish. But it is reasonable to assume that the ideological fight against communism was compromised in some ways by existing racism in the United States. This was so even during the McCarthy period of the 1950s when some civil rights advocates took great pains to convince others that they had no affinity for communism. The real targets of the struggle were the minds of people of other countries who were potential military allies (with strategic bases) or political allies or friendly economic markets. Several incidents occurred involving African diplomats traveling from the United Nations in New York to Washington, D.C. They often were openly discriminated against by segregationists owners of public accommodations. Such confrontations always brought anguished apologies from American officials, but the embarrassing experiences (for the Africans and the Americans) were not overlooked in the ideological atmosphere of the Cold War. Whatever its relative advantage vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in terms of military power and economic growth, the United States was more than mildly compromised by its own internal racial problems. Such moral discomfort could hardly be mitigated by the argument, frequently made in this country, that communist countries were surely no better in extending freedom to their own citizens. The point was to be different from– and better than– the communists in significant, substantive ways, not to be less racist and less oppressive.

These historical developments had a cumulative effect on the character and nature of the civil rights struggle. In the earlier years, many important campaigns had quite definitive, universally shared benefits. Victories over de jure segregation in most places saw "colored" and "white" signs come down immediately or at least instantly ignored. Victories in court over the discriminatory practices of local voter registrars in some instances but not all resulted in literally thousands of Black citizens lining up to register and to vote. Segregated interstate travel changed virtually overnight. These were visible, tangible pieces of evidence that "progress" was being made. And, importantly, all– who ate in public restaurants, rode local buses, were of voting age—could immediately change their daily habits of living. (There were variations, of course, but earlier victories often were defining moments in the lives of millions of people.)

Later, after the seminal decade of the 1960s, victories often were more elusive and individually experienced. Achieving certain goals, especially in the economic sphere, resulted in improvements but did not immediately impact the lives of masses of people. This is especially evident when examining socioeconomic indicators of change. Ending employment discrimination, desegregating colleges and universities, achieving real open housing laws– all are absolutely important. But all Blacks, for a variety of reasons, have not experienced the benefits and certainly not to the same degree. Those who cannot afford homes in new neighborhoods or pass the entrance tests to schools of higher learning or possess the job skills to take advantage of new employment opportunities– these Blacks (and there are many) seemingly have little over which to rejoice. Victories– yes; universally and immediately shared– no.

Unfortunately, this inevitable consequence, given the different levels of economic and educational achievements of Blacks under legal segregation, spawned a mistaken notion that the successes of the earlier civil rights struggle benefited only a middle-class Black cadre– not the masses. Legal segregation and discrimination held down all Blacks in one form or another, irrespective of economic status. Once those legal barriers were lowered, one would expect a more-than-qualified segment to compete successfully on the open market sooner than many others. Thus, instead contributing to a growing class schism in the Black community, the Civil Rights Movement has successfully exposed what was always known– that many Blacks could and would compete in the larger society if given the chance. According to another mistaken notion, major civil rights organizations failed to address this situation in their earlier struggles. Knowledge of the history of major organizations' efforts to deal with the economic problems of lower class Blacks as well as the civil rights issues would dispel this inaccurate conclusion.[20] The challenge, then, was to continue the struggle to broaden the base of those capable of competing. In a sense, this task would be much more difficult than overcoming segregation laws on the books. It would certainly mean less than universal rejoicing at the achievement of every "breakthrough."

Encouraging Trends, and Disturbing Developments

This section highlights three general areas of concern: some socioeconomic data; developments on the civil rights front; and the ascendance of an ideologically conservative mood in responding to issues of race, racism, and race relations.

Any assessment of "progress" or changes in the complicated arena of American race relations is a mixture of good and bad news. Regarding socioeconomic indicators– looking specifically at key health data, housing conditions, employment, education and family income– hard numbers over recent decades give a good sense of what has happened when comparing Whites, Blacks and frequently Hispanics. In most instances, the data show steady progress in absolute terms for Blacks. Yet there remains in some cases a major gap between Blacks and Whites that suggests much must be done in moving toward "e pluribus unum."

Life expectancy for Black females since 1970 has increased by six years and by four years for Black males. Note the persistent gap with their White counterparts.

Table 41: Life Expectancy at Birth - Number of Years by Race and Gender

Birth year	White Male	White Female	Black Male	Black Female
1970	68.0	75.6	60.0	68.3
1994	73.2	79.6	64.9	74.1
2000 (projected)	74.2	80.1	64.6	74.7
2005 (projected)	74.7	81.0	64.5	75.0

Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1997, The National Data Book, 88

Infant mortality has decreased but is still more than double for Blacks than Whites.

Table 42: Infant Mortality

Birth year	White	Black & Other	Black
1980	10.9	20.2	22.2
1985	9.2	16.8	19.0
1990	7.6	15.5	18.0
1994	6.6	13.5	15.8

Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1997, The National Data Book, 22; per 1000 live births.

Table 43: Reported AIDS Cases, 1981-1996

1981-1996	1990	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Non Hispanic White 268,746	**22,302**	**22,446**	**47,597**	**32,808**	**29,500**	**26,324**
Non-Hispanic Black 203,025	13,205	16,052	38,025	30,972	29,195	28,764
Hispanic 84,443	**5,672**	**6,766**	**15,443**	**12,577**	**11,569**	**10,865**

Source: Statistical Abstract 1997, 142; persons of Hispanic origin may be of any race.

Table 44: Conditions of Housing Units, 1995 (1,000s)

	Tenure		Black		Hispanic	
Total Units	**Owner 63,544**	**Renter 34,150**	**Owner 5,137**	**Renter 6,637**	**Owner 3,245**	**Renter 4,512**
2 or More Living Rooms or Recreation Rooms	26,179	2,762	1,659	355	925	197
Signs of Rats in Last 3 Months	**2,219**	**1,489**	**230**	**555**	**193**	**463**
Holes in Floors	503	571	106	177	71	125
Exposed Wiring	**873**	**887**	**88**	**240**	**80**	**175**
Rooms Without Electric Outlet	891	925	130	269	44	147
Open Cracks or Holes	**1,943**	**2,584**	**356**	**750**	**168**	**426**

Source: Statistical Abstract 1997, 728, by householder characteristic

Reported AIDS cases have increased considerably for Blacks, more than doubling from 1981 to 1996. The same is true for Hispanics. In spite of the much smaller population size, Blacks have a higher absolute number of AIDS reported cases than Whites.

Employment data by occupation over a recent 13-year period show increasing numbers for females, Blacks and Hispanics in most job categories. There are no exceptionally large gains, but the trend lines move upward (except for Blacks in the farming category).

Educational attainment data over three-plus decades show substantial improvements, but a big gap persists by race and sex.



Table 45: Employed Civilians by Occupation, Gender, Race and Hispanic Origin

	Total Employed (1,000)	% of Total			Total Employed (1,000)	% of Total		
		Fem	Blk	Hisp		Fem	Blk	Hisp
Occupational Total	**100,834**	**43.7**	**9.3**	**5.3**	**126,708**	**46.2**	**10.7**	**9.2**
Managerial and Professional	23,592	40.9	5.6	2.6	36,497	48.6	7.4	4.5
Technical, Sales & Administrative Support	**31,265**	**64.6**	**7.6**	**4.3**	**37,683**	**64.2**	**10.3**	**7.6**
Service Occupations	13,857	60.1	16.6	6.8	17,177	59.4	17.2	13.7
Precision Production, Craft, and Repair	**12,328**	**8.1**	**6.8**	**6.2**	**13,587**	**9.0**	**7.9**	**11.0**
Operators, Fabricators and Laborers	16,091	26.6	14.0	8.3	18,197	24.4	15.3	14.3
Farming, Forestry and Fishing	**3,700**	**16.0**	**7.5**	**8.2**	**3,566**	**19.0**	**3.9**	**19.2**

Source: Statistical Abstract 1997, 410-412

Table 46: Educational Attainment by Race, Hispanic Origin and Gender

Year Completed 4 Years of of High School or More	White		Black		Hispanic	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
1960	**41.6**	**44.7**	**18.2**	**21.8**	**N/A**	**N/A**
1970	54.0	55.0	30.1	32.5	37.9	34.2
1980	**69.6**	**68.1**	**50.8**	**51.5**	**67.3**	**65.8**
1990	79.1	79.0	65.8	66.5	50.3	51.3
1996	**82.7**	**82.8**	**74.3**	**74.2**	**53.0**	**53.3**
Completed 4 Years of College or More						
1960	**10.3**	**6.0**	**2.8**	**3.3**	**N/A**	**N/A**
1970	14.4	8.4	4.2	4.6	7.8	4.3
1980	**21.3**	**13.3**	**8.4**	**8.3**	**9.4**	**6.0**
1990	25.3	19.0	11.9	10.8	9.8	8.7
1996	**26.9**	**21.8**	**12.4**	**14.6**	**10.3**	**8.3**

Source: Statistical Abstract 1997, 159. Percentage of persons 25 years old and over

Table 47: Earnings by Highest Degree Earned, 1996

Characteristic	Total Persons	Not a HS Graduate	HS Graduate	Some College	Associate's	Bachelor's	Master's	Profess'al
Mean Earnings (Dollars)								
All Persons	26,792	14,013	21,431	22,392	27,780	36,980	47,609	85,322
Age: 18-24 Years	10,173	6,837	11,376	8,852	13,774	16,145	22,770	20,262
25-34	23,956	13,742	20,243	21,422	24,288	31,658	37,033	50,019
35-44	31,949	17,313	23,926	28,347	31,230	42,056	51,184	111,026
45-54	34,914	17,197	25,661	32,761	32,238	44,115	54,508	93,517
55-64	30,949	18,692	24,766	29,065	33,474	45,055	44,443	89,158
65+	19,612	10,803	16,443	17,528	16,004	26,442	31,258	58,844
Sex: Male	33,251	16,748	26,333	28,458	33,881	46,111	58,302	101,730
Female	19,414	9,790	15,970	16,152	22,429	26,841	34,911	47,959
White	27,556	14,234	22,154	22,898	28.137	37,711	48,029	85,229
Male	34,276	17,032	27,467	29,206	34,286	47,016	58,817	100,856
Female	19,647	9,582	16,196	16,215	22,547	26,916	35,125	48,562
Black	20,537	12,956	17,072	20,275	26,818	29,666	38,294	(B)
Male	23,876	14,877	19,514	24,894	33,674	36,026	41,777	(B)
Female	17,485	10,739	14,473	16,627	22,113	25,577	35,222	(B)
Hispanic	18.262	13,068	18,333	18,903	23,406	30,602	36,633	(B)
Male	20,312	14,774	20,882	21,705	24,021	35,109	38,539	(B)
Female	15,310	9,809	14,989	15,699	22,883	25,338	33,390	(B)

Source: Statistical Abstract 1997, p. 160; persons of hispanic origin may be of any race. (B) Base figure too small to meet statistical standards for reliability of derived figure; for persons over 18 years old and over with earnings, persons as of March; earnings for prior year.

Clearly, there is a positive correlation between education and earnings, but where level of education is constant, Whites earn more than Blacks or Hispanics. Interestingly, as for females, race/ethnicity shows little difference in earnings. This is decidedly not the case with males, where White males at all levels outearn Black and Hispanic males.

Table 48: Money Income of Families - Percent Distribution by Income Level, Race and Hispanic Origin in Constant 1995 Dollars, 1970-1995

Year	No. of Families (Thousands)	Under $10,000	$10-14,999	$15-24,999	$25-34,999	$35-49,999	$50-74,999	$75,000 +
All Families								
1970	52,227	7.7	6.7	15.4	18.0	25.4	19.0	8.8
1980	60,309	7.3	6.7	15.2	14.9	21.9	21.3	12.8
1985	63,558	8.3	6.4	14.7	14.6	19.8	20.8	15.5
1990	66,322	7.7	6.1	13.7	14.2	19.4	21.0	18.0
1992	68,216	8.8	6.5	14.4	14.3	18.5	20.6	16.8
1993	68,506	9.1	6.7	14.6	14.5	17.6	20.0	17.4
1994	69,313	8.5	6.7	14.6	14.1	17.9	20.0	18.3
1995	69,597	7.5	6.5	14.4	14.1	18.5	20.4	18.6
White								
1970	46,535	6.5	6.1	14.6	18.1	25.4	20.0	9.4
1980	52,710	5.8	5.9	14.5	15.1	22.7	22.4	13.8
1990	56,803	5.7	5.4	13.2	14.3	19.9	22.2	19.1
1994	58,444	6.6	6.0	14.2	14.2	18.4	21.0	19.6
1995	58,872	5.8	5.8	13.9	14.2	18.8	21.4	20.0
Black								
1970	4,928	18.6	12.6	23.0	16.9	16.5	9.8	2.6
1980	6,317	19.1	13.4	21.2	14.0	15.8	12.3	4.3
1990	7,471	21.4	11.2	17.5	13.7	15.6	12.8	7.8
1994	8,093	20.7	10.9	17.9	13.8	14.8	13.4	8.5
1995	8,055	19.4	10.9	18.3	14.3	15.9	13.3	8.0
Hispanic Origin								
1980	3,235	13.2	11.5	21.2	17.1	18.4	13.4	5.3

Source: Statistical Abstract 1997; percent of active workforce

The gap between Whites, Blacks and Hispanics in family income remains substantial. The percentage of Black families earning between $10,000 and $49,000 has dropped, while the percentage earning $50,000 and over has increased. The difference in family median income among Whites, Blacks and Hispanics is still in the double-digits.

Table 49: Unemployment Rates by Education, Race and Hispanic Origin

Year	Total	Less Than HS Diploma	High School Graduate	Less Than Bachelors	College Graduate
Total	%	%	%	%	%
1992	5.7	11.4	6.5	5.3	2.5
1994	5.4	12.4	6.2	4.7	2.9
1995	4.4	8.6	4.6	4.5	2.4
1996	4.1	10.7	4.4	3.8	2.1
White					
1992	6.0	12.9	6.8	5.3	2.7
1993	5.8	12.4	6.5	5.0	3.1
1994	5.2	11.7	5.8	4.5	2.6
1996	4.2	10.2	4.6	3.7	2.1
Black					
1992	12.4	17.2	14.1	10.7	4.8
1994	10.6	14.4	12.2	8.3	4.9
1995	7.7	13.7	8.4	6.3	4.1
1996	8.9	15.3	10.8	6.9	3.3
Hispanic					
1992	9.8	13.6	9.6	5.9	4.2
1994	9.7	13.4	8.3	7.2	5.2
1995	8.0	10.9	8.1	5.2	3.7
1996	8.5	12.3	7.3	5.7	4.0

Source: Statistical Abstract 1997, percent of active workforce

One of the most encouraging developments in recent years has been the steady decline in unemployment rates for Blacks and women.

Since publication of the official report in Table 49, more positive information has been released. By the end of 1998, the U.S. Department of Labor reported the unemployment rate for African Americans reached an all-time low of 7.9 percent. A combination of factors has contributed to this: overall expanding economy, greater job skills and educational training of Blacks, and enforcement of anti-discrimination laws on employment and voluntary implementation of fair employment practices by private industries and public agencies.

Table 50: Homicide Rate by Race and Sex, 1970-1994

		White		Black	
Year	Total	Male	Female	Male	Female
1970	8.3	6.8	2.1	67.6	13.3
1980	10.7	10.9	3.2	66.6	13.5
1981	10.3	10.4	3.1	64.8	12.7
1982	9.6	9.6	3.1	59.1	12.0
1983	8.6	8.6	2.8	51.4	11.3
1984	8.4	8.3	2.9	48.7	11.2
1985	8.3	8.2	2.9	48.4	11.0
1986	9.0	8.6	3.0	55.0	12.1
1987	8.7	7.9	3.0	53.3	12.6
1988	9.0	7.9	2.9	58.9	13.2
1989	9.2	8.2	2.8	61.1	12.9
1990	10.0	9.0	2.8	69.2	13.5
1991	10.5	9.3	3.0	72.0	14.2
1992	10.0	9.1	2.8	67.5	13.1
1993	10.1	8.6	3.0	69.7	13.6
1994	9.6	8.5	2.6	65.1	12.4

Source: Statistical Abstract, 1997, 204; victim rates per 100,000 resident population in specified group

Crime, the criminal justice system, and the racial breakdown of victims and inmates are all disturbing parts of any project examining racism in the United States. There can never be any semblance of "e pluribus unum" as long as criminal statistics and the law enforcement system reflect any bias based on race. Blacks, as the data show, are clearly in a distressed situation.

A government report in 1998 concluded:

Blacks represented 43 percent of arrests, 54 percent of convictions, and 59 percent of prison admissions for violent crimes in 1994, indicating that arrested blacks are more likely to be convicted, and convicted blacks are more likely to be imprisoned, compared with whites.[21]

The homicide rate for Black males (per 100,000) was 65.1 in 1994. The numbers in Table 50 are ominous, to say the least.

The death penalty is a volatile issue in American society, infused with moral arguments (pro and con) and racial overtones. Some opponents who do not raise the immorality point (i.e., it is morally wrong for the government to take a person's life as punishment) argue that Blacks have been disproportionately subject to death by state execution because of a racist law enforcement system. This argument pervades discussions of the discriminatory nature of the criminal justice system. It points to evidence of "racial profiling" whereby law enforcement officers operating on stereotypical prejudices tend to stop, search and arrest Blacks (for suspicion of creating a crime or resembling the profile of wanted criminals) more so than Whites. Denied as a prevalent practice for some time, more recently state and local authorities are candidly admitting that such behavior is more prevalent among law enforcement officials than previously admitted.[22]

Recent trends in the struggle against racial discrimination are characterized by increased pronouncements from virtually all quarters condemning such practices but growing difficulties in the evidence needed to prove that such practices still exist. It takes rather concrete evidence or outright admission to finally convince authorities of a serious problem. To be sure, there is no socially acceptable defense today of blatant racism or discriminatory acts. But when civil rights advocates attempt to establish the existence of discrimination and seek remedies to alleviate such practice, they are met with increasingly high standards of proof of actual harm experienced by identifiable individuals. At the same time, there is a clear trend away from according legitimacy to the lingering effects (legacy) of past discrimination. To establish such a connection, more than a historical account of the past frequently is necessary. In fact, it is very likely that such accounts will be met with unapologetic concession accompanied by an admonition that the legacy of a racist past is not relevant for future action.

No clearer illustration of this is found than in the words of former U.S. Sen. Allan Simpson (R-Wyo). The occasion was a Senate confirmation hearing in 1987 on Judge Robert H. Bork. President Ronald Reagan had nominated Bork for appointment as Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Bork's judicial and scholarly record did not please civil rights advocates, who strongly testified against his confirmation. One witness, Professor John Hope Franklin,[23] gave a concise history of racial segregation and discrimination laws since World War II (including his own experiences in being forced to use segregated trains traveling interstate). He noted how Bork had been on the opposite side of legal struggles against a de jure segregated system. Such a past record, according to Franklin and many others, should disqualify Bork from a seat on the highest Court of the land. But Simpson, a Bork supporter, was not convinced. While complimenting Professor Franklin on his "eloquent" presentation, ("You make the Constitution live for your students. There's no question about that.

I'm certain of that.") he made it clear that he did not see the relevance of that historical lesson to the task at hand. He stated:

> *The issue is that was a different time. Indeed, it was. So that's the way it is. And the extraordinary poignancy of your remarks, and the story about going back to the Negro coach, those things happened. ... If we are going to feel guilt about what we did in this country in 1964, we'll never get anywhere in this country. ... How long are we going to pick old scabs in this country? It stalls us from progress. Those things happened. They were repugnant. They were repulsive. We've made tremendous strides.*[24]

This clearly reflects the thinking of more than a small segment of the society on how it intends not to hold itself accountable for past racism. (This sentiment is reminiscent of the argument made in the 1960s against Whitney Young's Domestic Marshall Plan discussed earlier.)

The very vocabulary of popular political discourse is further evidence of a conservative mood.

The trend today is to treat the use of race as an allowable policy concern only after "strict scrutiny" reveals there is no other way to remedy the complaint, and if it can be shown there is a compelling state interest to be served by using racial classification. Neither should one assume that arguments pushing for "diversity"—in the workplace, in schools, in neighborhood housing—will necessarily be accepted as meeting the "compelling state interest" test.

There is also a trend toward permitting states to exercise more power, especially regarding "social programs," and removing the federal government as much as possible from responsibility. The importance of this trend lies in the fact that civil rights forces have historically relied on national government, not the states, in the battle for racial justice and economic opportunity. "States' Rights" have traditionally meant that some states (especially earlier in the South) would be less receptive to calls for racial justice. With pressing economic issues facing African Americans, there is little cause for optimism from many other states and regions in dealing not only with race but with social welfare issues.

The current trend toward "devolution" of more power and responsibility to state/local levels would suggest that Blacks will have a more difficult time convincing their non-urban state legislatures to respond to their needs of justice and opportunity. In competition with each other for resources, states inevitably seek to attract industries of economic growth. Therefore, they want to provide as low a tax base as possible, which means less state expenditures for health, welfare and even education for the state poor and needy. States are concerned about giving tax rebates and other infrastructural incentives, and these matters take priority in the long run. Some states are more affluent than others and will deal with these problems more easily. However, the nature of interstate competitiveness does not augur well for how the least among state citizens will have a reasonable advantage in their bid for state resources. In this regard, the "devolution" trend is an ominous one.

A third element, flowing from the second, is a decided conservative mood. (Less national government involvement is part of this trend.) More reliance on market forces and private self-help efforts are also aspects of this trend. An important dimension is a much more visible, if not discernibly larger, cadre of Black conservative voices challenging the pre-eminence of traditional civil rights advocates. These voices have always been around, but they are more voluble today and are accorded more public attention. They take positions against affirmative action and favor privatized solutions (for example, school vouchers and even privatizing Social Security), fewer government programs for alleviating poverty and unfettered market economy measures.

Like their White counterparts, Black conservatives are not a monolithic voice, but they take positions that directly challenge the views of traditional civil rights advocates on both anti-discrimination remedies and efforts to provide economic opportunity. While Black conservatives by no means voice the majority sentiment in Black communities—as consistently demonstrated by voting behavior and opinion polls—their views nonetheless provide a strong counter to the traditional ideological stance of civil rights advocates.[25] Such voices operate to legitimize a White majority conservative mood. Although they hardly represent more than 10 percent of Black voters nationally, they still keep conservative hope alive that more Blacks will hear and heed their arguments and join them.

Again, their main utility lies not in a broad base among the Black masses, but in the credence they give White conservatives. Now, the latter can have less fear of being branded racist if Black conservatives have agreed with them. This imputation of legitimacy extends to race issues and to economic policy. But it is the latter area that is especially significant to the ideological conservatives. The race issue (affirmative action, mainly) is not as important as the fundamental principles of a maximum market economy unburdened by government regulation. Race relations, as will be noted later, is simply not a top priority on the national agenda, voluminous public pronouncements notwithstanding. But control and direction of the economy is and always will be the central concern. To have prominent African Americans (members of a minority group with obvious economic disadvantages) articulating strong antistatist, pro capitalist views reaffirms the conservative stance– among Whites, who after, all are in the majority.

The very vocabulary of popular political discourse is further evidence of a conservative mood. One of the most insidious terms to slip into social relations dialogue is "politically correct." If one demonstrates by word or deed sensitivity to racial, ethnic, gender, or physical identities and disabilities, one is being "politically correct." Frequently, this has the pejorative implication of overreacting or responding to a "fad," done only to curry favor from a special group. The sensitivity is seen as pandering, much as a politician does for voter support. Why such demonstrated sensitivity is labeled "politically" correct– instead of being perceived as acting responsibly civil in a multiracial, ethnic, plural society– is seldom, if ever, raised.

Yet we know that language, words and images are important in mass societies. This is particularly true in political democracies where appeals to voters must be made. Political office seekers today virtually eschew the "L" word– liberal– and have no hesitancy in labeling themselves as some form of "conservative": fiscal conservative, compassionate conservative, pragmatic conservative, fiscal conservative/social moderate, etc. Since the Ronald Reagan years of the 1980s, the ideological pendulum has moved, if not to the far right, to a more moderate/centrist/conservative position. Such perceptions are frequently documented not only in opinion surveys but in careful analyses of voting records of Congressional members by various national interest groups and the ratings those groups, liberal and conservative, give the legislators for home district consumption. Of course, they take as their reference base the peak years of civil rights and socioeconomic activism of the 1960s. Then, especially under President Johnson, the country experienced its last days of political liberalism– The Great Society. (In actual terms, as noted earlier, it was a rather short period from 1963 to 1968, with the decline beginning in 1967.) Those years are gone, and even President Clinton proclaimed "the end of big government" in his 1995 State of the Union Address.

Thus the conservative mood today essentially means little likelihood for consideration of a "full employment" bill, universal health care for all, or serious federal resources for strapped local school districts. Where public sector budgets show a surplus, conservatives opt to cut taxes rather than increase expenditures for the needy. Any serious conversation about the future struggle against current racism and its legacy in the United States, along with expanding economic opportunity, must be conducted in the context of a society that basically prefers its national government to be less, not more, active in socioeconomic matters. And if these topics are raised when the private sector economy is performing well for a vast number of ordinary, working class people, one will find how quickly the conversation can become muted.

Opportunities and Strategies

In such an environment, one would be justified in having little optimism about great leaps forward in the near term. And yet, the United States is a fortunate country. Even though it has not achieved the 'e pluribus unum' to which it aspires, the country in 1999 enjoys a decidedly more optimistic mood among Black Americans than one might expect. This suggests that Blacks might well be more realistic about the present and future on racial matters than even some Whites. (This point will be covered in the concluding section.) Except in rare episodic moments, the American system seldom responds other than in slow, prodding, incremental ways. In a sense, the 1960s spoiled many liberals by leading them to feel that decade would become the rule (in terms of the pace and direction of race and race relations, at least) rather than the exception. Another incontrovertible fact is that certain absolutely crucial things did happen and societal attitudes underwent fundamental changes. Most politicians can no longer engage in the kind of race-baiting politics that supported American apartheid in an earlier time. In 1999, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R–Miss.) was put in the awkward position of having to explain his association with Council of Conservative Citizens. The national organization is an outgrowth of the old pro-segregation White Citizens Council formed in the 1950s to resist school desegregation. Now, at least, prominent politicians must seek to distance themselves from such associations and are forced to give tortured explanations denying agreement with many of the groups' more outspoken racist views.[26] Likewise, corporations can no longer openly defy laws on equal employment practices. Real estate agents must now be most clever and inventive in practicing racial discrimination in the sale and rental housing markets. Without question, many are up to the task, but now at least the efforts have to be made on penalty of legal repercussions.

What Are Some Opportunities?

According to a scientific study conducted by the Southern Regional Council (SRC) in 1996, a majority of Americans are, in fact, receptive to certain efforts to reduce racial inequality. But they are also concerned about the costs of government programs to achieve this goal. The report was candid in pointing out that racial inequality was not an issue uppermost in the minds of most White Americans.[27] "It found significant White support for such measures as more resources for education, strong enforcement of anti-discrimination laws, and even affirmative action where "quotas" or "preferential treatment" were not part of the equation. Part of the problem, the report concluded, was confusion over the meaning of "affirmative action." And if more time was spent educating the public in this regard, positive results might be forthcoming. Likewise, there was genuine hope that liberal forces could be mobilized around an enlightened race relations agenda.

Importantly, the SRC report concluded:

> *Americans are more supportive of public policies designed to offer help based on economic status than those targeted at racial minorities. This class versus race edge prevails regarding government spending priorities, affirmative action programs, and general policies to improve socio-economic conditions.* [28]

This report is essentially encouraging, but there are important cautionary observations. First, the fact that "class" has an edge over "race" as an approach is not a revelation to long-struggling civil rights groups.[29] Those groups have always understood the political problems of raising the race issue in American policy-making. Thus, going back to the New Deal, they supported "universal" social programs fully aware that many Blacks would not benefit from those programs on a nondiscriminatory basis, but they compromised and did not raise this race issue in many instances. They adopted a Social Welfare Agenda that clearly recognized the social and political wisdom of such a strategy. Therefore, they supported "full employment" even though they knew this did not mean "fair employment." They supported universal health care for all, even though they knew that health care would be allocated on a discriminatory and segregated basis.

The same was true with public housing legislation and educational resources, such as teacher salaries. Fighting these realities meant a continued, vigilant "Civil Rights Agenda." That is, the struggle to obtain "fair" (non-discriminatory) employment should not be abandoned; it simply was not politically wise to link it to the effort to obtain "full" employment. Thus, a "dual agenda" strategy had to be pursued, and over the years this very fact of race, racism, and race relations in the United States has characterized the civil rights struggle. Very often, civil rights groups were advised not to raise the race issue out of fear of losing broader support for class issues. At times, they followed this advice and strategy but at a cost. Importantly, the civil rights forces tried repeatedly to seek allies among the White liberal forces. They were sometimes successful but often were rebuffed precisely because of the preference of class over race.

Only the brief, liberal burst of activism in the 1960s saw a breakthrough that provided the opportunity for important gains on both agendas simultaneously. In other words, the SRC finding of preference for class over race in the 1990s is an old story known all too well to civil rights groups faced with hard political realities. And as the report honestly records, these realities are no less important now as they were decades ago. The opportunity today, however, lies in the fact that there are anti-discrimination laws in place. Now, a decision does not have to be made between advocating one agenda at the political expense of the other. There can be a political campaign for "universal" social policies, which, if enacted, cannot legally discriminate. And there can be simultaneously vigorous efforts to overcome de facto discrimination. Theoretically, the two struggles ought not be in conflict, but there is an additional political caveat here that will be explained in the concluding section.

There can be a political campaign for "universal" social policies, which, if enacted, cannot legally discriminate.

The data in the SRC report (and it is not the only encouraging one) have to be understood in another important political context. Aggregate national survey results can (and do) show encouraging possibilities for liberal policy-making. But the decision-making institutions in the United States are far more complex entities. Congress, for instance, is composed of 435 separate House of Representative districts and 50 Senate seats (two per state). Legislators listen as often as not to their distinct and locally based constituents, who, in fact, elect them to national office and to whom they are beholden for tenure. Built-in checks and balances in the governmental process complicate policy-making even more. No one political institution (the House of Representatives, the Senate or the Presidency) can act without the concurrence of the others or only on certain occasions with a "super," two-thirds majority vote.

This system of internal controls and checks was put in place at the drafting of the U.S. Constitution in 1787. The purpose was to limit the likelihood of a tyrannical majority. In addition, intricate rules of policy-making give considerable power to entrenched, resourceful interest groups. A process of bargaining, negotiating and compromise is the rule. Survey data cannot capture all the intricacies involved in moving an issue from general agreement to final outcome. What happens in the final stage when vested interests (that might well not represent a national majority view) craft a final piece of legislation may not look anything like survey results in a national poll– which understandably cannot probe and reflect all the vital interests sitting at the table determining what the legislation ultimately will be.

This is a frustrating aspect of American politics in a federalist, pluralist system, but it is the way Americans define and pursue their version of political democracy. National survey respondents are not at the bargaining table. Less visible, but more powerful, numerically smaller interests are. But this conclusion does not counsel giving up on efforts to build broad opinion support. It is simply an admonition that American democratic politics involves much more in pluralist policy-making than meets the eye– or gets reflected in an opinion survey.

Another recent phenomenon demonstrating changing times and the conundrum of race and democratic politics involved the reelection of a Black Democratic Congressman from a predominantly White district in Georgia. (This also illustrates some of the substantive policy accommodations that have to be made to be "successful" in the electoral arena.) U.S. Rep. Sanford D. Bishop Jr. previously represented a predominantly Black constituency until Congressional district lines were redrawn. Now he represents Georgia's 2nd Congressional District in southwest Georgia. The population is 60 percent White, 39 percent Black, and 1 percent other. Per capita income is $12,602 for Whites and $5,529 for Blacks. Twelve percent of Whites and 43 percent of Blacks live below the poverty line. Seventy-one percent of White adults over 25 years of age have a high school degree compared with 44 percent of Blacks. In this setting, some were apprehensive that Whites would not vote for this NAACP veteran of the Civil Rights Movement who was an admirer of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. But they did. Bishop beat his White Republican opponent by 57 percent to 43 percent in 1998.

To some observers, this proved that Whites in a Southern state with a long history of segregation and discrimination could set aside race and vote on other basis. It was proof that Congressional districts need not be drawn to favor Blacks. White support validated the legal and political arguments that it was not necessary to create minority/majority districts to get Blacks elected to Congress. White voters could rise above racial prejudice after all. As one citizen stated: "Sanford actually represents people without regard to race, and when he does that people forget his race."[30] But there is more to the story. Bishop was doing what American politicians are at times required to do to get elected. He changed his views to appeal to the majority in his district. One reporter wrote:

> *Mr. Bishop has earned the fealty of white constituents through his aggressive advocacy for federal farm programs, balanced budgets, welfare reform, school prayer and gun ownership. To suit his district, he has switched positions on issues like the assault weapons ban, which he first supported and later opposed. He advertises himself as a conservative and reinforced that claim by becoming the only black member of the right leaning Democratic caucus known as the Blue Dogs.*[31]

In the racial head count in Congress, official records accurately show a Black Congressman occupying the seat from Georgia's 2nd Congressional District. It remains to be seen, given the economic disparities between Whites and Blacks in his district, whether the latter will benefit in any significant way from his holding office. In the final analysis, the Representative's concrete stand on policy issues will tell whether the "color blind" political action of his White supporters translates into economic benefits for masses of his Black constituents as well as Whites. In this instance, being "color blind" for one group of voters could result in negative economic consequences for another group. No one will ever have to mention race overtly to explain this result. They simply will be politicians in a democratic society doing the will of a majority of constituents.

Are There Promising Strategies?

There are hardly any eureka-type revelations here. There is no hidden silver bullet that, if only discovered, would end racism with neat dispatch. America has been at this process and these issues for quite some time. But times do change. It is difficult to foresee the importance of a new international dimension intruding to facilitate positive change as was seen with World War II and the Cold War. Neither is a "crisis" (a widespread economic depression or a burst of mass 1960s-style protests) likely to serve as a catalyst for moving the lack of popular concern or low priority of race to a much higher position on the public agenda. Certainly not in the near term.

The more effective strategies will likely include (as unsatisfying and relatively unrewarding as these might seem) more of the same tedious efforts at coalition building, taking advantage of the egalitarian ethos (as opposed to an earlier permissive race-baiting atmosphere). In the legal realm, the Civil Rights Movement has developed its longest and most substantively adept leadership strategies, which remain promising. They lie not so much in constitutional or statutory interpretation but in the realm of acceptable proof of existing discrimination. Given the covert, subtle nature of much discrimination, this means careful gathering of evidence leading to hard-to-refute allegations.

One approach is described as "auditing research."[32] Teams of job applicants or housing seekers are sent to answer ads: a Black team and a White team. The White team follows the Black team. Results have shown clear instances where the minorities have been denied at much higher rates than Whites. These experiments have been criticized on methodological and ethical grounds, but their results have been quite useful in exposing the racism lying comfortably beneath the surface in American society. Perfecting these strategies for use in law enforcement should be a major priority. Once discrimination is established, the penalties (revocation of licenses, stiff fines, publication of abuses) should be as stringent as possible to match the rhetoric of public indignation at continued discrimination. Weak punishment will be of little, if any, value and might well aggravate the problem because it would provide a relatively painless, permissive way to continue old behavior. Another approach could involve a carefully constructed argument to demonstrate the ingenious nature of the "color-blind" stance. Here, instances such as Georgia's 2nd Congressional district could serve to pierce the defense that race is not involved in otherwise seemingly acceptable political behavior. This is very difficult, since racial discrimination and not poor economic condition per se is constitutionally prohibited. But if a relationship can be established between race, economic condition and representative conduct, the "strict scrutiny" test might be met. There are no certainties here, but social scientists, economists and lawyers ought to explore this territory. There is more to the vagaries of this subject than the simplistic, misleading sobriquet for justice called "color blindness." Considerable evidence will turn up regarding "auditing research" and the race/economic areas. The point is to persuade decision-makers (legislators and jurists) of the probative value of this evidence.

Conclusion: "E Pluribus Justitia"

At the beginning of the preceding section, reference was made to encouraging signs of an optimistic mood among Blacks in the United States. Given the constant public exposure of conditions and incidents with racist implications– racially motivated crimes, educational achievement gaps, episodic flare-ups in the criminal justice system and

Table 51: What Do You Think Is the Single Most Important Problem Facing the Country Today (1998)?

	Population		
	Black %	White %	General %
Topic			
Crime, Violence, Drugs	21.7	10.3	11.7
Employment (Jobs, Good-paying Jobs, Poverty, Homelessness)	17.3	5.8	7.6
Education	15.7	17.2	15.8
Moral Crisis (Morals, Family Values, Clinton Scandal)	10.2	20.6	19.4
Economy	8.4	9.8	11.6
Health Care	7.6	6.3	5.5
World Affairs (Foreign Policy, Terrorism, World Economy, Lack of Leadership	5.2	16.9	16.0
Race Relations	3.8	0.8	0.8
None/Don't Know	10.4	11.3	11.9
Numbers Surveyed *** Includes 94 Blacks**	850	709	850*

Source: Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, Public Opinion 1998: Political Atitudes by David Bositis, October 1998.

blatant discriminatory acts by corporate and public officials– a recent survey by the major think tank devoted to African American interests, the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, should be of interest to policy makers.

Table 51 shows Blacks and Whites still differ significantly on the single most important problem facing the country in 1998. The most troubling topics: crime, violence and drugs among 21.7 percent of Blacks (compared with 10.3 percent of Whites) versus the moral crisis for 20.6 percent of Whites (compared with 10.2 percent of Blacks). While a big gap exists between the races on "race relations," this problem ranks low on the list of concerns for both groups. Unfortunately, the survey gives no information specifying the meaning of "race relations," as was done with some other broad categorical topics.

In Table 52, the survey noted that for the first time in a Joint Center survey, Blacks responded more favorably than the general population when asked whether they are financially better or worse off than a year ago. It is interesting that younger Blacks (18–25; 26–35) show very high "better" response percentages over "same." Only among those

Table 52: Would You Say That Your Are Financially Better Off, Worse Off, or About the Same Now As You Were a Year Ago?

	Black Population					General Population		
	Better %	Same %	Worse %	D/K %	(N)	Better %	Same %	Worse %
Total	51.0	38.0	9.2	1.8	850	36.5	47.1	1
White	-	-	-	-	-	31.5	50.9	1
Men	49.0	37.3	13.7	-	400	37.4	42.0	2
Women	52.7	38.7	5.2	3.4	450	35.6	50.8	1
18-25 Years	46.9	29.5	19.3	4.3	127	43.8	30.3	2
26-35	65.3	27.3	6.8	0.5	168	49.4	45.2	
36-50	47.4	40.8	11.8	-	257	38.5	41.2	2
51-64	36.6	55.0	4.3	4.1	175	31.3	47.0	2
65+	77.7	21.0	1.3	-	88	16.4	75.9	
Northeast	57.1	31.9	6.9	4.1	153	40.1	49.4	1
Midwest	43.5	46.5	9.5	0.6	156	33.2	48.8	1
South	50.8	37.1	10.3	1.8	452	36.5	49.0	1
West	54.3	38.8	6.9	-	88	36.7	39.5	2
Liberal	55.0	36.0	6.9	2.2	333	42.8	36.7	2
Moderate	46.6	44.7	10.7	-	354	41.6	47.5	1
Secular Conservative	7.6	58.0	34.4	-	24	34.8	41.7	2
Christian Conservative	70.3	27.8	2.0	-	115	22.4	65.8	1
Less Than HS	43.1	47.1	9.8	-	97	23.5	52.9	2
HS Graduate	54.5	31.8	10.8	2.9	277	36.0	40.4	2
Some College/Tech	53.3	41.8	5.0	-	184	34.7	54.4	1
College Degree +	49.2	40.5	7.5	2.8	259	38.7	46.7	1
Less Than $15,000	16.9	59.9	23.2	-	75	17.8	35.6	4
$15-35,000	51.9	48.1	-	-	129	36.3	53.5	1

Source: Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, Public Opinion 1998: Political Attitudes by David Bositis, October 1998

51–64 years is there a smaller percentage of "better" to "same." Note also the responses by income category. Only the lowest (less than $15,000) and the $75,000–$90,000 register higher for "same" over "better." Given the importance of education, the educational cohorts in this table should be monitored carefully. In fact, in light of the relative economic boom in the country, these data suggest that Blacks in 16 demographic categories perceive themselves doing "better" than the previous year and doing the "same" in seven categories. Whereas, for the general population, the numbers are five (better) and 18 (same.)

Such results, then, should lead one not to be too surprised about the result revealed in Table 53. A majority of Blacks (51.0 percent) feel the country is going in the right direction. But only 43.3 percent of the general population share this view. The demographic categories for Blacks indicate a general consensus on this view, with only six categories registering a negative feeling: 18–25 years, 36–50 years, secular conservatives by the widest margin, less than $15,000 or $75,000–$90,000 by substantial margin, and more than $90,000. Thus, the poorest and the most affluent Blacks are inclined to view the country as going in the wrong direction.

Table 53: Do You Feel Things In the Country Are Generally Going In the Right Direction, Or Do You Feel Things have Pretty Seriously Gotten Off On the Wrong Track?

	Black Population				General Population			
	Right Direction %	Wrong Track %	D/K %	(N)	Right Direction %	Wrong Track %	D/K %	(N)
Total	51.0	42.3	6.7	850	46.0	46.1	7.9	850
White	-	-	-	-	43.3	48.5	8.2	709
Men	51.3	44.2	4.6	400	51.9	42.5	5.6	412
Women	50.7	40.7	8.6	450	40.4	49.5	10.0	438
18-25 Years	43.3	54.4	2.3	127	44.9	43.8	11.2	89
26-35	51.3	44.4	4.3	168	42.2	48.2	9.6	166
36-50	44.5	46.0	9.5	257	50.5	44.9	4.7	301
51-64	57.2	30.0	12.8	175	41.6	49.4	9.0	166
65+	77.5	22.5	-	88	49.1	43.1	7.8	116
Northeast	47.5	41.5	11.1	153	50.0	42.4	6.4	172
Midwest	50.1	40.4	9.5	156	51.2	45.4	6.3	205
South	51.5	43.7	4.8	452	48.3	50.0	6.8	296
West	55.8	40.1	4.1	88	43.2	44.1	13.0	177
Liberal	50.3	37.4	12.3	333	52.8	31.9	15.3	229
Moderate	54.5	43.2	2.3	354	43.1	50.2	6.7	255
Secular Conservative	19.3	80.7	-	24	61.4	37.1	1.5	132
Christian Conservative	52.5	47.5	-	115	37.2	56.1	6.6	196
Less Than HS	81.8	18.2	-	97	39.2	43.1	17.6	51
HS Graduate	46.7	44.1	9.2	277	36.4	57.0	6.6	228
Some College/Tech	45.4	42.4	12.2	184	53.1	40.6	6.3	239
College Degree +	48.7	47.8	3.5	259	48.3	45.4	6.3	315
Less Than $15,000	45.6	54.4	-	75	24.4	66.7	8.9	45
$15-35,000	56.5	30.8	12.6	129	45.2	52.2	2.5	157

Source: Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. Public Opinion 1998: Political Attitudes by David Bositis, October 1998.

On balance, one should be encouraged by these opinion data, even though survey experts point out that such results are at best snapshots at a particular moment and can be countermanded by new, negative events. While they indicate wide racial differences in some instances, they do not augur dire omens against continued progress and consequential optimism. In fact, the opposite could be gleaned from the data. Namely, with persistent diligent pursuit of both the Civil Rights Agenda and the Social Welfare/Economic Agenda, more positive results could be forthcoming in a reasonable time. One must always add here the absolute importance of a continuing healthy, growing economy.

Little has been said in this essay about the impact of immigration on the topic of racism in America. But this is a development that must be recognized and used.

Immigration of non-European groups, particularly Hispanic and Asian, will continue at great rates. This will obviously have consequences for the indigenous American population. It always has. But now and in the future, these new immigrants will be vibrant competitors in the economic market. Unlike an earlier time, they cannot be subjugated, discriminated against or legally exploited. They will further challenge the goal of "e pluribus unum" and they ought to be allies for any coalitions aimed at vigorous enforcement of anti-discrimination laws. All groups must be protected. These newer immigrants will less likely be persuaded to shed their cultural habits and "assimilate," if only because the old "melting pot" thesis has, fortunately, been discredited. The "unum" envisioned is not necessarily one ultimate homogeneous cultural canvas but a situation where many groups can live respectfully not as "one" but in "justice." More vibrant, truly competitive immigrant groups could contribute to the development of a more cosmopolitan society.

So much of America's coming to grips with its Achilles' heel is factored through the prism of anguish, fear and guilt regarding the country's history of slavery and sanction of segregation, its treatment of indigenous peoples who were already here and its earlier racist/exclusionist immigration laws. Newer, added groups arriving on different terms should help the country transform itself into a truly international beacon– truly unprecedented in modern history– where many different peoples can live and prosper without the undemocratic and racist rules of an earlier time. Of course, as racial, ethnic and gender barriers fall, the country will face with a totally new situation: for the first time in its history, all the citizens will have a chance to compete in a truly open and fair economic market. If increased immigration can speed this process, it will serve a historic purpose.

Finally, whatever the signs of a hopeful, optimistic mood among Blacks, a willingness by Whites to accept some class-based remedies, and, indeed, encouraging socioeconomic trends, one should not be sanguine that these phenomena will be self-fulfilling. A "truly open and fair economic market" will not emerge without conscious public initiatives not only to permit people to participate but to prepare them to do so. In this regard, the data on "Disturbing Developments" reported earlier should be given careful attention. The country is not yet at e pluribus unum.

Thus, one of the most important and difficult tasks is to stem the pendulum swing toward "less government" by continuing to make the argument for national responsibility. Whatever else is known about the story of America's engagement of these issues, this country has only progressed when the national community (especially through the lead of the national government) has been actively involved. This does not mean to the exclusion of state/local entities or the private sector. But the best vehicle for orchestrating and representing a collective will to deal with collective problems is a national democratic system. This is not an easy proposition to push at a time when there is less inclination to spend sufficient resources on new programs. It is certainly a difficult posture to take at a time of economic boom, and there is a mood to give more leeway (and less regulatory restrictions) to the private sector. Likewise, if the Joint Center survey data hold up, opponents of more activist government can point to the generally optimistic feelings of African Americans about the future. But these feelings should reflect a mood to build on, not to rest on. There are needy groups in the society that still suffer from racial and economic obstacles.

It has ever been the case that those who need public protection the most are those who have the least private resources to protect themselves and provide for their families. Whether on the civil rights front (struggle against racism) or on the social policy front (universal social programs), the country has not reached the stage where all its citizens are free to compete in the open market on anything resembling an equitable playing field.

Making this case and pursuing it vigorously remains the challenge.

END NOTES

[1] Samuel P. Huntington, *American Politics, The Promise of Disharmony*, (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1981), 27.

[2] Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *The Disuniting of America, Reflections on A Multicultural Society*, (Knoxville, TN: Whittle Books, 1991), 9.

[3] W.E.B. Du Bois, *Souls of Black Folk* (1903).

[4] See Nathan Glazer, *We Are All Multiculturalists Now* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997). "There were significant differences in the ways European immigrant groups assimilated. But there are orders of magnitude in difference. The differences between the rate of assimilation of Irish and Germans, or Italians and Jews become quite small when we contrast them with the differences over time between white European immigrants of any group and American blacks. These differences create different perspectives, on our historic past, on our present, on the shape of our culture" (155). And "… we also cannot ignore the remarkable and unique degree of separation between blacks and others. The caste characteristic still holds, and one evidence of it is either black or not– partial degrees of blackness, despite the reality of a very mixed genetic inheritance, will not be recognized, not by our Census, not by our society. We do not recognize partial or loose affiliation with the group, or none at all, for blacks, as we do for all other ethnic and racial groups" (158).

[5] Seeking an America as Good as Its Promise. Remedies for Racial Inequality. The Public's Views. (Atlanta, Ga.: Southern Regional Council, 1998), 15.

[6] See Gunnar Mydral, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1944). Writing more than 50 years ago and about the American South (no less applicable I would suggest today and about the entire country) Myrdal noted: "Criticisms and even factual statements should be phrased in such a manner that they do not 'offend' or create 'embarrassment.' I have come to understand how a whole system of moral escape has become polite form in the South. … This form is applicable even to scientific writings and, definitely, to public discussion and teaching on all levels. It is sometimes developed into an exquisite and absorbing art. … There is nearly common agreement in the South that reforms in interracial relations should be introduced with as little discussion about them as possible. It is a half-dormant, but easily awakened, beast. It is a complex which is irrational and uncontrollable, laden with emotions, and to be touched as little as possible" (36-37).

[7] One is tempted here to draw attention to the Brazilian preference, as described by the Nascimentos in this volume. That is, the preference, by some, to refer to "the social question" as opposed to "the racial question." Likewise, Wilmot James, in this volume, discusses the "reality" and "near-term inevitability" of racial consciousness in the South African context. There appears to be in that country a recognition of this stage of development, even if it is attacked as a "re-racialization" of South Africa. (The American equivalent response is "reverse discrimination.")

[8] This is a problem clearly common to all three countries in this project. But, in the United States, it is certainly one of political will to allocate existing sufficient resources, not so much whether the economy can afford the cost.

[9] Donna Cooper Hamilton and Charles V. Hamilton, *The Dual Agenda, The African American Struggle for Civil and Economic Equality* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 109.

[10] John Lewis with Michael D'Orso, *Walking with the Wind* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 13, 73-75, 82-87, 475.

[11] In 1966, a huge consortium of civil rights, liberal, labor, religious and a variety of civic-minded individuals signed what was called "The Freedom Budget for All Americans." Calling for $185 billion over a 10-year period, the economic plan represented the most idealistic and sincere thinking of the liberal community at that time about what was needed to achieve the "unum" the country had been espousing for centuries. It emphasized a full-employment economy, universal health care, full educational opportunity programs and much more. Many people observed that one important aspect of the plan was that it was "for all," not only for Black Americans. (In a sense, this grandiose proposal parallels The Freedom Charter issued by the ANC in South Africa several years earlier, at least in terms of hopes and aspirations.) Needless to say, the Freedom Budget received a polite but negative reception in the corridors of power in Washington, D.C. It was never really taken seriously.

[12] Whitney M. Young Jr., *To Be Equal* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964).

[13] Testimony of Whitney Young prepared for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, October 1967, LBJ Papers, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (LBJL), Executive SP/JL, box 48, University of Texas, Austin.

[14] *Time*, August 11, 1967.

[15] Kyle Haselden, "Should There Be Compensation for Negroes? No." *The New York Times Magazine*, October 8, 1963, 43.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. Memo from J. Edgar Hoover to the Assistant Attorney General, July 1, 1943.

[18] Walter White, "White Supremacy and World War II," *A Documentary History of the Negro People in the United States, 1933-1945*, Herbert A. Aptheker, ed., (The Citadel Press: Secaucus, N.J., 1974), 482-483.

[19] Letter from Dean Acheson to the Fair Employment Practice Committee, May 8, 1946. Cited in *To Secure These Rights, The Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1947), 146.

[20] See Hamilton and Hamilton, *The Dual Agenda, The African American Struggle for Civil and Economic Equality*.

[21] *Changing America, Indicators of Social and Economic Well Being, by Race and Hispanic Origin*, Council of Economic Advisers, for the President's Initiative on Race, September 1998, 51.

[22] See "Racial Profiling in New Jersey," *The New York Times*, April 22, 1999, A30. An investigation revealed "that 46 percent of those stopped by the police on a southern stretch of the Turnpike were black, even though only 13.5 percent of the motorists on that stretch were black. The new report found that although minority drivers made up less than half the motorists stopped, they represented 77 percent of those searched." The State of New Jersey indicted two officers accused of falsifying

the race of drivers they had stopped in an effort to cover up illegal targeting of minorities.

[23] Professor Franklin in 1997 was selected by President Bill Clinton to chair the President's Initiative on Race. Clinton's charge stated: "Today, I ask the American people to join me in a great national effort to perfect the promise of America for this new time as we seek to build our more perfect union. ... That is the unfinished work of our time, to lift the burden of race and redeem the promise of America." *New York Times*, June 14, 1997.

[24] Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate. First Session, 100th Congress, September 23, 1987, 736.

[25] See "A Collection of Views of Black Conservatives on Affirmative Action," *The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education*, Summer 1998, No. 20: 9 and Joseph G. Conti and Brad Stetson, Challenging the Civil Rights Establishment, Profiles of a New Black Vanguard, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993).

[26] John Kifner, "Lott, and Shadow of a Pro-White Group," *The New York Times*, January 14, 1999: A8. The senator initially stated that he had "no firsthand knowledge" of the organization's views, although he had addressed the group and met with the members. The senator's uncle called him an "honorary member." Predictably, Senator Lott issued a statement saying: "I have made my condemnation of the white supremacist and racist view of this group, or any group, clear. Any use of my name to publicize their view is not only unauthorized– it's wrong."

[27] Seeking an America as Good as Its Promise, Remedies for Racial Inequality, The Public's Views (Atlanta, Ga.: Southern Regional Council, 1998).

[28] Ibid., 15.

[29] See Hamilton and Hamilton, *The Dual Agenda, The African American Struggle for Civil and Economic Equality.*

[30] Kevin Sack, "In the Rural White South, Seeds of a Biracial Politics," *The New York Times*, December 30, 1998: A1.

[31] Ibid., A12.

[32] See Michael Fix and Raymond Struyk, eds., *Clear and Convincing Evidence* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1993); H. Cross, Employer Hiring Practices: Different Treatment of Hispanic and Anglo Job Seekers (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1990); James Heckman and Peter Siegelman, "The Urban Institute Audit Studies: Their Methods and Findings," Clear and Convincing Evidence; Marc Bendick, "Measuring Employment Discrimination Through Controlled Experiments," *The Review of Black Political Economy*, Summer, 1994: 25-48.

Truth and Reconciliation in America

By Ira Glasser

America's Original Sin

compared to the "heavy doom" of the African slaves. A colonial printer who was loyal to Great Britain attacked the hypocrisy. How could the rebels ground their rebellion in their professed love for liberty, he asked, and yet "themselves own two thousand Negro slaves?" There was no good answer to this question.

The contradiction may have become impossible to ignore, but it was not resolved. In the end, it was tolerated. Thomas Jefferson wrote that "the abolition of domestic slavery is the great object of desire," but he owned slaves himself and took no serious steps to outlaw the slave trade even when he was president. Patrick Henry, the fiery Anti-Federalist who refused to accept the original Constitution without a bill of rights, wrote that he looked forward to a time "when an opportunity will be offered to abolish this lamentable evil." But that time would have to wait because, Henry said, "the general inconvenience of living here without them" made freeing the slaves impractical.

And so the great 18th-century apostles of American liberty came to tolerate the greatest possible denial of liberty in their midst. The contradictions were left unresolved, and the inhuman denials of liberty based on skin color became imbedded in American culture. The Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, was written in linguistic denial: the word "race" appeared nowhere in the original documents; neither did the word "slavery." Like the Declaration, the Bill of Rights was written in broad language that appeared to exclude no one. But it was well understood that in fact there was a race exception to the Constitution, and it endured for most of the two centuries that followed.

Like a cancer, the fiction that skin color is a proxy for talent, character, intelligence, and humanity spread throughout the body politic . . .

It is important to understand that African slaves and their descendants were denied not only the fundamental rights of free speech, freedom of religion, trial by jury and other rights protected by the Bill of Rights. Nor was their condition merely one of peonage or economic servitude. No, the bondage in which Blacks found themselves in the American South was, beyond denial, deeply dehumanizing. For in America, where it was universally believed that all human beings are born with rights that no government could legitimately take away, American slavery could be legitimized only by regarding the slaves as subhuman. In fact, dominant White culture systematically denied the humanity of Blacks. Under the "slave codes" that controlled every aspect of their lives, slaves had no access to the rule of law. They could not go to court, make contracts, nor own any property– not even highly personal items. A slave could not strike a White person, even in self-defense. Rape was common, and the rape of an enslaved woman by someone other than her owner was considered trespassing upon a White man's property, rather than a criminal assault upon a human being.

No notion of fairness or due process of law diluted the harshness of these codes, which were mercilessly enforced by slave tribunals whose procedures made the old English Star Chamber seem a model of fairness. And the tribunals were not the only means of enforcement: terrorist night patrols; public ceremonies of humiliation and torture, such as whipping, branding, and even boiling in oil; imprisonment without trial under conditions even more painful than slavery itself; and death by hanging– all were pervasive features of life in the American South. Hundreds of desperate rebellions took place, undoubtedly many more than history has recorded, but few participants survived. Against all this, the Bill of Rights offered no shelter. Politics and racism became reified in the American culture and, from the beginning, overcame law and right.

Even worse, the fiction that skin color matters, that it is a legitimate distinction among people, that it signifies a lesser degree of humanity, was created and maintained. Over the years, that fiction became embedded in our social and political structures. It established and nourished sharp limits on opportunity and therefore on achievement. Differential levels of achievement in employment, education, and politics– themselves the product of discrimination and subjugation– became, ironically, so associated with skin color that they began to furnish additional justifications for discrimination. Like a cancer, the fiction that skin color is a proxy for talent, character, intelligence, and humanity spread throughout the body politic, seeped below the surface of our professed ideals and corroded them from within.

From the beginning, not everyone was swept along, just as some had spoken strongly and passionately against slavery at the time of the Revolution. Throughout the first half of the 19th century, those who advocated the abolition of slavery, though unsuccessful, kept the beacon of liberty shining throughout the long night. And they did so on moral grounds.

William Lloyd Garrison, the nation's most uncompromising White abolitionist, denounced slavery for more than 30 years from the pages of his newsletter and in fiery speeches, often in the most apocalyptic terms. Once, he publicly burned a copy of the United States Constitution, calling it "a covenant with death and an agreement with Hell." Garrison was sued, fined, imprisoned and abandoned by more moderate abolitionists. But he would neither relent nor apologize. "Slavery will not be overthrown," he insisted, "without excitement, a most tremendous excitement."

In 1857, at the peak of Garrison's activities, an event occurred that seemed to vindicate Garrison's view of the Constitution. The Supreme Court decided the Dred Scott case, striking down as unconstitutional a federal law that had prohibited slavery outside the South. If the Supreme Court was right, the Constitution prohibited Congress from abolishing slavery not only where it already existed, but also where it did not yet exist.

Worse than the decision itself, however, was its justifying language. Blacks, wrote Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, were "subordinate and inferior beings" who "had no rights which the white man was bound to respect." If that was what the Constitution meant, could Garrison's characterization of it be considered extreme?

Frederick Douglass, the most famous Black abolitionist of the time, saw the Dred Scott decision in more political terms:

> *The Supreme Court is not the only power in this world. We, the abolitionists and colored people, should meet this decision, uncalled for and monstrous as it appears, in a cheerful spirit. The very attempt to blot out forever the hopes of an enslaved people may be one necessary link in the chain of events preparatory to the complete overthrow of the whole slave system.*

Four years later, the Civil War erupted, perhaps exceeding "the tremendous excitement" Garrison had imagined and certainly constituting a formidable link in the chain of events Douglass had prophesied.

Six months after the Civil War ended, on December 6, 1865, the 13th Amendment became part of the Constitution. Chief Justice Roger Taney was no longer alive to see it, but William Lloyd Garrison and Frederick Douglass were. The 13th Amendment, all but unimaginable less than a decade earlier, seemed finally to have resolved the contradictions the original Constitution had ignored. But its promises were not redeemed.

Almost immediately, the former slave states, seeking to maintain their subjugation of African-Americans, passed a series of laws that came to be known as the "black codes." These codes literally resurrected many of the elements of the old slave codes. Blacks were not allowed to testify in court, for example, except in cases involving other Blacks. Blacks were also prohibited by law from holding certain jobs or occupations. In one state, they were prohibited from becoming shopkeepers or mechanics; in another, they couldn't start any business without first getting a license, which could be arbitrarily denied and often was. Thus excluded from the right to pursue economic opportunities, many Blacks came to depend for their living on jobs performed under conditions little different from slavery. Laws making it a crime to be unemployed were passed, and Blacks could be arrested and jailed for quitting a job; the acceptance of peonage became a condition of "liberty."

The right to meet or otherwise assemble peacefully was denied; residence in certain areas was prohibited. South Carolina barred Blacks from entering and living in the state entirely unless they posted a $1,000 bond. All this was enforced by internal passport systems. Blacks were legally excluded from juries, from public office, and from voting. Racial intermarriage was a crime for which offenders could be sentenced to life imprisonment. The death penalty was provided for Black men accused of raping White women; no similar punishment was imposed on Whites who raped Blacks. Law enforced social deference to Whites: Blacks were prohibited from insulting Whites, or even from looking at them in the "wrong" way. Some codes also required separation of the races in public transportation and in schools. Most codes authorized whipping and the public pillory as punishment for violations of any of the codes, not to mention the more informal and often more brutal private punishments that terrorized the lives of Black people.

All this was put in place within a year of the adoption of the 13th Amendment. During the three decades that followed, Black Americans' hopes and aspirations were snuffed out, and White domination was restored. Slavery had been abolished, but subjugation remained, supported by laws designed to deny the most fundamental rights to Black citizens and to maintain White supremacy. It would take another century before the struggles of Black people began even minimally to redeem the promise of the post-Civil War Reconstruction, much less the original 18th century vision of universal liberty and equal rights.

During all those years, racial discrimination became deeply entrenched, not only in our laws, but also in our political and social institutions, personal habits, instincts, and culture. Racial violence against Blacks was common and irremediable, and Black people, especially and tragically young Black people, learned to limit their aspirations and suppress their dreams. Most Whites accepted this, and nearly all Whites benefited from it. And until 1954, the United States Supreme Court– the institution James Madison had thought would be "an impenetrable bulwark" for liberty– mostly legitimized it.

During the middle of the 20th century– nearly 100 years after slavery had formally been abolished– a Civil Rights Movement arose that finally succeeded in striking down the crudest legal barriers to equal rights. But it could not strike down the complex social effects of centuries of slavery and legalized, persistent racial discrimination. It could not strike down the institutionalized, economic disadvantages that still fell disproportionately upon Black people. And it could not strike down what W.E.B. Du Bois once called "centuries of instinct, habit, and thought."

Where We Are Now

During 1997, the nation celebrated the 50th anniversary of Jackie Robinson breaking the color line in major league baseball. Until that day– April 15, 1947– players with dark skin had not– for that reason alone– been allowed to play professional baseball except in segregated leagues.

Seven years after Jackie Robinson broke the color barrier in baseball, the U.S. Supreme Court declared school segregation unconstitutional. . .

It was not because they were inferior players. Everyone, including White major-league players who had played with Black players off-season on exhibition tours, knew that there were many superior players in what used to be called the "Negro Leagues." But skin color alone, despite merit, talent, or productivity, had until that day in 1947 been maintained as a barrier. Good players, even great players, had been subjugated merely on the basis of a superficial and irrelevant physical attribute– skin color.

Robinson's feat, a spectacular athletic accomplishment under unimaginable pressure, was the first great public civil rights event of the post-World War II era. I was nine years old at the time, and living in Brooklyn, New York, far from any Black families. I did not know yet about Jim Crow laws. But, I learned through participation in that event about oppression based on skin color in a way no book or classroom could have taught me. And by watching Jackie Robinson and the players who followed him, I learned when I was very young, and in a way deeply meaningful to me at the time, that skin color had nothing to do with talent, ability, hard work, strength of character or any other trait that mattered. Skin color, it seemed to me then, was like eye color or hair color. It told you nothing about a man's character or his ability to hit a baseball.

From there, it was not a hard jump to understanding that skin color also told you nothing about a person's ability to play the violin or do mathematics, or about the desirability of a person moving next door or marrying into your family. I was not naive enough, even at that young age, to believe that skin color did not in fact act as a barrier, but it became impossibie for me to consider such barriers legitimate or moral.

Seven years after Jackie Robinson broke the color barrier in baseball, the U.S. Supreme Court declared school segregation unconstitutional and, 19 months after that, Rosa Parks sat down in a seat reserved for Whites in a bus in Montgomery, Alabama. A young, unknown Baptist minister named Martin Luther King, Jr. stood up to help her and organized a bus boycott that galvanized the nation's moral attention. These events inaugurated the mid-20th century Civil Rights Movement. In those days, and the days that followed, the facts were clear and hardly in dispute: people were segregated and subjugated based on superficial attributes, primarily skin color, by custom everywhere and by laws in the South often through state sanctioned terrorism.

No one disputed these facts. The dispute was rather about legal and moral principles: was such segregation and subjugation right? Was it legal? Although the struggle over these principles surely and perhaps decisively took place in the streets as well as in the courts, the forum where transformational outcomes primarily occurred were legal forums: courts and legislatures.

The goals of the struggle were to strike down Jim Crow laws and pass in their place civil rights laws that would prohibit discrimination based on skin color in places of public accommodation, schools, employment and housing. In 1963, at the time of the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, no such laws had been passed by Congress since Reconstruction. Yet by 1968– an astonishingly short time for so fundamental a change– this legal revolution was essentially won, at least formally. The legal infrastructure of segregation was destroyed, and a new legal infrastructure of antidiscrimination laws was in place.

No one should diminish the revolutionary consequences of that achievement. But at the time, few if any foresaw how limited that achievement would turn out to be. One current observer has noted that the effect of the Civil Rights Movement was to reduce discrimination and create equal opportunities only for those prepared to take advantage of it. What we know now is how deep the damage of slavery, discrimination, subjugation and dehumanization had penetrated, and how few were therefore ready to take advantage of the new formalities of legal equality. We also badly underestimated the intensity of resistance to the new equality and how enduring it would be.

Three decades later, we look out upon a landscape where legal equality is secure, but where serious and substantial color stratification remains– in education, employment, housing, health and imprisonment. These stratifications seem both deeply entrenched and relatively immune to the kind of litigation strategies that were so successful a generation ago. Moreover, no sense of moral urgency to do anything about these disproportions exists. Today, almost maddeningly, public opinion surveys show that nearly everyone seems to subscribe to the legal principles of non-discrimination we fought so hard to establish three decades ago. These principles are no longer significantly in dispute. That is our victory.

For many Americans, the racist explanations seem to ring true.

At the same time, public opinion surveys show no strong belief among Whites in the need for continued remedies for inequalities based on skin color. It is not that disparities are denied. It is just that to many Americans those disparities no longer seem immoral or the consequence of majoritarian and state-sanctioned injustice.

The moral and legal principles of legal equality are nearly universally supported, but now the facts are in dispute: what is the cause of the persistent stratifications? Are such inequities due to discrimination– past or present– or to something else? Are African-Americans disproportionately trapped in poverty because they are victims of structural racism or because they have less capacity, less intelligence, less talent, and less character? Are they disproportionately on welfare because of structural unemployment that is itself related to discrimination or are they disproportionately lazy and unwilling to work? Are our schools failing Black children because of public neglect, underfunding and inequitable allocations of resources, or are these failures of Black children the result of their place at the bottom of the bell curve of talent and intelligence? Are Blacks disproportionately in prison because of what Troy Duster has called "a fantastically intricate web of interactions" (not to mention the disproportionate and nearly genocidal impact of the "war on drugs") or because Blacks are as a group more genetically disposed to violent behavior?

These questions do not deserve to be taken seriously, but they are serious because they are being debated seriously in the forum of public opinion and among certain scholars. Public opinion polls show that large majorities of the American public, including large majorities of Whites, are opposed to discrimination and want to remedy it where it exists. But many, perhaps most, of these same White Americans no longer strongly believe that there is much discrimination taking place now. What then, they ask, is the reason for the persistence of demonstrable, color-coded disparities?

This is where Charles Murray comes in. He has an explanation. Blacks as a race are statistically less able. The welfare "reformers" also have an explanation: Blacks are lazy or, if not innately lazy, have been robbed of their initiative by having been on the dole, a malady not apparently found among those born rich. And the drug warriors have a similar explanation: Blacks are disproportionately arrested for drug law violations because they disproportionately commit more drug law violations.

These explanations have little, if any, basis in fact. Charles Murray's "science" has been overwhelmingly skewered by scholars, and his racial theories have been shown to be closely related to the sordid histories of pseudo-science that Stephen Jay Gould has so well described in The Mismeasure of Man. The welfare "reformers" have been properly taken to task for ignoring the macro-economic problems in which persistent, structural unemployment occurs. Just as the dominant ideology of Victorian England blamed poverty on the lack of virtue among the poor, while ignoring the cataclysmic changes of the Industrial Revolution that changed the nature of joblessness and poverty, so today's neo-Victorians have ignored the economic and technological changes that have widened the gap between rich and poor and permanently diminished the availability of manufacturing and low-skill jobs. They prefer instead to find laziness and the unwillingness of the poor to work as the cause for poverty. As for the drug warriors, their willingness to blame disproportionate criminality among Blacks as the reason for the exponential explosion of Black incarceration flies in the face of overwhelming facts, including the government's own studies which a few years ago showed that only about 12 percent of drug users and dealers were Black, while nearly 40% of those arrested were Black.

Yet these rebuttals of racist explanations seem not to have penetrated the domain of public opinion. For many Americans, the racist explanations seem to ring true. Why should this be so? I would suggest several reasons:

1. We are operating in a different context economically. Although inflation is low and the stock market is booming, many Americans feel economically insecure. Wage disparities have widened dramatically since 1979. Where once the wages of White males without a college education were only 30 percent less than those with a college education, by 1990 that disparity had widened to more than 70 percent. Where once one wage earner was sufficient to support an average family, today both spouses increasingly work because their combined wages are required. Many families are working longer hours and the everyday tasks of managing households and children have become frustrating and more difficult. Despite both parents working, many families cannot afford health care, cannot afford to educate their children, are burdened by the need to care for aging parents and are afraid for their own retirement years. For the first time since the end of World War II, a majority of Americans say that they think their children will be less well off than they are.

Optimism for the economic future has faded into insecurity for many American families. The spirit of generosity that characterized the '60s and was, in part, the result of widespread economic optimism has been replaced by a spirit of meanness and resentment born of fear and insecurity and whipped to a froth by pandering politicians who feed resentment and nourish fear as a certain path to electoral success. During the '80s this sort of pandering nearly became an art form, and many Whites came to believe that they were the victims of an excess of civil rights of Blacks and unfair advantages given to undeserving minorities.

2.The Civil Rights Movement has encountered a generational disconnect. The legitimacy of resentment against civil rights remedies has taken especially strong root among the young. Speaking today on college campuses, one is forced to realize that college freshmen were not yet born when Ronald Reagan first became president in 1980. The experiences that shaped many of our lives and formed our perceptions of reality are not shared by them. When one speaks to the young about the Edmund Pettis bridge, the road to Selma or the 1963 March on Washington, one might as well be talking about the Ottoman Empire. This generation has come of age during a time when the sharp edges of racism have been blunted, when symbols of black achievement in politics, business, education, journalism and entertainment are highly visible and when their political leaders almost universally encouraged them to believe that there was no longer any need for effective governmental remedies to skin color stratifications. The events that moved us do not move them.

3. Ironically, the sharp edges of racism have been blunted by the successes of the Civil Rights Movement. The public could see and understand voting discrimination when it came in the form of Bull Connor and his cattle prods on the 6 o'clock television news. The moral urgency of voting discrimination was made clear to most Americans by a succession of searing events: fire hoses in Birmingham; the death by bombing of four little girls attending church on a Sunday morning; Viola Liuzzo shot dead from a passing car; Medgar Evers assassinated in his driveway; and James Chaney, Michael Schwerner and Andrew Goodman found shot dead and buried in a ditch by Mississippi police officers– all killed in reaction to efforts to help Black citizens register to vote.

But, despite the violence, those efforts succeeded. Today, Blacks freely register and vote, and Black elected officials are visible, even in the deep South in a way that was nearly unimaginable only 30 years ago. Voting discrimination still exists, but now it lurks behind an impenetrable shroud of statistics and arguments over complicated, inkblot shaped voting districts– arguments too abstract and remote to engage the public's sense of moral urgency or outrage.

4. We have not been good enough– certainly not as good as our opponents– at learning to market our facts and ideas for public audiences, particularly audiences who say they share our values but who do not share our views because they did not share our experiences. Our skills were developed a generation ago for the specialized audience of judges and the specialized language of courtrooms and legal analysis. We have a deficit of language and imagination in marketing our case to the public.

Moreover, we often make the wrong arguments. We argue legal principles when legal principles are no longer substantially in dispute. We do not sufficiently argue the facts at a time when crucial facts are seriously in dispute, and when different factual perceptions are driving political outcomes.

5. Above all, we seem to lack a strong moral vision. Certainly, we do not often articulate such a vision. In the '60s, our vision dominated public discourse. Today the vacuum of our own visionary deficit has been filled by those who have cynically used our language– the language of fairness, nondiscrimination and color blindness against us.

We are also often anachronistic. We think in terms and use the terms of our youth. Consider, for example, how we talk about race. We know what we mean by that term when we talk to each other. But the task is to talk to others who do not share our views. What does the term "race" mean to them? Often it means more than we intend when we use the term. And sometimes it unwittingly reinforces precisely what we wish most to avoid. I propose that we begin to talk about discrimination based on skin color instead of discrimination based on race. I propose that we begin to call attention to social and economic stratifications and disproportionate distributions of opportunities and benefits based on skin color, not race. Why?

Skin color implies a superficial physical attribute, nothing more. Race implies much more. Race implies fundamental, defining characteristics biologically linked to skin color or other superficial physical attributes. Race implies that skin-color is linked to fundamental qualities like character, talent, intelligence and honesty when we know it is not. The concept of race in that sense is a scientific and biological fraud. The concept of race is the concept of our enemies, a social and political construct designed to justify the oppression of dark-skinned people. Getting rid of that construct has been our central goal. The very use of the term "race" unwittingly reinforces the teachings of Charles Murray. It is a fiction, and we should abandon it.

This should become the centerpiece of our articulated moral vision. Alex Boraine has said that in order to have reconciliation in South Africa, we need to tell the truth, to find ways to change false perceptions. The myths are there, he said, and they must be destroyed.

In America, the key myth that needs to be destroyed is the myth that skin-color is a proxy, a marker for innate, genetically-based fundamental characteristics like intelligence, morality, capacity for hard work, criminal behavior, etc. If leadership in America requires a vision, my vision is the one being projected today in South Africa: the vision of a nonracial society– a society where skin color matters as little as eye color or hair color.

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It is an ambitious vision, in South Africa as it would be in America, but we have never lacked ambition and there is no reason to stop now. By a nonracial society I do not mean to eradicate physical or cultural differences. Indeed, the eradication of such differences would require nearly genocidal suppression, not perhaps through actual genocide but through the slow death of assimilation. Even at its most benign, assimilation of differences implies hierarchy and subjugation, while true integration, as john a. powell has pointed out, celebrates differences and finds a way to accept them on equal terms.

But some differences are more meaningful than others. I believe we must project the vision that skin color, like hair color and eye color, is a superficial physical attribute signifying little. Skin color is not linked to more fundamental innate traits, and it is unfair, unjust, immoral and un-American to impose and maintain hierarchies and stratifications based on skin color.

The vision I propose is not without danger, however. Indeed, articulated mechanically, it can be strategically treacherous. Even as we articulate this vision, therefore, we must make it crystal clear that achieving the vision requires remedies for current hierarchies that take skin color into account. This is so because we do not write on a blank slate. We inherit a long history, reflected today, of imposed hierarchies based on skin color. A mechanical conversion to color blindness today would necessarily contribute to maintaining those hierarchies. That is why our opponents have adopted the language of color blindness. In fact, color blindness today is a barrier to achieving color blindness tomorrow because it ignores the reality of socially constructed color-based stratifications. Our moral vision is of a society where benefits and opportunities are not linked to skin color. But our strategic imperative is to find a way to get from here to there, and in the world we have inherited we cannot do that without taking skin color into account. That is our dilemma.

Our task is daunting, but we should not, must not, lose the belief that we will prevail. Stamina is everything. Since the 1950s, skin color disadvantages have been unimaginably reduced, yet they remain startlingly substantial and highly resistant to further change.

Why should we be surprised? Skin color subjugation is America's original sin, written into the blood and bones of the body politic for hundreds of years. Why should we have thought that redemption could come in only 40 years of struggle and through the passage of a few laws and the rendering of a few court decisions, however fundamental and transformational they were? Redemption is not that easy or swift, but I believe we are up to it. As Frederick Douglass said after the Dred Scott decision in 1857, we must stay cheerful. And struggle wisely.

Chronology of Major Events

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BRAZIL

1444	Portugal begins slave trade with Africa.
1494	Treaty of Tordesillas between Spain and Portugal grants Portugal the right to colonize lands east of a line 335 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands (this will include as-yet unknown Brazil).
1500	Cabral lands on the Northeastern coast of Brazil and claims land for Portugal.
1530	First Portuguese settlers arrive in Brazil.
1532	City of São Vicente founded.
1538	Direct importation of African slaves into Brazil begins.
1542	Duarte Coelho establishes first sugar mill in Pernambuco and receives permission from the Crown to import African slaves for plantation labor.
1548	Salvador Bahia established as viceregal capital of Brazil.
1555	Indians help French establish Rio de Janeiro.
1560s	Series of smallpox epidemics decimate Indian population of Brazil.
1567	Portuguese expel French from Rio de Janeiro.
1570	Crown prohibits Indian slavery; the law is not enforced in Brazil.
1575	Expedition from Rio de Janeiro crushes nearby Tamoios Indian settlements, killing 2,000 and enslaving 4,000.
1603	*Quilombo* (community of escaped slaves) Republic of Palmares founded near present-day Alagoas.
1609	*Paulista* armies begin raiding Jesuit missions in Paraguay for Indian servants.
1621	Smallpox epidemic ravages Amazonian Indians.
1621	Crown prohibits training of mulattos, Blacks and Indians as goldsmiths.
1630	Dutch East India Company seizes Pernambuco and other Northeastern captaincies; era of religious tolerance begins in northeast Brazil.
1645	Dutch expelled from Recife.
1648-49	Multiracial Brazilian forces defeat Dutch in Battle of Guararapes and begin to drive Dutch from northeastern Brazil.
1648	Portuguese recapture Angola from Dutch; Atlantic slave trade between Angola and Brazil reopens.
1654	Dutch withdraw from Pernambuco.
1692-94	*Paulista* army lays siege to and destroys Palmares *Quilombo*.
1692	Gold discoveries in present-day Minas Gerais region spark Brazilian gold rush; center of Brazilian slave economy begins to move to the south.
1708-09	War of the Emboabas: *Paulistas* fight Portuguese immigrants and northeastern Brazilians in Minas Gerais gold fields.
1710	Captaincies of Minas Gerais and São Paulo established.
1720	Royal control declared over captaincy of Minas Gerais.
1729	Diamonds are discovered at Sero do Frio Comerca.
1732	Crown abolishes color distinctions in Brazilian Army; Brazilians ignore the law.
1734	Free Blacks and mulattos expelled from Minas Diamond District for alleged smuggling.
1734	Crown prohibits Brazilians sending women to Portugal to discourage interracial unions in Brazil.
1750-1800	Cotton replaces sugar in plantation economy of northeast Brazil.

1755	Marquis de Pombal issues order encouraging marriage between Portuguese and Indians, proclaiming descendants of such marriages eligible for positions of honor and dignity.
1757	Pombal removes Indians from control of religious orders, establishes Directorate of Indians to integrate Indians into Brazilian colonial society.
1759	Pombal expels Jesuits from Brazil and seizes their property for the Crown.
1763	Viceregal capital moved from Bahia to Rio de Janeiro.
1769	Marquis de Lavradio begins coffee plantation in São Paulo.
1773	Crown orders that color should not disqualify persons from holding office in Brazil; law is ignored.
1775	Royal law encourages marriage between Whites and caboclos (children of White and Indian parents) but excludes Blacks and mulattos.
1798	Afro-Brazilian gold miners instigate Sastre Rebellion in Bahia.
1807	First Muslim Mâle slave revolt occurs in Bahia.
1808	Portuguese crown arrives in Rio de Janeiro.
1814	Famelic slave revolt occurs in Bahia.
1822	Empire of Brazil under Dom Pedro declares independence from Portugal.
1831	Anglo-Brazilian treaty bans importation of slaves into Brazil; it is not immediately enforced.
1831	Dom Pedro abdicates; Creole administration of Brazil begins.
1835	Muslim slaves and freedmen lead second Muslim Mâle revolt in Bahia.
1837	Sabinada revolt of women, children, and older slaves in Bahia is crushed, ending period of slave revolts in northeast Brazil.
1849	Quieroz anti-slave trade law is passed; Brazil begins enforcing Anglo-Brazilian treaty of 1831.
1849-50	British warships seize and destroy Brazilian slave ships in South Atlantic; slave imports into Brazil end by mid-decade.
1865-70	Paraguayan War: Brazilian government decrees that government-owned slaves who join the army will be emancipated; Blacks are conscripted into army and suffer overwhelming majority of casualties.
1869	Reform Club of the Liberal Party calls for a free-womb law.
1871	Rio Branco Law declares children born to slave mothers free and allows slaves the right to purchase their freedom.
1881	Non-Catholics, freedmen and naturalized citizens are granted the right to vote, subject to property requirements.
1884	Amazonas and Ceará states abolish slavery; abolitionist underground railroad begins.
1884	All slaves over age 60 declared free.
1886	General strikes force city of Santos to abolish slavery.
1887	City of São Paulo abolishes slavery within its borders, compensating owners with funds raised by abolitionists.
1888	Brazilian Parliament declares immediate, uncompensated abolition of slavery.
1889	Monarchy is overthrown; Brazil is declared a republic.
1924	*O Clarim da Alvorada*, Black newspaper, is founded in São Paulo.
1931	*Frente Negra Brasileiro* (Brazilian Black Front) is founded.
1937	President Vargas shuts down Frente Negra Brasileiro offices and those of other political parties in Brazil.
1944	*Teatro Experimental do Negro* (Black Experimental Theater) founded in Rio de Janeiro to promote Afro-Brazilian cultural advancement.
1946	Anti-discrimination prohibition is included in new Constitution but is weakly enforced.
1949	*União dos Homens de Côr* (Colored Peoples' Union) is formed in Rio de Janeiro to raise funds to overcome Black poverty in rural and urban areas.
1950	*Premiero Congresso do Negro Brasileiro* (First Brazilian Black Congress) is founded in Rio de Janeiro to give structure to Black politics in Brazil.
1951	Lei No. 1.390, the Afonso Arinos Law, makes discrimination based on race or color in public establishments, education and employment a criminal offense.
1978	*Movimento Negro Unificado* (Unified Black Movement) is founded.

1988 Brazilian Constitution makes acts of racial discrimination crimes punishable by imprisonment without bail.

1988 Centennial celebration of abolition takes place; Black political organizations bring discussions of racism to the forefront of politics.

1988 Literacy requirement for voting is repealed.

1988 *Fundação Palmares* (Palmares Foundation) established by the government to address concerns of Black activists.

1989 Lei No. 7.716 defines crimes that result from prejudice against race or color as felonies.

SOUTH AFRICA

1652 First Dutch settle at the Cape of Good Hope.

1657 Dutch East India Company frees a few servants, creating the nucleus for a burgher class.

1658 First substantial importation of slaves from Africa and East Indies begins.

1659-60 First Khoikhoi-Dutch War occurs.

1673-77 Second Khoikhoi-Dutch War occurs.

1688 Two hundred French Huguenot settlers arrive.

1717 Dutch East India Company decides against encouraging European immigration, increasing colony's dependence on slavery.

1779-81 First Frontier War with Xhosas near Fish River (Eastern Cape) occurs.

1793 Second Frontier War with Xhosas occurs.

1795 Burgher rebellions take place on the Eastern Cape frontier.

1795 First British occupy the Cape.

1799 Burgher rebellion is renewed on the eastern frontier.

1799 Third Frontier War against Xhosas occurs.

1803 Cape is restored temporarily to Dutch rule.

1806 British occupy the Cape for second time.

1807 British Atlantic slave trade is abolished.

1809 Colonial ordinance is issued regulating Khoi Khoi contract labor for Whites, bringing it under state control for the first time but strengthening masters' control over servants.

1812 Khoi Khoi servants bring complaints against masters' brutality to First Circuit Court for the first time.

1814 British acquire permanent sovereignty over the Cape.

1815 Frontier Dutch-speaking farmers (Boers) instigate Slagter's Nek rebellion against British colonial administration and servants' regulations.

1816 Shaka creates Zulu kingdom; period of African warfare and conquest known as *mfecane* begins throughout southeastern Africa.

1820 Some 5,000 British immigrants arrive at Algoa Bay (present-day Port Elizabeth).

1828 Ordinance No. 50 relieves Khoi Khoi of restrictions on their economic freedom.

1828 Shaka is assassinated by his brother Dingane.

1834 Slave emancipation begins at the Cape.

1834-35 British defeat Xhosas in Third Frontier War.

1836-38 "The Great Trek": small parties of Boer settlers migrate east into the African interior to escape British colonial administration.

1838 Dingane has trekker party of Piet Retief killed; other trekking Boers defeat the Zulu at the Battle of Blood River in retaliation.

1838 Boer Republic of Natal is founded.

1838 Slave emancipation is completed in the Cape Colony.

1843 British annex Natal; most Boers abandon colony for the interior.

1846-47 British defeat Xhosas in Fourth Frontier War.

1848 British government proclaims its sovereignty between the Orange and Vaal rivers (future Orange Free State).

1850-53 British defeat Xhosas in Fifth Frontier War.

1852 British recognize the independence of the Boers in the Transvaal.

1854 British grant independence to Boers in the Orange Free State.

1854 Cape Colony is granted representative government; nonracial franchise (subject to property qualifications) is established.

1857 Xhosa people kill cattle and destroy grain on the advice of anti-colonial Xhosa prophetess

	Nongqawuse: 40,000 Xhosas eventually die of starvation.
1858	Boers in the Transvaal found the South African Republic.
1858	Basotho under Moshoeshoe defeat Orange Free State in battle over highveld farmland.
1860	Indian indentured laborers arrive in Natal to work on sugar plantations.
1865-67	Orange Free State reconquers lost territory from Basotho.
1867	Diamonds are discovered near the confluence of the Orange and Vaal rivers (present day Kimberley).
1872	Cape Colony is granted responsible, cabinet government.
1877	British annex the South African Republic.
1879	Zulu army defeats British at Insandhlwana; British conquer Zulu kingdom.
1879	British capture Chief Sekhukhune, conquer Pedi kingdom in the Transvaal.
1880	First Anglo-Boer War occurs.
1881	South African Republic regains independence.
1884	First important gold fields are discovered in Transvaal.
1886	Johannesburg is founded.
1893	Natal is granted responsible government.
1895	Jameson Raid: An abortive effort by pro-British interests to overthrow the South African Republic government occurs.
1898	South African Republic forces defeat of Venda Chief Mphephu in Northern Transvaal to complete the colonial conquest of Africans in South Africa.
1899	Second Anglo-Boer War (South African War) breaks out.
1902	Peace of Vereeniging ends South African War.
1905	South African Native Affairs Commission advocates territorial segregation of Whites and Africans.
1907	Cape Colony School Board Act restricts access of non-Whites to public education.
1907	Responsible government is granted to Transvaal and Orange Free State; Africans are expressly denied suffrage.
1908	Convention assembles to plan for union of the four South African colonies.
1910	Union of South Africa is established.
1911	Mine and Works Act of Union Parliament sanctions an industrial color bar; Africans largely are relegated to lower wage mine labor.
1912	South African Native National Congress, later the African National Congress (ANC), is founded in Bloemfontein.
1913	Native Lands Act provides for territorial segregation; only 13 percent of land is reserved for Africans.
1921	Communist Party of South Africa founded.
1921	Bulhoek Massacre: Police in Eastern Cape open fire on millennial Israelite community under the leadership of Enoch Mgijima; 200 are killed.
1922	The Rand Rebellion: Violent strikes by White workers on the Witwatersrand end by military force.
1924	Smuts's South African Party is defeated in Parliamentary elections; a Nationalist-Labour coalition government is established under Hertzog.
1926	Colour Bar Act secures a monopoly on skilled jobs for White mine workers.
1927	Native Administration Act gives Native Affairs Department full control over African administration and encourages "retribalization" of Africans under hereditary chiefs.
1930	White women are enfranchised.
1933	Hertzog and Smuts form coalition government.
1934	Afrikaner opponents of Hertzog's coalition policy found Purified Nationalist Party.
1936	Africans are removed from the common voters' roll in the Cape Province; disenfranchisement of African majority is complete.
1946	Military troops break African gold miners' strike.
1948	Nationalist victory is declared over the United Party in Parliamentary elections under the slogan of *apartheid* ("separateness" in Afrikaans).
1949	Mixed Marriages Act is prohibited.
1950	Population Registration Act and Group Areas Act strengthen pass regulations and territorial segregation measures; forced removals of Blacks from White areas begin.

1951	Bantu Authorities Act establishes a new system of government for African reserves ("homelands").
1952	Reservation of Separate Amenities Act: "petty apartheid" is established (similar to U.S. segregation laws for public transportation, restrooms, etc.).
1955	ANC adopts the Freedom Charter.
1956	Coloureds are removed from the common voters' roll in the Cape Province.
1959	Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) is founded.
1960	Sharpeville Massacre: Police open fire on a protest over pass laws; 69 are killed.
1960	ANC and PAC are banned; parties advocate armed resistance against the apartheid regime from exile.
1961	South Africa severs its ties with the British Commonwealth and becomes a republic.
1964	Nelson Mandela and other ANC leaders are convicted of treason and imprisoned.
1966	Coloured District Six in Cape Town demolished; residents are removed to Cape Flats.
1976	Schoolchildren protesting compulsory Afrikaans education begin the Soweto Uprising.
1976	Transkei homeland is granted independence by Pretoria but is not internationally recognized.
1977	Bophuthatswana homeland is granted independence by Pretoria but is not internationally recognized.
1977	South African police in Port Elizabeth arrest and torture Black Consciousness activist Bantu Steven Biko, who dies in a Pretoria prison.
1979	Venda homeland is granted independence by Pretoria but is not internationally recognized.
1981	Ciskei homeland is granted independence by Pretoria but is not internationally recognized.
1983	Anti-apartheid groups form the United Democratic Front (UDF) and begin to agitate within South Africa for an end to apartheid.
1984	New Constitution creates Tricameral Legislature for Whites, Coloureds and Asians; Coloureds and Asians largely ignore legislative elections.
1986	Pass laws are repealed.
1986	President P.W. Botha declares state of emergency to quell Black resistance to apartheid; international sanctions are imposed on South Africa.
1989	F.W. de Klerk becomes president and begins process of reform.
1990	Nelson Mandela is released from jail; ANC and PAC ban is lifted; ANC suspends armed struggle.
1990	Separate Reservation of Amenities Act is repealed.
1991	Land, Group Areas, and Population Registration Acts are repealed.
1991	Government negotiations with ANC and other political parties begin in Council for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA).
1992	White voters overwhelmingly approve negotiated transition to democracy in referendum.
1993	South African Communist Party leader Chris Hani is assassinated.
1993	Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk receive Nobel Peace Prize.
1994	Bophuthatswana Army repels Afrikaner militia uprising, stages coup against President Lucas Mangope and demands reincorporation into South Africa.
1994	ANC wins first nonracial elections in South Africa; Nelson Mandela becomes president.
1996-98	Truth and Reconciliation Commission offers limited amnesty for crimes committed during apartheid era in exchange for truthful testimony.

UNITED STATES

1607	First permanent English settlement in North America is established at Jamestown, Virginia.
1619	First Black slaves arrive in Virginia.
1620	English establish New England settlement at Plymouth, Massachusetts.
1622	Indian attack on the Virginia settlement provokes massive retaliation.
1644	Second Indian uprising occurs in Virginia.
1667	Virginia legalizes slavery for converted Christian Blacks.
1675-76	Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia: White indentured servants form militia and threaten to overthrow colonial government.
1675-76	King Philip's War ends Indian resistance in southern New England.

1691	Interracial marriage between Blacks and Whites banned in Virginia.
1711-12	Tuscarora Indian War occurs in North Carolina.
1715	Yemassee Indian War occurs in South Carolina.
1763	Pontiac's Rebellion breaks out in the Ohio Valley.
1763	British proclamation prohibits White settlement west of Appalachian Mountains to prevent further Indian uprisings.
1776	Declaration of Independence is signed.
1783	American independence is recognized internationally.
1783	Northern states begin emancipation of slaves.
1787	Northwest Ordinance prohibits slavery in territories north of the Ohio River.
1787	Constitutional Convention comes to Three-Fifths Compromise on slavery; Southern states allowed to count five slaves as three citizens for purposes of proportional representation in House of Representatives.
1790	First federal naturalization law reserves citizenship for Whites.
1793	Invention of cotton gin strengthens economic basis for Southern slavery.
1803	Louisiana Purchase brings Indian nations and lands of the Mississippi-Missouri basin under U.S. control.
1808	International slave trade is closed.
1811	Battle of Tippecanoe breaks resistance of Ohio Valley Indian tribes.
1813-14	Creek War leads to cession of most Creek lands in Alabama.
1820	Missouri Compromise establishes dividing line between slave and free territory at 36° 30'N latitude.
1830	Indian Removal Act: Most Eastern Indian tribes are encouraged to relocate west of the Mississippi River; Indian Territory is established in present-day Oklahoma.
1831	Nat Turner's slave rebellion occurs in Virginia.
1831	Abolitionist agitation begins in the North.
1838	Cherokee "Trail of Tears": Federal troops forcibly remove Cherokee Indians from Georgia and lead them on a march to Indian Territory.
1840s	U.S. Army fights series of costly Seminole Wars in Florida, suffering many casualties and defeats; Army ultimately defeats Seminoles and removes them to Indian Territory.
1846-48	Conquest of Texas, New Mexico, and California in Mexican War brings Indian and Mexican communities in these regions under U.S. control.
1850	Compromise of 1850 temporarily resolves controversy over extension of slavery into the Western territories.
1854	Kansas-Nebraska Act revives sectional controversy over slavery; conflicts between White settlers and Indian nations on Great Plains intensifies.
1854-56	"Bleeding Kansas": Widespread violence occurs between pro- and anti-slavery White settlers in the Kansas Territory.
1857	*Dred Scott* decision of U.S. Supreme Court nullifies Missouri Compromise and denies all Blacks the right to U.S. citizenship.
1859	John Brown, a White abolitionist, attempts to lead slave rebellion in Virginia.
1860	Election of Republican Abraham Lincoln as president on platform opposed to the territorial expansion of slavery.
1860-61	Southern states secede from Union.
1861	Civil War breaks out; escaped slaves and free Blacks enlist in Union Army to fight slavery.
1863	President Lincoln issues Emancipation Proclamation, freeing all U.S. slaves.
1865	Civil War ends.
1865	Ratification of Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery.
1865	Presidential Reconstruction begins; Southern state legislatures pass Black Codes.
1866	Congress passes Civil Rights Act over President Johnson's veto.
1867-68	Radical Reconstruction begins; Southern Blacks are enfranchised; military occupation of Southern states offers some protection of Black civil rights.
1868	Ratification of Fourteenth Amendment extends citizenship rights to freedmen.
1870	Ratification of Fifteenth Amendment protects voting rights of Blacks.

1876	Sioux defeat of Gen. George Custer at the Battle of Little Bighorn intensifies drive to conquer and pacify Sioux nations in northern Great Plains.
1877	Radical Reconstruction ends; federal troops withdraw from Southern states.
1881	Tennessee passes first state law segregating the races in public transportation.
1882	Exclusion Act prohibits immigration of Chinese.
1887	Dawes Severalty Act provides for individual land allotment on Indian Reservations.
1889	Oklahoma is opened to White settlement.
1890	Mississippi becomes the first state to disenfranchise Blacks by constitutional convention.
1890	"Ghost Dance": religious resistance spreads through western Indian Reservations; Wounded Knee massacre of Sioux ends armed Indian resistance.
1896	*Plessy v. Ferguson* decision of Supreme Court sanctions segregation of public accommodations.
1909	National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) is founded.
1917	Supreme Court outlaws residential segregation.
1917	Race riots occur in East St. Louis, Illinois.
1919	Chicago race riot occurs along with similar outbreaks in other cities.
1934	Indian Reorganization Act grants greater autonomy to tribes on reservations.
1942-44	Japanese-Americans are forced into U.S. Army internment camps during World War II.
1948	Democratic Party platform calls for civil rights for Blacks; Southern Democrats bolt party convention.
1954	Supreme Court bans segregation in public schools in *Brown v. Board of Education* of Topeka.
1955	Montgomery (Alabama) Bus Boycott begins.
1957	President Eisenhower sends National Guard to force integration of Little Rock, Arkansas, high school.
1960-64	Sit-ins and mass demonstrations protest legalized segregation in the South.
1963	Martin Luther King Jr.'s Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) leads March on Washington.
1964	Civil Rights Act requiring equal access to public facilities is passed.
1965	Malcolm X is assassinated.
1965	Voting Rights Act providing strong protection for Black voting rights passes.
1965	Watts, California, riots occur.
1966	Huey Newton and Bobby Seale form Black Panther Party in Oakland, California.
1967	Supreme Court declares state laws banning interracial marriage unconstitutional in *Loving v. Virginia*.
1967	Riots occur in Newark, New Jersey, and Detroit, Michigan.
1967-68	"Black Power": Congress for Racial Equality (CORE) and Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) reject non-violence.
1968	Assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. in Memphis causes riots in New York, Washington, D.C., and across the United States.
1970	American Indian Movement (AIM) activists seize Alcatraz Island in San Francisco Bay.
1975	School busing riots occur in Boston.
1984	Rev. Jesse Jackson seeks Democratic Party nomination for President.
1986	U.S. civil rights groups protest the apartheid regime in South Africa; Congress imposes sanctions against South Africa over President Reagan's veto.
1992	Los Angeles riots result from the acquittal by an all-White jury of five White police officers for the 1991 beating of an African-American man, Rodney King.
1996	California voters pass Proposition 209, repealing affirmative action policies in state employment.
1998	Washington state voters repeal affirmative action.

Appendix

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Colin Bundy is Vice-Chancellor of the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa. Until 1998, he was Vice-Rector of the University of the Western Cape. Bundy is a historian who received degrees from Witwatersrand and the University of Oxford. He taught history at South Africa's universities for more than 10 years and was director of the Institute for Historical Research at the Western Cape. He is author of The Rise and Fall of a South African Peasantry (University of California Press, 1979) and co-author of Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa (University of California Press, 1987).

Ira Glasser is the executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), a post he has held since 1978. Previously, he served as executive director of the New York Civil Liberties Union. Prior to the ACLU, Glasser was a member of the science and mathematics faculties of Queens College and Sarah Lawrence College, and he served as an editor of Current magazine. Glasser is author of Vision of Liberty: The Bill of Rights for All Americans (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1991) and co-author of Doing Good: The Limits of Benevolence (New York: Pantheon, 1978).

Charles V. Hamilton is Wallace S. Sayre Professor Emeritus of Government at Columbia University. He taught political science and government for over 40 years at Tuskegee University, Roosevelt University, Rutgers University, Lincoln University, and Columbia. Hamilton is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the board of trustees of the Century Foundation. He served from 1979-1981 on the Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward South Africa. Among other works he has written, Hamilton co-authored Black Power (New York: Random House, 1967) and The Dual Agenda: Race and Social Welfare Policies of Civil Rights Organizations (Columbia University Press, 1997).

Lynn Walker Huntley is director of the Comparative Human Relations Initiative, a project of the Southern Education Foundation. She previously served as director of the Ford Foundation's Rights and Social Justice Program. A graduate of Barnard College and Columbia University Law School, Huntley served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General and Section Chief in the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, staff counsel at the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., and columnist for Essence Magazine. She is a member of the boards of directors of the Center for Women Policy Studies, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and the Interdenominational Theological Center.

Wilmot G. James is a professor and Dean of the Humanities Faculty of the University of Cape Town. He previously served as the executive director of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa). James also has taught at the University of the Western Cape, Indiana University and Yale University. He is a member of the boards of trustees of the Ford Foundation, Independent Newspapers (Cape), and David Philip Publishers (PTY) Ltd. James chaired the Task Team on International Migration for the South African government. He was a contributing author and co-editor of Now That We Are Free: Coloured Communities in a Democratic South Africa (Cape Town: Idasa, 1996) and Angry Divide: Social and Economic History of the Western Cape (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989).

Jeffrey Lever works with the Impumelelo Innovation Awards Programme in Cape Town, South Africa. He holds a doctoral degree in Sociology and has taught at various South African universities, including the University of Stellenbosch, the University of Cape Town, and most recently the University of the Western Cape. Lever has published articles on various aspects of the social and political life of South Africa and on social theory.

Abdias do Nascimento is professor emeritus, State University of New York at Buffalo, and Doctor Honoris Causa, State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ). Founder of the Black Experimental Theater in Rio de Janeiro in 1944, Nascimento was the first Afro-Brazilian Congressman who championed Black people's human and civil rights in the Brazilian national legislature. He is now president of the Afro-Brazilian Studies and Research Institute (IPEAFRO) in Rio de Janeiro. As an artist, he has exhibited his Afro-Brazilian paintings throughout the United States and Brazil. He has a long history of political activity both internationally and domestically. He represents Rio de Janeiro State in the Brazilian Senate and is an appointee to the newly created Rio de Janeiro State Government post of Secretary for Human Rights and Citizenship. He is author of Brazil: Mixture or Massacre? (Dover: Majority Press, 1989) among other works.

Elisa Larkin Nascimento is co-founder and director of the Afro-Brazilian Studies and Research Institute (IPEAFRO) in Rio de Janeiro. She is a graduate of the State University of New York where she received a master's degree and a law degree. Since 1975, Larkin Nascimento has participated actively in political and academic activities related to Afro-Brazilian affairs, including work with the Municipal Institute of Arts and Culture in Rio de Janeiro. She has translated or edited several published books and is co-author of Africans in Brazil: a Pan-African Perspective (Trenton, NJ: African World Press, 1992).

Nelson do Valle Silva is a professor at the University Institute for Research of Rio de Janeiro (Instituto de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro) and senior researcher at the National Laboratory of Scientific Computation (LNCC). He holds a doctorate in sociology from the University of Michigan. Silva has published widely on demographic and racial trends in Brazil, including "Racial Differences in Income: Brazil, 1988," in Race in Contemporary Brazil: From Indifference to Equality (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

No effort of the scale, breadth and complexity of the Comparative Human Relations Initiative, including the writing, editing, and production of this report, could be mounted without the guidance, support and wisdom of many people and institutions. Listing their names without singing their praises is inadequate recompense to thank them for the many contributions they have made to bring the Initiative into being, sustain it and make its contributions possible.

First, we thank our supporters of this international and comparative effort: Susan V. Berresford, Barry G. Gaberman, Mary E. McClymont, Anthony Romero, Alan Jenkins, Edward Telles, and Melvin Oliver (The Ford Foundation); Lori Villa Rosa (The Charles Stewart Mott Foundation); Robert Haas, Judy Belk, Gina Warren and Henry Ramos (Levi Strauss and Company); Ingrid Saunders Jones and Michael Bivens (The Coca-Cola Foundation); and Colin Campbell (Rockefeller Brothers Fund).

Several people who worked very hard to make this volume possible should be thanked publicly. We are deeply indebted to the authors whose names, words and wisdom grace this report. Steve Suitts helped to develop all aspects of the Initiative's work, including this volume. Thanks also to Pam Auchmutey and staff members of the Southern Education Foundation (SEF), Janet Keene, and Brenda McClendon. Tim Lane, a graduate student at Stanford University, expertly prepared the Chronology of Major Events. We also thank Cynthia Jones and Susan White of Jones Worley Design for carefully designing all of the Initiative's publications.

Lastly, the Initiative is indebted to Elridge McMillan, the president of the Southern Education Foundation (SEF), Norman Francis, Board Chair, and SEF Board members for sponsoring the Initiative.

Lynn Huntley

Director
The Comparative Human Relations Initiative
January, 2000

PUBLICATIONS

The Comparative Human Relations Initiative has developed a number of linked publications that amplify on the themes and ideas set forth in this volume, drawing on original sources, and in the voices of the people in these three countries. Reports include:

- **Beyond Racism**, an overview of findings by the Initiative's International Working and Advisory Group, featuring first person profiles of outstanding Americans, Brazilians and South Africans involved in the struggle against racism and reflections of International Working and Advisory Group members.

- **Three Nations at the Crossroads**, in-depth and data-rich portraits and accessible historical reviews of Brazil, South Africa and the United States by Dr. Charles V. Hamilton, professor emeritus, Columbia University; Ira Glasser, executive director, the American Civil Liberties Union; Dr. Wilmot James, dean, and Dr. Jeffrey Lever, professor, University of Cape Town; Colin Bundy, University of Witwatersrand; Dr. Abdias do Nascimento, Rio de Janeiro State Secretary of Human Rights and Citizenship; Dr. Elisa Larkin Nascimento, director, IPEAFRO; Brazilian scholar Nelson do Valle Silva, and a comprehensive historical timeline of key events related to race in the three countries.

- **In Their Own Voices**, a topically organized reader featuring articles, quotable quotes, and excerpted speeches by participants in Initiative meetings such as Ellis Cose, journalist; Dr. Frene Ginwala, speaker of the South African Parliament; Dr. Alex Boraine, vice chair, South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Dr. Emmett Carson, president, the Minneapolis Foundation; Gloria Steinem, contributing editor, Ms. Magazine; Dr. Mahmood Mamdani, professor, University of Cape Town, Dr. Njabulo S. Ndebele, vice chancellor, University of the North; Susan V. Berresford, president, the Ford Foundation, and many others.

- **Color Collage**, occasional papers on issues such as the origins of racism, the role of the media, truth and reconciliation efforts, globalization, economic inequality, the religious community, among others, by authors such as Sig Gissler, professor, Columbia University School of Journalism; Maria Aparecida Bento, director of CERT; George Reid Andrews, professor, University of Pittsburgh; C. Eric Lincoln, professor emeritus, Duke University; William Taylor, Esq., Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights; and many others.

BOOKS INCLUDE:

- **Beyond Racism, Embracing an Interdependent Future**, (working title), the Full Report of the International Working and Advisory Group to the Comparative Human Relations Initiative, including detailed citations, sources and annotated bibliography. [forthcoming]

- **The Same Beneath the Skin** (working title), a comparative anthology edited by Dr. Charles V. Hamilton, Dr. Wilmot James, Dr. Neville Alexander, professor, University of Cape Town and Dr. Antonio Sérgio Guimarães, professor, University of São Paulo, which considers educational issues in the three nations, the costs of racism, international remedies, affirmative action, and future prospects for movement beyond racism in the three nations by recognized scholars and activists. [forthcoming]

- **Beyond Racism in Brazil** (working title), a Portuguese language volume featuring papers by many leading scholars and Afro Brazilian activists. [forthcoming]

- **Grappling With Change**, Yazeed Fakier, author (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers and Idasa, 1998), a look at how South Africans are coping post-apartheid.

- **Between Unity and Diversity**, Gitanjali Maharaj, editor (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers and Idasa, 1999), a reader on post-apartheid nation-building efforts.

All Initiative reports as well as additional, commissioned papers are available on the Internet. To download Initiative reports, papers, and other documents in Adobe Acrobat format (pdf. file), to find up-to-date information about forthcoming books, or for ordering printed publications, visit the Initiative's website: **www.beyondracism.org** or contact the Comparative Human Relations Initiative, the Southern Education Foundation, 135 Auburn Avenue, Second Floor, Atlanta, Georgia 30303 (404) 523-0410 (phone) or (404) 523-6904 (fax). For information about receiving printed copies of Initiative publications in South Africa, inquire with the Institute for Democracy in South Africa at its website, **www.idasa.org.za** Information about the Southern Education Foundation is available through its website, **www.sefatl.org**.

LIST OF TABLES

[illegible]

BRAZIL • SOUTH AFRICA • THE UNITED STATES

Racism

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OWN VOICES

AIMS AND AUSPICES

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[illegible] To the contrary, the Initiative's work underscores [illegible] Ultimately, the solution [illegible] will be found in broad, multifaceted movements [illegible] The Initiative's overarching aim is to contribute to diverse efforts [illegible] and opportunities.

[illegible] because each has a large and disproportionately [illegible] and a history of legal and/or informal denial of civil [illegible] are in different phases of development and [illegible] transnational developments that [illegible] priorities and interests. These trends [illegible] efforts to move beyond [illegible]

[illegible] Atlanta, Georgia, U.S.A. [illegible] the Office of the Dean of the Humanities [illegible] in Brazil. The Initiative involved [illegible] meetings in Atlanta [illegible] 1998.

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BRAZIL • SOUTH AFRICA • THE UNITED STATES

Racism

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

[illegible]

VOICES

RACISM IN BRAZIL

CONSTRUCTION OF RACE AND RACISM

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

AFRICAN RENAISSANCE

ECONOMIC INEQUALITY

EDUCATION
  [illegible]
  [illegible]

COMMUNICATIONS / MEDIA

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

HUMAN RIGHTS

RELIGION

WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS

CIVIL SOCIETY

LESSONS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

PHOTOGRAPHY CREDITS

INITIATIVE PUBLICATIONS

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Introduction

This reader offers [illegible] views and perspectives of selected [illegible] Brazil, South Africa and the United States who [illegible] engaged [illegible] the struggle against racism and discrimination. It amplifies on themes and ideas set forth in *Beyond Racism: Embracing an Interdependent Future*, the Report of the Comparative Human Relations Initiative, *Beyond Racism: [illegible]* [illegible] and [illegible] *Three Nations at the Crossroads*, an in-depth survey of issues related to race in each country.

The volume begins with a short piece by journalist Ellis Cose, who [illegible] the many faces of contemporary race relations in the three countries. [illegible] by topically [illegible] excerpts of speeches made by participants at [illegible]. Several Brazilians spoke in Portuguese, and their remarks were taken from the transcripts of their presentations, as translated into English by interpreters.

This reader can convey only a small measure of the courage, hope and [illegible] that animate the struggle against racism and discrimination in these three countries. There is no simple [illegible] quick solution to this deep problem of our [illegible]. [illegible] many responses that over time will effect change and force [illegible] to recede. The [illegible] in this volume remind us that we all can contribute to human [illegible]. [illegible] after all is said and done, the future depends upon what each one of us is willing to do.

Lynn Huntley

Director

The Comparative Human Relations Initiative

January 2000

Courtesy Cape Ar

From Rodriguez to Raça

BY ELLIS COSE

A rock concert was the last place I had expected to find myself in South Africa in March, 1998. My reasons for being in Cape Town, after all, had nothing to do with music. I was there for an ostensibly more serious purpose, to spend time with an eclectic assortment of government officials, activists, scholars and journalists to ponder lessons to be learned from exploring racial experiences in Brazil, the United States and South Africa. Yet, on a pleasant Saturday evening, after the last symposium sessions had adjourned, I found myself with a small group of South African journalists en route to a venue called the Velodrome to hear a folk singer who went by the single name of Rodriguez.

Although I had not heard of Rodriguez before that weekend, my new friends had persuaded me that he was a sight worth seeing. It seemed that two decades ago, when Nelson Mandela was still in prison and democracy in South Africa seemed little more than a dream, Rodriguez had been a subversive figure of hope for liberal-minded South African youths. His idealistic songs had summoned up a vision of a world where suffering is vanquished, where goodness trumps evil, and where polarization can be expunged with a puff of marijuana smoke. If my informants were to be believed, there was a huge appetite in the present-day South Africa for the renewal of that utopian ideal.

Outside of South Africa, Rodriguez had never made much of a name for himself. Indeed, the Detroit native was so obscure that he had spent most of his life working menial jobs. He reportedly had spent more time working in a car wash than performing on a public stage. Nonetheless, his South African popularity had remained high enough to justify dreams of a successful tour.

His Cape Town debut was rather surreal, but it was also a manifest success. In the Velodrome, Rodriguez was received by his screaming fans as if he were a cross between Bob Dylan and a resurrected Elvis. Hordes of people (largely White and mostly young) surrounded the stage, many singing his songs from memory. More than one stray bra and panty landed at the singer's feet as the assembled fans lurched from one emotional high to another. Meanwhile, Rodriguez, revered, if somewhat befuddled, gamely - and at times, hesitatingly - pushed, doing his best to remember music he had not performed in public for years.

In the parking lot outside, following the concert, a sense of general goodwill seemed to wash over the crowd. The overall attitude was reminiscent of the aggressive conviviality one might have seen in the United States during the height of the flower-power era. Several strangers smiled in my direction and one approached, after hearing me speak, to confirm his suspicion that I was from the United States. "Welcome to Cape Town" he said, with a huge grin on his face, as he extended his hand in a show of friendship.

Later that evening, as I dissected the Rodriguez experience with my friends from *The Cape Times*, I was assured that I had witnessed something deeply revelatory about the South African soul. The journalists were under no illusion that Rodriguez's fans were typical South Africans. Nonetheless, they argued that the hunger for an easy accessible utopia was indeed typical of their countrymen. South Africans, they pointed out, had been through quite a lot– decades of censure and political isolation, followed by an explosion of democracy and hope. There was a huge and collective need to feel that peace and paradise were finally within their grasp– or so argued my South African hosts.

I am hesitant to attribute too much to the reaction of Rodriguez's fans; yet, like my newfound friends, I found myself searching for meaning in the crowd's reaction to Rodriguez. For even as that crowd embraced songs and a dream of brotherhood and tolerance, its very composition– overwhelmingly White and well-to-do– bore testimony to class and racial differences that continue to bedevil the new South Africa.

Indeed, what strikes even the casual visitor to South Africa is how deep those divisions run. Despite the much-touted dream of a rainbow nation, in many respects today's South Africa remains a very polarized place. Many Blacks are asking whether a deal that accepted continued White privilege as the price for peace was a deal that should have been made– even as many Whites wonder whether South Africa's best days are in the past. Then there are the so-called "Coloreds"– people of mixed race who enjoyed more privileges than Blacks but not as many as Whites under apartheid– who, in large part, remain suspicious of a majority Black government they believe is not particularly devoted to their interests.

Still, perhaps more than in any other country– including the United States– South Africa stands for the hope and proposition that an unpleasant racial reality can be transformed through the application of political will. This is not to say that there is a consensus in South Africa about how the "rainbow nation" is to be constructed, or even about the extent to which past beneficiaries of apartheid should sacrifice for the common good; but there is a sense, in part rooted in the fact that South Africa clearly has so far to go, that significant progress is possible.



Much of that consensus may be rooted in little more than recognition of the fact that apartheid was such a foul system that any alternative to it is likely to be better. Also, because in apartheid's abolition South Africa has seen the equivalent of a nonviolent revolution, there is a grand sense of possibility in the land. While there is certainly a sense of possibility in the Americas as well, the context is quite different.

In the United States, where the civil rights revolution was launched nearly a half-century ago, there is a widespread sense that the struggle has run its course. And in many quarters there is even a sense that the battle against racism has been won. The End of Racism, the controversial 1995 book by Dinesh D'Souza, contends that in America racism "no longer has the power to thwart Blacks or any other group in achieving their economic, political or social aspirations." In Ending Affirmative Action, published in 1996, Terry Eastland does not go so far as to claim that racism has disappeared, but he does suggest that things have improved to the extent that "remedial" programs such as affirmative action are doing more harm than good. Such assumptions have led to support for government initiatives–the most notable one being California's Proposition 209–that seek to eliminate affirmative action as an instrument of state policy.

Since Brazil has never had a civil rights struggle of the magnitude of that in the United States, many Brazilians have long believed that racism was not something that existed in Brazilian society. Indeed, many observers see the current American fixation on color-blindness as somewhat reminiscent of Brazil's ongoing flirtation with the idea of "racial democracy"– the idea that all Brazilians are treated equally, at least all Brazilians of the same social class.

Ironically, even as many Americans embrace an almost literal interpretation of color-blindness, many Brazilians are coming to reject it. And that has a lot to do with a generation of Brazilian civil rights leaders who are growing increasingly confident in their ability to make themselves heard.

It is time, they say, to make the long-cherished fantasy of racial paradise into something resembling reality. And the advocacy is having an effect. Black faces are increasingly appearing in schoolbooks and in soap operas, and even in high political office. Dulce Pereira, head of the Palmares Foundation (a government-funded institution that promotes Afro-Brazilian welfare and culture) observed, "I get a school book from three or four years ago, and I get a schoolbook now– the same book, from the same publisher– and it has Afro-Brazilians. Before it had nothing."

Brazil's President, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a former sociologist and an expert on race, has endorsed several initiatives aimed at engendering racial equality. He has also convened an inter-ministerial working group dedicated to promoting Afro-Brazilian inclusion. Even so, no one in Brazil seems to see a racial revolution on the horizon.

Much of the reason has to do with the Brazilian psyche, with the difficulty many Brazilians have in taking racism seriously, even as they accept or sanction its practice. As Hélio Santos, a Brazilian economist who serves as coordinator of the president's inter-ministerial group, observed: "We live here with a racism that is very sophisticated... It is very complex for Blacks and for Whites."

One facet of that complexity is that blatant racism is rarely seen in Brazil. Samuel Felicio, a 33-year old Black Brazilian who works as a marketing executive in São Paulo, noted that when a Black Brazilian is refused employment, "you never know whether it is happening because of your color or not. The theory of the racial democracy in Brazil hides the real problems that we are facing."

It is not simply that racism is denied, but that at the same time any positive use of race is discouraged. Berenice A. Kikuchi, a health care official who works in the mayor's office in São Paulo, recalls that in an attempt to reach the city's Black and Brown population, which suffers more from certain diseases– including hypertension and diabetes– than Whites, Kikuchi's staff designed a brochure featuring a Black family. As a result, she says, her office was accused of racism. "They are not accustomed to seeing us" on brochures, she said with a shrug, and therefore see the simple act of placing a Black image on a pamphlet as caving in to pro-Black bigotry.

Edivaldo Brito, São Paulo's secretary of justice, had an even more bracing experience. Brito, a tall, distinguished Black man with close-cropped graying hair, is also a law professor and former mayor of Salvador– in the largely Black state of Bahia. He generally speaks in measured, even tones, but when he speaks of being stopped by the police in São Paulo, one senses agitation– veiled indignation– beneath the surface.

The police demanded that he get out of his car with his hands in the air and questioned him in the street for nearly an hour. "It was humiliating," says Brito, noting that it was the fifth such incident in less than a year. "I was in my official car, with official plates, with a distinct black plate which tells my rank," Brito explains. That mattered not at all to the would-be arresting officer, who, as Brito tells it, only saw "an expensive car occupied by three Blacks– my security men and me."

"People here are not capable of distinguishing one kind of Black from another kind of Black," Brito lamented.

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QUALTUNE
BRASIL
ZUMBI
CONSCIÊNCIA NEGRA
CONTRA A DISCRIMINAÇÃO RA

Januario Garcia

Although the police officer himself was also Black, he assumed the car was stolen. "I tried to explain the importance of my position and my professional training," recalled Brito, a tinge of sadness in his voice, but "he didn't believe me. Despite being Black, he also had prejudice."

The obvious absurdity is that though Brazil proudly celebrates its African roots– in music, in cuisine, even in religion– racial prejudice is deeply embedded in the typical Brazilian mind. Felicio is so accustomed to taking that attitude for granted that she was surprised, during a Christmas season visit to Chicago, to find Blacks fully represented in the department store displays. "In every section there were Black Santa Clauses, Black angels." In contrast, he said, Brazil, for all its talk of a racial democracy, generally showcased Whites. "We are not a Black country or a White country. We are a mixed country," he noted, but one would not know that from most of the advertisements. "The companies in Brazil, advertising agencies, have to have respect for our people, to put our faces on their products, to put our faces in their advertisements," Felicio declared.

A 1997 study by Grottera, a São Paulo based marketing firm, confirmed Felicio's observations. The study, the largest marketing study ever done of Brazil's Black population, documented a growing middle class (defined as those with a median family income of R2 ,312 per month) that the business community was ignoring to its own detriment. It estimated the Black and Brown urban middle class population at seven million individuals (1.7 million families, with 2.2 children on average) whose aspirations and consumption patterns were similar to their White counterparts. They have "specific needs. They have money. They have dreams of consuming. They just don't have the attention of the Brazilian companies," reported Grottera. The study went on to argue that to ignore that market was not only an act of prejudice, but of stupidity.

So why did most Brazilian companies ignore Black Brazilians? One reason, speculated the report, had to do with the widespread assumption about Brazilian nonracialism. Since there was supposedly no prejudice in Brazil, it was somehow unseemly to specifically target

Black consumers. Among some companies there was also an assumption that the Black market was simply too poor, unattractive and unlettered to be commercially appealing. That such an assumption could not exist in the absence of racial prejudice was not a thought that most companies seemed to have entertained.

On the heel of the Grottera study, Brazil's racial image took another knock, this time from the Organization of American States, whose Inter-American Commission on Human Rights sharply criticized Brazil for pervasive racial discrimination.

The OAS study described an incident in São Paulo in 1996 when nine Black youths were arrested in their homes without warrants and were then tortured and made to confess to robbing a nightclub frequented by Whites. The courts refused to accept the coerced confession. Subsequently, the police, forced to reinvestigate the crime, produced the four White men with criminal records who had actually committed the crime.

The Inter-American Commission noted Blacks were not only more likely to be abused by the police, but that they were also more likely to suffer abuse and discrimination in general. Despite that fact the nearly half of Brazilians were either Black or Brown, only two percent of the students at São Paulo University, one of the nation's leading institutions of learning, were Black or Brown. Fewer than three percent of members of Congress were Black. There were also sharp racial disparities in income. On average, Whites earned more than 2.5 times what Blacks made and 4 times as much as Black women earned. Even when education and experience were similar between the races, noted the report, "the Black woman can expect to lose more children from illness, to die younger and to earn less."

Why, given the obvious racial disparity, has there not been more uproar among Blacks in Brazil? Sueli Carneiro, of Geledés Instituto da Mulher Negra, a São Paulo-based organization formed to fight racism and sexism, believes that part of the reason has to do with shame. "The majority of Blacks choose to believe that there isn't racism, although they suffer the effects," says Carneiro. Their refusal to see racism "is a way of defending themselves from humiliation. People have a lot of difficulty admitting to themselves that there is discrimination. They prefer to put on a mask."

To some substantial extent, however, that mind-set seems to be changing, as evidenced by the success of a Brazilian magazine founded in 1996 by Arnaldo Macedo, a former model, actor and sometime photographer who was trained to be an engineer. The product of a middle class family from Rio, Macedo broke into modeling in the 1970s, becoming one of the rare Black Brazilians to succeed in a field that catered almost exclusively to Whites. In the 1980s, he moved to New York, returning to Brazil in the mid-1990s with the hope of raising funds for a documentary on capoeira, a combination dance and martial art with roots in slavery. Macedo's search for financing took him to offices of Editora Simbolo, a company that publishes several magazines. The conversation with the president, Joana Woo, quickly veered into an unexpected direction. "I was trying to convince her to put some money in the film and in the middle of the conversation, we decided we were going to make a magazine for Black people in Brazil," recalled Macedo. The next day he returned with a prospectus.

Macedo's faith that the idea could work derived from his sense that there was a huge appetite for a message that would counter the dominant message put forth by Brazilian society. "Black, here in Brazil means ugly, poor, and everything that is negative" said Macedo.

In his inaugural issue, Macedo declared, "Raça Brasil was born to give you, reader, pride in being Black." The magazine's ideology can be summed up in three words: "Black is beautiful." Mixed in with beauty tips, celebrity profiles, and political analysis is an unrelenting promotion of racial pride. Even the interviews with public figures inevitably focus on that message. The interview, with Mayor Celso Pitta, the first Black (or, more accurately, mulatto) elected to be mayor of São Paulo last March, flaunts the following quote: "All the Blacks will be able to feel pride to have a brother doing a good job."

Because there was previously not much of a market for Black models, Macedo found that Raça had to train its own. "We had to scout people on the streets and in discos and bars and samba schools to transform people into models. Now we have a lot of Black models, beautiful, wonderful models in Brazil, and they work - in Europe and everything, but they started with Raça because they didn't have any chances before Raça."

Macedo makes no apology for his approach. Indeed, he thinks racial self-promotion is essential. "Self-esteem, that's the word. On each page, the reader will open the magazine and say, 'this is building my self-esteem up.'" says Macedo. His purpose, he says, is "to put the Black people in the right position in this country."

Started on little more than a hunch and a prayer, Raça has become one of the hottest magazines in the country. The first issue sold close to 300,000 copies, and circulation has stabilized, says Macedo, at slightly over 100,000. Raça's real success, however, lies not in its circulation figures, but in its forcing much of mainstream Brazil to grapple, how ever superficially, with the issue of Black discontent. And Raça is far from alone in that struggle.

During a public meeting last year, transportation minister Eliseu Padilha approvingly repeated a comment he had heard elsewhere. "There are two Blacks who are admired by the whole country," he said. "One is Pelé, the soccer 'king' and the other is asphalt," said Padilha. Many Brazilians were appalled; but instead of responding mostly with silence as they might have in the past, activists kicked up such a fuss that Padilha eventually explained himself in an interview (during which he denounced racism in Brazil) published in Black People magazine, a three-year-old Rio-based publication whose very existence testifies to a new attitude among at least certain Brazilians.

Ivanir dos Santos, executive secretary of CEAP, a Rio-based advocacy group for "marginalized populations," was among those speaking out against Padilha's statement, and the longtime activist says he now perceives a real change in the Black population in Brazil. He finds that more people are willing to protest with him than was the case in the past. Afro-Brazilians, he says, are "not shutting up anymore. People are losing their fear."

Even the fall-out from Brito's imbroglio with the police can be seen as a sign of how things are changing. Once he heard of the latest incident, Brito's boss, Mayor Celso Pitta, prevailed upon Brito to go on the radio to talk about the harassment he had suffered at the hands of the police. Pitta also went on the radio himself to complain and to remind people to stand up for their rights. He has no real control over the police, since they are under state authority, but nonetheless felt compelled to take some action. "I think it is important that everyone know what is going on because people get used to that type of humiliation," said Pitta.

In his own election, Pitta also saw much reason for hope. Because he had attained such high office, Blacks in Brazil "now see it is possible to achieve high positions in our society, high positions in our political life." Brazil, he added, was passing through "a historical moment."

What the ultimate result will be is impossible to say, all the more so because Brazil is so schizophrenic on the issue of race. Even as it is fascinated by racial differences, it pretends not to see them. And even though it practices racial prejudice, it is not particularly racially polarized. In some substantial sense, the challenge facing Black Brazilians is fundamentally different from that facing their North American and South African counterparts. Because Brazilians of all colors generally shy away from simple racial categorization, they also have less of a basis for organizing along racial lines— or even for thinking of themselves as members of discrete racial groups. The relative lack of racial animosity, however, has not made racial

discussions any easier in Brazil than they are in the United States or in South Africa. Indeed, what is striking is the extent to which Blacks and their allies in all three countries echo each other's complaint. Whereas Blacks in all three countries see a serious and continuing problem of prejudice and discrimination, Whites tend to see such problems as belonging to the past– even in South Africa, where apartheid was not overturned until 1991 and the first democratic elections were not held until three years later.

Frene Ginwala, speaker of the South Africa's national assembly, made that point at length in her comments in Cape Town before the "Beyond Racism" conference held by Idasa and the Comparative Human Relations Initiative.

"Racism is still part of our daily life and political rhetoric. This is but to be expected. It is surprising, however, to find that a number of people seem to believe that centuries of racism were wiped away with the democratic elections on April 27th, 1994. What is even more surprising is that those who were among the victims of apartheid are now being accused of introducing race as a factor in South African politics. Opposition politicians accuse the Government of re-racialising society, while the current leader of the National Party has likened the ANC to the NP of 1948."

Many Whites are indignant when they are accused of racism. After all they argue apartheid is now dead, we have had democratic elections and the country is ruled by a Black President and a predominantly Black cabinet and parliament...

Much of the confusion arises because many White South Africans are ignorant about what has been happening in our country over the past 50 years. They have little knowledge about the nature of apartheid, its impact on the lives of Black South Africans and the methods that were used to maintain the system.

Seen in the context of the complete separation of Whites and Blacks, the astounding ignorance can be understood. In general, Whites were completely insulated from the harsh effects of apartheid. The consequence of mass ignorance is serious, and the fact that we understand the reasons for this does not make the situation less frightening. While one acknowledges apartheid was sustained by the physical and legal barriers erected between South Africans, we must also state that the attraction of staying within the comfort zones of privilege and the protection afforded thereby kept Whites in their ghettoes.

Shaun Johnson, a South African journalist, also worries about the huge disconnect between the perceptions and experiences of Black and White South Africans. "Black South Africa is looking for serious signs from the White community. What they are getting is a back to business" attitude, says Johnson, who lamented in a 1997 article that "no mutually comprehensible language has yet been developed for opening an urgent honest and serious discussion about the core matter of race in the post-apartheid era."

One reason such honest and serious discussion tends not to occur is that many people cultivate what legal scholar john a. powell describes as "deliberate" or "functional" ignorance. By refusing to acknowledge a problem, people obviate– at least to their own satisfaction– the necessity of addressing it.

Many hoped that South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) would force South Africans to eschew such functional ignorance and to face difficult truths. Alex Boraine, the TRC's vice chairman, strongly argued that TRC seemed to be succeeding, that, at the very least, it was a force for honesty and healing.

He was challenged by Mahmood Mamdani of the Centre for African Studies at the University of Cape Town, who argued that the TRC had "obscured the truth as the majority have experienced it." The TRC, he was saying in effect, had contributed to Whites' functional ignorance by dividing the post-apartheid world into perpetrators and victims, thereby allowing the beneficiaries of apartheid who had not engaged in terrorism or torture to divest themselves of any responsibility for apartheid's lingering legacy.

Given the seeming ubiquity of functional ignorance, the question activists in all three countries must ask is to what extent is the success in the battle for equality linked to getting society to admit that racism remains a problem. In both the United States and South Africa, such admissions are getting more and more difficult to come by. And though in Brazil there is finally an opening to discuss racial problems, as well as signs of resolve in certain quarters to do something about it, the nation is nowhere near ready to make a total break with the racial myths of the past. Much of Brazilian society will continue to insist that racism simply cannot exist in Brazil. And even those Brazilians willing to admit the existence of some racial inequity generally take great pride in their perception that Brazil's minor racial problems pale in comparison to those in the United States and elsewhere.

[redacted]

In at least one respect, they have a point. The Brazilian system has made a semblance of racial equality possible, at least at the lower end of the socioeconomic scale. As Diva Moreira, a scholar and journalist who heads up the Black affairs office in the mayor's office in Belo Horizonte, explains it: "After abolition in Brazil, two parallel processes occurred simultaneously– de facto segregation in the upper echelons of society, and the subordinate integration of Blacks at its base." Such a process made it easier to believe that class, not race, was responsible for any racially disparate results.

But integration at the bottom of the pyramid is not the same as racial equality. Nor, for that matter, is tokenism that benefits certain middle class Blacks (as is the case in South Africa and the United States) any assurance of racial equality either.

Christine Qunta, a South African lawyer, argues that much of the answer lies with Blacks themselves: "It is a question of emancipating ourselves psychologically." Brazil's Brito made much the same point: "I think the problem will be solved when Blacks themselves are conscious of their value and believe it is possible that a Black will have the same social capacities as a White."

Even if that point is conceded, however, the question remains of how to transmit that message beyond such publications as Raça, into the larger society, so that not only Blacks, but also members of other racial groups in a position to affect the fate of Blacks, see the point in developing Black potential. And then there is the problem of remediation. How do you make up– as U. S. President Lyndon Johnson asked and as President Nelson Mandela echoed– for centuries of privilege that have given members of certain racial groups huge advantages over members of others?

If the three-way conversation among Brazil, South Africa and the United States has established anything, it is that all three countries are struggling with that question– and that none has much of an answer. That conversation has also established something else, and that has to do with the tendency of societies to view their own situation as exceptional and their own problems as eminently solvable within a generation– and at most two. The sad news is that, heretofore at least, that assumption has always been wrong.

Voices

RACISM IN BRAZIL

Sueli Carneiro

We are very far from having the experience that Black Americans have had, but we benefit from being behind because we don't need to repeat the errors that have been identified.

To provide a bit of context to understand race relations in Brazil, I am going to share a quotation with you:

I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of bringing about in any way the social or political equality of the white and black races. . . . I will say in addition that there is a physical difference between the white and black races which, I suppose, will forever forbid the two races living together upon terms of social and political equality; and inasmuch as they cannot so live, that while they do remain together, there must be the position of superiors and the inferiors; and that I, as much as any other man, am in favor of the superior being assigned to the white man.

Do you know who wrote these words? These words were written, not by a Brazilian, but by the American President, Abraham Lincoln, the "Great Emancipator" in 1858!

By way of contrast, here is how the sociologist, Gilberto Freyre, inventor of the idea of the Brazilian "racial democracy," described Brazilian race relations:

[Brazilians are]...a people who enjoy this extraordinary, peaceful racial harmony, in contrast with those other

parts of the world where racial hatred exists at times under the most violent and crude forms.

The dramatic issues of apartheid in South Africa and of the American segregationist past always call forth a comparison of the situations of South African, American and Brazilian Blacks. The Brazilian national conscience always felt itself to be free from racial conflicts that were present in South Africa and the United States. Indeed, those conflicts confirmed the myth of the Brazilian racial democracy. Thus, through direct comparison with Blacks and Whites in South Africa and the United States, we could consider ourselves in a racial paradise. The United States and South Africa were always used [in this way] to de-mobilize the Black revolt in Brazil.

The myth of racial democracy functions to sustain itself through four basic characteristics: first, the apparent absence of racial conflict; second, the nonexistence of legal segregation; third, the presence of some non-Whites in the elite classes; and fourth, racial miscegenation of the population, supposedly an indicator of racial tolerance.

This demonstrates the crucial difference in Brazilian racism compared to that in South Africa and the United States. Brazil developed a much more sophisticated and perverse form of racism through which racial intolerance masks itself in the equality of rights in legal terms and solidifies itself in absolute inequality of opportunities in terms of concrete social relations. Because of massive miscegenation and equality through legal measures, the ideology of racial democracy induced Blacks and Whites to believe that the social inferiority of Blacks was due to their own incompetence. The ideology of racial democracy masked the fact that the methods of racial segregation utilized in Brazil and South Africa, although different, achieved the same results. The South African bantustans and the American ghettos are redefined in Brazil as favelas, and all are populated primarily by Blacks. The South African pass laws are masked in Brazil by the need for professional identification papers, signed and violently required by the Brazilian police of Black workers, maids, and other marginalized groups for whom the vagrancy law was created. All of these strategies of marginalization of the Brazilian

Ricardo Funari/RF

Black population peacefully unfold with the sanction of Whites and ultimately the inaction of the majority of Blacks.

One of the products of this cynical and camouflaged form of racism is the absence of a collective Black conscience, capable of organizing itself against the cowardly enemy that never shows itself, since in Brazil, no one is racist [sardonic comment]. Thus, we all prefer to believe in the rationale advanced by our politicians and intellectuals: Blacks live under worse conditions because they are poor, not because they are Black. Put another way, we are told that what exists in Brazil is social and not racial apartheid.

Therefore, we, Black activists, like underdeveloped Don Quixotes, go to battle only against windmills. It is in this way that the notion of racial democracy has been achieved in Brazil, without Mandelas, without Bikos, without Martin Luther Kings, nor Malcolm Xs, without direct racial confrontation resulting in massacres and exterminations. With hunger, unemployment and sterilizations, racism in this form is able to continue silently to promote the genocide of the Black Brazilian.

In contrast to what occurs in Brazil, racial apartheid and segregation in the United States and South Africa constituted concrete instruments of racial intolerance. Where racial apartheid and segregation regulated race relations, it was possible for Blacks to develop a clear consciousness of the weight of racism in creating their oppression and social conditions. Segregation preserved a racial identity and ultimately constituted itself as a battle instrument in the affirmation and emancipation process of American and South African Blacks. Segregation and apartheid promoted the creation of institutions of support, solidarity and development of the Black communities. They produced strong and consequently prestigious national and international leadership groups.

The Brazilian myth of racial democracy in practice is more effective than Abraham Lincoln's beliefs or South African apartheid. In this context, we address the racial struggle. The fundamental political work of the Brazilian Black movement during the last twenty years has been aimed at the demystification of racial democracy. We seek to break the conspiracy of silence that surrounds the subject of racism in our society. *April, 1997*

Antônio Sérgio Guimarães

There is a notion within the international community that we do not have marked racial differences in Brazil. Some go so far as to say that we don't have race in Brazil, that what we have is color, a color graded so broadly that almost every color exists. This idea that in Brazil race relations are more cordial, smooth and humanitarian than in the United States dates back to American abolitionism. It is an idea that was constructed in dialogue with the United States.

Race was a recognized factor in 19th century Brazil. Then, with all the interbreeding, there developed the idea that mixed-race individuals would produce offspring who would revert to one race or the other. This idea was the basis of "whitening." One could be White in Brazil despite one's relatives, because of the belief that one ended up pulling to one side or the other. This created a new category of Whites and reinforced the notion of race as something consolidated in mixture. In contrast to the American system where anyone of mixed race is considered part of the subordinate race, in Brazil a person can be White and be of mixed race at the same time. Later we created a category called Pardo (Brown). While in the mixture some go to the White end of the spectrum and some to the Black end, there is an intermediate, mixed-race category– namely Pardo. This notion– that Whites and Blacks can be the product of mixtures– is the basis for the idea of racial democracy in Brazil.

After the Second World War, race itself became a racist concept in Brazil. It was replaced by the concept of ethnicity. The idea was that one's race should not be a concern. Race should only concern racists. Brazilian newspapers simply used ethnic groups as a nice way of referring to race. To deny the existence of races became the beginning and end of the anti-racist struggle in Brazil.

The concept of color in Brazil is at the base of classification of people. It has become the institutional form by which racial groups are classified. In the population census, race is recorded in the official statistics through color. In other words, you have the White group (Blanco), the Black group (Preto) and the Brown group (Pardo). It's just a translation of race, but free of the shame of race.

Social anthropology in the 1960s made important discoveries. For example, color in Brazil means more than skin color. It means type of hair, too. As an African American traveler to Brazil in the 1950s said, "I've discovered the secret of racial relations in Brazil: you discriminate by people's hair rather than by their skin color." Then there is also the shape of one's nose and lips. Another meaning of color is as a category of social status. In other words, racial color plus appearance equals color status. This idea of status in Brazil is strong and persists to this day.

The notion of a "good appearance" also transmits the idea of good manners. In the construction of race in Brazil, color and appearance are heavily implicated. What are the implications of this construction of race for strategies of social mobilization?

Social mobility for Blacks occurs through what has been called "whitening." This means that Blacks who climb the ladder can be defined as non-Blacks. They may not be treated as Whites, but they are distinguished as non-Blacks. Some recent studies challenge this, showing that the emerging Black middle class in Brazil defines itself as Black. I believe we don't have sufficient knowledge yet of how widespread this phenomenon is. What we have is a partial challenge to whitening. From the political point of view, a thesis is advanced that the Black movement in Brazil has a problem because its leaders cannot be sought amongst the Mulattos. The reason is that the Mulattos get whitened. Brazilians of color who could become leaders choose instead to become White.

The refusal of the majority of Brazilians to identify themselves racially is a problem for public policy. It leads to a tendency to forget the race issue, to make-believe it does not exist. This idea is prevalent among the majority of Brazilians.

The strongest idea of racism in Brazil is that racism and race are considered the same thing. People who believe in race are considered racist. If you do not believe in race, you are not considered racist, you are an anti-racist. The best way to not be racist in Brazil is to forget that race exists.

A second idea is that racism exists only as individual prejudice. That racism is completely individual. We may admit to prejudice by some individuals but never in a collective sense.

How do people who suffer racism conceive of it? What do they call racism? There are anti-discrimination laws in Brazil, and individuals file complaints of racial discrimination with the newspapers or police precincts. So what do they complain about?

Sixteen percent of all complaints are against the police; eight percent of complaints concern the right to come and go because of doormen and building superintendents who prevent people from entering buildings or using swimming pools. The idea behind that is that these people are not supposed to frequent such places. Another increasing category of complaints concerns consumer rights: individuals discriminated against in department stores, supermarkets, banks, restaurants, and bars. Here racial discrimination can be quite violent with ordinary people mistaken for bank robbers in some cases just because of their color. Or being frisked in supermarkets. Sixteen percent of complaints relate to discrimination on the job, or to people applying for jobs or passed over for promotion. And 12 percent of complaints relate to slander, slurs and attacks on personal honor.

In reporting these complaints however, there are extremely few cases where newspapers or police precincts acknowledge that there actually was racial discrimination. Rather, judges call it slander, a product of private personal relations which has nothing to do with the anti-discrimination laws per se. *September 1997*

Hélio Santos

There is a schizophrenic aspect to Brazil's racial discrimination: when a White or a supposed White assaults a Black, they assault themselves because although they may refuse to perceive it, they, too, have Blackness in them. In Brazil, unlike the United States and South Africa, the Black culture permeates everyone and everything. *April, 1997*

Benedita Da Silva

Brazil has the second largest population of Blacks in the world after Nigeria. South Africa has a population whose majority is Black whereas in the United States the Black population is a minority. In all three countries, Blacks are under-represented in social, economic and political spheres of life relative to their numbers.

In Brazil, for example, the minority White population has economic power and controls the government. But the under-representation of Blacks is not recognized in public discourse or the media. It is not given any visibility. This is because for Brazil to acknowledge racial discrimination, it would have to admit the myth it maintains about itself– the myth of being a racial democracy. Brazil has been able to perpetrate this myth largely because of its history of miscegenation and the dilution of clear racial identity.

Brazil needs to develop a social agenda that raises the visibility of racial discrimination. Such an agenda ought to tackle economic, social and political inequalities and promote affirmative action. One recent example of an effort to raise Black visibility was a campaign organized by the Black movement for national recognition of our Black heroes in order to reveal that in Brazil, there are Blacks.

April, 1997

CONSTRUCTION OF RACE AND RACISM

Manning Marable

Racism, or perhaps more accurately the processes of racialization, is a social dynamic of inequality and stratification for the purposes of exploitation. Racial categories are used to preserve social hierarchy and sets of dominant and subordinate relations that foster and perpetuate privilege.

This definition of racism makes several basic assumptions:

that racism is not an accidental or unintentional consequence in the make-up of any society;

that embedded in the very concept of race itself is the process of exploitation and the unequal distribution of productive resources and material wealth within a society;

that racism cannot fully be comprehended or understood essentially as a form of social intolerance and a rational hatred to a group's physical appearance or religious rituals, or social conditions; and

that racism is never static or fixed as a social process.

Racism as we know it today evolved out of very specific historical circumstances with the expansion of European colonialism into the western hemisphere. Throughout the non-western world, this expansion resulted in the genocidal elimination of indigenous populations and the vast forced migration of millions of Brown and Black slave laborers from their areas of origin into the newly colonized settler states. These historical processes were justified and encouraged by the construction of a powerful ideology of White supremacy, the creation of an empty, yet deadly, social category of "Whiteness." The maintenance of racial divisions, the fostering of competition and resentment along the boundaries of color and labor was an integral and essential feature of the economic development of these new societies in Brazil and much of Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa and the United States.



Race, from the vantage-point of the oppressed is also always simultaneously imposed from without and constructed from within. That is, race represents both a nearly endless series of liabilities and barriers imposed by those in power, such as strict laws enforcing group segregation and limiting access for credit and capital, and also the internal cultural development, traditions and collective identities of an oppressed population which seeks survival and resistance.

There is an inescapable ambivalence about race for the oppressed. Who we are is an historical product in part of our collective struggles to challenge the barriers of racial inequality. It is the memories of suffering and deprivation. It is also the joys and celebrations reflected in our distinct art forms, dance, religious traditions and music, as well as the transient transcendence of historical boundaries of ethnicity, language and tradition.

Liberals, at least in the United States and to some extent throughout the English speaking world, tend to think about Black populations primarily as the victims of historical processes of slavery, apartheid and segregation. They frequently minimize in their analysis the cultural autonomy and indigenous forms of resistance by Black people themselves. Perhaps this is not surprising. It is always easier for the powerful to speak for someone else than to allow the oppressed to speak for themselves. This essential duality of racialization has meant that Black people in many different societies throughout the world have frequently used race as a means of organizing within their own communities. The racial barrier under segregation in the United States to some marginal extent kept White capital outside of the Black community, permitting the development of a very small, yet active, Black entrepreneurial stratum.

The racial barrier in the United States and elsewhere created the cultural space for the construction of the Black church and the rise of original and creative forms of spiritu ality, drawing upon African culture and rituals from Ethiopianism and Rastafarianism to Santeria. Racial barriers fostered a lexicon of resistance, strategies and programs that fought for the restructuring of society, which would in some way lead to Black empowerment and greater human dignity. So for those of us who are committed to the process of transcending, of going beyond racism, the essential paradox is that we are forced by history to utilize the tools and language produced by race itself. As the Black American scholar W.E.B. DuBois might have put it, destroying racism requires race conscious solutions or conversely, we cannot eradicate race as a category of unequal social relations unless we are conscious of race. To uproot race, we must first identify it. Deconstructing race will require a critical reexamination and critique of certain concepts about diversity and pluralism which today are frequently popularized.

We have heard a good deal about multi-culturalism and Africanization. Multi-culturalism in the United States has generally meant the recognition of specific contributions of many different ethnic and cultural groups to the construction of United States society. It was frankly preferable to the traditional liberal's formulation of racial assimilation because it forced open to some degree the cultural pluralism in syncretism inherent in the American experience. But the possible contradiction in multi-culturalism is the neo-liberal tendency to celebrate everyone's differences without saying anything about class, power and privilege. If we simply celebrate cultures without simultaneously examining how culture is linked to power and the preservation of social hierarchies, it is at best a useless exercise. Celebrating diversity for its own sake can actually divert us from the practical tasks essential for constructing a genuine cultural democracy simultaneously.

The recent discourse about Africanization in South Africa is based on the very real necessity to bring more Black people into the apparatuses of power both in public and private sectors. In the United States, the policies of affirmative action have desegregated numerous institutions in American civil society and have been even more effective inside the federal government. Millions of African Americans, Hispanics and women have directly benefited from affirmative action and equal opportunity programs. Yet affirmative action, while essential, is not sufficient in the effort to achieve economic justice.

Affirmative action is about compensatory justice. The opening of doors to those who are qualified to prove themselves. It was never conceived of as an anti-poverty program or an effort to redistribute wealth or resources from one class to another. Affirmative action to some extent compensates women and minorities for being historically excluded, but it does not fully transform the actual structure of power.

Any strategy to dismantle racism must recognize the ways that state power has deliberately reproduced racial categories and encouraged and benefited from racial divisions. Racial categories after all did not fall from the sky, imposing themselves on non-European people. They were deliberately, socially constructed, and in these processes the State has always played a decisive and essential role.

In South Africa, the settler government constantly utilized the divisions between the Coloured, Indian and Black African populations to maintain state power. The legacy of these divisions frequently retarded the anti-apartheid movement and prolonged the hegemony of White authority. Similarly in the United States, all racialized ethnic groups have experienced varying degrees of oppression and exploitation, but do not often see themselves as having the same fundamental interests, and to be sure, racialization is not uniform in its ideological and coercive content.

Some racial/ethnic groups were privileged relative to the condition of other groups. On a sliding scale of oppression, it was deemed preferable to be nearer the top of the incline rather than at the bottom. It is problematic therefore to consider that the Coloured population of the Western Cape voted overwhelmingly, 68.7 percent, for the National Party in the 1994 elections.

As scholar Wilmot James has astutely observed: "At the first opportunity to register their preferences, Coloured people favored a restricted definition about who they were instead of taking on the broader nationalism, non-racialism espoused. It is ironic that the political framework produced by years of non-racial struggle yielded an outcome which rejected non-racialism."

Something parallel to the political tensions we see here is developing inside the United States, in a very different context, with growing political and socio-economic contradictions between Black Americans, Hispanics and Asian Americans. Each of these groups was in part socially constructed by sets of state regulations which defined collective identities. To be Black in a racist formation means that there were rigid implementations and dehumanizing restrictions imposed on you that were largely inescapable. Being Asian American, by contrast, also meant encountering severe barriers of discrimination which, however, were not as draconian or pervasive as those encountered by most Black people. For example, today Asian American households actually have a higher average per capita income than Whites, Hispanics or Blacks. Their rates of business development are up to roughly six times that of African Americans.

The political buffer role which to some extent the Coloured constituency has occupied in South Africa may be articulated in the United States throughout the upwardly mobile, affluent, better educated non-White population, Asians, Hispanics and African Americans alike. One should essentially understand Black America today not as one single monolithic community, but as three overlapping communities with, in many ways, very different interests: a successful Black professional and managerial middle class; a Black working class that has been steadily losing ground; and a Black ghetto class that is experiencing nothing less than socio-economic devastation. The United States' system accommodated a segment of the racial/ethnic groups to acquire middle class status while the larger dynamics of inequality and human underdevelopment remain--or have even become for many worse.

Some years ago sociologist William Julius Wilson suggested than an economic system in a multi-racial society becomes less constrictive as it becomes more competitive and industrialized, that race in such a society, relative to class "declines in significance." We might modify Wilson's race to class insight in two ways. First, an authoritarian capitalist state may be moved to adopt greater democratic representation and policies of racial diversity without a concomitant restructuring of class relations. Second, race as a powerful societal idea may not necessarily decline in significance, but actually mutate into new forms of domination, involving the construction of new ethnic identities, discourses and sets of social relations. We may have, in the twenty-first century, racism without "racists."

Deconstructing racism will require two final points. The rewriting of history, defective public narrative that shapes our collective notions of events and chronology, to reflect the actual lived experiences of those who have been locked out of the corridors of power. When I was in graduate school some years ago, a professor asked us why it was that in African safaris, the lion was always killed by the intrepid White hunters. The answer is "because lions have no historians." In the United States, most African Americans were taught that Africa had no history worthy of the name until it was colonized by Europe. Some anti-apartheid activists, comrades in our struggle in the United States, did not really know the rich history of the long struggle for freedom against racism in South Africa.

The future is in many ways prefigured by the past. If the dominant narrative about a society has systematically excluded the voices and lived experiences of Black and Brown people, history becomes a central ideological pillar for the preservation of White supremacy.

Lastly, the most important question that must be addressed in the goal of transcending and dismantling race and racism in theory and practice and the issues that we have yet to discuss sufficiently here is the question of agency. By what means can the racially oppressed become empowered in a political economy dominated and controlled by market forces? This question must also be answered in the context of globalization and the imposition of neo-liberal economic constraints on developing states such as Brazil and South Africa.

Unless the democratic state can pursue strategies of significant income and resource redistribution, the patience of those classes at the bottom of society will indeed wear thin. The rhetoric of democracy will seem hollow to those whose hopes for a better life remain unfulfilled. In both South Africa and the United States, the forces of Black freedom constructed a "counter hegemonic bloc," a broad based majority coalition that successfully called for the dismantling of Jim Crow segregation and apartheid, respectively.

The next stage of these democratic revolutions must find a way to construct new majorities dedicated to challenging all forms of human inequality, which are, after all, at the heart of what we still call racism. *March, 1998*

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Alex Boraine

I believe that truth telling does promote reconciliation, though it depends on what we mean by truth telling and by reconciliation. What kind of truth telling do we have in mind? Firstly, factual truth. The Act governing the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission requires us to "prepare a comprehensive report which sets out its findings based on factual and objective information and evidence collected or received by it or placed at its disposal."

This mandate operates on both an individual and broad social level. The Commission makes findings relating to individuals and the broader causes and patterns of human rights violations.

One form of factual truth telling is personal narrative truth. Through telling their own stories, victims and perpetrators have given meaning to the multi-layered South African



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

story. One of the Commission's objectives is to "restore the dignity of victims by granting them an opportunity to relate their own accounts of the violations of which they are the victims." The stories we listened to over two years were heart wrenching personal stories, conveying unique insights into the pain of our past. To listen to one man relate how his wife and baby were simultaneously murdered is a more powerful truth than all the statistics in the world.

Another type of truth is dialogue truth– truth established through discussion and debate. People from all walks of life were invited, sometimes subpoenaed, to the TRC process and contributed to this truth.

By facilitating dialogue and the telling of personal stories, the Commission not only helped uncover facts about past abuses, but contributed to the process of reconciliation by ensuring that the silence relating to individuals' experiences was broken. As a result of the TRC's work, it is no longer possible for people to claim that they did not know. It has become impossible to claim that the practice of torture by state security forces was not systematic and widespread. It is no longer possible to claim that only a few bad apples committed gross human rights violations. It is also no longer possible to claim that accounts of gross human rights violations in ANC camps were merely the consequence of state misinformation. It is when we listen to ordinary people's experiences that one is able to understand the magnitude and horror of apartheid.

The truth can provide the beginning of healing. Hopefully, from truth comes knowledge. That is the opposite of the deceit, lies and cover-ups on which South African society has been built. And from knowledge hopefully comes acknowledgment, and then accountability, accountability not merely by the foot soldiers who carried out the orders, but by the architects, politicians, leaders, indeed the entire White society. One of the problems in South Africa is that even Whites who dared to be against apartheid don't have clean hands. The whole White community benefited from apartheid. An aspect of the healing that could flow from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is an acceptance of accountability by a White minority that gained enormously at the expense of the Black majority, even though in some instances they opposed apartheid. Indeed, apartheid could never have survived without being buttressed by those who benefited from it. As one perpetrator who appeared before us, a former security policeman, Major Craig Williamson, said: "Our weapons, ammunition, uniforms, vehicles, radios and other equipment were all developed and provided by industry. Our finances and banking were done by bankers who even gave us covert credit cards for covert operations. Our chaplains prayed for our victory, and our universities educated us in war. Our propaganda was carried by the media and our political masters were voted back into power time after time with ever increasing majorities."

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission has assured that South Africa will never be able to deny its past. But the Commission's aim is not for South Africa to be paralyzed by its past and captive to it. It must go beyond that. The goal of reconciliation through truth telling is one possibility. But the Commission on its own cannot bring about that reconciliation, a reconciliation we all long for. Reconciliation will take place on many levels involving many initiatives over many years. The Commission can be a kind of building block, a foundation stone that can lead to a greater degree of acceptance, tolerance and respect– hopefully even a measure of reconciliation.

Reconciliation is a moral imperative and practical necessity if we are to live in stability and peace. But reconciliation cannot be insisted upon. A visitor to our offices commented that "it would not have been decent for a non-Jewish person to have suggested to Jews that they become reconciled to the Germans immediately after World War II." In other words, the Commission cannot demand that those who suffered must forgive.

To hold out forgiveness as a choice is different. I have been overwhelmed by the expressions of magnanimity and generosity shown by those who suffered so horrendously. Over and over we have had people come before the Commission genuinely wanting to forgive and make a new start. We have people seeking to forego bitterness, renounce resentment, move beyond old pain and hurt. In so doing, they have become victors and survivors rather than passive victims. A start has been made. We have a very long way to go. *April, 1997 and March, 1998*

Mahmood Mamdani

I am afraid that my response to the question, "can truth telling promote racial reconciliation?" is not going to be as

optimistic as that of the previous speaker. I have doubts whether truth alone can promote reconciliation. What if the truth should turn out to be morally unacceptable? While there is a relationship between truth and reconciliation, it is not a direct one. It is mediated through justice. It is Hannah Arendt who said: "men are unable to forgive what they cannot punish."

Only justice makes it possible for us to live with a morally unacceptable truth. The question becomes what kind of justice? Reconciliation will not endure unless we interpret justice to mean a justice that lays the ground for a new community of survivors, a community based on empathy between yesterday's antagonists and today's survivors. Gandhi once said: "Treat the thief as if, when the lights came on, the thief turned out to be your father." This was not an invitation to tolerate theft, but an invitation to make an analytical distinction between the act and the agent, to embrace the agent without embracing the act. We must distinguish between the moment when forgiveness is a real choice and forgiveness is a foregone conclusion. When forgiveness is a public ritual under the glare of television cameras, it has less the feel of an amnesty conferred by the victim and more the feel of a declaration of immunity by those in power. Such forgiveness, ironically, may feel like an act of disempowerment.

The TRC has looked at apartheid through the experience of a tiny minority of political activists and state agents, of perpetrators and a few thousand victims. In so doing, it has marginalized the experience of ordinary victims of apartheid. That experience can only be put center stage by looking at the relationship, not just between perpetrators and victims, but more broadly between winners and losers.

What is distinctive about apartheid is the link between the perpetrator and the beneficiary, between power and privilege, between racialized power and racialized privilege. This is why in marginalizing the victimhood of the majority, we must ask: has not the TRC obscured the truth as the majority experienced it?

The TRC invites beneficiaries to join victims in a public outrage against perpetrators. It invites beneficiaries to say: "If only we had known. We did not know this when we voted time after time for the regime of White power and White privilege." So beneficiaries, too, are presented as victims.

By reducing apartheid to its worst perpetrators, is not the TRC turning into a rescue operation for beneficiaries? I do not suggest that this is the intention of the TRC. But outcomes do not always flow from intentions, and this is an unintended outcome. The more beneficiaries are outraged at apartheid, the less they feel responsible for it. They see no need to be forgiven. As a consequence, victims are outraged at the callousness, the indifference, the lack of empathy of beneficiaries. They feel that forgiveness is undeserved and they return to their original demand– justice. So the TRC ends up fueling the very demand it set out to dampen.

Is there a way out? Yes, I think so. The solution is to bring to the surface the truth that the TRC is obscuring, that it is important to teach the beneficiaries not only about abuses for which they bear no personal responsibility, but about the structural injustices of apartheid of which they are direct beneficiaries and for which they bear a direct responsibility to redress.

The alternative is to place center-stage the experience of apartheid as a banal reality for sixteen million people arrested for pass law violations, for four million victims of forced removals, and for the millions who went through Bantu education. This experience has to be put center-stage as a reality lived by ordinary South Africans. The alternative has to re-frame the question of justice, not as criminal justice but as social justice. To do this will require a second Truth Commission that does not cut the cloth to suit the political reality of the day.

The contradiction is that while the TRC has addressed the dilemma of a fractured political elite, divided between a small minority of victims and perpetrators, it has glossed over the reality of a fractured society. If perpetrators today symbolize the change that has taken place, beneficiaries symbolize the change that has yet to take place. *March, 1998*

AFRICAN RENAISSANCE

Njabulo S. Ndebele

Many of you may be familiar with a recent book by Jacques Pauw entitled Into the Heart of Darkness: Confessions of Apartheid Assassins. The on-going hearings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission provide a most relevant background to the revelations of human depravity made in the book. Jacques Pauw was able to interview

many of the apartheid's assassins, who no doubt, felt they had to cover themselves once it became clear they would ultimately be discovered.

The following paragraph from the first chapter of the book sets a powerful background to the horrible events described in the rest of the book, whose cumulative effect is simply overwhelming:

"All over the country, commission investigators have dug up the skeletons of police victims who were killed and buried in secret graves. Every security police unit devised its own methods of getting rid of the bodies of their victims. Vlakplaas operatives packed explosives around the bodies of their victims, the Northern Transvaal Security Branch blew them up with land mines. The Eastern Cape Security Branch burnt them and threw their ashes into the Fish River, while evidence suggests that the Natal Security Branch buried them in secret graves and the Johannesburg Security Branch threw some of its victims down mine shafts."

After this, the assassins flip past, strutting down the catwalk of evil: Eugene de Kock, Ferdie Barnard, Dirk Coetzee, Paul Erasmus, Craig Williamson, Gideon Niewoudt, Paul van Vuuren, Dirk Stoffberg, and on and on.

After the seventh chapter, I found that I just could not continue with the book. There have been few times in my reading life that I have had such a violent reaction to a book. I think the reason I stopped reading had far less to do with the numbing shock of the descriptions of terrible deeds revealed than with what, in my view, is at the heart of any "African Renaissance" in South Africa.

Jacques Pauw deliberately wants us to remember Conrad's Heart of Darkness, a book which contemplates the depravity of colonialism. The historic link to the internal colonialism of apartheid is most instructive. Such evocations of human depravity contain the most serious messages for humanity. Without detracting anything from the profound philosophical significance of Conrad's contemplation, and that of Jacques Pauw's revelations, I found that in my con



text. I was being confronted with something Nkrumah wrote about in the fifties. At that time, he said, the history of Africa was the history of European adventures in Africa. Those of us who were compelled to study this history were contemplating the European experience in our midst. We experienced ourselves in this history, not at living beings, but as metaphor.

Why should the depravity of apartheid's assassins, White Afrikaner men, absorb my intellect at this most formative moment in the history of my country? Of course, we have to know the past. But the needs of our White compatriots seem to continue to occupy an inordinate amount of attention at that time when the newly liberated Black citizens of our country should enjoy center stage.

What we see illustrated here is, from my point of view, the trap of the social power of our White South Africa. The continuing cultural dominance of White South Africa ensures that the victims of its immediate past remain preoccupied with the lives of their erstwhile rulers, who as subjects of contemplation, continue to shape the discourse that informs social conscience.

It should be clear what the notion of the "African Renaissance" should mean for me. It means the centering of the majority experience in the national life of South Africa. This kind of understanding is the foundation of any kind of reawakening.

Who is there to write about the stories of the "victims"? Such stories will show not only pain and suffering in the hands of White oppressors, but also the pains and joys experienced in piecing together shattered lives. The opposite of the story of depraved perpetrators is not necessarily the story of abject, cowering, and wretched victims. On the contrary, the stories of the "victims" are the stories of victors inheriting a new land, and, in the process, embracing difficult contradictions. How is it that such people who have suffered so much, continued to strive for coherent lives, raising families, building communities, striving for personal ends? How is it that they were able to forgive some of the assassins? Surely life testimonies of this nature have the considerable potential to inform a new moral and value system in our country. It is this that offers even the depraved the promise of redemption.

The "African Renaissance" in South Africa is about how we can make the diverse instruments of the state serve the interests of the newly liberated. It is about the form and content of social change from the general perspective of the newly enfranchised citizens of our country. It is not a program of action but a social process. It is a transformative process, not an idealized state of being conjured into existence.

I think the same applies to the rest of the continent. The "African Renaissance" is a process that goes concurrently with significant trends toward democracy and economic growth which countries such as Ghana and Uganda are experiencing.

Of course, this idea of the African Renaissance is relatively new, and its meaning will be discussed and debated in the years to come. My contribution has simply been to add my own perspectives on it. *March, 1998*

ECONOMIC INEQUALITY

Bernard Anderson

Of all the institutions in society, I believe that government must play the major role in reducing racial economic inequality and assuring social inclusion. The government is the institution responsible for protecting the Constitutional rights of all its citizens to participate in society. The first requirement of government is to adopt economic policies that support the steady, balanced economic growth which is essential to reducing income inequality in a market economy.

Steady economic growth generates job creation and tight labor markets, which lead to higher wages as employers compete for workers. (By steady economic growth, I mean a rate greater than 2.5 percent per annum.) In addition there are many secondary effects of strong growth which reduce income inequality. One is that the bargaining power of trade unions to negotiate wage increases will be strengthened. Another is the greater likelihood that the government will be able to raise minimum wages. Any negative employment effects from raising the minimum wage will be ameliorated by strong economic growth. Also, in a growing economy, workers tend to transfer from the informal to the formal market economy.

Other benefits also flow from steady, balanced economic growth: public revenues that might be used to invest in human capital tend to be higher because of increased tax collections. Human capital investment tends to increase worker productivity which, in turn, increases the income

Flip Schulke [illegible]

earning capacity of the workforce and leads to higher wages. For all these reasons, a steadily growing economy narrows the earnings gap between higher and lower wage segments of the work force.

The relationship between economic growth and the reduction of income inequality is not just theoretical, but is based on actual United States' experience. African Americans bear a relationship to the American economy much like that of the caboose on the train. When the train speeds up, the caboose speeds up, and when the train slows down, the caboose slows down. But in the natural order of things, the caboose never catches up with the engine. Since 1993, the American economy has produced more than 12 million new jobs of which 12 percent went to African Americans. As a result, the rate of unemployment among African American youth is the lowest in almost 25 years. In addition, African American median income is today 63 percent of the median income of Whites, the highest it has ever been, and it has increased significantly in the past five years. So while African-Americans have gained employment and income, they have only partially narrowed the gap with White Americans.

Economic growth reduces income inequality, but economic growth alone won't produce a desirable level of parity in the distribution of income. Something more is required–specific government policies designed to reduce income inequality directly. In other words, if market forces simply take their course, income inequality will decline but not enough to achieve a desirable level of equality in the distribution of income among people of different racial groups.

Those who insist that government has no role because market forces will solve the problem fail to take into account the pervasive impact of racism. Racism denies people the opportunity to develop and use their talents to contribute to society. Racism blocks access to a good education, a good paying job, starting a business and participating in the growth of the economy. Although some degree of economic inequality is necessary in a market economy, economic inequality should not be based on race. The goal of the government, through public policy, should be to eliminate racial economic inequality.

The effort to reduce racial economic inequality in the United States began forty years ago with the Supreme Court decision in Brown vs. Board of Education, which abolished legal segregation in public schools. That was the forerunner to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which abolished segregation throughout society, required equal opportunity in a range of industries and created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the agency responsible for providing relief to those discriminated against in the job market. These efforts were supplemented by executive action of the President of the United States.

In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson issued an Executive Order requiring affirmative action among employers with contracts to provide goods and services to the federal government. Three types of inequality were the object of the order: job discrimination, which was the failure even to hire African Americans; job segregation, in which African Americans would be hired but employed only in certain occupations; and wage discrimination in which African Americans were paid lower wages than Whites. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 made each of those types of discrimination unlawful.

But a mere prohibition against discrimination will not on its own reduce economic inequality. It is necessary for the government to pursue direct policies aimed at reducing income inequality, like increasing minimum wages, investing in education and skills training, and targeting resources to community development.

In addition to supporting policies aimed specifically at racial minorities, the government also should pursue policies aimed more broadly at improving the income distribution in the economy as a whole. If the goal is to reduce racial inequality in economic life, then a variety of approaches must be pursued. One is affirmative action; another is work to lessen poverty.

Lyndon Johnson understood the need for a dual strategy. He used affirmative action to help pry open the door of opportunity for those who had been discriminated against, and he also introduced the poverty program. The central elements of the poverty program were to improve education and training for the disadvantaged and improve social security and health care for the elderly poor.

What has been the impact of these policies over the last thirty years? Rather mixed, I confess. This year's "Economic Report of the President," written by the Council of Economic Advisors, says that between 1940 and the present time, there has been a significant increase in the proportion of American families in the middle class. The increase in the proportion of such White families was constant over time, but the increase in the number of Black families into the middle class did not pick up until the 1960s, reflecting the impact of Lyndon Johnson's public policy. The rate of programs slowed from the late 1970s through the 1980s for two reasons: a general increase in income inequality in American society and a shift in public policy emphasis during the 1980s away from efforts to promote and assure equal opportunity. The national administrations in office from 1981 to 1993 were not committed to reducing racial inequality. Since the Clinton Administration took office in 1993, we have seen the gap begin to narrow again.

President Clinton last year announced the "President's Initiative on Race." The goal is to get Americans to talk about race. That initiative is being led by the distinguished African American historian, Dr. John Hope Franklin. The next two years will tell the tale. In that period we will know whether W.E.B. DuBois' dictum, that the problem of the 20th century is a color line, will define the struggle for the next century as it has been the struggle for the last.
September, 1997 and March, 1998

Neil Coleman



The issues of economic inequality and racial inequality in South Africa are so closely intertwined as to become virtually impossible to separate. So when I refer to economic inequality, I am including racial inequality at the same time.

On the issue of globalization, its salesmen, what I would call its "sunshine salesmen," would like us to believe that it is about to propel us into a new dawn of progress and prosperity. Unfortunately the reality is quite different. Without being a prophet of doom, our high tech, sophisticated, new global order threatens to plunge our world backwards into an epoch of social disintegration and the destruction of nations on a

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CASH LOANS
WITH A DIFFERENCE
FREE
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scale of which matches the degradation of primitive colonialism over the last two millennia.

You are all familiar with the statistics of poverty and inequality in the developing world and the deterioration of those statistics over the last few decades. Contrary to those who claim that globalization is a powerful instrument for progress, it is deepening these racial and economic inequalities within nations and between rich and poor nations. Until recently, those making such dramatic claims against globalization were laughed at, but now the once trumpeted darlings of the West, namely the so called "Asian tigers," have been reduced to lame ducks because they stood in the way of this runaway juggernaut.

The worker leader in Brazil, Comrade Lula, who came close to becoming the president of that country, said: "The world war has already started. It is a silent war, not for that reason any less sinister. This war is tearing down practically all the Third World. Instead of soldiers dying, there are children dying. Instead of millions wounded, there are millions unemployed. Instead of the destruction of bridges, there is the tearing down of factories, hospitals, schools and entire economies."

While I refer to globalization as an economic juggernaut, it is not somehow a mystical and independent phenomenon that has appeared on the world stage mysteriously. It is a deliberate and carefully managed creation of certain very powerful nation-states as well as international multilateral institutions.

At the same time, there is a complex and contradictory relationship between the nation states, particularly in the G7 countries, and the globalization process that sometimes turns out to be a monster that bites the hands of its creators. More recently, we have had the secret negotiation of the multilateral agreement in investment, which attempts to impose a global structural adjustment package, even on the G7 countries which have historically escaped the bitter medicine of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.

Of course, in pursuing these agendas, these states are representing the interests of a small fraction of their populations, and little or no reference is made to the electorate in negotiating measures which have a devastating impact on their lives, their jobs and their social welfare. There may have been referenda in Europe about the Maastricht Treaty, but as far as I know, there has been no such referendum in the United States.

Far from the powerful nations abdicating their powers to international institutions, there is, in fact, at the same time a contradictory movement in which the capital in those countries relies increasingly on the state to regulate things such as property and contract rights, standardizing currency weights and measures, ensuring the availability of key input, labor, land, finance, technology and infrastructure, general macro-economic orchestration, regulation of conditions of work and so on.

However, the strong role of a few nation-states, together with their role in controlling international, financial and trade institutions, is increasingly limited to a small core of countries, not necessarily even all the G7 countries, and this includes some of those who recently entered the league of the industrialized nations.

The term "globalization" is in fact itself a paradox. The reality is that we are far from so-called globalization, involving the dispersal and internationalization of economic power and participation and the creation of one global village with all citizens participating equally. In fact, globalization is not the dispersal and expansion of this economic citizenship, but, its opposite– the contraction and the removal of economic participation, which previously some societies, including the developing world, have enjoyed, and the growing concentration of economic power in the hands of a few powerful states and global corporations. So, what we are really seeing is the emergence of a global oligarchy as the sovereignty of nation-states is broken down and the integrity of their economies is dismantled. Under the mantle of free trade and sound financial management and the mobility of international capital, even the limited control which developing countries had over their own countries has been threatened. One only has to look at the current crisis in East Asia to see the extent of this.

At the same time, the transformation of the world economy into a global casino, a gambling den for the financial speculators and the destruction of the industrial capacity and consumption base of most nations, creates a pressure cooker situation where the world economy is constantly on the brink of explosion. This requires increasingly draconian intervention by the G7 countries, particularly the United States and the multilateral finance and trade organizations linked to it, namely the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization.

Despite the rosy predictions in the wake of the Asian crisis, it is clear that those at the center of this fragile equilibrium are aware that the monster threatens to get out of control. Even the mother of all speculators, George Soros, has called for an introduction of a new system of financial regulation in the wake of the chaos on the world market.

The number of billionaires in the United States alone increased from 13 in 1982 to 149 in 1996. The Global Billionaires Club, which has about 450 members, has a total world-wide wealth well in excess of the combined gross domestic product of a group of low income countries which contains 56 percent of the world population. As a result, enrichment of individuals through financial speculation takes place completely divorced from the real economy and from real productive and commercial activities.

Activists need to begin to flag these issues on the international stage. We need an alternative platform for a new trade and financial world order, including agreement on a just and transformed trade dispensation which integrates the social clause, not as a protectionist measure as it is currently perceived by the majority of countries in the developing world, but alters the terms of trade in a way in which the majority of countries can meaningfully participate. The same applies to the financial order.

Secondly, we need to look at the democratization of international institutions such as the IMF and the World Trade Organization. Civil society and trade unions should be involved in the transformation of those institutions. We need to bring back the World Bank to the original mission as an institution which is oriented toward the development needs of countries.

Thirdly, it is important to build a social movement in the Global South and between the South and the North, to begin to articulate a new development path which harnesses the potential of technological progress, rather than subordinating countries and allowing these to become the victims of that technological development.

Fourthly, we should place these issues sharply on the agenda of international platforms, including the Committee for Social and Economic Development, the World Bank and the ILO. It is unacceptable that agencies such as the World Bank are pursuing mutually contradictory programs and objectives which are directly antagonistic to the interests of the member states of that institution.

Finally, we should place these issues on the agenda of the summit of the non-aligned movement. This is an issue which President Mandela has flagged in relation to issues of poverty and world inequality. *March, 1998*

Melvin Oliver

Even though the scaffolding of racial discrimination has been dismantled, the past has trapped us in a legacy of racial inequality and privilege that is a powerful constraint on our possibilities for economic and social equality. At different levels and in different contexts, White racial privilege continues to be reproduced.

Many people in the United States believe that class has replaced race as the key to understanding Black disadvantage. They assert that since the structure of racial inequality has been dismantled legally, the economic status of African Americans is purely a result of their class experiences, particularly their educational backgrounds. The existence of a Black middle class is held up as evidence that race is no longer important. The struggle to maintain affirmative action consistently meets this argument.

One of the reasons why this argument is successful is that conceptually we are focused on income, as opposed to wealth or assets. Assets refer to the savings, investment and other accumulated resources in a household. In contrast, income is associated with consumption of goods and services and standard of living.

While the ratio of Black to White income has remained constant– between 58 and 62 percent of the median White family income– wealth disparities are drastically different. African Americans in the United States have a median net worth of eight cents (8¢) for every dollar of net worth that Whites have. Over 62 percent of African Americans have a median of zero or a negative number. They owe more than they have.

What does this mean? Imagine a Black family that loses its income stream. It would have to turn to public assistance. If that were not available, nearly eight out of ten African American families would not be able to survive at a poverty level of consumption with their level of net financial assets for three months. Nine out of ten Black children live in such asset deficient households. Over half of the Black middle class have zero or negative net financial assets, as well.

The data show that race, not class, is an important determinant of wealth, while for income, class has more salience. Wealth captures not only contemporary resources but material assets that have historic origins. Assets reflect inequalities that are products of the past passed down from generation to generation.

Wealth allows us to deconstruct the origins and maintenance of racial privilege. It helps us uncover the footprints of the past that weigh heavily on the present. Wealth is a consequence of inheritance, rates of savings, and income.

The concepts described below can be used to understand this differential investment opportunity structure.

The first concept, "racialization of state policy," refers to how state policy has impaired the ability of many African Americans to accumulate wealth– and discourage them from doing so– from the beginning of slavery throughout American history. In particular, state policy has structured the context within which it has been possible to acquire land, build community and generate wealth. Historically, policies and actions of the United States government have promoted homesteading, land acquisition, home ownership, retirement, pensions, education and asset accumulation for some sectors of the population and not for others. Blacks in particular have been excluded from participation in many state-sponsored opportunities.

If you look at tax policy, it is clear that we have had a welfare system that has had two tracks. One track involves tax breaks that really are designed for people to create and accumulate assets. The other is an income-oriented welfare system that keeps people at a point where they can subsist. African Americans are concentrated in subsistence public policy, while Whites, especially middle class and upper income Whites, get the benefits of asset accumulation tax policy. So it is very important for us to be cognizant of budgetary implications of public policy.

The notion of an "economic detour" is really a way to try to understand the low level and marginalization of African American business development. Blacks are really the only ethnic group that has not been able to play an economic game as free agents. By that I mean having the ability to go anywhere to buy, sell and be involved in the economic life of the society. Blacks did not have access to White markets prior to the late 19th and early 20th century. They were not even able to create protected markets, which today we call "ethnic economies," because Blacks could not protect their markets. When Blacks have had businesses, they have had to compete with Whites and other groups. Even when Blacks were successful, there is a strong record of violence and intimidation to keep Blacks from business development.

Blacks form the sediment of the American stratification order. They began at the bottom of the hierarchy in slavery and had to face the reinforcing and cumulative effects of segregation right up through the mid-1950s and 60s. The effect of this inherited poverty and economic scarcity for the accumulation of wealth has been to cement the social structure, make it something hard to move. As Blacks have had cumulative disadvantages, many Whites have had cumulative advantages. Since wealth builds over a lifetime and is then passed along to kin, it is an essential indicator of Black economic well being.

If you look at the current mechanisms for creating wealth, you find that African Americans are also victims of a set of interesting policies in the private and public sectors. Let us consider housing ownership as a case in point. The data shows that when applying for loans, Blacks who have qualifications equal to Whites are still turned down 60 percent more often. My research shows that Blacks are charged higher interest rates than Whites, usually a half point higher. Moreover, the value of the average White home increased $53,000 in the '70s and '80s compared with $31,000 for Black homes. Taken together, these forms of contemporary bias cost the current generation of Blacks about $82 billion. This is a very conservative estimate.

Let me now articulate why asset building is the core of the 21st century's quest for material and economic justice. By asset building, I mean the policies, practices and tools that promote the creation, growth and control of assets by disadvantaged people. What kind of assets am I talking about? Obviously wealth is the sine qua non of any kind of asset that we are talking about, but there are other assets such as natural resources that have enduring consequences. They are passed down from generation to generation, and many people in the world depend on these assets for their livelihood and for planning theirs and their children's futures. Water, forests, and land are key natural resources that have asset-like qualities.

Poverty reduction means moving people to a point where they hold and control assets that enable them to successfully plan for their family's and their community's future. Income based policies, income transfer is a subsistence policy that will just keep people out of poverty, just above starvation. I have never seen anyone spend themselves out of poverty. You save and invest to get out of poverty.

The intergenerational character of assets is very appealing. We have to start thinking about this if we are going to effect enduring economic change. Assets create hope for the future. When people have assets they think differently about their lives. One way of building human dignity and self sufficiency is to give people the resources that they need to build their lives. With assets, people begin to think of the long-term and pursue long-term goals. In other words, while income feeds your stomach, assets change your head. Having assets provides the long-term possibility for the alleviation of poverty. *March, 1998*

Benedita Da Silva

Brazil has the seventh largest economy in the world, as measured by GDP. It is a wealthy country but its distribution of wealth is extremely unequal. The richest ten percent of Brazilians have a mean income 30 times higher than the poorest 40 percent of the population.

There are two Brazils: the Brazil that the world knows and the Brazil that the world ignores. The latter Brazil still has slave labor, still has child labor. Infant mortality is high,



illiteracy is widespread, housing and health conditions are precarious. The vast majority of the "other Brazil" is Black.

Economically, Brazil can be divided into three regions. The southeast is a rich, highly developed region within which there is a large and growing slum-dwelling population with a high concentration of Blacks. The midwest has a medium level of development but also heavy social exclusion of Blacks. And the northeast is underdeveloped and the region where there is overt discrimination against Blacks. There is also discrimination against northeasterners as a whole. In the northeast of Brazil, 46 percent of the population live below the poverty line.

Until recently, poverty was predominantly rural, but today we see a concentration of poverty in urban areas too. We have a huge street population in Brazil, called "street people," the vast majority of whom are Blacks. Fifty percent of the urban population is without sewerage services.

What is the government's strategy? Globalization has forced the country to adjust, as has the pressure on us by the International Monetary Fund. Brazil is paying its foreign debt, and we are good debtors, but we have a huge internal debt too. It is the largest in our history, but there is not the political will to tackle it. Instead the government believes simply that the way forward is to let economic growth and the free market diminish social inequality. It is opening up the country to foreign capital and to privatization. These will only make things worse for the socially excluded.

I am not here just to say that the government is no good. We have submitted proposals to the government: we engage in debate. What we really want is for our government to get their policies right. Thus we have established alliances with the government, and these alliances have already been quite successful. They have led to the government finally admitting openly that there is racism in Brazil. We have also begun to create tools to ameliorate social and racial inequalities. We have a Secretary of Human Rights who is important and who we want to turn into a permanent standing minister, so that what he says has weight and is not marginalized. *March, 1998*

Vic Van Vuuren

We're moving into this era now where businesses suddenly realize that in order to bring people into the economic mainstream, certain affirmative action steps are going to have to be taken. When we started [in South Africa] in 1994, business was driven by fear, fear of the unknown and fear of what was going to happen to their corporations and industry if they did not join in the transformation process.

Now the business sector has come to the intellectual realization that we need to invest very strongly in education and look at affirmative action programs to bring Black people into areas where they were prevented from entering before.

We've still got one major problem to move across the barrier of racism and that is the emotional or the human element, which has not really taken root. People are bringing about change because of necessity. I think that is the driving force with the transformation process at the moment. Someday, we're going to have to find the trick of moving across the barriers where we talk about the cultural change, and there's going to have to be a lot of hard work in this particular arena.

What we do have in our favor, which I haven't found in many other countries, is a government that has introduced a certain infrastructure, enabling us to engage in meaningful debate. We have a structure called NEDLAC, which is the National Economic Development and Labor Chamber.

We have for the first time in our country the Minister of Labor introducing a government five-year plan to enhance economic growth. We have five pieces of legislation that are currently being considered, but it's difficult, with the speed that we are trying to move, to meet expectations.

There is an unbundling of the conglomerates to bring Blacks into the mainstream of the economy. Much of what has happened to date has been tokenism around the periphery, trying to show things are happening. But real ownership and movement into the mainstream of the economy are increasing. Some large companies are subcontracting with small Black businesses and entrepreneurs. This will also play a positive role.

We've got a lot to do in a very short space of time. I think that the business sector has to move from an intellectual affirmative action approach to one of really crossing the cultural divide. *September, 1997*



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Francis Wilson

There have been three great achievements in South Africa in the 1990s: the negotiated political settlement; peaceful and substantially fair elections; and the creation of the best constitution in the world. We like to think it's even better than the American constitution.

There was a great sense of enthusiasm in South Africa and much of the western world when apartheid finally came tumbling down. It was a great beginning, but it is not enough because we have a weighty triple legacy to overcome: the legacy of conquest, the legacy of slavery and the legacy of apartheid. Paradoxically, as we move into the 21st century, South Africa has great cause for hope because of the political transformations and great cause for alarm because of the economic inheritance.

The legacy of conquest is that the land is owned and controlled by the Whites. The Land Act of 1913 said that 86 percent of the land would be in White hands, and 14 percent could be controlled by Blacks. It was not only the land. It was the minerals under the land and the water. But the material wealth of the society was not allocated by that 1913 Land Act, but rather by the conquest of the 200 years that preceded it. The 1913 Land Act was simply the wrapping up in long pink ribbon of the consequences of those 200 years. This is important to understand, because when that Land Act was abolished in the early 1990s, people said that a pillar of the apartheid system had been taken down. But it was not a pillar of the apartheid system; it was the scaffolding of the apartheid system. And removing the scaffolding didn't change the structure or the distribution.

The second legacy is the legacy of slavery. The irony is that Black South Africans were never enslaved. Slaves came from Angola, Mozambique and Southeast Asia. By 1700, there were more slaves in the Cape Colony than settlers.



When slavery was abolished in 1838, it led to the great trek of Whites moving up to the interior and was followed by a thicket of laws to control movement of labor: labor laws, pass laws, migrant labor laws. When the big bang in the South African economy came– with the discovery of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886– labor control was already well organized, and Whites had political power.

Because of pass laws and migrant labor laws, most workers were not allowed to live near their place of work and were brought in as migrant laborers, housed in single-sex compounds and then sent back periodically to the rural areas. South Africa's industrial revolution was powered by migrant males who were allowed to come into Johannesburg from some distant rural area and work for up to two years before being sent back from whence they came. For a hundred years we had an industrial process in which oscillating migration was the centerpiece. (We tend to gloss over this in South Africa, but it is still a reality for 95 percent of those working on the gold mines.) The consequence, apart from the destruction of family life, has been a bias in the process of capital accumulation because the wealth is generated in Johannesburg, not in the rural areas where the workers and their descendants live.

Thirdly, there is the legacy of apartheid, defined as what apartheid did from 1948 to 1994. The legacy of apartheid as regards inequality can be illustrated in any number of ways. The richest 10 percent of our country earn 51 percent of the total income, and the bottom 10 percent earn 4 percent of the total income. Forty percent of the population is living in poverty. It has racial dimensions, gender dimensions, an age dimension, and a geographic dimension. In 1993, average unemployment (if you include all those looking for work and those who've given up looking) was running at 30 percent. But for Black South Africans, unemployment is 39 percent. For Whites, it was 4.5 percent. So there's a racial component to unemployment. There is also a gender component. Females are 35 percent unemployed, compared to 25 percent of males. There is also a geographic dimension: in metropolitan areas, big cities, unemployment is 34 percent. In the rural areas, it is 42 percent. Elderly Whites between 55-64 suffer 2.4 percent unemployment. On the other hand, if you are a Black African youngster between the age of 16 to 24, not in school, not at university, looking for a job, unemployment is 65 percent.

People with a 65 percent chance of being unemployed are living in a completely different world from those whose chances are 2 percent. We inhabit the same country, we have the same constitution, we like to think we have an equal society, but our inheritance is fundamentally skewed and destroyed by the past.

The image of poverty in South Africa is of an elderly Black woman with a 30-kilogram bundle of firewood on her head, walking five miles once or twice a week. She's Black and she's a woman, and she walks under a power line that produces electricity. And yet more than half of the households do not have access to basic energy. That encapsulates the socio-economic reality in South Africa.

The consequence of apartheid is massive inequality that puts us, together with Brazil, as the two countries in the world with the greatest measured inequality.

The great problem South Africa faces in tackling economic inequality in a sustained way is that its school system is in a mess. As South Africa moves into the 21st century, it does not yet have the educational system it requires to develop the growth to overcome poverty and unemployment. This is a central issue– how South Africa builds a universal education system for primary and secondary levels that really works. The miracle of South Africa is that we have been given a few years to try and deal with inequality. But if we don't deal with it, the society is not going to hold together.

A new and modern danger is that posed by globalization. It is ironic that the very moment when political forces in South Africa move toward equality, economic forces of globalization are moving toward greater inequality. As the world becomes smaller, South African engineers, doctors, politicians and civil servants reckon that their salaries should be at OECD levels. Meanwhile, at the other end of the scale, farm workers, who are among the poorest paid in the society, are having their wages capped not only by virtue of a very high level of unemployment but by immigrants coming in from Mozambique. Jimmy Carter made a speech in Johannesburg last year when he said that the greatest new fact to contend with, as we move into the 21st century, is globalization. "We are going to have to see how we can shape globalization to our benefit," he said. That is a thorny challenge to grapple with because the problem with globalization is that it benefits the "haves"– those who have assets, education, access to the internet and who tend to be White– and prejudices those at the bottom of the factory floor who don't have skills and who tend to be Black.

So politically we have equality, but economically we still have a long way to go. The fundamental questions to address now are: How do we focus, really focus, on those 30 percent in our society who are worst off and who are predominantly Black? How do we focus on those on the bottom of the economic pyramid with an ideology and strategy that is attuned to the needs of those at the bottom, rather than an ideology and strategy attuned to the needs of those at the top? *April, 1997 and March, 1998*

EDUCATION

Caetana Damasceno

From the beginning of primary instruction, we know that a Black child's chances of remaining in school are slim. Often, they have to leave to go to work. We say "Ah, that Black child, he has many fewer chances than a White child." The Black child is forced to leave school, and when he goes again, he gets held back. The curriculum is inadequate. The public schools are of lesser quality than private schools. But the Black child's parents don't have the resources to send the child to private school, and it continues like this– a series of disadvantages.

In Brazil, unlike the United States, the best universities are commonly public universities. And in order to attend the public university, there are examinations, what we call in Brazil the "vestibular." Black young people who are able to break through the barriers by attending primary and secondary school are minimally prepared and less prepared than their fellow White students to take the examination. What happens is something strange and wicked. Those people who end up attending public universities– that still cost nothing– aren't the persons that came from underprivileged classes. It is the Blacks who are excluded, while Whites who have long enjoyed advantages, assume the places at the public universi

Wendy Phillips

ties. This perverse situation raises serious questions and undermines transformation. *April, 1997*

Jonathan Jansen

However heretical and surprising it may seem, post-apartheid policy in South Africa has in fact created inequalities. It has sustained old inequalities. It has made some inequalities much worse. In order to illustrate this statement, I am going to use the post-apartheid education policy as a case study.

The average education policy document has a preamble running to about ten pages that says things like: we are creating "a just society," a "more equitable country," we are "for non-racism, non-sexism, democratic governments in schools," and so on. There is reference throughout not only to how bad the past was, but to how good the future looks and to how education will level the playing fields. There is an almost religious fervor in the preamble to policy documents, not only in education but other areas as well. Most South Africans take these policy documents at face value, believing that they mean what they say.

But what has been the reality? Since 1994, when South Africa had its first democratic elections, privileged White schools have gotten better and Black schools have gotten worse. How did this happen? What happened to the preambles in all the White papers? (I am still puzzled as to why South Africa, as a Black country, calls these things "white papers," but that is another debate.)

The first strategy after the 1994 elections was broadly referred to as the "Reconstruction and Development Program" and specifically within that were "Presidential Lead Projects." What President Mandela and his government intended to happen was that there would be, within 100 days, "fast tracking of implementation," where something on the ground is done to signal there is somebody else in power. One of those programs, called the "Culture of Learning Program," was intended to create changes in schools very quickly, fast-tracking those changes and hopefully signaling that things were beginning to improve.

But what actually happened is that nothing changed. I did the national evaluation for this program, and what the report showed was, first of all, that schools used the additional funds they received, not to improve teaching in schools, not to improve the quality of education, but to build toilets, fix window panes, and plug leaking roofs. Secondly, a lot of the schools did not get the money at all because provincial governments took that money as much-needed revenue with which they could do other things, like buy trucks. Thirdly, in the newly created provinces, there simply was not the infrastructure in place to be able to use that money. They were still trying to sort themselves out, to find out who was appointed and how to deal with the old racist bureaucrats. The moral of the story is that nothing changed.

In KwaZulu Natal, the province where I live, they cannot even find the money. To this very day, they do not know what happened to 60 million rand [approximately $10 million]. It is missing. So the dazzle that was supposed to come in that 100 days simply did not impact people in the schools.

A second attempt to shift resources from White to Black schools also ran into problems. The idea was to take teachers from privileged schools and insert them into disadvantaged schools. In many provinces it was supposed to work like this: approach teacher X and say: "Listen, there are too many of you in this school, we would like you to move to school Y." Teacher X then says: "You have got to be kidding, I am not going to move, okay? I am quite happy here, I live here, I have been here for 35 years." To which the government then says: "We will make it worth your while to leave the system. We will give you a voluntary severance package," which at that point was quite lucrative. So the teacher leaves the post and should theoretically go to the marginalized school, to the Black school. But of course that does not actually happen. Why? This was never really about teacher reallocation or re-deployment. It was never about taking resources from one set of schools and moving it to another set of schools. It was a fiscal rescue attempt for a government that simply did not have money to pay its teachers; it was purely a response to a fiscal crisis.

In KwaZulu Natal, we have just done a survey of 25 White schools and 25 Black schools. This is what happened in January 1998 in grade one. The White schools hiked up their school fees by 70 to 120 percent. With the added revenue, they hired a second teacher for each grade one classroom. They call the additional teacher a teacher's aide, but in all cases the teacher's aide was a qualified teacher. So you have a grade one classroom with 20 children and two teachers.

At the same time, in Black schools the learner ratio increased from 60 children per classroom to 70 children per classroom. One teacher, whose main focus in life is to stay sane and who is under-qualified in math, must teach in a classroom that was not built for 70 children, with a new curriculum, plastered on the wall saying "Curriculum 2005 learners must be taught in small groups, the teacher is the facilitator, learners will pose their own questions." The White schools, with their revenue base, are able to engage this new curriculum, but the Black schools are even worse off.

What can we do about it? There are a few options. The first is to set a cap on White schools' ability to generate additional revenue. Of course that is problematic in this current regime because, if White schools raise their own funds through their parent base, then theoretically that gives the state more options with regard to funding Black education. Secondly, you cannot really tell White parents not to spend more money on their children's education. Another way is to simply take from White schools and give to Black schools. There are several ways of doing this. One way is to double fund Black education, simply say that for every Black child that shows up the subsidy is doubled as compared to a White child. The only problem is there is no money for that.

In the context of such fiscal constraints, we will never reduce the inequalities in the education system because the terms of our transition do not allow for punitive damages against Whites. I apologize for putting it so bluntly. It may be that, as this realization sets in, Black South Africans will realize the cost of transition from apartheid, and say simply, "the terms may have been too high." *March, 1998*

William Taylor

By unanimous decision in 1954, the United States Supreme Court in Brown vs. Board of Education struck down the laws requiring racial segregation in public schools as violating the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. Brown is not simply an historical artifact to be respected and viewed in a glass case, but it is a decision that has contemporary significance and tells us something important about how to provide educational opportunity for all our children.

There were really two major purposes that have been ascribed to the Brown decision by most commentators. The first was to eliminate an official caste system established by racial segregation laws, adopted by states throughout the South and at some border areas in the post-Reconstruction period. The objective was, in one phrase, to vindicate the rights of Black people. In still other words, the purpose was to remove the fiction that had persisted since the Supreme Court's infamous Plessy vs. Ferguson decision that talked about "separate but equal," and implied that segregation laws were intended as something other than a massive racial insult, affixing to Black people the status of second-class citizens in the United States. The second purpose was to remove barriers to equal educational opportunity faced by Black children, to terminate practices causing psychological and sociological harm that generated a sense of inferiority and negatively affected the motivation of children to learn.

These two purposes are in some tension. In the aftermath of Brown, a debate raged, and it still has echoes today. Was Brown a legal decision or was it a decision based on sociological and psychological evidence of harm? Was it a race decision or was it an education decision? I count myself among the ranks who believe that Brown was a legal decision, that is, it was silently grounded in equal protection jurisprudence, that it was a race rather than an education decision.

Despite the broad and often eloquent language in the decision about the importance of education to participation in American society and the damage to children that was wrought by segregative practices, there is ample evidence that this was not the core of the decision. Rather the language was an effort to persuade people that far-reaching change was called for in the practices and habits of the country. These were required by the need to protect children from further harm. Therefore, people should be willing to accept the change in recognition of the harm.

The evidence that this was a law decision and a race decision unfolded quickly as the Court rapidly struck down segregation laws governing transportation, public recreation and other areas without requiring any showing of sociological or psychological harm. It also became clear in later years that the centrality of public education would not be used to scrutinize other kinds of inequities, such as the inequities in the financing of school systems not based explicitly on race. But more than 40 years after the event, one must judge the significance of Brown by reference to both objectives.

If all that had been accomplished in the wake of the decision was ending the legalized caste system, as great as that accomplishment was, without the extension of practical opportunities for educational and economic gains, Brown might be said to have historical significance but little contemporary relevance. In fact, a substantial degree of success has occurred in both areas.

At the time of the decision, every state had a rigid code of segregation calling for the separation of the races in all aspects of public life. The codes were mirrored by the practices of private institutions such as places of public accommodation or employers. While Brown purported to deal only with enforced segregation and public schools, it was followed rapidly by a decision striking down segregation laws in other areas. Some of these decisions were widely resisted for a decade, and none more so than Brown itself. But the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 created a sea change. It did so by placing the authority of Congress, the President and the Executive Branch behind the decisions of the courts, and by outlawing racially discriminatory practices of employers and in places of public accommodations, such as hotels, theaters, restaurants and the like.

By the end of the 1960s, it is fair to say the overt indicia of the old caste system had begun to disappear. But the old system left a legacy in the persistence of acts of discrimination, particularly in housing, employment and education, and the continuation of negative stereotypes of Black citizens and other people of color held by many members of the White public. The pervasiveness of discriminatory acts and attitudes in the racial divide between Blacks and Whites in the United States is troubling to everyone who had expected that the court decisions and anti-discrimination policies of the government would have brought more progress. But there's nothing to suggest that Brown or other desegregation decisions offer the wrong prescription. Rather, their proponents underestimated the entrenched character of racism in the American society.

The most compelling language in Brown spoke of the stigmatizing effects of segregation, citing the work of Kenneth Clark and others, and concluded that segregation affects the hearts and minds of Black children in ways unlikely to be undone. This portion of the opinion gave rise to a spirited debate about the quality of the social science evidence and the propriety of using such evidence as the basis for opinions on constitutional issues. But the interesting and surprising thing is that over a 40-year period, the social science evidence on Brown issues has remained remarkab consistent.

Another congressionally mandated study to evaluate the effectiveness of Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which is the seven billion dollar program of federal aid to disadvantaged children, reached similar conclusions. The study, called the "Prospects Report," concluded, after tracing the performance of students over a five-year period and interviewing thousands of teachers, administrators, parents and children, that poor children perform far better in middle class surroundings than in classrooms where poverty is heavily concentrated. In other words, a poor child in a 75% or more middle class school will ordinarily do better on various measures of performance than the same child will do in a 75% or more poverty school. Now, this is not explicitly a race finding, but it takes on racial significance when you understand that in the United States the only two groups who live in concentrated poverty are African and Hispanic Americans.

On the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), the most respected measure of U. S. educational change, Black teenagers reduced the gap between themselves and White teenagers by almost a half between 1970 and the end of the 1980s. That's not the message that they have been getting in the media. This is a success, among others, in the civil rights revolution that we ought to be celebrating. Otherwise, stereotypes get reinforced, and people get the notion that all of this is inevitable and that you can't make much progress.

These gains are not explicitly linked with desegregation, but it's clear that school desegregation played an important role in them. During the 1970s, for example, the largest gains in the nation were recorded by Black elementary students in the southeast of the United States during the period when school desegregation was taking place across the region for the first time. In addition, I think a positive generational effect may be at work. As young people in the 1970s succeeded and entered college with the help of affirmative action programs– and moved in through their hard work to more skilled and remunerative occupations– they were able to establish families and pass the benefits down to their children, the teenagers who did well on the NAEP tests and assessments in the 1980s.

Unfortunately this progress has seemed to come to a halt by the end of the '80s and regression is taking place in the '90s at the same time that we are experiencing resegregation in the public schools. The most important fact is that the Brown remedies have contributed to substantial progress. The failure to make greater progress is attributable in large part to the interaction of deprivation and continued practices of discrimination which have resulted in enormous continuation of racial and socio-economic isolation of the Black population in this country.

In conclusion, let me say that a great deal has changed in the four decades since the Brown decision. In the 1950s, the thinking of people who were most friendly to racial progress was governed by a kind of unconscious paternalism. Moreover, in the wake of the decision, many people thought that change would come fairly quickly as a result of the decisions. Instead, we went down a very tortuous path with the decision evoking massive resistance in the White South, inaction at the national level by President Eisenhower and Congress, frustration in the Black community, leading to Dr. King's direct action movement– which in turn led to violent repression– which at last touched the national conscience and brought about effective legislation.

Today, we understand that Brown served more as a catalyst for change than as a static landmark, and that the decision may be thought of properly as not conferring rights, but as having empowered people to empower themselves. We have a better understanding of the need to respect cultural difference, to value diversity, while struggling to identify the things that ought to bind us together. We have the sobering knowledge that the struggle for equality has been made more difficult by the forces of suburbanization that robbed central cities of resources at the very moment that Black people were arriving in search of opportunity. We have the knowledge that the engine of capitalism works seemingly now more effectively than ever to maldistribute income, rather than redistributing income, and that the communications revolution that we keep talking about may serve paradoxically to separate people rather than bring them together– unless we pay some attention to how we use it to bring people together.

But we also know that the vision of those who brought the Brown case and who fashioned the strategy, Charlie Houston, Thurgood Marshall, their colleagues and supporters, was fundamentally right: it has brought more practical progress in the status of Black people in this country than has been achieved in any other period in history. If we discard that vision without understanding its continuing relevance, I fear that we may lose our moorings completely.

April, 1997

COMMUNICATIONS / MEDIA

Joel Zito Araújo

The history of Black representation on television in Brazil during the last 40 years is one in which Blacks have either been stereotyped or rendered invisible. At the University of São Paulo, I am part of a group researching television, in particular, soap operas, the United States equivalent of sitcoms, which are our most important prime time shows. In Brazil, soap operas have the largest television audience and attract sponsors that pay the highest prices. Between 1963 (the starting point of daily soap operas in Brazil) and 1994, there were 512 soap operas in which Black characters appeared in just 224. Less than half. For the rest, Black characters were not present. They were invisible.

For those soap operas that did have Black characters, the question is: how were they portrayed? Most Blacks played characters based on negative stereotypes in which Black people, as slaves or the descendants of the slaves, are essentially seen as subservient or evil. For example: the seductive mulatto who destroys White households; the mentally unbalanced mulatto who resents the social structure and is psychologically unfit; the "dumb mulatto." The image of the Black in Brazil was of the humble, subclass working for the White class, and soap opera stereotypes have served to reinforce this notion.

More recently the stereotype was modernized. In one soap opera, one of the main characters is a Black household employee who is proud to be Black and is portrayed positively. However, she is still devoted to her White family employers, doesn't have a husband or children, doesn't have any connections to the Black community. In other words, her world is the White world. So we updated the stereotype but kept the stereotype. Other soap operas appropriate positive images of typical Black Brazilians– as sexually liberated, happy, good dancers– as a feature of Brazilians in general.

Hand in hand with soap operas, commercials failed to give Blacks visibility and reinforced stereotypes. The first middle-class Black family reached our commercials only after they reached the soap operas. News programs also fail to give visibility to Black leaders. They give Black leaders a platform only with regard to cultural events, like Carnival, but not when serious political or social issues are on the agenda.

Since 1994, the stereotype has undergone a change again. A landmark soap opera, called "The Next Victim," portrayed a Black middle class family and had a tremendously positive impact on public opinion. More recent soap operas have left behind the stereotype entirely: in one soap opera a Black woman, married to a White man, experiences discrimination and acknowledges racial discrimination in our society. In addition, Black movements have successfully brought legal pressure to bear by challenging plots that have been identified as racist.

Increasingly, we see these new ideas in soap opera mirrored in our commercials and in the attitudes of major companies who sponsor programs. The common belief used to be that Blacks were not significant consumers, so commercials were never directed towards them. Neither were programs. Today, research shows that 20 percent of those who earn above the minimum wage are Afro Brazilians. This amounts to 20 million consumers. Finally, attention is being devoted to these consumers. Finally, we are beginning to see programs exclusively oriented to the Black population. These are positive developments, but we still have a long way to go. *September, 1997*

Sig Gissler

It's a daunting task to assess media coverage of race in the United States for a number of reasons. Please remember that the term "media" is very elastic. This is a vast continental country, 1600 daily newspapers, many more weekly newspapers, hundreds and hundreds of magazines, television stations, several gigantic television networks, exploding cable news outlets, and then we have the boundless realm of cyberspace.

Also, anyone in the United States can call him or herself a journalist. The performers range from The New York Times to trashy supermarket tabloids, from Tom Brokaw to talk radio hosts speaking to guys on car-phones, which sometimes remind me of the blind leading the blind.

The point is, the media in America are not monolithic. As in racial groups, there is great diversity inside the diversity. Even so, I want to be a little bit audacious and say some things that stand out. No one can doubt the media's vital role in relentlessly shaping how people of different races think about each other. And it also shapes how public policy on race related issues is formulated.

Yet, too often, the media in America falter. The coverage is fragmented, episodic, confused, misdirected and sometimes cowardly. When there is a chance for better understanding of Black family life, the media often are too sensational or superficial. When there's a chance for better coverage of race in urban politics, the media often are too cliché-ridden. When there's a chance for better perspective on inner city crime, the media often are too gripped by the lurid. Worst of all, when there's a chance for frankness on race related problems such as AIDS, teen pregnancy, or the White backlash in the workplace, the media often are too cryptic, ambiguous or timid.

Frequently, racial coverage in America is like a roller coaster ride. At the peaks, after a riot erupts in Los Angeles, newspapers and television provide an in-depth report, but soon media descend into neglect. The last presidential campaign I think was a tragically missed opportunity to really deal with race in America. It's not surprising that the presidential candidates would tend to dart and dodge on racial issues, but I thought the political correspondents were consistently neglectful by not pressing the candidates about what they intended to do about race relations in America.

Yes, there's been considerable progress in media performance. There's cause for hope. We sometimes forget how bad the old days really were. Historically, people of color were largely ignored by the media in the United States. And when they were covered they were often tagged racially, or tagged by ethnic labels, and usually covered in negative or bazaar circumstances. Within the lifetime of people sitting in this room, newspapers carried headlines like "Girl Slashed with Jack Knife by Crazed Negro."

Newsrooms were all White and largely all male. When Watts erupted, the first big riot of the 1960s, The Los Angeles Times did not have a single Black reporter. In fact, they had to reach into the advertising department that had one Black employee, deputize that employee to be a reporter and put him into action covering the riot.

Today we do a much better job of covering racial issues in the United States. We're fairer, our coverage is fuller and sometimes it's brilliant. The newsrooms are more diversified in staff, in leadership, in content. Journalists of color are featured columnists and more and more are moving into the ranks of management. Yet, the defects are many, and I'd like to cite a few.

One is insufficient scope in our coverage. Race coverage is still too intent on Black and White. We need to push beyond that and to broaden into a much more multi-polar analysis to better reflect the surge in immigration that's occurred in the United States, the growth of the Latino and Asian populations, especially in big cities where the destiny of this country is going to be played out. In New York City, for example, the Latino population is now probably larger than the Black population, and the census figures are indicating that the Latino population is likely to surpass the Black population in the United States by the year 2005 to 2010.

Other defects cluster under the label, distortion and disparity. There's a consistent pattern of what I call cumulative inaccuracy in media coverage. This is where a false impression is conveyed by otherwise accurate reports. Crime coverage by television news is a particularly painful example. Almost nightly, young Black and Latino men in handcuffs are paraded on television. In New York City we have a term for this. We call it "the perp walk," meaning perpetrators are walked on television so that the images can be recorded for the news shows. Each of these stories is probably true. The men have been arrested for an alleged crime, yet the cumulative effect of this is false. It exaggerates violent crime by men of color, and it creates excessive fear.

Another distortion occurs by what I call racial framing. This is where a story does not mention race, but a newspaper will use a photograph or television will use an image that in a flash frames that story in race. It's particularly evident in coverage of crime, homelessness, drug abuse, welfare, the list goes on and on. It's the power of unspoken communication. And sometimes we end up with the worst of both worlds where this image will introduce race into a story, but then the story does not deal with it. It has no context, no understanding. This, of course, adds to the cumulative distortion.

There's also a problem of racial disparity in coverage. Again let's use crime as an example. Murder in White neighborhoods is better covered than murder in Black neighborhoods. Supposedly this is because it's more newsworthy, and perhaps you can construct a case for that. But there have been some very glaring examples of this disparity. One of the most notorious occurred in the case of the Central Park jogger where a White female banker was raped and beaten by a gang of Black teenagers. There was a tornado of publicity over this event– month after month of stories. Shortly after that incident a Black woman was raped and thrown off a roof. There was a brief burst of coverage, but not much, and the Black community of New York to this day resents that disparity.

Another defect is insufficient depth– just not digging enough, not connecting the dots. We plunge in the racial stories, and we fail to pull together the bits and pieces. The examples are legion, especially in the realm of race, poverty and economics.

Another cluster of defects falls under the label, insufficient diversity. There is a consistent eclipse of everyday life in Black and Latino communities. One reason crime seems to dominate inner city life is because the full picture of inner city life is missing. Overheated crime coverage pains Black and Latino middle class members, but the working class Black and Latino folks, the folks who rise early, toil, raise kids, pay taxes, they are wounded, too, by media induced misperceptions.

There's also the myth of the Black and Latino monolith, a major media sin– the failure to distinguish the complicated streams of culture inside Black communities, inside Latino communities, inside Asian communities. This diversity within diversity does not emerge effectively in our coverage.

And we also fail to explore the role of class, and excessively negative coverage. Without being too pollyannaish, we need to pay more attention to success stories, to the problem solvers. Again, the Black and Latino middle class are neglected in this regard, but even greater neglect is visited upon the working class multitude. Also grassroots organizations, churches and other groups are consistently neglected. And these are groups that are battling against great odds, heroically battling to create better neighborhoods. And we also pay too little attention to interracial success stories. After Crown Heights exploded in violence with Jews and Blacks sometimes pitted against one another, the media covered that intensely, but we neglected to cover adequately some of the efforts that were subsequently made by Jewish and Black groups and organizations that build bridges across this divide.

So what are the barriers to better coverage? One, of course, is the nature of journalism, the hurly-burly pursuit of approximate truth which often collides with deadlines, limited space, and limited airtime. And sometimes– nutty notions about what the audience wants. We also have to face competitive pressure, attract the audience and hold it. That's one of the rules of journalism– be first. This often results in conflict, controversy, and also, quite frankly, fear sells. One of the rules of thumb on television is that if it bleeds, it leads. And television has heightened the journalistic sense that for a story to be good it must be very dramatic and preferably involve some lurid personalities.

And then there is the myth of public apathy– that our audience is not interested in deeper exploration of racial issues. I think this is a terrible mistake. It confuses weariness with boredom. Audiences are tired of stilted, predictable, cliché-ridden coverage. Our task is to make the truly important fascinating.

Finally, the struggles with newsroom diversity. Diversity of our newsrooms is crucial to better news performance. There are two facts to face about newsroom diversity. The first is that newsrooms are still too White. Yes, there's been growth in diversity, but the gains are insufficient. We must do better for moral reasons but also for very practical reasons. This can turn into being good business for journalism as the nature of the audience changes.

The second fact is that diversity is poorly managed. When you diversify a newsroom, you immediately create fresh tensions. This can hurt the effort to cover race frankly and effectively. Sometimes it can result in punches being pulled, in watering down of stories. We also face the problem of what I call, "mutual withholding" in newsrooms, where Black reporters are reluctant to really say what they feel because they don't want to be tagged whiners. White reporters are reluctant to speak out about their feelings because they don't want to be tagged as racist. And so, mutual withholding occurs, and no effective work gets done. Quite often we are not making the most of the diversity and the talent that we have in our newsrooms.

So what are some of the remedies? I think the defects and the barriers quickly suggest their own remedies. They include:

Broaden the sweep of racial news and take on controversial issues. Resist mushy, "let's please everyone" stories; look for new sources, fresh voices. Seize the opportunity to engage readers and keep an eye out for genuine success stories.

Review content periodically to ensure that people of color are not unfairly stigmatized; put crime in perspective. Make sure there are a variety of stories and images, including those that reflect everyday life. Make sure they find their way into the flow and mix of the news.

Redefine beats or assignments so that race is more consistently part of the coverage from City Hall to the White House. Whatever is done with beats, resolve to dig deeper in the race-related problems. Provide texture and coherence and connect the dots for distracted readers and viewers.

And increase newsroom diversity at all levels, but better manage it, which means set the right tone and explain honestly goals underlying the practical value of diversity. Avoid excessive finger pointing and cheerleading. Resist insidious political correctness. Remember no one has a monopoly on truth. Listen to thoughtful critics. Treasure candid staffers. Increase spending on diversity training, retreats, and bull sessions. In short, find forums to hash things out.

Media should also get more involved with various aspects of Black, Latino and Asian communities consistent with the need for journalistic independence and credibility. Support innovative efforts to improve education, reduce unemployment and raise the quality of life in our cities. Be a catalyst for improved race relations.

Perhaps the biggest need is for dynamic leadership at the top of our news organizations. This has been too slow to develop. I think the hope lies not in preaching and finger pointing, but in the profit motive. When it becomes clear that better serving the changing face of urban America will result in profitability, we will see better performance. The converse of that–weak performance– can threaten your survival.

One final point– what you can do as individuals is to complain. Send letters to the top people in news organizations, to the publishers as well as the editors, to the station owners as well as the news directors. They are read, partly because so few are written. It's much more effective than the phone. One other thing, applaud the good. Try to catch the media doing something right and then reinforce it. *April, 1997*

Shaun Johnson

I work for Independent **Newspapers**, owner of 18 **newspapers** and the **biggest** newspaper group **in Africa**. The group's **roots** come out of the **gold** and diamond **prospecting** boom more **than** a century ago, so **you** can appreciate that **the** newspaper group has **some** difficulty defining **itself** in the South Africa of **Nelson Mandela. (By way of** context, in terms of audience there is only one medium in South Africa– radio. Television is second, newspapers a long way behind. But the importance of newspapers lies in setting agendas and guiding debates.)

My story is this. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a group of young journalists took a stand and refused to work for the mainstream press. In those days it was a crime even to print the name Nelson Mandela, and, if you only read the mainstream press, you would not have known that there was an ANC nor that there were people on Robben Island. This group of young journalists began to form their own newspapers, which became known as the alternative press. Two such newspapers I was involved with were the New Nation and the Weekly Mail. These newspapers weren't well run commercially, but they did many brave things during the state of emergency.

The 1986 state of emergency was no joke. They could lock up 30,000 people on one night, but you couldn't report this. The rule was that you were not allowed to discuss the fact that there was a state of emergency, unless you had the permission of a government minister. You had to be an amateur lawyer to be an editor because there were 111 specific laws against the press. This made it difficult to run a newspaper. One solution employed was to say on the front page: "In terms of the law, we are not allowed to discuss the fact that we are living in a state of emergency unless we have the permission of a government minister. Here are the home telephone numbers of all the government ministers to call if you wish to discuss the state of emergency." About 50,000 readers took to telephoning the ministers at home at 2 A.M. to discuss the state of emergency. It sounds silly but it had an effect. It drove them crazy. They lifted the state of emergency so they could get some sleep!

After the amazing events of February 2nd, 1990, the ANC was unbanned and the country moved swiftly into a transition with unprecedented press freedoms. The journalists of the alternative press, whose sole aim in life had been to bring down the apartheid regime, didn't know what to do. Some of us decided that the time was right to transfer to the mainstream press because, although the alternate newspapers were powerful voices, their circulations were very small.

So now, some of us find ourselves sitting in the offices of the newspapers we refused to work for 10 years ago. And we're in charge. It's the old story of the inmates taking charge of the asylum, with senior positions filled by people whose personal political history is the opposite of what the newspapers used to stand for. Although people at the top have the new mindset of the so-called "new South Africans," many underneath are from the old. Editing recently a newspaper in Cape Town, I had to ask: how are we going to make this newspaper reflect the interests of the majority? Part of the answer is that you have to bring people from the majority into the newspaper. Affirmative action is not an academic subject for us, it's every single morning. It's hard because many people of the old mindset have not done anything wrong; they are not evil. But their mindset cannot be tailored. And, in order to bring new people in, old people have to go. I have 18 newspaper editors who report to me, of whom 16 have been in their jobs less than one year. So things are transforming quickly. That said, the representation of African editors and female editors is still very low.

In other newspaper groups, we are seeing some strange bedfellows. One Johannesburg newspaper, The Citizen, started in the 1980s by secret funds from the apartheid government, is owned by a conservative Afrikaans company. It has a disgraceful political history, but now in the new South Africa, it has been bought into by a Black empowerment company run by an ex-UDF activist named Eric Morobi. He has a difficult time explaining how he is the owner of a right wing newspaper that supported apartheid. He says: "Wait, wait, wait I'm going to do something." But what?

On a more abstract level, newspapers face an interesting dilemma. Our traditional audiences, mostly middle and upper class Whites, are leaving us because they feel we have moved too far toward the new dispensation. And the Black majority is still suspicious of us because of our history. So you try to guide a middle path, but risk losing everybody. These are the dangers.

A debate raging in the media is over the concept of moral equivalence between the old and new government. The one view holds that newspapers that attacked the old government must now equally attack the new. In my view, that is immoral. You cannot compare the illegitimate government of P. W. Botha with the legitimate government of Nelson Mandela. But these battles rage in our newsrooms every day.

Our media is presently more free than anywhere in Africa and probably in most countries in the world. Nobody knows whether, or for how long, it will continue however. Many of us believe that the way the media perform between now and 1999 will dictate the future of those freedoms into the next century. *September, 1997*

Njabulo S. Ndebele

Recently, I read a particularly brilliant discussion of the O. J. Simpson trial in Michael Dyson's book, *Race Rules*, in which he discusses different perspectives from which one can understand what actually happened.

Fascinated, like millions of people in the United States and the world over, by the varied reactions of the American public to the dramatic outcome of the trial, Dyson suggests that from a judicial perspective, justice is done when facts adduced as evidence in a trial lead to an outcome generally perceived to be commensurate with the wrongs committed, regardless of the social, political, economic, or racial status of the accused. However, from an historical perspective, African Americans could easily cite a litany of examples where judicial process was violated by the influ

ence of racial considerations. In effect, society prescribed a law for White perpetrators and another for Black ones. Social pressure often compromised justice. The discrepancies between crime and judgment could be particularly stark in incidents involving both Blacks and Whites. Therefore, there was something leveling about the O. J. Simpson drama in which all Americans recognized almost ritualistically, and in a most public kind of way, how important it is that justice should not only be colorless, but also that it has not always been so.

So, from an historical perspective, it should not be too difficult to understand why large sections of the African American community could have seen some kind of divine justice in the outcome of the O. J. Simpson trial. By the same token, it is not difficult to appreciate the reaction of disbelief among many White Americans. Far more than being shocked by the discrepancy between facts and outcome, they confronted squarely the ugly reality of how life has always been on the other side of the railroad, where things would often not turn out just the way they were expected.

Of course, Dyson is quick to point out that from a judicial perspective, it is not wise to celebrate injustice. But in the American context, the judicial perspective may not always be the entire story. It is here that Dyson asks the fundamental question: faced with these two perspectives, how can we bring back the necessary honor and respect that are properly due to the legal system? He answers that it is almost mandatory that the full context of these two perspectives be given in any explanation of controversial outcomes. The two perspectives interact very intimately. But the more direct point is to make explicit the crucial fact of race in the shaping of American society.

I think this perspective on the O.J. Simpson trial rings with a special resonance for South Africans. In South Africa today, as everyone has a story to tell, it is difficult to find any White person who was a racist, in the same way that it



Picturenet Africa

is almost impossible to find any Black person who did not support the struggle against apartheid. Fortunately, the hearings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission have done much to burst the bubble of amnesia. The tendency for people to want to forget a terrible or embarrassing past may be understandable, but, in a democracy achieved through compromise, such forgetfulness may be dangerous. It may represent the emptying out of social thought, leaving us to celebrate illusions of non-racialism. We must strive to experience the varied nature of our transitional life and to articulate our thoughts as clearly as possible. To take things for granted may be to leave our still unequal world intact.

For example, it needs to be stated constantly that the bulk of the media in South Africa has, and continues to be in White hands. Where Blacks have moved in through majority share acquisitions, the senior management expertise and the organizational ethos have remained largely White. There is nothing inherently wrong about this, but, in a country of such immense diversity as South Africa, an image of society refracted through the lenses of expertise grounded in a restricted field of experience may yield serious distortions regarding assumptions about what is universal. A Black government might be sensitive that White journalists are critical of their actions on the grounds that South African White journalists have yet to prove that their interpretation of the conduct of that government is not colored by prejudice based on unacknowledged, if undeclared, race-based interests. Although such sensitivities might be understandable, at the same time, a situation should not develop where a government hides behind such a situation conveniently and loses the ability to distinguish between prejudice and legitimate criticism.

How this matter is to be addressed is a difficult issue. But it is the experience of many that a large number of South African journalists do not verify their sources of information, or where they try to, do not pursue verification with professional rigor. They depend too much on telephone interviews; do not distinguish fact from interpretation; do not strive to understand their subject; are subject to the influences of special interests; have an overblown sense of their power to make or unmake reputations, so that journalism becomes associated with sensational exposure rather than informative reporting and commentary. But, like all South Africans today, they are testing democratic waters and flexing the muscles of free speech, albeit with some recklessness. So, historically conditioned social and political attitudes, combined with a relatively weak professional culture may wreak havoc on how the image of a new society is painted. How then can South African media win public trust in the quality of their product? No answer to this question can exclude the context of the history of inequality to the extent that that history may have distorted the roles of the media.

But there is another aspect to this matter. What is the intended audience of South African media? Who sees what, listens to what, and reads what? A dominant audience, one that is catered to by the traditional media and whose capital and social power continues to act as an attraction for technology, for commodities, for information, and for the participation of other weaker social sectors, may maintain dominance in a manner that solidifies past patterns of power and influence. Seen in this light, the question of the media becomes a central strategic issue of policy for the new democratic government. For example, in addition to local issues of ownership, what is the effect of foreign ownership of the media on the national question?

This larger question of the media audience takes us to the industrial and commercial sectors of South Africa where a similar question can be asked. For which buyers and consumers do our industries manufacture, market, distribute and sell their products? Can an industrial and commercial infrastructure that was primarily geared toward the needs of a White minority reorient its innovative capacity to meet new needs of a market it essentially does not know? Its inability to reorient itself may result in serious distortions in our ability to understand the various ways in which our economy may grow.

The South African situation suggests that it may be easier to achieve genuine consensus on the broad larger issues where questions can be posed, answers formulated, and policies developed. There, the contours of historical effect can be more easily visible and constantly addressed. What will not be easy, and this is where "race rules," is dealing with the more intense interactions of human contact in business offices, in news rooms, in staff rooms of schools, in research laboratories, at the stock exchange, in the operating room, in the design room, in faculty board and senate meetings of universities, in offices in the civil service, in real estate agencies, in hotels and restaurants, etc. It is in those micro situations where inequities and their effect on human relations reveal themselves existentially. It is there where measurement is possible.

Before I conclude, I must refer to one aspect of our country that has the potential to keep the pernicious history of racism alive so strongly that it can lead to explosions at the point at which race, in time, conflates with class. Something must be done about the inherited spatial apartheid. The proliferation of informal settlements in largely Black areas and the provision of new houses, built like the old matchbox houses will have the effect of con tributing to the maintenance of the spatial structuring of racial thinking. If the environment does not confirm our thoughts about fairness and coherence, it makes our thoughts false because it induces denial.

If my general perspective in these remarks makes any sense, it should serve to underscore my concluding note of caution. It suggests that while we should be concerned about race and racism in our country, the fundamental challenge of the new South African state is not in how to react to a history of White racism, but in how to develop the country by empowering its newly enfranchised citizens. This means that race should not be allowed to define the national agenda. But racism, in micro situations of human contact at work, in public facilities, in the interactions of business and commercial exchanges, or anywhere else should be dealt with steadfastly and, if possible, with appropriate legislation. Such a perspective underscores the necessity that an enfranchised Black majority must run the country by developing long term strategies of national development and not reproduce reactive conduct in which it simulates the conduct of an oppressed community. The path of real freedom is assuming full responsibility for the future. *March, 1998*

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

George Fredrickson

The argument against affirmative action in the United States could be based either on the claim that it has done its job and that Blacks no longer suffer from discrimination or that it was never justified in the first place because it violated the non-racial or color-blind character of America's basic principles.

Both of these propositions are dubious. A number of social scientific studies show that Blacks are still significantly disadvantaged, that racism is not dead and true equality of opportunity far from achieved. Furthermore, the United States Constitution is not color-blind in the way that current critics of affirmative action contend.

Before the Reconstruction Era, the Constitution directly sanctioned slavery and official discrimination against those not defined as White. The 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments passed in the Reconstruction Era were targeted at Blacks with the intention of freeing them from slavery and granting equal citizenship. The 15th amendment, the most explicit, maintains that the vote could not be denied to anyone "on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude." But the vote could still be denied on other grounds, as later occurred in the Southern States. Two leading enforcers of civil rights during the Kennedy/Johnson era, namely Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach and Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall, argued in the New York Times of February 22nd of this year that affirmative action is well within the bounds of the Constitution and does not violate the 14th Amendment by discriminating against Whites: "For racial bias to be a problem, it must be accompanied by power," they wrote. "Affirmative action programs are race based, not to show the preference of one race over another, but to resolve that problem."



Brazil is different. Unlike the United States and South Africa, it does not have a history of segregation laws or officially sanctioned discriminatory practices. Also color lines are more blurred in Brazil, reflecting a more tolerant attitude toward intermarriage and inter-racial sexuality. Yet, as recent studies show clearly, Black and Brown Brazilians are severely disadvantaged relative to White citizens in income, living conditions, educational attainment, access to employment and political influence.

Brazil has seemed less racially split than the United States and South Africa because it has substantial numbers of impoverished Whites. According to one measure of poverty, 90 percent of Afro-Brazilians live below the poverty line, but so do 50 percent of White Brazilians. Economic inequality does correlate with race, but it is more difficult than in the United States or South Africa to distinguish between cause and effect.

Scientific racism was in vogue in Brazil around the turn of the century and was consciously reflected in immigration policies designed to attract Europeans and thus whiten the country. During this period, Afro-Brazilians were regarded as superfluous and expendable, suffrage was limited to the literate, and no provision was made for the education of former slaves emancipated toward the end of the 19th century.

Racial ideology in Brazil changed between the 1920s and 1940s as European immigration declined and Afro-Brazilians received recognition as contributors to Brazilian national culture. In the imagination of intellectuals, Brazil stood in contrast to the United States because it encouraged the cultural and even the biological mixing of the races, and thus was born the myth of Brazil as a racial emocracy. But symbolic recognition did not lead to political and economic empowerment, and Black and Brown razilians for the most part remained impoverished, illiterte and powerless.

was not until the 1980s and '90s that the myth of Brazil s a racial democracy was challenged. Social scientists emonstrated that racial prejudice was alive and directed gainst mulattos (Pardos) almost as much as Blacks (Pretos). hey found discrimination was pervasive. It became clear nat the idea of Brazil as a racial democracy obscured the act that Afro-Brazilians remain second class citizens from ne vantagepoint of economic, social and political power, not in the eyes of the law.

nder pressure from Afro-Brazilians, the government assed anti-discrimination laws, but they have not been igorously enforced. Brazil has not embraced affirmative ction because of the belief that White supremacy as pracced in South Africa and the United States– legacies that ay justify such a policy– has never existed in Brazil.

the United States, the claim that discrimination is no nger a serious obstacle to African American opportunity called "the new racism." In Brazil, the comparable affiration that Brazil has a firmly rooted racial democracy is imply the "same old racism."

on-racialism in South Africa, while superficially similar to onstitutional color-blindness in the United States and the eal of racial democracy in Brazil, has critical differences. Vhites in South Africa never claimed that the South frican Constitution in effect between 1910 and 1993 was color-blind." It was anything but. It clearly and explicitly ntrenched White supremacy. The doctrine of apartheid uled out inter-racial democracy. The official rationale for apartheid was cultural essentialism more than biological determinism. In South Africa non-racialism became the slogan of the oppressed rather than a myth to conceal inequality. The belief that "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, white and black" was enshrined in the Freedom Charter.

What is the future of non-racialism in South Africa? That is the question. One problematic aspect of non-racialism stems from its effort to accommodate the relatively affluent White minority in a Black majority state. South Africans of European origin still hold the lion's share of the country's wealth. To make possible the transition to Black majority rule, Whites were assured, or at least given the impression, that they would not have to give up too many of their advantages. Rectifying the legacy of apartheid would seem to call for massive affirmative action. Such efforts to close the gap have taken place, but mostly by persuasion and informal pressure from the government rather than force. Nelson Mandela used his valedictory speech at the ANC's 50th National Conference to chide Whites for not doing enough to overcome the legacy of apartheid. There is a growing feeling among Africans that South African Whites have gotten off much too easily. But how much voluntary abdication of privilege can be reasonably expected of Whites? A formal redistribution of wealth and privilege is obviously required.

In my opinion, all three countries need both strong affirmative action policies and anti-poverty measures to create a more equitable distribution of wealth and opportunity. South Africa and Brazil lead the world in mal-distribution of wealth, the United States outranks other western industrial nations in the degree of its economic inequality.

While affirmative action is necessary to make the dominant institutions of these societies reflect the diversity of their populations, social democratic reforms are needed to reduce the gap between the "haves," who are predominantly White, and the "have-nots," disproportionately Black and Brown. Whether such a tilt to the left is possible in today's world economy, dominated by multi-national corporations and their agents in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, is a sobering question.

March 1998

john a. powell

The debate about affirmative action in the United States and, I daresay, in South Africa and Brazil, often is focused too narrowly. We are thinking of a specific program or a specific strategy. I'd like to suggest that the racial inequality in all three countries is deeply embedded in structures and distribution systems that are over 100 years old, and ending discrimination would not destabilize that inequality. So just to stop racial discrimination today in all three countries would not redistribute the resources, economic, cultural, political resources in a way that would overcome the deep structural embeddedness of racial inequality.

We come from different countries with different histories, but there are some commonalties that are important and not just in terms of these three countries, but as worldwide phenomena. In virtually every country in the world (that is, every multiracial one), people of lighter skin and European descent are at the top in terms of disproportionate accumulation of wealth and privilege, and people of African descent or darker skinned people are at the bottom. It's an incredible worldwide phenomenon.

In the United States, what color-blindness suggests is that we don't see race. But, if we don't see race, we can't see racial inequality. There's a movement here to stop tracking statistics on racial inequality. That would be devastating to efforts addressing this issue. And so, the debate in the United States about race and racism often gets focused on individual actions instead of the institutions and structures that distribute resources. And one reason that debate can sound and seem reasonable is because we take an ahistorical perspective.

Brazil has experimented for years with a concept of color-blindness with devastating results. I think we, in the United States, should learn from that. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission has said we have to look at our history, that we can't just go forward, our history is our future. Unless we address that, we will continue to reproduce it.

In the United States, there's not one national monument memorializing the slave trade. We have civil rights monuments all over the country, we still have the confederate flags flying here in the U. S. South, we have confederate memorabilia all over the country. We do not have one national monument documenting the slave trade, and it's this deliberate forgetfulness, this deliberate denial, that makes it so hard. We cannot have reconciliation in the United States until we embrace our history.

The last thing I'd like to suggest is that we need to find ways to get Whites to participate in this effort. What's in it for them? I suggest we discuss and explore two things: how the destabilization of racism benefits Whites and how the cost of racism and racial hierarchy can be made prohibitive.

* * *

The discussion about race being socially constructed or biologically constructed is part of the ongoing affirmative action debate in our three countries. The argument goes something like this, and it's interesting. (I would say the neo-racists or neo-conservatives have actually seized this insight.) They say that if race is not biologically real and if there's no biological foundation for it, then that is all the more reason that we should just drop race as a category. It creates all this controversy, all this divisiveness, all this polarization, and it's not even real. So, why don't we just drop it?

They make a very serious mistake. The mistake they make is both conceptual and political. The political mistake may not be a mistake, it may be a strategy and I'll say more about that shortly. The conceptual mistake is that saying something is socially constructed is not the equivalent of saying it is not real.

First of all, race means many different things. We have talked about historical race, cultural race, economic race, racial identity– all having different trajectories, histories, and different ways of being manifest in South Africa, Brazil and the United States. To say that they are socially constructed would also suggest that as we move from time to time and from place to place the construction of race would also change. And, in fact, we see that as we move from Brazil, the United States and South Africa.

But there are also certain commonalties. One way I'd like to drive this home is to point out that not only is race socially constructed, but also almost everything is. Often when people hear that race is socially constructed, they often think again, why don't we just drop the categories and be individuals and really be who they are? And then I remind people that individuality is also socially constructed, so there's no default position that we can get to beyond social construction to the real person. What the social construction of race should suggest to us is that there are forces, mechanisms and language that are important in the formation of race. So, when the conservatives again make the point that race is not real because of its social construction– that is a conceptual mistake.

The practical error, which may not be an error, is this: we assume that the problem in our respective countries is race itself and so in Brazil you have non-racialism, or super-racialism. In South Africa you have non-racialism and in the United States you have color-blindness. All of them purport to deal with some large social problem. What is the social problem?

If you were to take those strategies you would think the social problem is race. But the social problem is not race, but racism or racial hierarchy. It is a mistake to equate racial hierarchy with race. Racial hierarchy and racism are not necessarily synonymous with race. In fact, I would argue that color-blindness at this point in history, certainly in the United States and probably in Brazil and South Africa, is a strategy to maintain racial hierarchy. And so, if we want to address racial hierarchy, the strategy should not be color-blindness, nor should the strategy be racial neutrality. Why is that so?

Going back to affirmative action, the assumption is that if we could get beyond race and just deal with individuals, all these problems would go away. The assumption is that affirmative action is not only a problem, it is undemocratic, that we're all individuals and that we should move toward being treated as "individuals" as quickly as we can.

But if in fact racial hierarchy has been imbedded, not only in individual attitudes but also in terms of deep structures and practice, then a race-neutral strategy will leave those structures and practice intact.

There is a liberal philosopher, John Rawls, who says that, if you want to know if society is just and well ordered, you may look at the attitudes of the individuals, but that's not dispositive. The main way to know if a society is well ordered and just is to look at the social practices, structures and institutions of that society, not solely at the individual attitudes.

Much of the discussion about race, racial prejudice and racial discrimination focuses on individual attitudes. And I would daresay that even if it were possible to stop prejudice and discrimination on the personal level in our countries, the racial hierarchy would still remain.

What is our goal with affirmative action? The goal is not clear. One goal is to end racial discrimination. Another goal that's sometimes cited is to provide equal opportunity. A third goal is to treat us all as individuals, to get beyond stereotypes. All of those goals tend to be backward looking.

A goal that's not often mentioned is to destabilize racial hierarchy – to challenge racial hierarchy, to challenge racial supremacy.

Now, one of the problems of affirmative action as it is conceived in the United States is that, if we focus on affirmative action-as being primarily a goal of doing away with discrimination or prejudice, then we focus on the apparent victim, that is, the person who has been discriminated against. We have to identify who that person is, and once we stop that discrimination, the problem has been "corrected."

If we focus on racial hierarchy, it suggests something else. It suggests a relationship. It suggests that one group is being subordinated, but another group is being privileged. So it introduces White privilege, which doesn't get involved in, doesn't get insinuated in the more narrow way of thinking about affirmative action. Even though there are different histories in South Africa, Brazil and the United States, and we are at a different location, we shouldn't get locked into debating whether affirmative action is good or bad. We should be examining the racial hierarchy in place in these respective countries and how it operates. Then what we will adopt are strategies to destabilize and challenge it. And we can measure how effective we are in relation to that goal, as opposed to whether or not it's unfair to have affirmative action in place.

There is another disadvantage to the narrower concept of looking at just discrimination. Discrimination invites the response that affirmative action is reverse discrimination. If discrimination is bad, then what we want to get to is a society that's neutral, where discrimination does not take place.

It also suggests that there are at best two actors. There is a person who is being discriminated against, and there is a person who is discriminating. And it suggests that everyone else is neutral. And so you get into the position of the innocent White. I didn't discriminate, I didn't have slaves, why should I have to pay for slavery or discrimination? By dropping out White privilege, there's no way to see how institutional arrangements, in fact, have privileged those who are included at the same time that it discriminates against those who are excluded.

These issues are very complex because racial subordination is not simply a way to distribute resources, although it is that also. It's a way of distributing identity. These things are not just distributive in terms of resources; they are also constitutive in terms of who we are. A real change in racial hierarchy would not just affect the distribution of things, but also affect who we are.

The concept of affirmative action as practiced in the United States is too narrow. It accepts institutional arrangements and only wants to include those who have been wrongly excluded. In doing that, even if it's done, it leaves the racial structure, the racial hierarchy in place.

Finally, in all three countries there is a strong fidelity, at least ideally, to the concept of equality. So we embrace the ideal of equality, and then we see gross inequality. We see inequality rampant along racial lines. That calls for an explanation, and there are a number of possible explanations, but two of them are prominent.

Racial discrimination or racial hierarchy exists in our society. If you reject that, as they initially did in Brazil and are trying to do in the United States, it calls for another explanation. The obvious explanation is that if the structure is fair, if there's not discrimination, the group that's on the bottom must be there because of its own inadequacy. And so, it invites the Charles Murrays and others to reintroduce the idea of racial inferiority.

Now obviously, that's a very disturbing position. But, once we accept racial inequality and the same time accept the position that our society is racially just, we are backing up to that position. Affirmative action gives us an opportunity to engage in a much larger critique, to engage in a critique of our structures, to engage in a critique about merit, to engage in a critique about how opportunities and resources are distributed. I call this "transformative action."

The final point I want to address, which comes up a lot, is that it's not racism at all. It's really class. It's really the economy. I would argue again that there's no such thing as "just poverty." In the United States, Brazil and South Africa, class or poverty or economic resources are all racialized. It's all interrelated. And so, in the United States for example, there's White poverty, there's Black poverty, and there's Native American poverty, and they all operate differently. There's the White middle class and the Black middle class, and the Latino middle class, and they all operate differently. Therefore, even if we were to try to move to an economic model, we would still have to introduce race. *April, 1997*

Hélio Santos

The myth of racial democracy has impeded the domestic struggle against inequality in Brazil. In the last 20 years, the Black social movement has forced Brazilian society to acknowledge its racist nature, so much so that the majority of Brazilians now commonly accepts that there is racial discrimination against the Black population. Nevertheless, there is still no consensus on what or whether affirmative action should be undertaken.

Many Black Brazilians say that they don't want handouts, that affirmative action is a policy that treats Blacks as if they were handicapped. But, if indeed Brazilian society is racist and if it has marginalized Black people for almost half a millennium, something must be done to correct this. Affirmative action is necessary, and we must break through to a new understanding.

Much is said about the dismantling of affirmative action policies in the United States, in particular the most recent measures in California. But affirmative action was successful in the United States. If it wasn't, it wouldn't be attacked or assaulted as it is. In the United States, we are told, companies must prove that they do not discriminate. This is something entirely novel to Brazilians. The private sector in Brazil does not understand that the inclusion of the Black population could benefit their own interests.

The Brazilian constitution, contrary to what is sometimes said, is open to public policies of affirmative action. There is no constitutional impediment. It is important to influence the legal culture in Brazil, despite the fact that laws are not taken all that seriously.

The question is: who will take on the role of the operational actor in affirmative action policies in Brazil? In my opinion, it is up to the Black leaders. There is no greater scandal than the school system in Brazil. We should begin with education and then discuss affirmative action policies in the media and the workplace.

The group that I coordinate in Brazil submitted to the President of Brazil affirmative action proposals in the fields of education, labor, and communications. In education, we have proposed a strategy that would facilitate the entry of Blacks into public and private universities; it would facilitate access by Blacks to educational loans in preschool and primary education.

In the field of labor, we proposed creation of special credit lines for small and medium-sized Black businesses and for the utility companies to adopt a principle of ethnic diversity and gender equality in their hiring criteria.

In the field of communications, we proposed mechanisms to raise the visibility of Blacks and to induce radio and television stations to reflect the racial diversity of Brazil in their programs. We must demand of the Brazilian government that they begin to meet some of the ideas of the Black social movement. *September, 1997*

Christopher Edley, Jr.

Let me start with a very quick statement about some of the immediate legal political and policy developments in the United States that may be of interest. First, with respect to legal developments, the United States Supreme Court has in the last 10 years made several rulings to clarify the fact that when the government acts in a race conscious manner, no matter how well intentioned its actions, the Constitution requires that they be subject to a strict standard of scrutiny, meaning that the government's action must be justified by some compelling interest, and that the measure adopted be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.

Perhaps the two most critical points to make in this regard are these: the universe of interests that are compelling for purposes of constitutional analysis is relatively narrow. We know, for example, that a compelling interest exists when the government is trying to remedy discrimination, but there's considerable debate about how to define discrimination. It seems fairly clear from that case law that the discrimination that the government can act against in a race conscious manner cannot be broad societal discrimination, broad societal inequality, but rather, it has to be something that is more particular. Not necessarily particular to individuals who are named, but something that is at least more concrete than simply pointing to the fact that one group is relatively disadvantaged in comparison with another.

Another thing that is clear is that the courts have been raising the hurdle, raising the evidentiary tasks for what government must show in order to withstand this strict scrutiny. The bottom line is that we have in the past decade an increasingly conservative series of opinions that emphasize that in the eyes of the United States Constitution, race is different. When the government acts in a way that takes race into account, it must be prepared to offer a very compelling justification. Race can be used as a factor, but only under limited circumstances and with careful justification.

The second key legal development that I want to mention is from an intermediate court in Texas about a year and a half ago. This case, called the Hopwood case, involved an affirmative action scheme at the University of Texas. The central holding in the case is that diversity can never be a compelling interest that justifies race conscious affirmative action in higher education. I hasten to add that this is the decision of only one appellate court. In 47 of 50 states, the law of the land remains that diversity may in some circumstances provide an appropriate legal justification for race conscious affirmative action. But this case is clear in pointing to the fact that there is a move afoot within the judiciary to challenge what have been understood to be the constitutional justifications available for race conscious governmental action. The conservative trend is clear, but affirmative action is not dead.

[redacted]

Now I'll move to the political developments. The two central ones I would point to: First, the developments in the state of California with Proposition 209. The voters in California adopted by ballot initiative a referendum amending the state constitution to make voluntary affirmative action with regard to both race and gender impermissible in the state of California. So, although these voluntary affirmative action measures in education, employment and contracting are permissible under federal constitutional law, the state of California has amended its constitution to make them impermissible within that state, our nation's largest, representing 10 percent of the population.

It was a hard fought political battle. The exit polls from that initiative suggest that a large proportion, perhaps a quarter of the people who voted on that initiative, were completely confused as to what the initiative meant, and actually thought that they were voting to support affirmative action, rather than disband it. So an argument could be made that if the same issue were put to the voters and the resources were there to educate the public, the result might have been the opposite. Nevertheless, as a political expression of how controversial affirmative action is, and the mood of the country, Proposition 209 cannot be dismissed, and one reasonably expects that in other states, there will be similar battles in the coming years.

The other key political point is that civil rights leaders in the United States are on the defensive, not only in court, but on the legislative and political front, as well. For example, with respect to the United States Congress, I doubt that there is any civil rights advocate worth his or her salt who would affirmatively wish for the Congress to legislate on civil rights this year. If anything comes to a vote in the Congress, we're likely to lose and move in the wrong direction. Instead, the dominant strategy is to try to resist and try to prevent legislation from moving forward, to try to prevent ballot initiatives that are likely to roll back civil rights from taking place. The posture is overwhelmingly defensive using conventional strategies.

A third recent development is that the fiscal policy of the United States has finally adopted a plan to balance its budget. The opportunity to use federal government fiscal policies to influence the agenda of redistribution in the United States is limited by the budget deal and limited by the politics of physical constraint that are likely to persist for some years into the future.

Lastly, I will speak to a critical civic development. We have not come into power in many institutions throughout our society. Many people leading the editorial staffs of the newspapers and in television newsrooms, people moving into senior management positions in corporations, and people elected to high government office have no moral experience of civil rights struggle. Indeed, their predominant experience with these issues as adults has been a period of retrenchment rather than of progress. *September, 1997*

HUMAN RIGHTS

José Gregori

I am the National Secretary in the National Secretariat of Human Rights, founded a few months ago by the Brazilian government to speed up a federal program of human rights in Brazil. This is the first time the Brazilian government has implemented such an all-encompassing policy, which says something about our political will to defend human rights.

The thrust of the program is to eliminate racial, ethnic and religious prejudice in Brazil. This is our goal. We have been in existence 15 months, and I must confess that results are not what we might have hoped. But I also believe we should acknowledge that we've established a new direction in Brazil– a change in climate that is gradually permeating Brazilian society, demanding respect for human rights in all walks of life. Although it is difficult to quantitatively measure progress in the atmosphere and behavior by Brazilian society towards human rights, there are facts that illustrate this progress. In 1992, there was a riot in a prison in São Paulo that resulted in police killing 111 inmates. At the time, few people got worked up about this. Then, in April this year, Brazilian television broadcast evidence of explicit criminal activity by members of the São Paulo military police. After the broadcast, there was a tidal wave of national indignation. For the first time, public opinion demanded a reaction. Although it would be improper to say that this change in public opinion is wholly due to our national human rights policy, I believe it has had some effect.

There is now a new direction with people demanding that human rights be respected. We are well aware that there is still racial discrimination in Brazil, still dramatic differences in people's starting points and living conditions. From a democratic perspective, this is unacceptable. In the Secretariat of Human Rights, we have an inter-ministerial group made up of representatives from various ministries and Black movements. This working group has the task of locating areas that are still responsible for discrimination and inequality and to propose corrective measures.

We are completely open to suggestions identifying points where there needs to be a change of attitude by the government. In our justice system, we already observe signs of a change of attitude. Two cases illustrate this: in a case in Rio Grande de Sul in 1996, a citi

zen was jailed for two years for inciting to racism. In another case, an electric worker who had been fired because of racism obtained reinstatement by that company.

We are making progress. Most government ministers no longer contemplate huge policies without taking into consideration the opinion of the Black community. As I say, we are making progress, but we cannot expect results overnight. *September, 1997*

Lynn Huntley

It is not only Black people who are harmed by racism; it is also White people who must work to maintain their hegemony over their fellows and whose humanity is compromised by the acts and rationalizations that must be pursued in order to sustain their advantaged place. As James Baldwin once wrote to Archbishop Desmond Tutu, "Black freedom will make White freedom possible. Indeed, our hope, which we have been forced to buy at so high a price, is the only hope of freedom that they have."

Not too long ago, I was speaking with a friend about the struggle for social justice waged by and on behalf of African Americans. We were cataloguing many of the things that our forebears had been able to achieve with so much less in terms of education, resources, and positions. Toward the end of our talk, we focused on the weight that we felt on our shoulders in light of all of the problems, reversals and suffering of so many of our people.

Later, when I thought about the conversation, I wondered whether we should be hopeful about what the future portends in the struggle to counter the invidious consequences of racial division and hierarchy. And I said to myself: "It is no longer a matter of what our mothers and fathers did or should have done or will do. It is our watch now. What will we do?"

We must continue to struggle against racism, sexism and other linked forms of oppression, not only because it is the right thing to do, although it is. We must continue to struggle because to give in and give up is to ensure that all is lost and to betray what we stand for. We struggle ultimately in order to affirm our values and who we are. *April, 1997*

Gay McDougall

When it was born, the United Nations had very close ties to the international campaign against racism. Although racial discrimination had been a violation of international law for decades, the international system that developed to eliminate racial discrimination was codified by the United Nations. It is a system that is not perfect, not by a longshot. It is primarily useful in contexts where there is a lot of activism at the national level. It is a supplement and can be an important extra push, as it was in countering apartheid in South Africa. Apartheid was perhaps the one real success story in terms of the international battle against racism, but it was totally dependent on what went on inside the country.

A number of mechanisms are employed by the United Nations to address racial discrimination. The centerpiece is the "Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination" Convention put in place in the 1960s. The treaty offers real possibilities for raising issues and censuring offending governments. Once a government ratifies a treaty, it is obligated to submit a report one year later on what they've done to fulfill their obligations under the treaty, and then every two years after that. Interested non-governmental organizations, both from that country and other countries, can get involved. Non-governmental organizations can file what we call "shadow reports" to present a different view of the government's compliance, and they can submit questions to the committee that it may use in questioning the government. Other countries may raise complaints against a member country that has ratified the treaty. And it is also possible for individuals to lodge complaints or a human rights organization to lodge a complaint on an individual's behalf.

The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination will investigate and ultimately render a set of findings and recommendations. The Committee, however, does not even have to receive complaints from any party or government to take early warning steps, in situations like Rwanda.

In the end, there is no enforcement mechanism, but it is important to remember that governments are sensitive to criticism. This is effective pressure that can be brought to bear. There are other limitations to the treaty process, namely that the offending government has to have ratified the treaty to be subject to the complaint process.

In addition to the treaty-based system, there is the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. Each year, for six weeks, approximately 54 countries sit and publicly debate human rights issues. It is a forum in which individual countries can be identified and their problems discussed by government members and non-governmental organizations. It can result in a resolution denouncing a country, a censure, or a resolution that calls for special measures. In addition to public debate, there is a confidential procedure where an individual can file a petition that can be considered by a Subcommission of the Human Rights Commission and then by the Human Rights Commission itself. But that is a confidential procedure, which means you lose the advantage of public debate.

There is also a Special Rapporteur on racism who makes on-site investigations and reports back to the Human Rights Commission on details of racism in those societies. In 1994, he made an onsite investigation in the United States; in 1995, he went to Brazil. In both cases, the governments were quick to respond to his reports.

Finally, if there is a broad enough consensus that a country has consistently abused the rights of its citizens over a period of time, the General Assembly and the Security Council can take action. The Security Council can impose diplomatic, economic, and/or military sanctions.

In the case of South Africa and apartheid, all these buttons were pushed. The case for sanctions was driven by non-governmental organizations inside South Africa, well organized and reaching out to non-governmental organizations and other governments worldwide. Achieving a worldwide consensus is critical to getting this last stage of sanctions imposed by the Security Council. *April, 1997*

Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro

I'd like to use a quotation that Lynn Huntley gave me yesterday: "The fish doesn't know that it is in water." Most of the Brazilians don't know they are racist or that they are swimming in a totalitarian, racist and hierarchical society.

Every time I come to the United States and need to "classify" myself or my family, I never know how to define us. But every concrete experience outside the protection of academia in this country reminds me that Brazilians are Latinos. I also have two anecdotes. When my young daughter was 8 years old and in a New York public school, she was perhaps one of the not very typical Brazilians here: pale White skin, blue eyes, blonde hair, almost Danish. (By the way, you must know that there are more Black fashion models in Denmark, which has a population smaller than São Paulo City, than in all of Brazil.) And my daughter's friends talked to the other Latino children, gently caressing her hair: "Don't be afraid of her. She's Hispanic." Five years later in the Spring term, as I was trying to enroll the same daughter at Moses Brown, a Quaker school in Providence, not because I prefer it, but because it was very close to my house, the principal was very cautious on the telephone, asking me during half an hour so many questions about my daughter's possible behavioral problems. I got the concrete feeling that he was afraid to deal with an Afro-Brazilian or a Latino girl. This is so strange. The last time we had any connections with Spain was between 1580 and 1640 when Portugal became part of the Spanish empire. We don't even speak Spanish.

The Brazilian immigrants, this new phenomenon in the United States, have marched with the Latinos carrying a special sign that says "Brazilians." The Brazilians who come for menial jobs in this country are obliged to socialize with the Portuguese but consider most of them former colonists. There are more than one million Brazilians who are abroad here in the United States and in Europe, working in menial jobs or in European cities. This has obliged the very cosmopolitan Brazilian diplomats to establish mobile units around New York or Boston to assist Brazilians or to hire lawyers to protect the rights of the new Brazilians in European jails because they receive the same illegal treatment that is usually reserved for the Blacks or the Afro-Brazilians in our country.

We look ourselves in the mirror and the mirror says to us, "You are not Europeans like most Brazilians think. You are not White. You are now in the same place– as in the kitchen, in the manual labor, in conditions of sexual exploitation, in the places and life conditions you have always left for the Afro-Brazilians." Our images in the mirror are no more happily under disguise. Brazilian-White

[redacted]

intellectuals are now perfectly aware that Afro-Brazilians live under the most incredible social and economic conditions– the salaries, the limited access to education, the arrests by the police. There is barely one percent of Afro-Brazilian students in universities, and the Brazilian with the worst situation in our society is a woman, Black with three children and the head of her family. Nobody beats this Afro-Brazilian woman in the degree of her poverty and deprivation.

But for the first time in our history since 1889, the federal government has finally acknowledged that we have some problems in race relations. It has promulgated a national program on human rights. There is at least now some transparency. And extraordinary things are happening in civil society. A new dynamic mobilization of Black professionals, Black lawyers, Afro-Brazilian women is occurring. Perhaps White intellectuals will become more sensitive to our privileged condition and be able to fight racism more efficiently.

We must fight for democracy and human rights, defining as a priority to fight for the rights of our fellow Afro-Brazilians, women and men, not because we are generous, but because it would be impossible for White intellectuals or politicians to look at our pale White faces in the mirror without shame if we don't fight for democracy which includes all Afro-Brazilians. This is a moral imperative.
April, 1997

Barney Pityana

The significant thing about the South African struggle has been the combination of historical moments of internal uprising and the effects that they have had on international responses to the resolution of apartheid. From the time of the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, the struggle against apartheid intensified. The liberation movements were banned, and then they established armed wings.

As a result of Sharpeville, the international community began to really take the issue of racism and racial discrimination in South Africa seriously. The 21st of March was declared the International Day for the Elimination of All Forms of Racism and shortly thereafter the United Nations promulgated the International Covenant for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The international community also took steps to declare apartheid a crime against humanity.

These responses from the international community grew out of activities and the resistance of South Africans. When the police killed children in Soweto in 1976, uprisings broke out around the country. Therefore, the issue of internal revolt and internal dissent became very manifest, even though many governments and many countries still believed that apartheid South Africa was a country with whom they could do business, notwithstanding the pronouncements of the United Nations. In 1976 the escalation of the sanctions against apartheid became very real and grew considerably.

By 1983, the internal struggle– the struggle to make the country ungovernable– was also gaining momentum. The apartheid regime passed a new constitution that was still grounded in racism. In a sense, this was an acknowledgment that the policies of apartheid just simply were not working. But the majority of the people in the country said that this constitution just will not work. The United Democratic Front was established.

The internal repression– most of which we are only now discovering with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in place– escalated at this time. Until now we have not known the full extent of the disappearances, the murders of people, and the participation of the state in these acts. Nineteen eighty-three marked the beginning of the end of the apartheid regime and the apartheid system, helped by the gradual effectiveness of international sanctions and the rising profile of the anti-apartheid struggle. Industrial trade partners of South Africa, like Britain and the United States, began to step up their sanctions. For the first time there was an acknowledgment that South Africa belongs to all the people who are in it, that it belongs to the Blacks and the Whites, and everyone else, whatever color, language, group or religion.

The Constitution of the new South Africa is founded and rooted in human rights, non-racialism and non-sexism. The first section says very clearly that the Republic of South Africa is democratic and founded on the following values: the value of human dignity, the achievement of equality, and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.

The Bill of Rights is very important because it obliges the state to respect, protect, promote and fulfill all the rights set forth therein. Everyone is subject to the Bill of Rights, including the president and the government. There is also a Constitutional Court that determines when any of the principles of the Constitution are being abrogated. And it allows citizens to complain whenever any part of the Constitution is being violated.

The right to equality is important because the separation on the basis of color and race entrenched inequality. The right to equality provides for the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. It is also an acknowledgment that many people have been disadvantaged because of our country's history of exclusion, especially Black people, even though they were the majority.

It is necessary for legislation to be passed and other measures to be taken to promote the achievement of equality and to provide redress for persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. That is the affirmative action clause. It makes provision for measures to be taken at state level to bring about substantive equality for the people of South Africa.

The Constitution also makes provision for certain institutions or commissions to be established to ensure that the rights and principles in the Constitution are protected by entities that are independent of government and at state expense. Among these institutions is the Office of the Public Protector or Ombudsmen, the Human Rights Commission and the Commission on Gender Equality. These are independent institutions, accessible to the ordinary people of the country, institutions that can take government to account and to task. These institutions may also take private entities, such as commercial institutions, to task in order to promote equality and combat racism. Policy initiatives are vital and important. There is legislation in Parliament to ensure affirmative action and equity in labor relations, ensure that people do not get discriminated against because of color and enforce requirements that public and private employers maintain equity in the workplace.

But we still need more ways in which ordinary people can learn, discover, be trained, and understand what the responsibilities of a rights-based society are.
September, 1997

Franklin A. Thomas

Part of the worldwide political revolution of the last 20 years has been the ascendance of the ideals of democracy and individual worth. Accompanying that struggle and accomplishment has been a recognition that without economic advancement, political accomplishments will be hollow.

Fundamental human rights with respect to race, gender and other forms of oppression are critical elements of political stability, and they have become a standard by which we judge and evaluate individual systems. There is a growing sense that as pockets of capital are owned increasingly by pension funds and unions, it may not be unreasonable to envision a time when the demands of that capital for stability will require nations to pay attention to the human rights of all their constituents. *September, 1997*

RELIGION

Robert Franklin

I would like to begin with a quotation from Martin Luther King, Jr. that I think really underscores the call to action that is needed in our time for religious communities. King said, "This hour in history needs a dedicated circle of transformed nonconformists. The saving of our world from impending doom will come not through the complacent adjustment of the conforming majority, but through the creative maladjustment of a nonconforming minority."

I began by quoting King because I think that King is arguably the most important religious intellectual in 20th century America. King was competent in both the dominant symbols and intellectual traditions of this nation. King was able to draw upon the ideas of Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln, as well as the prophets Isaiah or Moses from the biblical covenant tradition. He argued that America had a moral imperative to extend full civil rights to all people.

The moral victory of the civil rights movement, one can argue, was achieved on August 28, 1963, when King delivered the "I Have a Dream" speech. But the legislative victory occurred shortly thereafter with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

The civil rights movement was a social movement to reform American democracy that was church-led and church-based. It led to a national movement of conscience and social change. In the preaching traditions, the prayer traditions, and the song traditions of African-American grassroots folk a kind of magnetism and momentum was triggered that was appealing to many progressive Christians, Jewish-Americans, and others who joined King and Rosa Parks.

As the Black church took the lead and was aided by the press (and I think media and press is very significant in terms of the power and success of the civil rights movement), there was a kind of parallel, technological revolution that took place as King emerged on the scene. In 1953, 48 percent of American households owned televisions; five years later, 1958, 86 percent of American households owned televisions. So, it's within that five-year period.

In addition, with the development of wireless microphones and cameras, reporters were able to go into the southern towns and follow these often rapidly unfolding, unpredictable movements. And with 1960 came the expansion of the national news programming from 15 minutes to 30 minutes, so there was more time available. And, of course, King was on the scene, a young, Black Baptist preacher in starched white shirts and business suits, quoting Shakespeare and Plato. And so King was good copy for television. And in fact, the media embraced him in a way that propelled the movement forward. And I think that's often an understated dimension of the movement.

I continually tell students to go back and re-read King's Letter from the Birmingham jail. It was written in response to a group of White clergymen who, in Birmingham, Alabama, really urged King to leave town. They invited him to go back to Atlanta, characterized him as an "outside trouble maker," whose best possible work would be done back in Montgomery or Atlanta. They heard this voice of ethical challenge and prophetic confrontation as problematic, and so they urged the prophet to keep moving and get back on the Greyhound bus.

Letter From the Birmingham Jail

While confined here in the Birmingham city jail, I came across your recent statement... One of the basic points in your statement is that the action that I and my associates have taken in Birmingham is untimely...

We know through painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed. Frankly, I have yet to engage in a direct-action campaign that was "well timed" in the view of those who have not suffered unduly from the disease of segregation. For years now I have heard the word "Wait!" It rings in the ear of every Negro with piercing familiarity. This "Wait" has almost always meant "Never." We must come to see, with one of our distinguished jurists, that "justice too long delayed is justice denied."

We have waited for more than 340 years for our constitutional and God-given rights. Perhaps it is easy for those who have never felt the stinging dark of segregation to say, "Wait." But when you have seen vicious mobs lynch your mothers and fathers at will and drown your sisters and brothers at whim; when you have seen hate-filled policemen curse, kick and even kill your black brothers and sisters; when you see the vast majority of your twenty million Negro brothers smothering in an airtight cage of poverty in the midst of an affluent society... when you are forever fighting a degenerating sense of "nobodiness," then you will understand why we find it difficult to wait. There comes a time when the cup of endurance runs over, and men are no longer willing to be plunged into the abyss of despair.

Oppressed people cannot remain oppressed forever. The yearning for freedom eventually manifests itself, and that is what has happened to the American Negro. Something within has reminded him of his birthright of freedom, and something without has reminded him that it can be gained. Consciously or unconsciously, he has been caught up by the Zeitgeist, and with his black brothers of Africa and his brown and yellow brothers of Asia, South America and the Caribbean, the United States Negro is moving with a sense of great urgency toward the promised land of racial justice.

You speak of our activity in Birmingham as extreme ... But though I was initially disappointed at being categorized as an extremist, as I continued to think about the matter I gradually gained a measure of satisfaction from the label. Was not Jesus an extremist for love: "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you." Was not Amos an extremist for justice: "Let justice roll down like waters and righteousness like an ever-flowing stream..." Was not Martin Luther an extremist: "Here I stand; I cannot do otherwise, so help me God." So the question is not whether we will be extremists, but what kind of extremists we will be. Will we be extremists for hate or for love? Will we be extremists for the preservation of injustice or for the extension of justice? Perhaps the South, the nation and the world are in dire need of creative extremists... *Martin Luther King, Jr., April 16, 1963*

It's an interesting dynamic when you consider the tensions within the priestly role that many ministers define for themselves. Remember, according to Max Weber in his sociology of religion, the function of the religious leader, the priest, is to mediate an encounter with the holy. But King brought this other emphasis, this prophetic notion, that something is profoundly wrong with the world and the world needs transformation. Transformed nonconformists.



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So you see the tension, the moral drama that began to emerge with the leaders of Birmingham's religious community, the priestly caste as it were, presiding, raising money, church as country club and minister as chaplain to this private community. And King, banging on the door, nailing theses to the chapel door in true Protestant spirit, true to his name, Martin Luther King.

Since our session is really to focus on assessment of strategies to improve race relations, I really want to lift up King, to underscore this tension between the priestly and the prophetic roles that ministers play, but also to identify at least four religious approaches to fighting racism that have been prominent in American history.

The first I characterize as that of the "Council Movement." This is the work of coalitions of churches and denominations, such as the National Council of Churches of Christ, or at a larger global level, the World Council of Churches. These council efforts engage in educational activities, legislative reforms, and on occasion, act as prophetic conscience. These movements tend to be ecumenical, and they tend to be national, but the criticism I hear aired most often is that they also tend to be kind of elite, top-down. They rarely reach the good people of Montgomery, Alabama, the good people on the ground.

The second are denominational initiatives. The generalization I offer here is that these tend to be better educated, more affluent believers that have initiated aggressive movements that have often produced some exciting change, exciting models. For instance, the United Methodist Church in South Carolina adopted a policy of cross-racial appointments placing White ministers in Black congregations and Black ministers in White congregations. It's been a stormy experiment. You can go down the list, American Baptist, Lutheran Churches, Presbyterian Churches, all have some form of anti-racism education, advocacy and other sorts of "moral, renewal" efforts.

A third level is that of local congregational and collaborative activities, and these often are the most difficult to sustain. One of the things that's been popular around the country is the partnering of inner city African American congregations with suburban White congregations for occasional worship services, corporate exchanges, and choir exchanges to try to loosen up some of the apartheid in terms of cultures of worship that can be so different and so alienating for people on Sunday morning at 11:00 a.m. As a seminary professor, I recall pastors around the country calling for support, new ideas to sponsor. And one of the things I frequently talked about was using the season of lent as a time in the Christian community for churches to work on their problem areas, to work on racism and sexism together during that 6-week period.

The fourth level involves individual acts of conscience through which people find ways of expressing that sense of being transformed non-conformists. I know many White people who belong to Black churches. And their presence in the Black church is in a sense an act of treason for their privilege of White skin and White supremacy. And they think about it in those terms. They're not encouraged by the White community to be in that Black church, but they have found fellowship and support for their presence in the Black church. It's an act of anti-racist conscience.

A final comment. There are roughly 340,000 religious congregations of all kinds in the United States. Roughly 340,000, I think, according to the Independent Sector and roughly 65,000 African American churches. So there's tremendous potential in terms of volunteerism and more energy and fervor that can emerge from these communities, which have been all too often rooted in their prophetic indignation toward racism.

There is significant resistance to engage in this project of fighting racism, and I'll just mention three sources of resistance from what I have observed. One, alluded to earlier, is that some members of the White community perceive themselves to be increasingly victimized by affirmative action and other race-specific remedies. This is something that we keep bumping into as we begin to talk about the need to revive the coalition of conscience that marched with Dr. King. The instability of the economy seems to have a centrifugal, polarizing effect rather than an effect of encouraging people to collaborate.

A second source of resistance is that of exhaustion, exhaustion over previous efforts that did not succeed. There is a tendency for people to stop doing what doesn't seem to work. So I sense out there a significant measure of exhaustion and despair about the reviving of mass-based movements for racial justice.

Third, is simply the fear, fear of engaging in such a volatile issue. I've heard middle class White housewives, when I've gone to speak at White churches, talk about the importance of racial justice. I did a survey at a Hampton University Minister's Conference of 6,000 to 7,000 ministers from across the Black church denominational spectrum. Sixty three percent of the respondents indicated that interracial dialogue was important to them. That's significant -- well over half of the members of this very influential group of Black clergy--felt that interracial dialogue was exceedingly important. But when asked, they also said that they were not inclined to initiate those dialogues, in part, because the agenda of caring for the immediate needs of their communities was so overwhelming, it was hard to get something additional on the agenda.

This opens the door for the White religious community to revisit the issue of dialogue and of initiating efforts to work with the Black, Asian and Latino and other clergy. I share that significant statistic because I think that the door is open, there is a willingness to communicate, but somebody's got to make that first move. Somebody has to facilitate the community building between the groups.
April, 1997

WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS

Vera Soares

The women's or feminist movement in Brazil is rather heterogeneous. Brazil lived under a military regime during the 1960s, but, at the end of the 1960s, the women's movement re-emerged and was concerned with the political issues of the time. It was a movement that reconstructed itself to address the issue of democracy. During that time, the movement worked on questions of gender and class.

The women's movement in Brazil is largely composed of women who struggle for better living conditions. In general, they are poor women who live on the peripheries of cities; they are working women– urban and rural– who bring as their central questions, questions about better working conditions, participation in the unions, and the possibility of acting as leaders of the unions. The Brazilian women's movement also includes feminists who focus on the subordination and exclusion of women in society. They seek therefore to create proposals to help women escape marginalization.

When the movement addressed the issue of invisibility, or the exclusion and discrimination against women after the 1970s, it elevated the national debate about the status of women. It sought to demonstrate how, in reality, the different social segments incorporate themselves into the society's daily struggle. Nevertheless, from its inception, the women's movement did not incorporate the racial question. In order to incorporate this issue, it required great efforts by women who participated in the anti-racist movements in our country. These women constituted themselves as a movement that takes the issues of race and gender into account. Since the end of the 1980s, the Black women's movement has added an element to mainstream feminism.

The mainstream women's movement incorporated the race issue initially in a superficial way. We would say in our discourse that we had a strategy to bring visibility to the discrimination and segregation in society from day to day. Thinking now of our course of development, I think that we still need to make efforts to construct our reality so we can think about a more complex matrix of discrimination– a matrix where we can consider issues of race and gender. In this way, I believe that we can move away from this notion of treating the racial issue as an aggravating factor; it is more than that. It is a necessary dimension in the analysis of Brazilian society.

It is important to understand that we have to work with all of the concepts from all of the ideologies that have a basis in beliefs of inferiority and superiority. *April, 1997*

Leslie Wolfe

The women's movement in the United States is probably not what you think it is. It is not just "that White women's movement" that everyone always speaks of. We have in the United States a kaleidoscope, a whole collection of feminisms– many voices, many faces. Most have not been heard or seen by the mainstream– the so-called mainstream - but that does not in fact deny their existence or their power. There has been a tradition, for example, of African American feminism in theory, scholarship and activism since the 1830s. It has been submerged, but it is being reclaimed.

Since about the late 1970s, the unreported news of the women's movement, unreported in the media and elsewhere, has been the building of very strong women of color organizations that are outspokenly feminist in their agendas and their discourse. We have seen the flourishing of Black feminist theory.

Now in the midst of a right-wing backlash in the United States which is suggesting all kinds of horrors to us, we are seeing ourselves in what I like to call a post-Beijing era in which we and women around the world are speaking in one voice to say "women's rights are human rights." We have been continuing development of anti-racist, multi-ethnic feminist ideology and organizing. This, I think, is building more solidarity among women in the United States than certainly we had imagined before. We are in a combined struggle against systems of dominance, whether it's based on race or class or gender. And I think that, in a very significant corner of the United States women's movement, we have been struggling for many years to build this feminism that confronts both sexism and racism simultaneously.

Now for White women, this means understanding our own skin privilege and what it means in the context of gender oppression. We must reject that skin privilege, speak out loudly against racism and rout out the vestiges of racism in ourselves, our organizations, our feminist theory, and our policy priorities.

The women's movement has been unique in its persistent engagement, often appropriately angry about racism and classism in our movement. We have been having this argument, this debate, this conflict, this anger for 25 years. Confronting race and racism has been and remains a central issue of the women's movement because we know that the only way we can deal with the sexism that oppresses all women is to deal with the differential ways in which it oppresses women by virtue of their race and class.

So, I think that more than other progressive movements, if I can be so bold, we have struggled with these issues in virtually every realm. As you've noticed, we have not been successful in every way. But the struggle itself and the engagement in this transformational debate that has been going on since the 19th century is in itself a success. And I also need to be clear by what I mean by "we" feminists. We need to know that many women aren't feminists– yet. Many White feminists do falsely remain tied to White skin privilege. Many otherwise progressive and egalitarian men remain tied to patriarchal assumptions. But this we believe will change.

African American feminists throughout the 19th century argued quite clearly in much more exquisite ways than we do now that the struggle had to be simultaneously focused on the liberation of Blacks, both men and women, and of White women. However, most progressive White men, feminist White women and Black men struggling for racial equality couldn't hear that truth– couldn't hear that complex truth. And so, very few Black women were welcomed in the 19th century as leaders in either interracial abolitionist societies or in the emerging feminist movement. These painful issues of race and class and gender bias persist to our own day. In fact, they are shared, but silent legacies that White and African American women faced as we engaged in activism for social change in the 1960s and '70s.

Like their foremothers who worked for women's suffrage and Black suffrage, women of color in the 1960s and 1970s experienced racism from their White sisters. Though this racism was often unconscious and unintended, it still stung. White feminists sometimes assumed that similarities of gender oppression would overcome the differences of race and class, if only they could recruit women of color into their organizations and their ideology. Sometimes the road to hell is paved with good intentions. Some White feminists, however, expected women to deny their differences and submerge them into a pseudo-melting pot which was destructive to a unified feminist vision and movement.

Women of color had to confront the demand, from both men of color and from White women, that they choose: is it racism or is it sexism that you'll fight against? Some feminists of color and White feminists began to develop what we sometimes call the "third way," which was considering racism and sexism as the twin and inseparable evils of caste that we, as feminists, had to confront.

We still talk about women and minorities in the United States or women and people of color, as if they are mutually exclusive categories, as if dualistic thinking will capture the realities that all of us live in this world, as if ending one oppression is sufficient. You don't want to end one oppression and leave the other one surviving. It is the notion that all the women are White, all the men are Black, but as the title of one study by a Black woman said, "some of us are brave."

We need to recognize that the feminist movement is not a monolith. I think that all of us are in various stages of denial and defensiveness, and we have been for decades. But I have watched the changes happening in some of the organizations that were immune to change, and I think that we also have to model new ones.

We had a 1994 U.S. election that brought us a conservative Congress. The angry White male vote was augmented by White women's votes. What are we going to do about this? It is really quite painful to see people voting against their own best interest.

By virtue of race and class and gender and marital status, some of us are in the first class cabins and others are in the cargo hold, but none of us is the captain. Somehow that's where I think we need to target. *April, 1997*

CIVIL SOCIETY

Susan V. Berresford

I am pleased to be part of this program because it addresses one of the most important challenges of our time– the need for all societies to build institutions and habits that encourage different groups to work and live together in harmony. If we can help each other do this, the natural talents and differences within societies will be national assets rather than sources of strife.

The importance of this challenge became especially clear to me as I prepared to be President of the Ford Foundation. I talked with many people from around the world about issues the Foundation might address worldwide.

Wherever I went, most people, whether in rich or poor, old or new countries, expressed concern about the speed, depth and scale of change that was creating profound and sometimes negative effects. And they worried about mismatches between future needs and many of today's systems and assumptions. They repeatedly noted the need for new knowledge about inter-group differences and ways to make differences of culture and tradition a national advantage rather than a liability.

Many believed that the uncertainty generated by rapid change has undermined people's confidence in their ability to solve serious problems. They urged the Foundation not only to work directly on these problems but also to bring media attention to the successes of courageous and effective change agents. They believed this would help overcome pessimism and the passivity pessimism generates.

Different as Brazil, South Africa and the United States are, the roots of inequality have a family resemblance that cuts across national borders. For example, as this morning's speakers noted, scientific communities in all three countries historically supported popular notions of supposed racial, ethnic and gender traits. All over the world, the "other" with these traits was stigmatized as intellectually inferior and suited to only a limited role in society. This supposed inferiority was codified by exclusionary law and custom, deepening negative perceptions and stereotypes.

So, since histories show similar patterns at a fundamental level, it should not surprise us that Ford's work in the three countries devoted to these problems bears some similarity. Five types of grantmaking work stand out for me as important contributors to progress in the three countries.

First is the philanthropic support given to those who challenge the myths about group difference and disadvantage. These change agents examine the notion of group traits, they expose the policies that have reinforced disadvantage based on difference, and they develop counter theories and examples.

A second type of philanthropic support in all three countries helps people establish links between the need for change and a nation's ideals. In most nations, there is a gap between reality and the ideals embodied in constitutions and key documents and traditions. And there is also a gap between reality and increasingly recognized international standards of human rights and human well-being. Philanthropy can help narrow the gap by supporting people and institutions who project the moral force of the society's and world community's ideals and expose the shortcomings. That can help mobilize people to become active participants in change processes. It can help transform the silent ranks of decent people into engaged supporters.

There is a third type of valuable inter-group relations work foundations have supported. It involves efforts to open up the systems and institutions that create opportunity for men and women. An enormous number of grants support organizations that challenge, in courts or policy forums, systemic barriers in housing, jobs, and other areas. Other grants support education and training to overcome generations of disadvantage. Often mentoring relationships are key to their success. Still other grants help people at the community level build their own organizations to improve basic living conditions– water, sewer, housing, safety, etc. All of these efforts help to uncover and unleash talent, give people valuable experiences and create new power bases.

The fourth category of funding helps rediscover or preserve the artistic and cultural contributions of the excluded group. Too often, the artistic expression of disadvantaged groups has been ignored, trivialized or destroyed. Philanthropies support theater and musical programs, exhibits and museums and a host of other activities that present the cultural and artistic products of excluded groups. Ultimately, these efforts encourage people in the larger society to see the "other" community in its fullness and depth.

The fifth lesson is that philanthropy needs to support organizational change efforts. Organizations mirror the values of the society. Therefore they often contain vestiges of exclusionary practices. Ford and other funders have helped advance organizational renewal by making grants for organizational development– board rebuilding, staffing changes and program planning. This work enables the "new" staff from formerly excluded groups to voice their views in neutral forums. It also involves bringing diverse teams together to solve important and shared problems. It is through this collaborative effort that people learn the value rather than the dangers of difference.

Ford also works to stimulate organizational renewal by considering the composition of applicants' board and staff as we evaluate proposals. We believe there is a connection between the diversity of the organization and its ability to be effective in our diverse and integrated world. So we discuss the matters of board and staff diversity as part of the grant negotiation process, and we have made negative decisions based on these discussions.

These five categories of grants cover a great deal of what philanthropy has done over the years to promote fairness, good inter-group relations and the utilization of the talent that abounds around the world, in every community. Of course, there are other types of work that we could add. But more important than an exhaustive list is some understanding of the principles that underlie all of this work. They are principles drawn from Ford's experience in the three countries that are the subject of your collaboration, but I believe they apply more broadly. They are five key factors in the effort to tilt the balance toward success.

The first principle is that philanthropic effort must be sustained over the long term. Prejudice is a stubborn habit. Attitudinal and institutional change occurs slowly, punctuated by periods of flagging energy, backlash and setbacks. And as time goes on, the kinds of grantees that are effective in one stage may not be those who will bring the greatest progress in the next. So funders need to be willing to adopt new grantmaking approaches.

Within a foundation, a long time frame creates a need for strong leadership and clarity of vision. It is easier to keep your eyes on the prize when the values that drive the effort and the assumptions about change processes are articulated clearly and repeatedly by the leadership. And through regular discussion of that vision with board and staff, people have opportunities to change perceptions, to find new ways to talk about sensitive subjects, and to develop new understandings and alliances. So a long-term view, with clear vision and flexibility is the first principle.

The second principle reflects the reality that grantmakers need to assist change agents in many sectors or to collaborate so that change occurs in multiple settings. Racial, ethnic, gender and other inequalities have deep and wide roots. If change only comes in one sector such as education, aspirations will be frustrated in others such as employment or health. So the second principle is: there is no "silver-bullet" sector.

The third principle is that while there is always a very important role for outsiders, the impulse, strategy and energy for change must come from the inside. Sustained effort and appropriate change strategies require authentic leaders working from within institutions, nations or groups. It is the force of people's will to improve their own circumstances, advance fairness, and address affronts to their dignity that is most likely to carry the day. And those able to "carry the day" include women as well as men. Ironically, that is often overlooked or forgotten in freedom struggles.

The fourth principle is: we need both carrots and sticks. We all know that it is easier to agree in principle than to change our ways and deliver results. We also know that those who benefit from the status quo may be slow to give up what they have. So while we make the moral and practical arguments for change, we have to be sure there are consequences for those who continue to sow the seeds of discord and disadvantage. Philanthropy can help by those who analyze the degree of real change that is occurring, those who identify intended and unintended bottlenecks. And donors can support comparative learning about the construction of carrot and stick systems that have worked. And, terribly important also, is the need to celebrate success when it occurs. Success is one of the carrots. Changing attitudes and behavior is a tough process, and we all need to mark and celebrate the progress we make as we see the long road ahead. If we do not note and celebrate success, people will feel effort is hopeless, and they will be reluctant to join.

Finally, as your program suggests, the fifth principle is that there is extraordinary payoff from projects that enable practitioners and policy analysts to compare experiences across borders. These exchanges inspire new action and encourage adaptation of successful ideas to new circumstances.

Changing the status quo will always be difficult, particularly in inter-group relations. That is because the work is complex, and it is also strongly influenced by factors such as the economy's performance that are hard to control or predict. It is also difficult because working to promote equality often means sailing against the prevailing winds and that can be controversial and risky. But that has always been one major role for philanthropy. It has chal lenged complacency by supporting visionaries and taking on tough questions such as race and human relations. This is a proud part of philanthropy's history. I am proud that Ford is part of that history.

As we do this work, we will again be reminded that creativity is not the sole province of any group or class or country. And we will recognize that the world community needs the contributions of people who have been marginalized by racism, sexism, and other prejudices. Their energy and talents can help create communities where difference is a cherished asset, not a cause of violence or exclusion. They can help us construct communities that treasure and promote caring, fairness, intellectual honesty, harmony and well being. *April, 1997*

Emmett D. Carson

I will provide a brief overview of the United States nonprofit sector; a conceptual framework for examining how United States organizations, and in this case, foundations, view diversity; and then use that framework to make some observations about the extent to which United States foundations are interested in civil rights and human rights issues relevant to African Americans.

The nonprofit system in America is a means through which Americans influence the public and private sectors. It is the way we experiment with new ideas and argue for the hearts, minds and pocketbooks of the larger society. Any group of people can organize and get a tax-exempt status for almost anything.

The nonprofit sector consists of grant-seeking organizations that want to get money, and grant-making organizations, foundations, that give money. There are over one million grant-seeking organizations in the United States. Of these, about 489,000 are in a special tax code category that we call 501 [c] (3).

There are 38,000 grant-making foundations in the United States. Together they have assets of $195 billion. In 1994, they awarded $11 billion in grants and $93 million in loans. These are very powerful institutions because they have concentrated wealth. They are able to influence the non-profit organizations asking for money. They can mean life or they can mean death. To show you how concentrated they are, the top 25 largest foundations in the United States account for $52 billion dollars of the 195 billion. The Ford Foundation is among the most wealthy of these foundations.

john a. powell said that "racism is about institutional practices and power." And he stated, "In the absence of evidence to the contrary, there is an assumption, a belief, that institutional practices are fair." Foundations enjoy this assumption of goodness. That's what philanthropy means: to do good, to further humanity. So, if there are any institutions that are supposed to be good, it would be foundations.

When you start talking about race relations and diversity, the aim is to get an institution, such as a foundation, to think: "Well maybe we aren't fair. Maybe there's something either about ourselves internally or about the society that isn't right." Foundations don't instinctively think that they have to do something about race relations or diversity because they presume that they already work fairly.

There are three things in my experience that lead organizations to think about race relations or diversity. I call them the "three m's": morality, market and mission. By morality, I mean you decide it's a good thing to do. We shouldn't discriminate; we ought to be equal opportunity employers; we ought to give everybody a fair chance. Now why do we say those things? Because its good to say them, and we ought to believe them.

That motivation leads to the creation of principles. You begin to affirm that everybody is equal, believe everybody will be treated fairly, and want to hire anybody who's qualified. That's what morality leads you to do. Concerns about morality lead to those kinds of outcomes in terms of principles and statements.

Market creates a recognition that: "Hey, there are some different people out there. If I put a different image forward, people will associate with that image so that they'll buy my product or associate with me." So Nike will have Michael Jordan selling gym shoes, and that's a statement to say: "We know Black people like Michael Jordan. They'll see him wearing gym shoes and they'll think we're OK." And it works. People buy Nike gym shoes. It's a market-driven piece.



Non-profits do the same thing. We have a group called "United Way" in the United States, and there's frequently a Black and Asian person in their ads because they want to say to those communities: "We affiliate with you." It doesn't mean that their Boards or their staffs or even their programs are different. But it's the image thing. That's the market.

The third thing that gets institutions to think about diversity is mission. That is, an institution understands that it is essential to have people of color involved in order to carry out institutional mission. When an institution has a mission focus, then it worries about the Board, the staff, the program, because it associates having people of color in those roles with getting the job of the institution done. So depending on what led you to race relations and diversity, whether it's morality, market or mission, you end up with very different outcomes.

Many foundations have diversity statements or affirmations of their morality. But Whites account for 90 percent of all foundation governing boards in the United States. African Americans account for six percent; 63 percent of the 90 percent White board members are male. Well, 84 percent of all the professional staffs of foundations are White, nine percent are Black, four percent are Hispanic, and three percent are Asian.

If you look at the top 1,000 foundations in the United States for which a study was done, in 1994, civil rights groups received $76 million or 1.2 percent of the total. That may seem pretty good, $76 million. (Remember: foundations gave out a total of $11 billion.) Compare that to museums and historical societies: They received $266 million. Performing arts groups received $230 million. So civil rights was a long way down on the scale.

If you look at that same 1,000 foundations, and you split it by population group rather than by subject areas, Blacks received 2.5 percent or $15.6 million. That's compared to 1 percent for Hispanics, which was $6.6 million; one half percent for Native Americans, which was $3.5 million; and less than three percent for Asian Americans, which amounted to $17 million.

If you look at international heman rights related grantmaking by United States foundations, you find that all United States foundations gave a total of 3.4 percent of their funds for international affairs. That's peace and security issues, immigrants and refugees, everything. Total– 3.4 percent. Only 11 percent of the 3.4 percent went to human rights.

What can we conclude? We can conclude that having a concern about morality, doing the right thing, has not translated into the boards and staffs of United States foundations being diverse; it has not translated into civil rights activities receiving substantial support; it has not translated into people of color groups receiving any significant share of the pie. And so I would suggest that most movements for social change, by and large, have not been supported by mainstream philanthropic institutions.

Movements for social change have been supported by groups that raise their own capital to support their own issues. There is an enormous amount of research going on in the United States looking at how people of color there have amassed their own philanthropic resources to promote social change. The evidence does not show that radical social change comes through foundations, at least in the United States. For example, with the exception of the Ford Foundation and a couple of others, few foundations will support civil rights litigation. That's a major issue.

Foundations are created because of wealth. The people who have that wealth have been beneficiaries of the system. So they have a greater interest in using that wealth to maintain the status quo rather than in creating radical changes. And as long as you understand that, then you understand the role that many foundations play. They move as society moves, but they are seldom in front of society. *September, 1997*

LESSONS

Neville Alexander

The French novelist, Balzac, once said, "At the beginning of every great fortune lies a great crime." The issue of reparations or redistribution of ill-gotten wealth has got to be addressed. In most societies it has been addressed by revolutionary means. I think there is consensus here that revolutions are out in the 21st century, probably, and that therefore reformist means are going to have to be found. What those are or can be is the issue that people need to grapple with in order to see whether it is possible to accelerate change and to transform societies into "non-racial utopias."

The issue of race and class, the separation of categories, analytical categories, is an ancient debate. It goes right back to Marx, to Weber and others. But it is still an issue which in an empirical sense is not understood properly.

It is very interesting to hear that race is possibly, under certain circumstances obviously, paramount, but someone else was saying the exact opposite– perhaps we must deal with class first, class is paramount. Clearly the context determines what we prioritize. We need a paradigm, an approach that will make it possible for us to focus on a particular historical situation and to ask the right question. We must pose the right questions, otherwise we will never get the right answers.

Jonathan Jenson asked provocatively, by way of a joke, although I am sure he meant it very seriously, why in a Black country do we refer to "white papers"? The answer is very simple: because of the nature of the transition, we have taken over the bureaucratic mold of the apartheid state. That has hardly changed and that is the reason why, among other things, transformation has been held back by the practices and the beliefs of the past. We have got to break through that.

It is pointless to look to the state for certain types of initiatives. We have got to do things ourselves. We have got to find the ways and means of putting pressure on the state at all levels, whether it is trade unions organizing to change the priorities of the state, or of big business, or of the people who have power in our societies. But at all levels we have got to take the initiative ourselves, including the schools. We have got to find ways of making things work, of training ourselves, of transferring the knowledge and the skills that we have got. I think that is the important message. How do we create assets, how do we create skills, how do we create knowledge for ourselves and put the pressure on those who have power in our society, whether it is at a political or the economic level, to change their perceptions in order to change their priorities? Then I think the question of globalization will fall into place.

Noam Chomsky, a few months ago at the University of Cape Town, made the point that we can paralyze ourselves by mystifying and reifying the concept of globalization. If we know that certain decisions are deliberately made in certain boardrooms, particularly in Washington and other United States capitals but not only there, we would not allow ourselves to be paralyzed and petrified in front of the statue, the idol of globalization. *March, 1998*

Barbara Arnwine

I'm going to go through a couple lessons, based on what I've learned from this conference, from others and life experience. The first lesson is that neither racism nor sexism exists in a vacuum. They're never, never benign, never without purpose. Second, there is always a clear economic advantage for someone benefited by a racial hierarchy or "pigmentocracy." Those interests do not relent their position, their privilege, and their advantage easily. Third, neither racism nor sexism can be maintained without active mechanisms that reinforce their operation daily in society.

The United States has an active racial and gender dynamic. Throughout all three countries that we have been comparing, we see a similar use of these dynamics and racial hierarchy maintenance strategies. We see the use of stereotypes, the myth of superiority, the internalization of racism and feelings of inferiority, wage denials, unequal employment, segregation, bad media depictions, underfunding of organizations that fight on behalf of the oppressed, segregated housing, unequal educational opportunities, etc. If I had one lesson to share from the United States, it is that racism is tenacious. It is persistent; it does not yield in and of itself. Secondly, when racial progress is made, it's very tenuous and not guaranteed. It is not permanent. Thirdly, you have to have constant vigilance to fight to advance rights and you must constantly fight to maintain victories.

Victories happen because of the activism of the disadvantaged and those who are oppressed and the goodwill of those who dissent to the racial advantage in the society. We, who are activists, have to take advantage of those opportunities to affect change that will result in a new system.

Another lesson is that multiple strategies are critical and must be deployed in order to defeat the comprehensive nature of racism. There is no one correct strategy. Racism is comprehensive in its denials, in its operation, and we have to have a comprehensive strategy that fights it. So, in the United States, what we have seen historically is use by African Americans of all kinds of strategies. We have appealed to morality. David Walker's "Appeal" in 1829 was an appeal to morality. We have used self-help strategies, from the underground railroad to fighting against discrimination. We have appealed to constitutional authorities saying that the constitution itself says all people are created equal. We have used litigation, mass demonstrations, legislation, media, public education, research, policy analysis, community organizing and strategic alliances. And those alliances have been with many groups. We have had alliances between the Black and Jewish community, alliances with women's organizations. One of the increasingly significant questions for the next century within the United States is what kind of alliances will be created between Blacks and Hispanics and among Blacks, Hispanics and Asians as we collectively become the largest population groups in the United States. We have also aligned with disaffected sectors of the power elite. All of these are necessary and complementary strategies, and they are critical to advancement.

Another lesson is that no movement in this age can succeed without the leadership role of women being recognized and enforced. Women throughout the world are fighters. Women care deeply, as do men. But our issues have to be critically important in a movement, and they have to be acknowledged and made part of the platform and the agenda. One of the reasons for the lull the civil rights movement is in now is because of its denial of women's roles. Some women decided that the movement and its leadership were not fair and pulled out of the movement. So we have a very good group of women leaders now, and we have a traditional group of other leaders. This has been a problem, and it's a problem that we have not openly addressed and reconciled ourselves to in our movement in the United States, and we have to.

I also would like to say that intersection of race and gender has to be a major focus, and it has to be emphasized. We have to look at the particularized forms of discrimination.

Another lesson is there is no way to underplay the need throughout all of our societies to examine, monitor, study and publish information on the existence of racial discrimination, its persistence and forms. We found out that you cannot have affirmative action without a fundamental recognition in society that racial discrimination still exists, and that racial discrimination is important. I would say to my Brazilian brothers and sisters that that is a crucial part of the struggle that has to be undertaken.

In any struggle, there's never going to be complete agreement about strategies. One thing we've learned is that you cannot be discouraged by the disagreements over strategies, because

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there's not going to be uniformity. Right now, in the United States there is disagreement about nationalism, integration, and self-determination. We learned historically that we cannot abandon one form for the other, but in fact we have to take all of it and merge it into tool and a weapon to move forward. I think that as the struggle goes on here in Brazil, and there are differences of ideologies and differences of opinion, my advice is to be patient with each other, to learn from each other, and to use the best that everyone offers within their various strategies. That will be important.

The other lesson is don't be discouraged because progress is not always a continuum. Movements have their peaks and their lulls. They do not necessarily move progressively forward all the time. In the United States, we've had our times when we moved forward, and then the White backlash and stagnation occurred. But we cannot allow that lack of visible progress every day to discourage us. Because the one thing that is clear is that we are making progress, and we are moving forward.

My last message is to my Brazilian sisters and brothers. I think that you hear the rest of us talk about what's happening in our countries, and it can be at times mindboggling. It may seem like so much is happening there. How do we make it happen here? That frustration can be great. But I want to remind everyone here it was only in 1985 that the military rule ended, and your progress since then has been amazing. In fact, it's an inspiration to all of us. Forcing the issue on education curriculum, pressuring the media for rightful depictions of our people, positive images, raising the consciousness, having mass demonstrations, Zumbi celebrations– all of these things you've done in a very short period of time. My advice to you is keep educating, keep struggling. Remember as Frederick Douglass said, "Without struggle, there is no progress."

We have taken our lessons from you. I came here and saw the Pardo category, and, when that proposal was put forth in the United States, I said, "Oh, no, not after what I saw in Brazil." Because of that, the Lawyers' Committee did something it normally would not have done. It led a coalition against the creation of a multiracial category in the United States because we cannot afford to repeat the Brazilian experience. That was a lesson from interacting with you and learning from you.

I think another lesson flows from having listened to your language about identity and elites. A lot of that language needs to be used in the United States debate. There is some discussion now that's beginning about White skin privilege and talking about identity and how identity is tied to the maintenance of racism. We need to do more of that. We need to learn from the efforts that the women's movement is working on here. There's so much that we can learn from each other.

To all activists, I always say a couple of things. One is that you have to love each other. It's hard to work and struggle over ideology, against an oppressive system, against people who are totally against everything you stand for where there's very little recognition of your point of view in society. It's hard, and the only thing that sustains you in those moments is love of others who have the same view and are working hard with you and love of the people who you are struggling for. Those are the things that make us good activists -- that give us the heart, the spirit, the inspiration to struggle on no matter what the odds are. Our people have always learned from each other.

W.E.B. DuBois learned from the pan-Africanist movement. King learned from Gandhi. Nelson Mandela quotes King all the time. We are joined not only by African blood; we are joined by our love of equality and the knowledge that all things are possible when we unite. *September, 1997*

Christopher Edley, Jr.

Let me make three points about the broader picture of change as I see it within the United States. First, I think we must bear in mind that there are dual impulses within the establishment. The establishment expresses both conservative and progressive impulses. These wax and wane over the decades. It is a mistake to believe that at any given moment, it is all one or the other. They coexist to varying degrees. For 25 years the conservative impulses have been at the ascendancy, and I believe that works as a broad generalization on matters both of race and class. Both the conservative and progressive impulses tap two sources of fuel. They're fueled both by a moral vision and by pragmatism. The moral vision at stake is, on the one hand, a vision related to autonomy, and on the other, a vision related to communalism. Hence, the conservative emphasizes self-help and market forces; the progressive emphasizes social welfare norms and redistributive measures.

The pragmatic fuel for these conservative and progressive impulses is also familiar. The pragmatic concerns, on the one hand are of property, and on the other hand, of efficiency. Of property, the conservative says: "What's mine is mine." The progressive says: "We need to be inclusive and redistributive because we need quality workers and a peaceful society."

What we see in much of our public policy debate is the interplay of these multiple impulses and multiple values. We make a mistake in our analysis if we fail to recognize that all of these impulses are simultaneously present in this system.

The second major point involves the seduction of revolutionary zeal within the social change movement. I think that what we've seen with the limited success of social change in the period 1950 to 1975, is that there has been a flow of protest directed toward the establishment, using the mechanisms of litigation, of electoral politics, of the mainstream media, of corporatist careerism, of institutional philanthropy. By channeling our protest into these establishment structures, there necessarily has been moderating influence because, after all, these establishment structures are inherently and inevitably self-protective and conservative. If the purpose of a lawsuit is to persuade a judge, how much can you expect to accomplish as the judiciary becomes increasingly conservative? If the purpose of electoral participation and running for office is to win majority support, how bold can we expect initiatives to be, given that we are in minority?

So, the conundrum is that with success, however limited, and the move to become part of the establishment, the revolutionary zeal, the true progressivism that seeks to challenge and change the workings of the establishment, becomes compromised. Part of our dilemma, therefore, is that much of the leadership in the civil rights struggle is now part of the mechanisms of the establishment and are confined to working within the processes of the establishment. I'm not pointing fingers of blame, because autobiographically, that's how I've spent my life. This is symptomatic of this generation's approach to the civil rights' struggle in the United States. It is inherently self-limiting.

Another point involves the ambivalence over identity and the tension between nationalism and universalism that has persisted for well over a hundred years. Our debates over human relations in the United States remain very much alive and well. The Black community itself is ambivalent over the integration ideal and how to pursue it. And, indeed, the nation as a whole is ambivalent on that score.

And lastly, the connection between local and national action. A late, great democratic politician, Thomas P. O'Neill [former U. S. Speaker of the House of Representatives], said, "All politics is local." The political extreme right in the United States relearned that lesson well over the past decade, especially the far right Christian Coalition, recognizing the importance of grassroots efforts. The civil rights movement has talked about the need to put more attention on grassroots local activism for perhaps the past two years.

The current struggle in the United States on matters related to race focuses on five key things:

1. Race blindness as a debating tactic and a legal argument, as a norm that has simple appeal but dangerous consequences. This is a morally intelligent position, but one that cannot be reconciled with any kind of a commitment to effectiveness in remedying discrimination and closing the opportunity gap.

2. Reaction against identity politics, the argument being made that race does not matter, that since the categories of color are socially constructed we should, indeed, ignore them. The court in the Hopwood case said that paying attention to race as a basis for diversity in admissions to college is as irrational as paying attention to blood type. Of course, they sound like they're on a different planet. The argument is that the social realities of racial difference should be ignored.

3. Class, not color, as a policy tool for bringing about inclusion. Many argue that race conscious measures aren't required because alternatives are available.

4. Whispers of inferiority that will not go away. There was a flurry of debate recently about whether the President or the Congress should apologize for slavery. But, of course, the issue isn't slavery, it's the ideology of racial supremacy that undergirded slavery. The question is whether the ideology of racial supremacy still lives and how it still poisons our public and private discussions.

5. Finally, appeals to self-help. Some assert that there is no special role for government, and, indeed, no special role for private charity, that self-help is the most important prescription. They say that the Black family structure must be repaired by Black families, for example, or that education is a matter of parental and student commitment, not of social welfare programming.

Having mentioned those, let me close by saying a word about President Clinton's Race Initiative and how the President's Initiative relates to all that I have said before. I am a consultant to the President, and to this White House Initiative, but I'm speaking here in my personal capacity, especially since I suspect the President will disagree with what I am about to say. This Initiative is often referred to as the National Conversation on Race. Any kind of Initiative must have a substantial policy component because policy changes are needed in order to change the social and economic factors which help to determine the distribution of opportunity.

The difficulty, however, is that policy alone will not produce important progress. That is because the bold kinds of policy measures that are needed to close the opportunity gap do not have the necessary moral or political predicate. I could give you my $200 million plan to save the inner cities of America. It is a terrific plan, but it would be dead the moment it left my lips because there is no political or moral foundation for bold initiatives. One important reason is that there is no moral foundation, putting aside American's traditional reluctance for bold redistributional efforts.

Whenever the political face of a problem is Black or Brown, American's compassion comes up short. Therefore, the second part of the Initiative is not simply to emphasize policy, but to do something that will change the values in a way that make it impossible to have bolder policies.

This Initiative must not be about closing the "chat gap." It's about closing the opportunity gap. It's not conversation for the sake of conversation. The end of this is not conversation- the goal is racial justice. So the conversations that are needed are conversations that have some hope of building bridges to connect people across lines of class and color. We don't know what kinds of conversation this will be.

We hear stories about grassroots organizations that are trying to build racial coalitions, but from a Washington, D. C. perspective, it's difficult to know which of these initiatives is actually successful in public relations terms, and which of them are actually successful in terms of effectiveness of connecting people across lines of class and color.

My own hypothesis is that the conversation must lead to some form of action, some form of experience that engages people with people who are different. Engagement to reform schools, to clean up a toxic waste dump, to organize a labor union, whatever the case may be. At the end of the year, however, the challenge will be, has this conversation sparked interest in leaders around the country at the community level and in institutions to continue the effort to build bridges that connect people across lines of class and color? If it's left to Bill Clinton alone to do this, he will fail. All politics is local and the "values" battle over racial justice must be local as well. *September, 1997*

Frene Ginwala

Given the role of race in the different histories and circumstances of Brazil, the United States and South Africa, how do we understand the words "beyond race?" Do they provide a vision for the future, or is the concept put forward to ensure that present strategies look at other factors in addition to or in place of race? Can we go beyond race in order to improve inter-group relations; do we not need to factor in race when we make and implement policies to ensure equitable development? Is race not an important element in ensuring that globalization does not overtake the need to address structural inequalities and disparities both within societies and between countries? Does the title "beyond race" suggest or indeed require an interpretation that race is not something that needs to be taken into account in the strategies we devise? Or, is the achievement of these objectives not a necessary pre-condition before we can go beyond race? At what point can we go beyond race?

These questions are at the very heart of the political debate and the national agenda in South Africa today.

Racism is still part of our daily life and political rhetoric. This is but to be expected. It is surprising, however, to find that a number of people seem to believe that centuries of racism were wiped away with the democratic elections on April 27, 1994. What is even more surprising is that those who were among the victims of apartheid are now being accused of introducing race as a factor in South Africa politics. Opposition politicians accuse the government of re-racializing society, while the current leader of the National Party has likened the African National Congress to the National Party of 1948.

Many Whites are indignant when they are accused of racism. After all, they argue apartheid is now dead, we have had democratic elections and the country is ruled by a Black President and a predominantly Black cabinet and parliament.

Many argue that we have moved or must move beyond race and to refer to race as a continuing feature in South

Africa's social economic political and cultural fabric is simply a new form of racism.

Blacks resent repeated assertions that apartheid is dead and are increasingly frustrated by the failure of their fellow citizens to understand its racial legacy. They are horrified and angered at the many incidents of racism in schools, in the police, defense force and other institutions and by the insensitivity of White politicians and opinion makers. Increasingly one hears criticisms that Black leaders have gone too far in tolerating racism in the attempt to foster reconciliation.

Nearly four years after South Africa's first democratic elections, South Africans have yet to arrive at a common understanding and appreciation of the extent to which race and racism still feature in our society and why.

Much of the confusion arises because many White South Africans are ignorant about what has been happening in our country over the past 50 years. They have little knowledge about the nature of apartheid, its impact on the lives of Black South Africans and the methods that were used to maintain the system.

Seen in the context of the complete separation of Whites and Blacks, the astounding ignorance can be understood. In general, Whites were completely insulated from the harsh effects of apartheid. The consequences of mass ignorance are serious, and the fact that we understand the reasons for this does not make the situation less frightening.

While one acknowledges apartheid was sustained by the physical and legal barriers erected between South Africans, we must also state that the attraction of staying within the comfort zones of privilege and the protection afforded thereby kept Whites in their ghettoes.

Many did not want to know the price paid by Blacks for White privilege. Many knew and, as we learn from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, actively and knowingly participated in the most brutal violations of human rights. Others, especially the leaders, blatantly continue to deny any knowledge of them.

The opinion makers, analysts and intellectuals chose not to inquire. Many were enthusiastic participants in the Cold War anticommunist rhetoric of the apartheid rulers, or were taken in by it, and refused to consider the reality of what was happening in our country.

A very small group of Whites did venture out and stand up for their principles and beliefs, often at great cost to themselves and their families. But the truth is that, overall, there was an abject failure of leadership among White politicians, the judiciary, the media and intellectuals. Even while acknowledging the immense barriers built by apartheid, one must also note the human agency that created them.

This failure is not just a matter of historical interest. Unless all of us understand the nature and extent to which race has been a factor in shaping our society and our responsibility, we will be unable to recognize the legacy of apartheid and the challenges that face our democracy.

I want to refer particularly to the necessity of understanding that the privileges enjoyed under apartheid form the basis of the relative wealth, status and standards of White South Africans today – and not their collective merit.

The de-racialization of our society is one of the major challenges we face. Unless we are able to address it successfully, the aspirations, values and vision of the new South Africa that inspired and distinguished the liberation struggle and won it respect and international acclaim and support, will become a matter of history rather than the dominant features characterizing the new South Africa, and the much acclaimed miracle will prove to have been a transient illusion.

Apartheid was not just discrimination on grounds of race, religion or ethnicity such as operates in many societies, where equality is professed but Jewish, Japanese and Arab millionaires are denied entry into golf clubs, or Black people are refused service in restaurants or accommodations in hotels and guest houses, or property owners formally or informally agree not to sell their houses to anyone except a White Anglo-Saxon person, or schools and universities refuse access to Black pupils, or local authorities refuse to allocate good housing to immigrants from Africa and Asia.

In all these cases, in the United States civil rights struggle and the ongoing anti-racist movements in Europe, the basic law or constitution and values of the society provide that all races should be treated equally while the practices of individuals, clubs, public and private institutions or subordinate state, province, city or local government try to exclude members of a particular group, race or religion.

In general, those who are excluded support the system or institution to which they are denied access. They do not wish to change either the system or the institution, but rather want to ensure that these operate in conformity with the laws and constitution and on the accepted national public policy of equality.

In contrast, South African society for the past 350 years until 1994 was not based on equality. Rather assumptions were made about the character and capacity of different racial groups and the need for unequal relations between them. Through the many decades of slavery, colonial settler and White minority rule, South African society has been organized on the basis of these assumptions. Initially, we were not unique. But while the rest of the world developed more enlightened policies, South Africa stood still and later marched resolutely backwards. When challenged, the rhetoric of segregation, rights for civilized, separate development, and apartheid were used as the veneer to gloss over the entrenchment of naked racism in our society.

The economic, social and cultural order was defended by retaining political power among Whites and, in turn, reinforced by creating a dominant racist ideology that masqueraded as culture and Christian nationalism and which was promoted in the education system, some churches and the media.

Thus were laid the foundations of apartheid South Africa: dug as different groups of settlers came to our shores, constitutionalized in the Boer republics, the pylons driven by British colonialism and imperial financial interests, maintained and strengthened through united effort even as Britain and Boer competed for our natural resources and disputed the spoils and, finally, set in concrete after 1948.

This is the base upon which our entire society has been organized, with institutions founded to maintain and strengthen unequal relations, and run by those who had a vested interest in the preservation and extension of the prevailing order.

This process of structured racism was built up over more than three centuries. Outside of Nazi Germany, apartheid provided the most overt ideology for racism and exceeded the Nazis in the single mindedness and its comprehensiveness of organization.

Apartheid differs fundamentally from racial discrimination. It was the institutionalization of race and racism into every aspect of our lives, to the extent that these were structured into society and were not aberrations or particular manifestations initiated by individuals. Racism was the water and sand of the building blocks of our society and hence is intrinsic in the organization of our society and the relationships and institutions we have inherited.

Three consequences flowed from the understanding that apartheid was not simply racial discrimination or a continuation of segregation and the recognition of its structured character.

Since the 1880s and before, the leaders of the majority sought to co-operate with all those who promoted an inclusive South African society based on inter-ethnic unity and non-racialism. Over many decades their efforts and overtures were rebuffed. Whenever Whites were offered a choice, they turned their backs on an inclusive society. By the second half of this century, South African society as constructed by the White minority was no longer acceptable to Blacks even as a starting point. They no longer wished to enter it. They rejected the possibility of reforming apartheid and the attempt to co-opt them into that process. Rather they sought the destruction of apartheid and its institutions.

Second, and linked to these internal developments, was the response of the international community. Recognizing the distinction between racial discrimination and apartheid, it declared the latter a crime against humanity and adopted the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.

Even Pretoria's long standing allies, who did not ratify the Convention, eventually accepted that we were not engaged in a civil rights struggle and recognized the legitimacy of the liberation struggle including the armed struggle to eradicate apartheid. The notion that apartheid could be reformed was rejected and support given to the liberation movements and anti-apartheid forces.

It should be noted that to this day, a number of White academics and commentators refuse to come to terms with the criminality of apartheid. They focus their energies on making procedural distinctions between resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly and ignore the validity of the Convention in international law. They continue to shield the politicians and others, who engaged in criminal actions. In this way and others they continue to abdicate their responsibility to help Whites to understand and come to terms with our past. Perhaps this is unfair. They are themselves ignorant and hence cannot be expected to enlighten.

The third consequence is the matter we have to address: in what circumstances does or should race remain a primary factor in policy making?

There are societies in which racial or ethnic stratification coincides with wide disparities in economic and social conditions. Provided that race or ethnicity were not the basic building blocks of that society and its institutions and the maintenance of inequality was not the objective, it may be possible to develop general programs for the alleviation

of poverty or improvement of education and health which will consequentially remove racial and ethnic disparities. (I want to stress it is not the mere existence of racial or ethnic groups, but the unequal relations prescribed for them that constitutes racism and raises the problems.)

In South Africa, this is manifestly not possible. Ironically, to deracialize we have to focus on race. Together with the racially based inequalities we inherited, we find that the very instruments we must use to manage society and to overcome the legacy are themselves shaped by racism and designed to perpetuate unequal relations.

All our institutions were designed, built and organized to serve particular objectives, and those who served in the institutions developed them to perpetuate the unequal relations between South Africans. We now require institutions that promote vastly different objectives– hence the need for their transformation including changes in the decision-making structures of the institutions and procedures. Concomitant with our rejection of apartheid reform and refusal to be co-opted into the process was the commitment to fundamentally transform our society.

This goes beyond addressing the very obvious inequalities in material conditions and amenities. While we need to address matters such as unequal access to resources, the differential facilities for Blacks and Whites in, for example, education, health and welfare, we must also look at the way these sectors were organized. For the objectives of the new South Africa are vastly different and the reorganizing of these areas and other institutions need to be addressed.

We need to actively transform society, our economy, culture, and institutions. To do so, we need to consciously address structured racism and sexism and ensure that we act to remove these as an essential component of transformation.

If we want to look beyond race into a truly democratic, non-racial and non-sexist society, we cannot ignore race or gender, but need to build in the removal of them into each and every policy we develop and each program we undertake.

Affirmative action is necessary– both as a product of deracialization and gender equality and as a necessary factor in transformation. It is necessary that institutions, including civil service, are broadly representative of our population.

not only on grounds of justice equity and equality, but to conform to the constitution.

This is also necessary in order to ensure that decision-making bodies are able to draw on the experience and knowledge of all members of society. Only a representative body will be able to locate and identify the racial and sexist nuances and factors and devise the policies and program that will remove them. In that way, development will transform society, and we will also ensure equitable development.

The need for interventions such as affirmative action is illustrated by the absence of women at decision making levels in the United States, Japan and some European countries, notwithstanding equality laws and relative affluence. It is in the Nordic countries and others where they have accepted the need for action to secure representation in order to address structured gender inequalities that women are beginning to enjoy real equality.

Unfortunately, the success of de-racializing and transformation will depend on South Africa developing a common understanding of apartheid and the legacy we have to address. But as I have indicated, this is precisely what is lacking. South Africans have little common experience on which to base a common understanding of our recent past. Old wounds are still open and bleeding, while the rapid pace of change creates new ones in the absence of understanding.

If we want to move forward, we have to overcome our anger and frustration at the failure of others to understand. We cannot simply berate each other, engage in vitriolic debate, level charges and counter charges of racism, and hope thereby to build understanding.

Prior to negotiations, there were lengthy exchanges and dialogue between members of the liberation movements and South Africans of other persuasions. The intention was not to convert, but to build bridges. We succeeded to the extent that we were able to enter and conclude negotiations. Perhaps we need to re-open the process both formally and informally.

Crucial to improving inter-group relations is to open and maintain channels of communication. There is a national predilection for workshops and conferences. Our need is for dialogue and consultation, to improve understanding, rather than make decisions.

In the longer term, we need to consider programs for all citizens. One such would be a national service for young people. I am not here referring to the schemes for newly qualified doctors and lawyers to undertake internships. Young people in high school or just after could be drawn into a program in which they would live together, receive civics and vocational training, and perform community service. Clearly, more thought needs to be given to this, but the important component of bringing young South Africans to live, work and play together to share experiences should not be lost.

Notwithstanding our relatively peaceful transition, the potential for social conflict should not be underestimated. We can learn a lot from the international experience here.

We have seen that the suppression of various forms of social identities and, perhaps even more importantly, debate around these identities for 70 years did not stop ethnicity, nationalism and xenophobia from becoming one of the key centrifugal forces which led to the fragmentation of the Soviet Union. Similar processes have unraveled other countries such as former Yugoslavia, and ethnic strife dominates African countries such as Burundi and Rwanda.

Developments outside our borders will impact on our efforts to de-racialize. As part of our own transformation and restructuring, and our own nation-building project, we have to contribute to what is popularly described as the "African Renaissance:" to build an inclusive South African and Pan African consciousness that will facilitate cooperation and interaction to address our own problems and those of the region and continent.

The dominant view of Africa is one of poverty, drought, economic dependency, ethnic violence, mismanagement and autocratic rule. This racist perception overlooks the tremendous strides many African countries have made especially in the last 15 years and Africa continues to be isolated and sidelined in the international area. Part of the edifice of colonialism and racial oppression was the devaluing of everything African. Much of the inherently inclusive and humanist values of traditional African society have been lost in the process.

In South Africa (as in other ex-colonial countries) exclusive notions of ethnicity were propagated, which still have great divisive potential. De-racializing South African society will necessarily have to take cognizance of this.

South African society is very much at a watershed. As a nation, we comprise a multitude of ethnic identities, a plethora of languages and a string of religions. Wide disparities of wealth overlap with a racial cleavage, an urban rural cleavage and gender cleavage. Fundamental to the resolution of conflict is the eradication of structured inequalities within society.

There are no ready blueprints for successfully unifying multi-ethnic societies. Similarly, there are no blueprints for dealing with inter-group relations or social reconstruction within conflict-ridden societies. The specific historical, political and even perhaps, the psycho-social realities of a given country will determine the success of any approach. While all states have to find ways that are appropriate for them, it is useful to examine different approaches.

Through sharing we are able to develop new insights into our own situation. We learn to ask the relevant questions and attempt to find the answers. We may learn what to do but also what not to do.

There are no easy answers. For South Africa, a society with a high potential level of conflict, ignoring race, or leaving it socially unmanaged or to individual conscience, would be to our peril. *March, 1998*

Antônio Sérgio Guimarães

How do I view this moment in the history of racism, and resistance to racism, from the point of view of Brazil, South Africa and America? My general point is that the struggle against racism in one country profoundly affects the struggles in other countries.

The demise of apartheid in South Africa is a decisive international event. All social engineering since the 16th century terminates here. State racism, legalized racism is dead. The era is buried. I do not mean that it cannot be resuscitated, but rather that until the demise of apartheid in South Africa, the international anti-racist agenda had as its reference point an ideology of racism enshrined as law. A legalized racism. Now we have an opportunity to go to another threshold.

An observation which leaves us Brazilians a little sad is the realization that the decisive moment in our own country was the abolition of slavery in 1888. At that time, unlike Black South Africans called upon to participate in the construction of the new order, Black Brazilians did not participate in negotiations for the new order. The Republic was proclaimed in Brazil, but there was not the slightest possibility that the Black population would be included as a protagonist with regard to its interests.

Brazil was known as the first colonial country to have non-racialism enshrined as a constitutional principle, and for that reason we were seen, and saw ourselves, as a model reference for the anti-racist struggle. One common international belief was that Blacks and Whites could not live together because of inherent racial hatred. We were cited as proof that this was not true. From the beginning of the 20th century until the '60s, many comparative studies in race relations were done between Brazil and the United States. These studies held a clear idea that Brazil was a racial democracy, based not on the facts in Brazil, but on the interests of those who cried out against racism in the United States– the White liberals and the African Americans– who needed a non-racial model to compare their circumstances to. This attitude made it harder for the Black Brazilian population to free itself from the idea that they lived in a non-racial democracy.

The civil rights struggle in the United States– in which African Americans participated in the negotiation and construction of the new non-racist order– in turn, changed the racial agenda in Brazil. It became clear that Black Brazilians could not achieve anything without mobilization, culturally and politically. It also became clear that subtler forms of racism– non-ideological forms which involved discrimination in daily life– were significant. When Robert Blauner and other scholars in the United States developed the concept of institutional racism– that racism has consequences regardless of legislation– and when the American government accepted this idea, it became easier for the Black movement in Brazil to be understood. Racial inequality in Brazil– economic, social and political inequalities between Whites and Blacks– began to be considered in a serious light. In 1994, the president in Brazil publicly recognized racism in Brazil. It took 94 years for the Brazilian State to face up to this issue and to acknowledge that it exists.

Now we have reached a new point in the racial situation in the United States in which class separation is growing between middle class Blacks and poor, excluded Blacks. Attacks against affirmative action policies by conservative Whites have begun to find an echo in the middle class Black community. There is a fear that the social and cultural agreement between middle class Blacks and the broader Black community has been broken or threatened. This is a fear never heard before by Brazilians: the fear that

American Blacks might experience the same situation as Brazilian Blacks and lose the tools of struggle against racism, particularly the legitimacy that they had enjoyed from a communal base. This appears to have been precisely the challenge for Brazilian Blacks. In other words, a line that separates those who have money, education and social status from the majority of the population who have absolutely nothing.

Our challenge is to struggle against racial discrimination and increase opportunities for Black people in general. The fact that racial discrimination in Brazil operates through class differences has begun to occur in the United States. In Brazil, people say that those who have no money have no rights, that those who have no money are Black regardless of their color. *March, 1998*



Wilmot James

The end of apartheid is not simply of significance to South Africans, but to the global community of people who are concerned with the immorality of racial segregation, racial discrimination and racism. The end of apartheid, in a sense, was the culmination of a global commitment- symbolized by the United Nations in the 1960s. It ended an era of legally codified, systemic racial discrimination, an era– in global and moral terms– when a variety of countries systematized practices that discriminated against people of color and, in particular, Black people.

That has been a triumph. But it is a beginning of another, and I think a much more difficult, process where the evidence of racism has become much more fragmented. It has seeped through the cracks in the social order, making it difficult for social change agents to be concrete and precise about what to struggle against.

The way in which anti-racist struggles can be pursued varies from country to country. In the case of the United States, existing rights were extended to people who were previously denied those rights. So, the form of that struggle was a civil rights movement. In the case of South Africa, it was negotiated settlement after a long period of violent struggle. And in the case of Brazil, it's a question of a post-military-rule democratization process. But, the common medium of change is a deepening of democracy or democratization. The striking thing about Brazil is that the struggle here is to get the issue on the agenda. That is, to get it recognized as a problem.

These three different countries not only use different instruments to change things, but are at different moments in time in relation to racism. In the case of South Africa, the people who have been involved in struggles and challenging the status quo by causing the social order not to function, making the townships ungovernable, and being involved in protests are now within government. They now have the responsibility of not only keeping the country together, of keeping diverse populations together, they also have to initiate public policy, to legislate, to govern.

In Brazil, there is a relatively smaller percentage of people who represent an anti-racist cause in positions of governance. How do people from this background use newly acquired power to govern, to make decisions, and be persistent in order to pursue an anti-racist agenda for their country? What do they do under circumstances in which a whole range of other issues becomes more important, where the challenge of governance is a much bigger question? Will political leaders necessarily lose sight of anti-racist values that they have been committed to in the past? It is a question about the quality of leadership, the stubbornness of leadership, and the persistence of people to keep at something that is not easy to achieve. The leadership question pertains not only to government but also the private sector and civil society in all three countries.

In South Africa, sovereignty has become very important. That is, what is a South African state? Where does it begin and end? What is "South Africaness" as an entity? The pride and patriotism associated with these issues has become quite crucial. It places enormous pressure on people in power to keep the diverse populations together and in the process of reconciliation. The tendency of political leadership is to absorb conflict, to want to keep things together. They do not want to see conflict. There is a tension between that and how people of color and Black people mobilize in order to assert their own interests. I find it very interesting that in the case of South Africa, Pan Africanism and Black consciousness, which in fact is a moment of Black assertiveness, is politically marginalized.

There's a tension in all three countries– Brazil, South Africa and the United States– between finding a medium by which Black people can assert their interests and the political pressures on leadership to build a nation. *September, 1997*

Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro

In terms of truth telling, Brazil, South Africa and the United States are evidently at different stages. The military dictatorship is already part of the past in Brazil, but there is still a need to expose the real situation of Black people in Brazil.

I think that it is important to build up our identity as citizens. Neville Alexander said that "the struggle is against forgetting." In Brazil, in addition to not forgetting the past, we also have to strengthen and advance the fight to recognize racism. Even though the federal government has acknowledged social discrimination, our society has not fully incorporated the recognition of discrimination.



Senator Benedita da Silva mentioned that human rights have to be recognized as rights to which Blacks are entitled. This is difficult because of the limitations of our judicial system. There are many horrors and tragedies that we could tell you about the police and their actions in relation to Blacks in Brazil. We have to show that these formal aspects of democracy must be strengthened in order to make substantive democracy a reality.

There's also the debate on affirmative action that is just beginning in Brazil. In the National Program on Human Rights, we refer to affirmative action as positive discrimination. Of course, our colleagues from South Africa are ahead in this effort. Affirmative action for them is not a theoretical issue, but a daily challenge. Equity for Blacks in Brazil is still an aspiration. In the Report on Human Development for 1996, it says that only 1.7 percent of the Black population has over 12 years of education; the figure for Whites is 11.4 percent.

The Black woman is certainly in an underprivileged position, and we must place her advancement as a priority when we discuss our fight for equity. There is a role to be played by both the state and social movements, not only Black movements, but social movements undertaken by all of those who are fighting for democracy.

So the lesson is to keep on struggling, choosing different routes and keeping hope alive. *September, 1997*

Gloria Steinem

I was asked to cluster my thoughts around two questions: What is the most striking thing I learned from considering racism and inequality from three national perspectives? And what gives me cause for optimism about the prospects of improved race and gender relations?

The most striking thing I have learned is that racism is an invention, an utter and total fabrication that grew up as a necessary justification for the military or legalistic take-over of the land, labor, water and resources of one people by another people. It will probably only be undone by the return, the redistribution or the communal ownership of land, labor, water and resources– redistribution from the top down and from the bottom up.

The shared justification for racism in all three of our countries and continents accounts for the similarities between us. If you are going to take over the land of a people and subdue them, you must convince yourself you are justified. For instance, I grew up being taught that North America was inhabited by a few primitive people before the Europeans arrived. Not that there were 500 sophisticated nations in North America with a settlement in the mid-west the size of London at the time. Not that 90 percent of those people were later eliminated by conquest and disease.

Once they have been set up, structures of inequality may be maintained in different ways. In South Africa, racism was maintained using a culturally masculine style: with clear rules, distance, military authority and the like. In Brazil, it was maintained by what might be called a feminine style: that is, by perpetuating the myth that we are all together, that everything is fine. In the United States, it was done both ways: north and south, the clarity of southern racism versus the subtler diffusion of northern racism.

There is also a clear connection between racism and sexism. Just as racism grew up as a necessary justification for the take-over of the means of production, sexism grew up as a necessary justification for the take-over of the means of reproduction– the ability to decide the number and the ownership of children. As racism grew, sexism had also to deepen and grow because it took on the added task of maintaining the separation of races by controlling the means of reproduction. Women of the so-called superior races had to be restricted sexually in order to maintain racial purity, and women of the so-called inferior races were exploited sexually in order to produce more people, marked by their skins, for cheap labor.

Of course both groups of women were a source of unpaid or underpaid labor and still are. Every time we refer to reproduction or women's unwaged work with such phrases as "women who do not work," we are continuing a form of slavery.

We are learning that racism, sexism, class and other inequalities can only be uprooted together. The hierarchical, patriarchal family literally manufactures inequality, and I think finally we are learning that we cannot really have a democracy without having democratic families. The two are inextricably connected, the large and the small, the macrocosm and the microcosm.

I think that a critical mass of people is learning these lessons, which brings me to my cause for optimism in answer to the second question. The uprooting of apartheid is cause enough for optimism, but there are others, large and small. It is a source of hope to me that the least among us is beginning to be heard. True, the average South African– the woman who spends three hours a day collecting water only to subsist– is not in this room but she has been heard in this room and accounted for in this room and taken as the vision of the average South African. We should take as a general rule Gandhi's idea that, if you are doing something that you could not explain to the least powerful person in your nation, you probably should not be doing it. I worry about academic language that removes us from each other. I am going to put a sign on every path to Yale and other universities that says: "Beware! Deconstruction Ahead."

The hyper-masculinity and racism that was used to maintain apartheid and as a justification for colonial imperialism has been challenged and that is a cause for hope. Such racism, we should recall, used to be part of mainstream thought. Such racism justified conquering non-European continents and came home as the Holocaust. In fact, the unusual thing about the Holocaust was that it took place in Europe. But the justifications of racism on which genocide was based had already been well developed.

The remnants of the pre-patriarchal, pre-nationalist, pre-sexist, and pre-monotheistic cultures that have survived genocide on this and every other continent offer inspiration: they remind us that there once were different ways of making decisions, of relating to nature and to each other. Knowing that 95 percent of human history was different is a source of inspiration because otherwise we might succumb to the idea that the current way is somehow natural or inevitable. I am going to make a button for myself that says: "History will set you free but first it will piss you off."

A final cause for optimism is that a different consciousness has been brought about in our time by a combination of the nuclear, environmental dangers that respect no national boundaries and the vision from outer space of our fragile spaceship earth. That is a very different vision from the vision that developed racism, sexism, class, the idea that everything must be ranked, that nothing is linked, as it grew up in the conquering stage of our consciousness. The optimism I feel comes not just from these realizations but also from the power of social justice movements around the world. I do not think we have begun to realize our own power yet.

But securing the future is not automatic: it depends on what each of us does every day. We must behave as if everything we do matters, because everything we do does matter: the words we choose, the way we spend our dollars, how we relate to each other. Each of those things really does matter. *March, 1998*

Franklin A. Thomas



Why do racism and discrimination persist in America, even when we can identify a shared vision of the future for our country, a shared vision that is non-racist, prosperous, and peaceful, that offers the opportunity to all members of society to fill their potential? We embody that vision in our constitution, as amended, statutes and laws.

But there is much disagreement as to how to achieve that vision and how hard we are willing to work to achieve that vision. Part of that disagreement and lack of will is based on our confusion as to what has and has not worked in the past in tackling racial discrimination, inequality and poverty.

In the early, second decade of the century, American efforts to tackle poverty centered around trying to protect the capital-oriented economic system while not having a violent revolution. After World War I, we had another period of industrialization where people left the farms for the cities. Then came the Great Depression that Black and White

Americans experienced as a nation. "The New Deal" of the '30s was the response.

The New Deal was the first major articulation of a social contract between the government and the people, between the "haves" and the "have-nots." This contract said that there was a shared obligation to provide social protection for all of the citizens of the country when the economic system failed to provide them with sufficient income. So our Social Security system, labor laws, and a host of other initiatives and protections came into being.

For me, the anti-poverty programs of the 1960s– known as the "War on Poverty"– can be seen as a continuation of the New Deal. Their focus was on the inner city where many Black Americans lived, and their message was: "We recognize that, notwithstanding voting rights and other initiatives, major, debilitating inequality still remains."

Today we confront a backlash against programs aimed at helping Blacks and the poor. The restructuring of the industrial sector and other efforts to improve productivity have made people more insecure and thus more selfish. There is no longer any social dishonor in being self-centered. The philosophy too often espoused is that we are not responsible for anyone other than ourselves. We don't have to feel responsible for the special problems of Blacks and the poor.

Programs designed to help Blacks and the poor are systematically attacked. The moral imperative to address the legacy of slavery has been removed. Those who challenge the exclusion of poor and Black people are attacked. Even talking about our ideas and our shared vision of a prosperous, non-racial society is subject to ridicule. *April, 1997*

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This publication includes a collage of views expressed over time by the devoted, faithful and generous members of the Initiative's International Working and Advisory Group. Their willingness to give of themselves has enriched the work of the Initiative immeasurably. Their insights and wisdom are among the Initiative's greatest treasures.

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Lynn Huntley
Director
The Comparative Human Relations Initiative

PHOTOGRAPHY CREDITS

The pictures of persons and townships featured in the text are largely the work of South African photographer, Ricky Fairbairn, to whom we are indebted. Figures in the borders are from photography by Ricardo Funari/RF2.

Cover, Uniphoto

page 6, Wendell Brock

page 57, March on Washington 1964, Flip Schulke Archive

INITIATIVE PUBLICATIONS

The Comparative Human Relations Initiative has developed a number of linked publications that amplify on the themes and ideas set forth in this volume, drawing on original sources, and in the voices of the people in these three countries. Reports include:

Beyond Racism, an overview of findings by the Initiative's International Working and Advisory Group, featuring first person profiles of outstanding Americans, Brazilians and South Africans involved in the struggle against racism and reflections of International Working and Advisory Group members.

Three Nations at the Crossroads, in-depth and data-rich portraits and accessible historical reviews of Brazil, South Africa and the United States by Charles V. Hamilton, professor emeritus, Columbia University; Ira Glasser, executive director, the American Civil Liberties Union; Wilmot James, dean, University of Cape Town, and Jeffrey Lever, South African scholar; Colin Bundy, University of Witwatersrand; Abdias do Nascimento, Rio de Janeiro State Secretary of Human Rights and Citizenship; Elisa Larkin Nascimento, director, IPEAFRO, Brazilian scholar Nelson do Valle Silva, and a comprehensive historical timeline of key events related to race in the three countries.

In Their Own Voices, a topically organized reader featuring articles, quotable quotes, and excerpted speeches by participants in Initiative meetings such as Ellis Cose, journalist; Frene Ginwala, speaker of the South African Parliament; Alex Boraine, vice chair, South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission; Dr. Emmett Carson, president, the Minneapolis Foundation; Gloria Steinem, contributing editor, Ms. Magazine; Mahmood Mamdani, professor, University of Cape Town; Njabulo S. Ndebele, former vice chancellor, University of the North; Susan V. Berresford, president, the Ford Foundation, and many others.

Color Collage, occasional papers on issues such as the origins of racism, the role of the media, truth and reconciliation efforts, globalization, economic inequality, the religious community, among others, by authors such as Sig Gissler, professor, Columbia University School of Journalism, James Jennings, professor, University of Massachusetts, Reid Andrews, professor, University of Pittsburgh, C. Eric Lincoln, professor emeritus, Duke University, and many others.

Books include:

Beyond Racism, Embracing an Interdependent Future, (working title), the Full Report of the International Working and Advisory Group to the Comparative Human Relations Initiative, including detailed citations, sources and annotated bibliography. [forthcoming]

The Same Beneath the Skin (working title), a comparative anthology edited by Charles V. Hamilton, Wilmot James, Neville Alexander, Antônio Sérgio Guimarães, and Lynn Huntley, which considers educational issues in the three nations, the costs of racism, international remedies, affirmative action, and future prospects for movement beyond racism in the three nations by recognized scholars and activists. [forthcoming]

Tiranda a Máscara: Ensaios Sobre o Racismo no Brasil (working title), Antônio Sérgio Guimarães, editor, a Portuguese language volume featuring papers by many leading scholars and Afro Brazilian activists. [forthcoming]

Grappling With Change, Yazeed Fakier, author (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers and Idasa, 1998), a look at how South Africans are coping post-apartheid.

Between Unity and Diversity, Gitanjali Maharaj, editor (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers and Idasa, 1999), a reader on post-apartheid nation-building efforts.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Neville Alexander is a professor and director of the Project for the Study of Alternative Education at the University of Cape Town in Cape Town, South Africa.

Joel Zito Araújo is a television and video director and screenwriter. He is a Ph.D. candidate in Communication Science.

Barbara Arnwine is the executive director of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law based in Washington, D.C., USA.

Bernard Anderson is an assistant secretary in the United States Department of Labor, Washington, D.C., USA.

Susan V. Berresford is president of the Ford Foundation in New York City, New York, USA.

Alex Boraine was the vice chairperson of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission from 1995 to 1998, and is now a visiting professor at the New York University Law School, New York City, New York, USA.

Sueli Carneiro is the coordinator of Geledes, Institute for the Black Woman, in São Paulo, Brazil.

Emmett Carson is president of the Minneapolis Foundation in Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA.

Neil Coleman is head of the COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) parliamentary office in Cape Town, South Africa.

Caetana Damasceno is a professor of anthropology at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Christopher Edley, Jr. is a professor at the Harvard University Law School in Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.

Robert Franklin is the president of the Interdenominational Theological Center based in Atlanta, Georgia, USA.

Frene Ginwala is the speaker of the South African Parliament and is based in Cape Town, South Africa.

José Gregori is the Minister of Human Rights of the Federal Government of Brazil. He is based in Brasilia, Brazil.

Sig Gissler is a professor of journalism at Columbia University, New York City, New York, USA.

Antônio Sérgio Guimarães is a professor of sociology at the University of São Paulo in São Paulo, Brazil.

Lynn Huntley is the director of the Comparative Human Relations Initiative at the Southern Education Foundation and a member of the International Working and Advisory Group to the Comparative Human Relations Initiative. She is based in Atlanta, Georgia, USA.

Wilmot James is professor and dean of the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa, and a member of the International Working and Advisory Group to the Comparative Human Relations Initiative.

Jonathan Jansen is dean of the Faculty of Education at the University of Durban-Westville in Durban, South Africa.

Shaun Johnson is a writer and managing director of Independent Newspapers Cape in South Africa, and a member of the International Working and Advisory Group to the Comparative Human Relations Initiative.

Gay McDougall is executive director of the International Human Rights Law Group based in Washington, D.C., USA.

Mahmood Mamdani is the AC Jordan Professor of African Studies at the University of Cape Town in Cape Town, South Africa.

Manning Marable is a professor of history and political science at Columbia University, New York City, New York, USA.

Njabulo S. Ndebele is an author, poet, and the former Vice Chancellor of the University of the North, in Pietersburg, South Africa. He is now Scholar-in-Residence at the Ford Foundation of New York, New York City, New York, USA.

Melvin Oliver is a vice president at the Ford Foundation, New York City, New York, USA.

Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro is a professor at the University of São Paulo, director of the Center for the Study of Violence, and a member of the International Working and Advisory Group to the Comparative Human Relations Initiative. He is based in São Paulo, Brazil.

Barney Pityana is chairperson of the South Africa Human Rights Commission based in Johannesburg, South Africa.

john a. powell is a professor at the University of Minnesota Law School and director of the Institute on Race and Poverty. He is based in Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA.

Edna Roland is the coordinator of Fala Preta and a member of the International Working and Advisory Group to the Comparative Human Relations Initiative. She is based in São Paulo, Brazil.

Hélio Santos is the coordinator of the Inter-ministerial Working Group convened by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso and a professor of economics at the Catholic University of Brazil in São Paulo, Brazil.

Benedita da Silva is the vice governor of Rio de Janeiro State, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Vera Soares is a Brazilian physicist, feminist activist, and researcher. She coordinates the University of São Paulo's Extension Program and is a Councilor of the São Paulo State Council on Women's Conditions in Brazil.

William Taylor is a lawyer practicing in Washington, D.C., USA.

Franklin A. Thomas is a consultant with the TFF Study Group in New York, City, New York, USA, and a member of the International Working and Advisory Group to the Comparative Human Relations Initiative.

Vic Van Vuuren is director of human resources at Sanlam, in Bellville, South Africa.

Francis Wilson is a professor of economics and director of the South African Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) at the University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa.

Leslie Wolfe is the executive director of the Center for Women Policy Studies in Washington, D.C., USA.

All Initiative reports as well as additional, commissioned papers are available on the Internet. To download Initiative reports, papers, and other documents in Adobe Acrobat format (pdf. file), to find up-to-date information about forthcoming books, or for ordering printed publications, visit the Initiative's website, www.beyondracism.org

Or contact The Comparative Human Relations Initiative, The Southern Education Foundation, 135 Auburn Avenue, Second Floor, Atlanta, Georgia 30303, (404) 523-0410 (phone) or (404) 523-6904 (fax).

For information about receiving printed copies of Initiative publications in South Africa, inquire with the Institute for Democracy in South Africa at its website, www.idasa.org.za

Information about the Southern Education Foundation is available through its website, www.sefatl.org.





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Racism

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Racism

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Introduction

Among civil society institutions in the United States, none has been more influential than the religious community on matters related to social transformation and relations involving African Americans and their European descent counterparts. Dr. C. Eric Lincoln writes in "Some Reflections on Racism and Protest in the United States" about the role of religion and religious leadership. It is not an accident that many of the leaders and participants in the civil rights movement of the 1960s and 70s in the United States were affiliated with religious bodies. Nevertheless, socially, most churches in the United States remain racially identifiable. In recent years the religious community has been less visible in the struggle to advance the human rights of African Americans. Lincoln reflects on the betrayal of religious values that sanctioned the extermination of Native American peoples and the enslavement of Africans and provides great insight into the forces that liberate and constrain religious leadership, focusing primarily on African American clergy and the historically prophetic mission of the Black church.

There is a demographic sea change under way in the United States. By the middle of the next century, it is projected that the United States will be a "majority-minority nation" in which no single "racial" group will constitute the majority. The implications of this transformation are profound and complex, presenting new challenges and reasons for people of all stripes in the country to come together and rethink ways to manage diversity.

Since Latinos are projected to be the nation's largest minority group in the future, finding ways to develop and/or strengthen bonds of mutual interest between Latinos and persons of African descent is a matter of special import. These groups, together with Asian Americans, have the potential to constitute a new governing majority for the nation. There are signs of stress and lack of understanding between Blacks and these other groups. A conversation between them is just beginning. Many of the countries from which Latino or Asian immigrants hail have their own varieties of racism based on color or phenotype. In the two pieces, "Successes and Challenges of Relations Between African Americans and Latinos," by Drs. Rosa Dávila and Nestor Rodríguez, and "A Framework for Good Intergroup Relations Between African Americans and Latinos," by Antonia Hernandez, Esq., some of the points of agreement, conflict and potential union are mined with clarity.

The Hernandez and Dávila and Rodríguez papers have value for South Africans and Brazilians. South Africa has become the "preferred destination" for diverse peoples from the continent of Africa. Brazil has many communities borne of past immigration and will, as it continues to develop, surely receive more immigrants. But whether among newcomers and established residents or other communities of diverse people, forging alliances and coalitions is a critically important aspect of nation-building, consolidation of democratic governance, and surmounting racism and discrimination. Everyone has someone who may dislike him/her due to "difference." Finding ways to reduce inequality, promote unity and tolerance, and facilitate inter-group cooperation is the only road to peaceful coexistence among peoples and nations.

The array of technological advances that have made the world a smaller place is reshaping rules of commerce and international relations within and among nations. In his paper, "Globalization and Its Impact on Race Relations and Divisions in the United States," Dr. James Jennings conducts a useful review of pertinent literature and describes some of the ways in which this phenomenon is interacting with domestic efforts to reduce inequality and combat racism. Clearly the era into which the world is moving– with powerful multinational corporations influencing domestic trends and decision making, instant communications, the rapid flow of capital across national boundaries, and increased competition– will impact on the economy of nations and efforts to reduce inequality. Recent disruptive demonstrations by protestors against the World Trade Organization in Europe and the United States may be a harbinger of problems to come. While many scholars may argue that globalization's effects have been overstated, and it has not yet had a dramatic effect in the United States, Brazil or South Africa, few would assert that the effects of globalization and continuing technological innovation will not become more palpable with the passage of time. In this short piece, there is a glimmer of what lies ahead.

Global and international forces are affecting the search for remedies for racial discrimination. In "International Remedies for Racial Discrimination and Race-Based Inequality," Lennox Hinds, Esq. recounts some of the history of this quest from the vantage point of African Americans and considers the value and promise of international responses to racism, itself an international phenomenon. The idea that all human beings have internationally recognized human rights simply by virtue of their consciousness and membership in the human species is one of the transformative ideas of our time. It is emboldening people around the world and in Brazil, South Africa and the United States to seek recourse in international and domestic fora in order to meet basic needs. In his piece, Hinds identifies the origins of some of these efforts and maps the terrain that activists have crossed. As the next century dawns, the search for international responses to racial discrimination will likely be an increasingly powerful dynamic in the allocation of opportunities between and among groups and nations.

Dr. Mandy Taylor, author of "Public Sector Interventions in Combating Racism in South Africa," describes some of the domestic efforts underway in her nation to dismantle the legacy of apartheid. It has become popular in some quarters to believe that South Africa is now free of racial discrimination and can put race and racism behind it. But a closer look at Taylor's paper demonstrates that this is far from the case. De jure racial discrimination may have ended, but de facto discrimination and racism, embodied in practices, policies and systems that disadvantage Black Africans and privilege Whites, have continuing life.

The era of legalized racial segregation in the United States grows more distant with the passage of time. South Africa and the United States are now becoming more like Brazil, which has long had de facto racism and discrimination as a feature of national life. The paper by Taylor then is instructive for all three countries since they now face the contemporary challenge to undo the structural legacy of racism and the need to combat racial discrimination in its de facto form using the power and resources of the public sector.

South Africa is the only one of the three nations with an African descent majority in power in the political arena. The commitment of its leadership to combat racism is unquestioned. South Africa's efforts to unearth the structural and institutional manifestations of racial discrimination are instructive for such efforts in the United States and Brazil.

The volume closes with two pieces about Brazil. The first, "Forms of Black Political Response in Brazil" by an American scholar, Dr. Reid Andrews, offers a view of Brazil's Black movement, its strengths, weaknesses and the battles that lie ahead. The second is called, "Reflections on the Afro-Brazilian Movement" and was written by Dr. Abdias do Nascimento, a Brazilian scholar, public servant, actor, artist and activist– a "man for all seasons," and Dr. Elisa Larkin Nascimento, an activist-scholar. The Nascimentos use Abdias do Nascimento's life as a prism to review key events in the history of Black efforts in Brazil to overcome racism.

Brazil has the largest population of people of African descent outside of the countries of Africa, and yet this population has to the outside world been largely invisible. Certainly, the "myth of the great racial democracy" has masked the reality of the subtle and not so subtle forms of racism and discrimination that plague Brazil and retard its economic development. Although Afro Brazilians have had a profound influence on Brazil's culture, they – Blacks and Browns – have been socially, economically and politically marginalized.

As the pieces suggest, one of the major reasons for including Brazil in the Initiative's comparative framework is to underscore the fact that racial identity is a "social construction," generated both from within and outside by individuals, groups, and cultures. Race is an idea that is understood and used in different ways. It is not stagnant. Ideas about race will continue to change in the future due to migration, interbreeding, and other phenomena that are eroding the traditional conception of race grounded in ideas of "geographic" origin. In Brazil, where lines of "race" are somewhat blurred, one can glimpse the contours of future battles to be waged in the United States and South Africa over lingering structural and interpersonal manifestations of racial discrimination, "color-blindness" or "non-racialism" and White supremacy. As the century ends, the family resemblance among these nations is becoming more pronounced.

These are the pieces that form this volume's collage. Incomplete? Yes. Untidy? Yes. Of value? Yes, for in the real world events, issues, people and institutions are in fact a changing patchwork. We hope that the reader will obtain the other Initiative publications described in the Appendix to help round out the partial picture that this volume presents. The Initiative has published books that focus on Brazil and South Africa in depth and will in 2000 release a comparative anthology on all three nations. Several other reports, companions to this volume, are also available. In them, comparative issues are more fully examined, country-specific issues reviewed systematically, and information about trends that will shape future dynamics of inter-group relations in these nations provided.

The Initiative is indebted to the authors for the distilled judgment and wisdom in these papers. They remind us that we all have the duty and responsibility, borne of enlightened self-interest, to use our talents and influence to help ourselves, our communities, institutions and nations, indeed the world, move beyond racism.

Lynn Huntley
Director
The Comparative Human Relations Initiative

January, 2000

[E]Race[ing] Inequity: Race, Class and Gender in the Classroom

By Gloria Ladson-Billings

The severity, the cruelty, and the persistence of the delusion of White Supremacy [illegible] education to be as remote, and as much to be feared, as [illegible]

James Baldwin, The Price of the Ticket [illegible]

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class have progressed beyond those that examine race (see for example, Chodorow, 1978; DeBeauvoir, 1961; Gornick, 1971; Hartsock, 1971; Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Carnoy, 1974; Apple, 1988; Wexler, 1987). This paper attempts to address the problematic nature of race and provide some examples of how race can be creatively and successfully deployed to insure educational equity for all students.

Defining race

Despite our best efforts to confine, control, and manage race, it remains a slippery concept that takes its meaning solely from a society's system of hierarchy, difference, and inequality. Omi and Winant (1993) argue that popular notions of race as either an objective condition or an ideological construct have epistemological limitations. Haney Lopez (1994) asserts that "most scholars accept the common wisdom concerning race, without pausing to examine the fallacies and fictions on which ideas of race depend.... Race may be America's single most confounding problem but the confounding problem of race is that few people seem to know what race is" (p. 193). Nobel Laureate, Toni Morrison (1991) tells us that:

> *Race has become metaphorical– a way of referring to and disguising forces, events, classes, and expressions of social decay and economic division far more threatening to the body politic than biological "race" ever was. Expensively kept, economically unsound, a spurious and useless political asset in election campaigns, racism is as healthy today as it was during the Enlightenment. It seems that it has a utility far beyond economy, beyond the sequestering of classes from one another, and has assumed a metaphorical life so completely embedded in daily discourse that it is perhaps more necessary and more on display than ever before (p. 63).*

Why is race such a problematic concept? Probably because it makes no sense and has no real purpose other than to rank human beings. Consider some of the ways that race operates in the United States. One "drop" of Black or African "blood" automatically makes someone Black regardless of his or her skin color, hair texture, or facial features. Perhaps the real issue is not that race is used to determine who is Black, American Indian, Latino, or Asian American, but rather that race is used primarily to determine who is not White.

Lee's (1993) examination of two hundred years of the U.S. Census revealed that "questions on race have been included in all U.S. population censuses since the first census in 1790" (p. 86). The racial classifications used in the U.S. census have varied widely over time. The 1890 census had eight "racial categories"– White, Black, Mulatto, Quadroon, Octoroon, Chinese, Japanese, and Indian. The most recent 1990 census had 16 categories, including one labeled, "other."

It is not merely the categorization that creates a problem. The real issue is what these categories come to mean and how they become a way to predict school and social success. It is interesting to note that at this writing a school district in southern California is embroiled in a controversy over what to name a new high school. Members of the local school board suggested that the school be named in honor of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., but a vocal group of White parents objected. They argued that the name would disadvantage their students. They reasoned that college admissions officers would believe their students had attended a "Black" school and their school performance might be deemed suspect. Despite the fact that college and universities make decisions about the quality of a high school based on a variety of criteria (i.e., the number of Advanced Placement Courses offered and passed, the average SAT or ACT scores, the standardized test scores that rank the school within the state), the parents steadfastly held to a notion that anything vaguely associated with Blackness would have a negative impact on their children's life chances.

Race and education

Most of the scholarly work concerning race and education was developed using a deficit paradigm, i.e., examinations of the school performance of children of color presumed some level of inadequacy on the part of the students. Thus, literatures of cognitive deficiency (Jensen, 1973; Herenstein & Murray, 1994) or social (familial, community, cultural) dysfunction (see for example, Bettleheim, 1965; Bloom, Davis & Hess, 1965; Omstein, 1971; Omstein & Vairo, 1968) became the standard way of explaining the persistent gap between the performance of children of color (particularly Black, Latino, and American Indian) and their White counterparts.

The cognitive or intellectual deficiency theorists relied on intelligence testing as a way to determine the capabilities of students. Since Black children continued to score at least 15 points below that of Whites, it was concluded that Blacks (particularly, poor Blacks) did not have the genetic "stuff" to produce intelligent, high performing children (Herenstein & Murray, 1994). The "remedy" for these deficient children ranged from conceding their alleged inability to learn and reducing the amount of additional funding to the more drastic social and political response of urging aggressive birth control and sterilization for low income, Black mothers.

The social theorists offered more benign solutions. They believed if schools and social agencies could compensate for what the children, their parents, families, communities, and culture "lacked," then they could begin to catch up with their more affluent, White peers. Thus, by the 1960s, a host of programs began to appear designed to ameliorate the "problems" these children presented. Headstart, Follow Through, and all day kindergarten classes were school level responses to student deficits. Generally, these programs required that parents (typically, mothers) participate actively in the children's education. This participation might be in the form of serving as an instructional aid in the school, attending parenting classes, or complying with a set of directives supplied by teachers.

The Public Broadcasting System (PBS) aired programs such as Sesame Street and The Electric Company. The programs used a fast paced, lively format to help children learn letters of the alphabet, sounds, colors, numbers, counting, and simple concepts of sequencing, distinguishing differences and similarities, and other skills believed to be prerequisite for success in reading and basic mathematics. So successful were these television programs that they began to be offered in several languages and exported to other countries.

At many schools across the United States, Title I (later named, "Chapter I") legislation passed by the federal government called for compensatory education programs to provide academic services for youngsters who scored below the 50th percentile in reading and mathematics. This notion of "compensating" became a classic, liberal response to poor school performance of those students deemed "different." Thus, children of color, linguistically different students, and poor children were all seen as learners who needed additional support to meet the norms set by White, middle class students.

Anthropological understandings of school failure

In the late 1970s, anthropologists joined educational sociologists in a quest to build more powerful explanations for school failure among particular groups of students. Their work fell into two camps– cultural ecology and cultural difference. Briefly, the cultural ecology theorists argued that different cultural groups performed differently because of the kinds of norms, standards, and values that were reinforced within their cultural groups. Those norms, standards, and values were influenced by macrostructural forces such as the economy, social rules and discourses, and politics. For example, if African American students were consistently in environments where the only roles for African Americans were low level and servile, then they would presume that there was no need to try to achieve since there were no possibilities for success. Or, conversely, if African American males regularly saw highly paid professional basketball athletes, the cultural ecologists suggest that the message is conveyed that basketball is the only worthy professional pursuit. The cultural ecologists discuss how families and communities support particular sets of norms that either support or discourage school achievement. Their work details the performance of some Asian American groups, some Central American students' academic performance versus that of Mexican American students, and some Punjabi Indian students. In general, their work suggests that African Americans have developed an oppositional culture that rejects school performance (see for example, Ogbu, 1978, 1987; Matute-Bianchi, 1986; Gibson, 1988; Gibson & Ogbu, 1991).

Cultural difference theorists, on the other hand, believe that poor school performance on the part of some groups is not a result of family, community, or cultural norms that discourage academic excellence, but rather the differences or cultural mismatches that exist between home and school. For example, if a particular group of American Indian students come from a cultural community that encourages and supports cooperative activity, students may perform poorly in a highly competitive classroom. Or if Native Hawaiian students are comfortable using a communication style known as talk-story and that communication style is allowed and encouraged in the classroom, researchers have documented remarkable reading test score improvements (Au & Jordan, 1981). The cultural difference theorists have argued the necessity for schools and teachers to make accommodations that would smooth the transition between home and school so that students can experience school success (see for example, Erickson & Mohatt, 1982; Cazden & Leggett, 1981; Mohatt & Erickson, 1981; Vogt, Jordan, & Tharp, 1987).

Concerns about both approaches – cultural ecology and cultural difference – have emerged. Cultural ecological models when applied to African Americans fail to recognize the long and well documented history of educational striving and achievement (Anderson, 1988) and the extraordinary length to which African Americans went to ensure themselves an education (Siddle Walker, 1996). Cultural difference models rarely deal with systemic problems and suggest that deliberate linguistic accommodations can remedy school failure. Such models rarely deal with built-in inequities in schooling – tracking, assessment, curriculum, pedagogy and funding.

A culture centered approach

Irvine (1990) dealt with the lack of what she termed "cultural synchronization" between teachers and African American students. Her analysis included the micro-level classroom interactions, the mid-level institutional context (i.e., school practices and policies such as tracking and disciplinary policies) and the macro-level societal context. Her work begins to look holistically at the major issues confronting students of color in United States classrooms. Hers is a culture centered approach that serves as a useful rubric for understanding what must be done to improve educational opportunities for all students.

Is the problem one of getting students of color to perform at the same level as White middle class students or is it one of transforming the educational system so that all students, regardless of race, class, and gender, can achieve excellence? I would argue that it is the latter. Thus, the real task is to look carefully at the nature of the system in which the schooling occurs. When you look at the condition of marginalized groups in the United States – African American, Mexican American, Puerto Rican American, and American Indian students, in particular – it is clear that the very nature of their education is not comparable to that of their White, middle class peers.

Perhaps the closest analogy to understanding what these youngsters are experiencing is colonialism. Consider the extant elements. African Americans (and other marginalized groups) attend schools that have been established by forces beyond their control. The curriculum, the funding formulas, budgeting, the staffing, hiring and firing policies all reside outside the purview of the community. It is true that most schools give some lip-service to the idea of parent-community involvement. However, that involvement typically refers to asking parents and community members to be complicit in whatever has been decided already. It rarely involves having parents make real decisions that affect the operation of the school. To have that kind of power, parents must be property owners.

The United States is a nation based primarily on property rights (Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995). These property rights are powerful determinants for who receives greater consideration in the society. Examples of property include real property, possessions, and intellectual property. Since education is not a centralized function in the United States, each state has jurisdiction over its administration. In most states, education funding is tied to property taxes. Thus, those communities with more valuable property are deemed worthy of better schools. This is a paradox since those children who most need outstanding schools – excellent facilities, first rate teachers and enriched curriculum – are the least likely to receive them. Instead, because of shrinking tax bases, urban and rural school districts are seriously underfunded. Their classrooms are overcrowded and poorly equipped. Their teachers are less experienced and more likely to be under qualified or teaching out of their area of certification. Their curriculum is more likely to be a basic and routinized one where students have a prescribed set of things to learn and are taught to become knowledge consumers rather than knowledge producers. Yet, without the ability to produce knowledge, the poor, the underclass and the disenfranchised can never break out of the lowest realms of the society. This is exactly what colonial education is designed to do – maintain the status quo and keep everything in its place.

But all is not lost. Teachers are not powerless to change the educational experiences of students in their classrooms. Recent research by African American (and Afro-Caribbean) scholars has documented outstanding pedagogical practices by teachers committed to the success of Black children, and this work is garnering attention from a variety of scholars, researchers, practitioners, and school administrators (see for example, Delpit, 1996; Foster, 1997; King, 1991; Ladson-Billings, 1994; Ladson-Billings & Henry, 1990; Lee, 1991).

The theoretical linchpin of this work is what I have termed, "culturally relevant pedagogy" (Ladson-Billings, 1995). This theory was generated from a three-year study of eight expert teachers of African American children. In this study the classroom practices, professional beliefs, and values of the teachers were observed, recorded, analyzed and interpreted to provide a vision of what successful teaching might look like in classrooms where students typically were unsuccessful. The major components of their work are academic achievement, cultural competence, and critical consciousness. Each component is briefly described below.

Academic achievement

No matter what other functions schools perform for students and their families, their major responsibility is to ensure that students acquire the academic skills, knowledge, and competencies that afford them the maximum amount of choices and opportunities for lives of productivity and integrity. Those skills, knowledge, and competencies may vary from time to time across communities, but there are no instances where parents desire school failure for their children.

With regard to the teachers in this study, academic achievement covered a wide range of classroom and community activities. One teacher used a more "traditional" approach to teaching and the curriculum. Her classroom looked like ones with which most of us are familiar. Reading, writing, and mathematics dominated the day. Students received intensive skill building and were pushed to excel. The teacher accepted no excuses for poor performance. When students failed to meet expected standards, the teacher developed alternate ways to reach them. Failure was not an option. Generally, the students referred to their teacher as "strict" but expressed a sincere affection for her because they believed her strictness was tied to her commitment to them.

On the other end of the continuum was a teacher whose classroom seemed to be a beehive of perpetual activity. Every day students were engaged in projects, problems, and puzzles designed to challenge and stretch their thinking. One of the classroom's major projects was an old-fashioned quilting bee that had arisen out of students' curiosity about what people did before television was invented. After several weeks of research on how people of colonial America spent their free time, the students developed a list of activities that included, square dancing, attending church, candle making, barn-raising, and quilting bees. The students understood what a quilt was but were unsure about what a quilting bee entailed. The teacher decided to help the students research and organize a quilting bee.

While the end product of a quilting bee seemed exciting and elaborate, some observers might doubt the academic worthiness of such a project. However, as the students prepared for this quilting bee, they were required to do lots of bibliographic and ethnographic research to find the kind of information they needed to host an authentic quilting bee. For several weeks the students compiled their information and made plans for the quilting bee. They needed to calculate how much food and supplies they would need for a quilting bee that their family members–parents and siblings–would attend. An analysis of the type of work the students were engaged in revealed studies in literacy, mathematics, history, geography, science, art, music, and library skills.

I highlight these two examples because they represent very different teaching styles or techniques. Thus, the question of academic achievement does not reside merely within a methodology. Rather, it is tied to teachers' commitment to supporting the academic achievement of all students. What this kind of commitment requires is a fundamental belief in the intellectual capability of all students. It is a bottom line perspective or world-view that sees students, regardless of race, class, or gender, as educable.

Cultural competence

Culturally relevant teaching requires that students maintain some cultural integrity as well as academic excellence. White, middle class students are not expected to renounce their culture and background as a route to educational advancement. However, children of color often are expected to reject aspects of their culture and background to be deemed acceptable and intelligent. Some students are asked to suppress their home language, change their style of dress, reject music, art, and other forms of cultural expression in order to advance in school. These kinds of "either-or" choices rarely sit well with students. Fordham & Ogbu (1986) have documented a phenomenon called, "acting White," where African American students fear being ostracized by their peers for demonstrating an interest in school related tasks. However, their work fails to investigate the kind of alienation and displacement many students feel when school achievement causes estrangement between them and their peers. Culturally relevant teaching is designed to minimize the gap between students' academic achievement and their sense of personhood.

One way cultural competence is achieved in the classroom is by utilizing students' culture as a vehicle for learning. A second grade teacher in my study of culturally relevant teaching shared her love of poetry with her students through their own love of rap music. Instead of railing against the supposed evils of rap music, the teacher allowed her students to bring in samples of lyrics from what both she and the students determined to be non-offensive rap songs. Students were encouraged to perform the songs and the teacher reproduced them on an overhead so that they could discuss literal and figurative meanings, as well as technical aspects of poetry such as rhyme scheme, meter, alliteration, and onomatopoeia.

While the students were comfortable using their music, the teacher was able to use it as a bridge to school learning. Ultimately, their understanding of poetry far exceeded what either the state department of education or the local school district required. The teacher's work is an example of how academic achievement and cultural competence can be merged.

Another teacher supported the students' cultural competence by working hard to involve their working class and low-income parents in the classroom. By creating an "artist or craftsperson-in-residence" program, students could both learn from each other's parents and affirm cultural knowledge. The teacher developed a rapport with parents and invited them to come into the classroom for 1 or 2 hours at a time for a period of 2-4 days. The parents, in conversation with the teacher, demonstrated skills upon which the teacher was able to build.

For example, a parent who was known in the community for her delicious sweet potato pies did a 2-day residency in the fifth-grade classroom. On the first day, the parent taught a group of students how to make the pie crust. The teacher provided the supplies for the pie baking, and the students tried their hands at making the crusts. They placed them in the refrigerator overnight and made the filling on the following day. The finished pies were served to the entire class.

The students who participated in this pie making experience were required to conduct additional research on various aspects of what they learned. They did reports on George Washington Carver and his sweet potato research, conducted taste tests, devised a marketing plan for selling pies, and researched the culinary arts to find out what kind of preparation they needed to become cooks and chefs. Everyone in the class was required to write a personal thank you note to the guest.

A carpenter, a former professional basketball player, a licensed practical nurse, and a church musician did other residencies. All of the classroom guests were parents or relatives of students in the class. The teacher did not "import" role models with whom the students did not have firsthand experience. She was deliberate in reinforcing that parents were a knowledgeable and capable resource.

A third example of how a teacher supported her students cultural competence is demonstrated in one teacher's encouragement of her students' use of their home language while they acquired a secondary discourse (Gee, 1989) of "standard" English. Thus, her students were permitted to express themselves in language (spoken and written) with which they were knowledgeable and comfortable. They were then required to "translate" to the standard form. By the end of the year, the students were not only facile at this "code-switching" (Smitherman, 1981) but could better use both languages. Cultural competence coupled with academic achievement are powerful aspects of good schooling for children of color. However, these two may be meaningless at helping students cope with macro-social issues without critical consciousness.

Critical consciousness

Culturally relevant teaching does not imply that it is enough for students to choose academic excellence and remain culturally competent if those skills and abilities represent only an individual achievement. Beyond those individual characteristics of academic achievement and cultural competence, students must develop a broader sociopolitical consciousness that allows them to critique the cultural norms, values, mores, and institutions that produce and maintain social inequities. If school is about preparing students for active citizenship, what better citizenship tool than the ability to critically analyze society?

Freire brought forth the notion of "conscientization" which is a "process that invites learners to engage the world and others critically" (McLaren, 1989, p. 195). However, Freire's work in Brazil was not radically different from work that was being done in the southern United States (Chilcoat & Ligon, 1994) to educate and empower disenfranchised African Americans.

In the classrooms of culturally relevant teachers, students are expected to engage the world and others critically. Rather than merely bemoan the fact that their textbooks were out of date, several of the teachers in the study, in conjunction with their students, critiqued the knowledge represented in the textbooks and the system of inequitable funding that allowed middle-class students to have newer texts. The teachers helped their students to write letters to the editor of the local newspaper to inform the community of the situation. The teachers also brought in articles and papers that represented counter knowledge to help the students develop multiple perspectives on a variety of social and historical phenomena.

Taken together, these three elements – academic achievement, cultural competence, and critical consciousness – form a vision of the guiding principles of culturally relevant teaching. Underneath those overarching elements are the teachers' conceptions of themselves and others, their organization of social relations, and their conceptions of knowledge. Each conception is described below with examples of how they influence classroom practices.

Conceptions of self and other

Culturally relevant teachers see themselves as connected to the students they teach. They see their futures as integrally linked to that of their students. They challenge assimilationist practices that are designed to select out a few "special" students whose success will serve as an indictment of the failure and inadequacy of the others. The sociology of education research tells us that teachers' status in the United States is relatively low among the professions. Additionally, teachers' status is tied to that of their students. Thus, those teaching in schools serving White, upper middle class students enjoy higher prestige and status. Conversely, many of the teachers who teach in the inner city, barrios, and on reservations in the United States feel that their own personal prestige and sense of themselves is diminished because they have the "misfortune" to teach those students society would rather forget.

This transfer of low status can and does create a situation where teachers either feel sorry for their students or begin to resent them. Rather than challenge their students to high academic standards, these teachers give students mundane and mindless tasks because they do not believe their students are capable of rigorous, demanding work. When presented with intellectually stimulating tasks, these teachers' first comment is, "My kids can't do that." But then there are teachers who think highly of their students, value them as students and people, and expect them to do well.

Organization of social relations

Students are not merely placed in a classroom with teachers and expected to succeed. Culturally relevant teachers create relationships with their students that are equitable and extend beyond the classroom walls. The teachers work to establish a sense of connectedness between themselves and the students rather than idiosyncratic relationships between themselves and those students who distinguish themselves. These teachers work to create a family atmosphere in the classroom where students learn from each other and depend on each other for success.

Conceptions of knowledge

Culturally relevant teachers understand that one of the most important skills their students can develop is the ability to deconstruct, reconstruct, and construct knowledge. Rather than turn out students whose only evidence of schooling is the ability to parrot back facts and figures, students of culturally relevant teachers are able to produce and construct knowledge by building on their own background skills and experiences and linking them to new information.

Culturally relevant teachers teach students to be critical of information – to challenge sources, perspectives, and claims of validity and objectivity. This ability is particularly important for students who are disenfranchised because so much of the information they encounter characterizes them, their families, their communities, and their cultures as dysfunctional and deprived. They need to be able to develop counter knowledge that allows them to understand the social and political realities they confront. In the classrooms of culturally relevant teachers, students will learn to view the curriculum and subject content critically. They will learn that there are multiple ways to achieve excellence and that excellence is possible for all students.

Confronting the obstacles

Having the "right" kinds of teachers is but one aspect of ensuring educational success for all students. It is important not to naively assume teaching is the only thing that has gone wrong for students of color. These students continue to deal with inequitable funding and resources, uninspired curriculum and limited parental input and access to the educational process. The very structure of education ensures that schools continue to reproduce social, economic, and political inequity.

Even if some students are fortunate enough to have exemplary teachers occasionally, the fact that their schools may fail to offer an enriched curriculum or extra curricular programs disadvantages them. The fact that the buildings in which they are taught are unsafe and substandard or the technologies available to them are obsolete will continue to render them unequal.

Shujaa (1994) has argued that education and schooling are not necessarily congruent. Further Shujaa asserts, schooling is "a process intended to perpetuate and maintain the society's existing power relations and the institutional structures that support those arrangements," but education "is the process of transmitting from one generation to the next knowledge of the values, aesthetics, spiritual beliefs, and all things that give a particular cultural orientation its uniqueness" (p. 15). Given these definitions, we can see that children of color are much less likely to receive an education despite years of schooling.

Even in an era of school reform, children of color continue to be educationally disadvantaged. Beyer (1985) points out that the widely cited *A Nation at Risk* report was:

> *a pretext that justifies current social practices and institutions, a way of covertly supporting the status quo, a way of diverting attention away from basic social, political, and economic disparities and forms of oppression, and resultant forms of inequality.... By recasting the frustration, impatience, and anxiety that typify American social life in terms that safeguard those social institutions that support current inequalities, this report provides a "sleight of hand" that is at once ideologically ingenious and socially injurious (p. 48).*

Ultimately, the failure to educate whole segments of a citizenry will have devastating effects on the entire society. In the United States we already are seeing the results of under education among African American males. Currently, there are over one million people incarcerated in the United States and African American male inmates outnumber White male inmates. But it is not only the removal of people from the society via incarceration that troubles us. Many will remain within the society but on its periphery. We call them by a variety of names – homeless, indigent, beggars, welfare recipients, the working poor. They are limited in their ability to contribute to the society. They are outside of the economic, social, and political process, but they are still among us. Their diminished quality of life is a testament to our failure to deal justly and equitably with all citizens. We may appease ourselves by declaring that they are lazy or mentally incapable but we are still confronted by what we might have done to ensure that they could have led more satisfying lives.

The challenge of race in a society deeply structured around issues of race and racism will not be met solely by what we do in schools. However, this challenge will be met through education – an education that transcends classrooms and curriculum. It will be met by a revolutionary commitment toward radical restructuring of the society and what it means to be an educated citizen in a democratic, multicultural society.

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The Seven Deadly Myths of the U.S. Nonprofit Sector: Implications for Promoting Social Justice Worldwide

By Emmett D. Carson

INTRODUCTION

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In the last decade, several international organizations and programs have been established with the goal of advancing and promoting the nonprofit sector worldwide.[7] While these organizations have made enormous efforts to recruit and involve people from around the world, the initial leadership and early funding has come largely from the United States. As these organizations have begun to develop bylaws, position statements and marketing literature, the myths that are imbedded in beliefs about the U.S. nonprofit sector are being advanced inadvertently in countries throughout the world. As a result, countries that rely on the guidance of these organizations in developing their nonprofit sector may produce very different outcomes than expected.

The nonprofit sector can be a powerful tool for citizen self-expression and empowerment.

This problem is compounded when one considers three worldwide developments – the demise of communism, national budget constraints and concern over socioeconomic justice – that have created an unprecedented interest in understanding the role of the nonprofit sector within a democratic society.

With the demise of communism as a viable alternative to the free market system, new democracies in South America, Africa and Eastern Europe must define the appropriate roles and mix of responsibilities for the government, business and nonprofit sectors. There is no ideal mix, but rather choices that must be made based on each country's historical, cultural and legal traditions. To the extent that these countries rely on a model of the nonprofit sector that incorporates significant aspects of the U.S. nonprofit sector, they are unlikely to get the anticipated outcomes due to a lack of understanding about the myths surrounding the U.S. nonprofit sector. Established democracies worldwide are facing severe budget constraints in providing services to assist the poor. This has created renewed interest in exploring the extent to which the nonprofit sector can replace or substantially augment programs and services to the poor that have been traditionally provided by government. Lastly, the nonprofit sector's role in promoting social and economic justice is of considerable interest in countries that, like the U.S., enacted laws and engaged in social practices which legalized and socialized discrimination against people of African descent in nearly every facet of their existence.

While some of the myths about the U.S. nonprofit sector have been acknowledged and are openly discussed, there are significant limitations in the structure and operation of the U.S. nonprofit sector as it relates to issues of racial and gender equality. The primary purpose of this essay is to examine the myths related to the U.S. nonprofit sector and their implications for lessening racism and advancing social justice. In the U.S. and abroad, it is hoped that such an exploration will help to bring much needed attention to the inherent and subtle biases that exist within the U.S. nonprofit sector as it relates to race and wealth. The next section provides a basic description of the nonprofit sector and how it operates. The subsequent sections examine seven myths about the U.S. nonprofit sector that have hidden implications for those concerned about using the nonprofit sector to promote social justice issues. The myths are: the myth of the U.S. origin of volunteerism and philanthropy; the myth of pure virtue; the myth of independent thought through financial independence; the myth of altruistic giving; the myth of volunteer-operated organizations; the myth of racial and gender equality; and the future myth of a societal safety valve.

There are at least two issues that should be noted before moving forward. This paper focuses largely on the U.S. nonprofit sector; however, where possible, examples are drawn from Brazil and South Africa. These countries were selected because they are the focus of the Southern Education Foundation's Comparative Human Relations Initiative for which this essay was commissioned. While Brazil, South Africa and the United States each have vibrant nonprofit sectors, there has been only scant research on the nonprofit sectors of Brazil and South Africa compared to significant, ongoing research on the U.S. nonprofit sector. Efforts to compare the number and activities of nonprofit sector organizations in different countries are hampered by the different definitions and classifications of nonprofit organizations that exist within each country. [In South Africa, the post-apartheid government is currently in the process of rewriting many of its laws, including those governing the nonprofit sector. The former apartheid government had imposed major legal restrictions on the ability of anti-apartheid groups to organize and to raise funds through charitable contributions. Among the many issues under consideration in South Africa is whether contributions to nonprofit organizations should result in a tax deduction for the donor.]

This essay does not suggest that it is inappropriate for American nonprofit leaders to encourage the development of the nonprofit sector in other countries or share their experiences. It does suggest that some of these individuals and institutions should be less rigid in their conceptualization of the appropriate relationship between the government, business and nonprofit sectors and that public leaders should be more critical in assessing the strengths and shortcomings of the U.S. nonprofit model.

What is the nonprofit/ non-governmental sector?

It is commonly accepted that every national economy can be divided into three sectors: government, business and nonprofit. The government sector taxes citizens to provide goods and services. The business sector sells goods and services to consumers to make a profit. The nonprofit sector receives donations of time from volunteers and contributions of money from donors to provide services and engage in advocacy. The first indication of the inherent complexity of the nonprofit sector is that it is described in terms of what it is not rather than what it is.[3] In the U.S., where reliance on the free market system is paramount, the word "nonprofit" is used, whereas in countries where the government has typically provided most services, the word "non-governmental" is more likely to be used. Other terms that are also used to describe this sector are: voluntary sector, associations, civil society, independent sector, social sector and third sector.

At least part of the difficulty in establishing an appropriate name is that the nonprofit sector encompasses a wide array of organizations that serve causes, communities and individuals. This essay will use the words nonprofit and non-governmental interchangeably to include both grantmaking and grantseeking institutions. In the United States, there are over 38,000 grantmaking foundations and over one million formal grantseeking organizations of which over 489,000 are categorized as 501(c)(3) organizations according to the U.S. tax code.[4] In Brazil, it is estimated that there are over 169,260 nonprofit civil associations and 11,076 foundations.[5] Unfortunately, there are no reliable statistics about the South African nonprofit sector at this time.

The role of the nonprofit sector is to provide the space or latitude within the law that allows for citizen participation (other than voting) in activities and causes that citizens believe receive insufficient attention or financial support by either the government or business sectors. It is the place within a democratic society that allows people to organize out of common interest for a cause or to provide services by contributing money and volunteering time. By serving as a vehicle for public discourse on competing ideas, the nonprofit sector provides a pressure release valve that sustains the core democratic system. Tocqueville observed:

> *In America the citizens who form the minority associate in order, first, to show their numerical strength and so to diminish the moral power of the majority; and, secondly, to stimulate competition and thus to discover those arguments that are most fitted to act upon the majority; for they always entertain hopes of drawing over the majority to their own side, and then controlling the supreme power in its name.*[6]

In the U.S. context, large-scale, fundamental societal change that occurs through the nonprofit sector is often slow and difficult because a broad consensus must be developed among a multitude of competing voices. The accomplishments that are often attributed to the U.S. nonprofit system, for example, the civil rights movement and the women's suffrage movement, cannot be viewed independently of the freedoms guaranteed in the U.S. Bill of Rights. In particular, freedom of speech, freedom of religion and right of assembly provided a national environment where nonprofit organizations could flourish. Stated differently, these freedoms allow citizens to believe whatever they want and to voice their opinions virtually anywhere they want to.

In addition to these individual freedoms, a free press has an important relationship in assisting nonprofit organizations to recruit financial contributors, volunteers and members. As Tocqueville observed, uncensored communication increases the awareness of various ideas and enables citizens to more readily identify causes that they are willing to join by volunteering their time or making financial contributions.[7] A similar observation was reached in a scholarly paper on philanthropy in Brazil about "the importance of the media for the mobilization of public opinion and the development of philanthropy..."[8] Without the range of individual freedoms guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. nonprofit system would likely operate very differently. Moreover, in another democracy with different cultural traditions, the same laws would likely generate different results. With this framework as background, the subsequent sections examine the major myths imbedded in discussions about the U.S. nonprofit sector and their implications for promoting socioeconomic justice within both the nonprofit sector and the country as a whole.

The myth of the U.S. origin of volunteerism and philanthropy

There is a widespread misperception that the United States is singularly responsible for the spread of voluntarism. Peter Drucker, a noted international management specialist, made the following statement during a major address:

> ... *the tremendous growth of the volunteer in the West began in the U.S., where we have the oldest tradition, this movement is now rapidly coming up in Western Europe.*[9]

Clearly, the idea of volunteering to help one's fellow neighbors did not begin in America. All of the world's great religions encourage its adherents to engage in charity and to help the less fortunate. Moreover, a growing body of research has begun to document that nearly every culture, over time, has had a unique history and tradition of giving.[10] As a nation of immigrants, many of these giving and volunteer traditions are evident in the activities of each cultural group in the United States.

What is different about the U.S. nonprofit sector is the extent to which the nation relies on it, instead of government and business, to promote ideas and provide services. The country's belief in this system is so strong that even groups that were initially denied legal status under U.S. law at the founding of the country (all who were not White male property owners) were able to use the nonprofit system to voice grievances and seek redress. With regard to African Americans, the matter of slavery ultimately was not resolved through use of the nonprofit sector (notwithstanding the efforts of the abolitionist movement and the "Underground Railroad"). But the nonprofit sector did provide the intellectual and ideological space for the women's suffrage movement, and the civil rights movement, as well as the ongoing discussions about gay and lesbian rights and a woman's right to an abortion. It should be noted that the women's suffrage movement gained the support of White men, in part, by suggesting that the votes of White women, influenced by their husbands and "racial" solidarity, would help to negate the impact of the African American voter.

In addition to providing space for competing ideas, the nonprofit sector allowed African Americans, following the end of slavery, to provide essential services for themselves when these services were legally denied to them by nonprofit organizations and public agencies that assisted White Americans. As a result, African American philanthropy and volunteering, which was allowed within limits, accounted for the creation of the first African American churches, schools, banks, insurance companies and a wide array of multi-purpose mutual aid associations. These institutions represented an essential survival mechanism for communities which could not rely on either the existing morality or legal structure for direct assistance.

As social protest activities for equal rights have been successful in changing the laws from "separate but equal" to mandating increasing degrees of equality, the character of the nonprofit sector also has changed. A key observation is that a nation's laws are an important determinant in shaping nonprofit activity as it blends with specific cultural and historic traditions. While the United States did not invent volunteerism and philanthropy, it has relied on this mechanism, more so than other countries, to allow for competing voices and to provide services. As a result, African Americans and other groups have been able to use the nonprofit sector to bring their grievances and aspirations to the attention of the entire community.

The myth of pure virtue

There is an inherent view in much that is written about the nonprofit sector that all actions that are undertaken within this sector are universally good. Lester Salamon has referred to this as the myth of pure virtue. He states:

> *The nonprofit sector has grown and gained prominence in recent years fundamentally as a trustworthy and flexible vehicle for elemental human yearnings for self-expression, self-help, participation, responsiveness, and mutual aid. With roots often in religious and moral teachings, the sector has acquired a saintly self-perception and persona. The upshot has been a certain romanticism about its inherent purity, about its distinctive virtues, and about its ability to produce significant change in people's lives.*[11]

A more accurate understanding of the nonprofit sector is that it is a vehicle that does not distinguish between the ethical merit or right or wrong qualities of ideas. What is considered to be a positive societal outcome by one group may significantly curtail the rights of another. The nonprofit sector equally supports racist and non-racist positions. Foundations and the grantseeking organizations that they support can be found on every side of any societal issue. While the nonprofit sector is a powerful tool for social change within every democratic society, it is a tool that can be used to advance or curtail social justice. There are foundations and grantseeking nonprofit organizations that support and oppose equal rights for women, equal rights for various racial groups, gays and lesbians, abortion, the environment, as well as other topics.[12] It is only in hindsight that a society declares which position was morally correct for its time.

An example of how U.S. philanthropy has mirrored the larger societal beliefs can be seen in foundation support of

African American education. Following slavery, few believed that African Americans could learn anything more than menial tasks. As a result, foundations focused on providing African Americans with vocational skills. By 1930, the "separate but equal" doctrine of the country, coupled with an emerging view within the African American community of a "talented tenth," led foundations to support liberal arts education over vocational training at historically Black colleges and universities. By the 1960s, the understanding that separate is unequal led foundations to support efforts to diversify predominantly white colleges and universities. Foundations and grantseeking institutions, more often than not, reflect and act in accordance with the prevailing societal views.

The myth of independent thought through financial independence

The belief that the nonprofit sector promotes independent thought stems from the belief that its operations are financially independent from government and business and thus provide an unbiased voice on social issues. This has been a powerful argument in support of the nonprofit sector in the U.S. and abroad. The idea of citizens believing in a cause so strongly as to voluntarily make contributions of time and money to support those efforts is often cited as a key feature of the American nonprofit sector:

We have something enormously special in America's third or independent sector that is often perceived more clearly by people from other countries than by Americans themselves.... Many foreign visitors come to Independent Sector each year to learn more about American voluntary practices. These are not necessarily people who are unhappy with their political structures, but they are keenly aware that very real aspects of freedom and influence are missing when there isn't a third or buffer sector. At best, they find it restrictive and at worst oppressive when there is only the one governmental system for education, culture, or religion and when there is not a tradition of independent service and criticism.

The reality is that the nonprofit sector is far from being financially independent of government or business. In examining the sources of revenue for U.S. nonprofit organizations, one study found that nonprofit organizations are highly dependent on government contracts and fees for services to carry out significant portions of their work. It was estimated that nonprofits receive 31 percent of their income from government, 51 percent from fees for service and only 18 percent from private contributions (donations). In addition, the U.S. government provides a financial incentive in the form of tax deductions to people who contribute to nonprofit organizations. While the relative importance of this provision is the subject of considerable debate, few deny that the tax deductibility of charitable contributions is a powerful incentive for individuals to contribute to charitable organizations. This subject is more fully discussed in the next section on the myth of altruistic giving. The U.S. government also has supported charitable organizations by providing them with service contracts to provide specific programs and services.

The same is true in Brazil, where nonprofit organizations that are designated as "public interest and associations" receive a variety of special advantages. These advantages include exemption from employer contributions to social security; eligibility to receive donations from federal and state agencies; charitable deduction status; eligibility to receive revenue from state lotteries, as well as other benefits. After complaints that some organizations were unfairly excluded from obtaining the special designation, the 1935 law was revised in 1990 to clarify that "eligibility is dependent on the organizations' ability to provide services without regard to race, creed, color or political conviction of actual or potential clients, and with a profit motive." The view of an independent-thinking nonprofit sector is certainly not the perception of the nonprofit sector in some other countries where there are close ties between government and nonprofit organizations. In South Africa, for example, Mr. Mandela's African National Congress drew heavily from anti-apartheid, nongovernmental organizations for leadership positions throughout the new government.

There is growing overlap in the activities of the business, government and nonprofit sectors. For example, governments are contracting with nonprofit organizations to provide assistance to the poor. To the extent the government is biased in awarding contracts to nonprofit organizations, those that are most critical of government policy or those who advocate on behalf of a discriminated against constituency may find themselves less able to obtain government contracts and, as a result, secure their financial future. In Brazil, the Public Enterprise of the State of Rio de Janeiro works closely with nongovernmental organizations to provide sewage facilities, water ducts and garbage collection. Over 150,000 people were reached in one project involving the Water and Sewer Company of Rio. As federal and local governments continue their efforts to reduce costs by eliminating support for social programs, nonprofit organizations are creating profit-making enterprises to subsidize the charitable activity of the nonprofit organization.

While such efforts may make nonprofit organizations less dependent on government, they may also make them less responsive to the needs and interests of their primary constituents. As nonprofits manage profit-making enterprises, the business imperative to make a profit may undermine the social conviction of the nonprofit organization. For example, in an effort to satisfy the profit motive, will a nonprofit choose to sell an inferior product, restrain its social message or pay its workers less than an adequate living wage in order to maintain its profit margin?

These are important questions, the implications of which are only now beginning to be fully appreciated. What is clear is that U.S. nonprofit organizations are heavily dependent on the favorable U.S. tax policies as well as revenues from government service contracts and revenues from profit-making ventures. This reliance may account for why considerable attention is given to generating financial resources, including tax incentives and self-generated income in various manifestos that have been issued by several of the international organizations committed to promoting philanthropy worldwide. These issues are discussed in greater detail in the next section on the myth of altruistic giving.

The myth of altruistic giving

One of the most important and inspiring aspects of the nonprofit sector is the belief that citizens spontaneously and without added inducement make charitable contributions to support the causes that they believe in. The reality is that government tax incentives and the existence of enabling legal environments are often critical components for encouraging people to give. As discussed earlier, what has not been adequately appreciated is how the American legal system with its freedom of religion (believe anything), freedom of speech (say anything), and right of assembly (gather together anywhere) provided an enabling environment for the proliferation of nonprofit groups in the United States. Unfortunately, when promoting the virtues of the nonprofit sector abroad, well-meaning advocates often forget that the enabling environment for the sector within a particular country is a key consideration that develops from each culture's charitable traditions and the country's unique history and politics. While the more astute proponents of encouraging the development of the nonprofit sector recognize the importance of an enabling environment, they often seek to promote an environment that in many respects appears very similar to that of the United States.

For example, in a widely circulated position statement, "Toward a Vital Voluntary Sector II: The Challenge of Permanence – An Action Statement," published by the International Fellows in Philanthropy Program of Johns Hopkins University, the signatories affirm their belief that deliberate action is needed to "ensure the survival of a vibrant nonprofit sector in countries around the world over the long run. . ."[14] While the signatories go on to acknowledge the existence and legitimacy of the multiplicity of differing relationships between the government, business and nonprofit sectors in countries throughout the world, they nonetheless identify five areas that they deem to be most important: improving public awareness and support; generating financial resources; training and organizational capacity-building; sector service and support organizations; and research. The American influence is imbedded throughout the document and is perhaps most prevalent in the section on generating financial resources. The signatories believe:

Government must provide: 1. a legal basis for legitimizing nonprofits, including legal recognition of nonprofit organizations in all their various forms; 2. tax incentives for nonprofits, including favorable treatment of the income of nonprofits and tax deductibility of gifts made to nonprofits by individual and corporate donors; and 3. subsidies for the work of nonprofits that is in the public interest. These subsidies may take various forms, including direct grants; purchase of service contract; in-kind assistance; set asides of tax revenue; lottery proceeds; and privatization income.[15]

A similar, although less detailed recommendation has been adopted by CIVICUS. Specifically, CIVICUS calls for a "more supportive political, legal and fiscal environment that enables the freedom and autonomy of association," and "increased and stronger partnerships among corporate, government and civil society institutions."[16]

There is little difference in these recommendations and the current treatment of nonprofit organizations within U.S. tax code. There are many countries in which nonprofits are not formally recognized, and contributors do not receive tax deductions. There is no inherent reason that the nonprofit sector must be supported through tax incentives to be effective. In fact, there are some studies that suggest people would continue to give at nearly the same level without the need for a tax deduction.[17]

The issue of whether individual contributors receive a tax deduction is important because the wealthier the person, the more valuable is the ability to avoid a tax. Put another way, poor people have less money to give and thus do not receive the same level of economic benefit from a tax deduction as a wealthier person. Tax systems that provide incentives (deductions) for people to contribute to the nonprofit sector may find that the issues and concerns of wealthier people are more likely to be supported and financed (for example, arts and culture organizations).

These same issues are evident in how charitable giving can be used to substantially reduce estate taxes. Wealthier people can leave some or all of their estate to the charitable organizations of their choice to provide support for the organizations' activities and reduce their overall tax liability. Obviously, poor people are less likely to utilize these tax provisions to support the charitable causes of most interest to them.

If (and there is no evidence that this is true), the wealthy are less likely to support social justice issues or income redistribution issues (perhaps due to how some may have accumulated their wealth), nonprofit organizations focusing on social justice issues may find it more difficult to raise the necessary financial support from wealthy contributors. This is likely to be true even when donors can receive a tax deduction. However, it is important to note that being well financed does not guarantee the broad-based public support necessary to implement a particular reform. Closely related to the myth of altruistic giving is the myth of volunteer operated organizations which is discussed below.

The myth of volunteer-operated organizations

The image that is often presented of the U.S. nonprofit sector abroad is that most if not all nonprofit organizations rely heavily on volunteers to carry out their activities. While it is true that nonprofit organizations are more likely to rely on volunteers for some part of their operations (especially board governance) than either government or business, it is not accurate to suggest that most of the work of nonprofit organizations is accomplished with volunteers. In 1994, U.S. nonprofit organizations employed 9.7 million full and part-time employees and 5.5 million full-time equivalent volunteers, which accounts for 62 percent of all volunteer employment in the U.S. economy.[23]

The image of the nonprofit sector as primarily dependent on volunteers is important to examine for several reasons. While volunteers play an important role in allowing nonprofit organizations to carry out their activities, large-scale, volunteer operated nonprofit organizations are rare. Many nonprofit organizations are multimillion dollar institutions that provide services to individuals throughout the country and require employees at all levels who have the necessary skills to ensure that quality services are provided and that financial contributions are prudently invested and accurately accounted for. This level of professionalism on a full-time basis cannot be reasonably expected of a volunteer or from a poorly paid workforce. The view of a volunteer-driven nonprofit sector has contributed, in part, to why executive compensation of nonprofit leaders in the U.S. continues to be the subject of intense media interest. The belief in volunteers is so pervasive that there are those who believe that nonprofit professionals who request reasonable compensation, life insurance, medical benefits and retirement plans are somehow less committed and motivated about their work.

When promoting the virtues of the nonprofit sector abroad, the image of nonprofit organizations that is often promulgated is that these institutions can be effectively managed and operated by volunteers. Lester Salamon makes the following observation:

> *...the belief that true nonprofit organizations rely chiefly, or even exclusively, on private voluntary action and private philanthropic support. This myth is particularly pervasive in American thinking about the nonprofit sector, but since the American nonprofit sector is widely perceived as one of the largest and most highly developed, it has affected thinking more broadly as well.*[24]

As stated, volunteers play a critical role in the governance of nonprofit institutions. Unfortunately, there is widespread anecdotal evidence that racial and ethnic groups are significantly underrepresented on the governing boards of foundations and grantseeking nonprofits. While there are no reliable statistical data about the racial composition of the governing boards of grantseeking nonprofit organizations, there are reliable data on the governance of foundations. The Council on Foundations has found that White males represent 64 percent of all foundation governing boards compared to 27 percent for White women and 3 percent for both African American men and women (the remaining 3 percent is divided among other ethnic groups).[25] These data are significant because to the extent that the governing boards of nonprofit organizations are not racially diverse, those institutions are less likely to identify and be responsive to the needs of different groups notwithstanding statements of nondiscrimination. The Ford Foundation was unique in pushing this issue to the forefront by requiring every nonprofit organization requesting a grant to identify the racial and gender composition of the organization's board and staff in evaluating whether to award a grant.[26] It is interesting to note that several organizations have been created in the United States with the purpose of recruiting and placing underrepresented groups on nonprofit governing boards.

To the extent that hiring discrimination on the basis of race and gender occurs in the nonprofit sector, specific racial groups and women may find themselves less likely to be hired. Those who are hired may receive less total compensation compared to their colleagues in similar positions. This issue is examined more fully in the next section on the myth of racial and gender equality.

The myth of racial and gender equality

One of the most persistent beliefs about the nonprofit sector is that it is inclusive of all races and cultures and that issues of racism and sexism, where they exist, are isolated incidents that are not representative of the nonprofit sector as a whole. The reality, as noted earlier, is that the nonprofit sector reflects the spectrum of the most enlightened and most limited view of an issue at a given moment in history. Many of the oldest and most prestigious nonprofit organizations can look at their past histories and find that their organizations have not always equally provided services or advocated on behalf of minority communities or women. For example, in the U.S., it is ironic that while the nonprofit sector can rightfully claim to have provided women opportunities for participation and leadership that were at one time denied to them in government and the private sector, it is seldom acknowledged that, reflective of the times, both then and now, women are paid less for their skills and talents than men.

The most recent research on diversity within the non-profit sector has raised troubling questions . . .

The fact that the nonprofit sector can rightfully claim to have provided the necessary space for some of its members to challenge the status quo has obscured discussion of the nonprofit sector's collective behavior with regard to issues of diversity and inclusion in its hiring and employment practices. The most recent research on diversity within the nonprofit sector has raised troubling questions that refute commonly held beliefs about the nonprofit sector's commitment to a diverse and inclusive volunteer and paid workforce. Notwithstanding the reliance of smaller nonprofit organizations on individual contributions and the growing percentage of racial minorities in the overall population, the U.S.-based Independent Sector has repeatedly found that people of color are simply not asked as frequently as White Americans to volunteer. Moreover, when asked, these same groups are far more likely to agree to volunteer. In short, these findings suggest that the strategy for increasing both giving and volunteering is for nonprofit organizations to simply ask specific racial and ethnic groups for their financial and volunteer support. What accounts for the apparent unwillingness of nonprofit organizations to ask people of color to volunteer? What does it say about the willingness of nonprofit organizations to be inclusive of different racial/ethnic groups?

Data from the U.S. Census compiled by the Nonprofit Academic Centers Council (NACC) raises even more disturbing questions. The study, "Nonprofit Management and Leadership: The Status of People of Color," documents that in percentage terms, various racial and ethnic groups are underrepresented in the nonprofit sector across occupations as compared to the government and private sectors. Specifically, people of color account for 24 percent of the government sector, 21 percent of the private sector and 17 percent of the nonprofit sector.[28] Other research has found that African Americans and other non-White ethnic groups working in foundations are underrepresented and academically more accomplished but underpaid, compared to their European American colleagues.[29]

At least part of the explanation may be that unlike government, which mandated and implemented affirmative action plans and the private sector that has begun to respond to equal employment legislation and consumer demand, small individual contributions coupled with a sizable volunteer workforce may not encourage diversity in the nonprofit sector as rapidly as in other sectors. While the population growth of African, Hispanic and Asian Americans are beginning to create new market pressures on nonprofit organizations to be more responsive to specific ethnic groups, the concern here is that the nonprofit sector's uncritical acceptance of its presumed achievements in this area (the myth of pure virtue) may be preventing a candid assessment of what the nonprofit sector has accomplished and what tasks remain.

Altogether, the available research data raise considerable questions about the predominant image of the nonprofit sector as inclusive and providing equal opportunities for people of color. What are the implications of the fact that people of color are disproportionately not asked to volunteer in nonprofit organizations that may, in some instances, purport to represent their interests? Given the belief that volunteering leads to increased giving, why aren't these groups being asked? Why are people of color underrepresented as paid employees in the nonprofit sector? It is likely that discriminatory hiring practices account for some part of these findings. These issues suggest that those who would work through nonprofit organizations must be alert to internal organizational issues of racial and gender discrimination as they seek to address these and other social justice issues in the larger society.

The future myth of a societal safety valve

The nonprofit sector is not only an essential component in the U.S. safety net to provide services to the disadvantaged, but its advocacy role is essential for providing space for the expression of unpopular issues that would otherwise be ignored by the "majority wins" rules of our political system. This "majority wins" system can often lead to resentment and withdrawal by those who are not part of the winning majority. This feature strengthens rather than weakens the underlying political system. Tocqueville observed:

> *They [governments] bear a natural goodwill to civil associations, on the contrary, because they readily discover that instead of directing the minds of the community to public affairs these institutions serve to divert them from such reflections, and that, by engaging them more and more in the pursuit of objects which cannot be attained without public tranquillity, they deter them from revolutions.*[iii]

With one significant exception, the United States is widely recognized as having maintained an exceptionally stable democracy. This stability is due, in part, to the nonprofit sector that provides a constructive vehicle to promote change for citizens who disagree with the status quo. Again, the enabling environment in the United States is an essential underlying reason for this success. The one exception to the otherwise stable democracy in the United States was the Civil War. The issue of race and slavery was so divisive that the pressure release valve of the nonprofit sector was unable to contain it.

There are disturbing signs that the issue of race is once again building pressure on the U.S. democratic system that cannot be constructively diffused by the nonprofit sector. The current pressure is coming from a small segment of White Americans who have formed armed militia groups for the explicit purpose of overthrowing the U.S. government. While this may, at first, seem preposterous, these groups have: military training; amassed large stockpiles of guns, ammunition and explosives; and carried out several attacks against government targets. It is somewhat surprising that some Whites have chosen violence over peaceful change through the nonprofit sector. Considering that historical injustices that have been endured by African Americans and Native Americans in some areas continue, one might have predicted that some of their members would have been more likely to take up arms. Rather than organizing to work within the system to promote change, neo-Nazi and militia groups have withdrawn from the democratic system. Unless efforts are made to successfully draw these individuals back into using the voting process and the nonprofit system to peacefully promote their views, the current violence is likely to continue to escalate. Such actions would make the future myth of the nonprofit sector as a societal safety valve an unfortunate reality.

Conclusion

Around the world, advocates for social justice are searching for new tools to combat the historic and ongoing problems of racism and discrimination. This search has become more important with the global dominance of democracy and the free-market system as well as the need to address national budget constraints. The U.S. nonprofit system is often viewed as a successful model that has empowered dispossessed people to successfully harness and direct their own financial and volunteer resources (as well as those of supporters) to promote socioeconomic equality within the legal system. The nonprofit sector is also viewed as a way to stimulate citizen participation and provide services in lieu of, or in conjunction with, government. This essay has examined the seven deadly myths of the nonprofit sector and their hidden implications for social justice advocates. The myths are deadly because, in addition to being misleading, they have hidden implications for social justice that may exacerbate rather than ameliorate the socioeconomic divisions. This is especially relevant to advocates for social justice working abroad who may be less familiar with the opportunities and limitations presented by the U.S. nonprofit system.

The nonprofit sector can be a powerful tool for citizen self-expression and empowerment. However, it is clear that the U.S. nonprofit sector has hidden race and class considerations which should be explicitly recognized by those who would promote or use the nonprofit sector as a mechanism to address racism and socioeconomic inequality in the U.S. or abroad. There are enormous individual and institutional resources (financial and volunteer) that are directed through the nonprofit sector of different countries. Further analysis would appear warranted in order to examine how best to utilize the nonprofit sector to effectively address social justice issues in light of the myths discussed in this essay and the cultural and legal environment in each country. Without such forethought, advocates of using the nonprofit sector to address social justice issues may unknowingly import some of the inequities and internal contradictions of the American nonprofit sector.

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Some Reflections on Racism and Protest in the United States

By C. Eric Lincoln

The Origins of African American Rejection

Humanity as superlative value

All of the world's great religions presume the uniqueness of human life and place it at the apex of the schedule of values worthy of protection and preservation. There is probably no other single value in which there is such a unanimous convergence of opinion and belief. Nevertheless, in spite of the universality of commitment to the supreme value of human life in the abstract, and the [illegible] universality of religion, the world's most prominent religions have seemed unable to translate the value of human life into a principle of consistent derivative value in human life represented by individual selves. Hence, [illegible] commonly [illegible] or not infrequently because of religion, human life as a supreme value is often tarnished by the [illegible] of other values religion is called upon to validate. In other words, some human lives are inherently worth more than others because they are presumed to be enhanced by such values or accidents as color, race, class or social status.

This troublesome contradiction is the nemesis of human interaction and peaceful collaboration throughout the world [illegible] project themselves into the most intimate of human relationships and institutions [illegible] which determine the quality of life for millions of people for whom life as a supreme value [illegible] a prominent example of the institutionalization of concepts which often reflect [illegible] which it appeals to and receives from religion the [illegible] see ourselves and the way we see others. This is the pervasive problem our world has to face as we step tentatively into the churning, uncharted waters of the 21st century. We do not know where the shoals and the reefs are hidden, nor beyond which horizon the storm clouds are gathered. But we do know that they are there. There is a critical continuity in human experience. The bounds, which mark the beginning of the new millennium, are projections of our own imaginings. In reality, "Y2k" has no objective reality of its own. We will go on being what we were unless we decide to change. Our habits and conventions do not automatically change with the changing of the calendar. And so we will likely be taking with us into the future the odious baggage dragged out of the past as the standards for the millennium ahead.

Race in the United States

Racism comes to different cultures at different times and for reasons that may be widely disparate. In the United States where the felt need to identify, distinguish, separate and evaluate human beings in terms of "race" has been continuous since the beginning of American history, the seeds of our racial mania are often attributed to the Christian religion itself. Such disparaging nonsense is only with great difficulty exposed for what it is. The Christian faith as the prevailing religious world view of the American people has been, indeed, vigorously and persistently mined and exploited in search of legitimization for racist ideology. But it is not the faith that is flawed, but rather the "faithful" who, for whatever reason, have not kept the faith.

Two sources of Christian racism

Racism in America is rooted in three closely related aspects of the American experience: territorial expansion; economic aggrandizement; and political hegemony. Together, these three interests represent a tightly integrated packet of values which to the conventional American mind transcend the superlative value of human life and such derivatives as justice, equality, and the sanctity of the individual. Conflicting teachings of the Bible – the Christian code for human action – have been systematically ignored or "reinterpreted" to serve the cause of racial exploitation.

Territorial expansion: the first thrust of racism

The Pilgrims who came to America from Europe in the first quarter of the 17th century were devout Christians fleeing religious persecution and in search of religious freedom. There is little, if anything, in the literature of the period which would seem to indicate that they were any more or less racist than their counterparts left behind in Western Europe. They came to America, they said, to build "a new Jerusalem," a city under God set on a hill, as it were, to serve as a beacon to all humanity who chose to live in the shadow and by the dictates of God Almighty.

Certainly this was a noble, laudable enterprise and one which all Christians might have been proud to acknowledge and affirm. But there was apparently an aspect of the plan that this intrepid little band of Christian pioneers – and their successors – had not thought through. To build a city, however noble its purpose, required land, and the land the Pilgrims had their hearts set upon was already occupied by some people mistakenly labeled "Indians." What to do? God's City must be built, and God had delivered them from the toils of religious persecution in Europe, the perils of the sea, and the rigors of survival in a strange and distant land that they might make the New Jerusalem the embodiment of God's favor and God's grace. But what about the Indians? Were they not also a part of God's crowning superlative creation called humankind? Were they not included among the children of God?

Such vexations would have to be thought about and resolved. Certainly the Indians looked human, or almost human. But just how human were they? They were different, if one thought about it. They were "Red" men! The Europeans were "White." And the Indians were "savage" and "uncivilized," exhibiting none of the social graces or cultural refinements which distinguished the expatriates from Western Europe. Moreover, they were "heathen," knowing nothing of the one true God who created the heavens and the earth. They made no distinction between themselves and the animals they considered their "brothers," who shared the land with them, and whose flesh they ate and whose skins they wore to shield them from the elements. Could it be that these Indians were in fact more animal than human and therefore beyond the pale of divine grace and human consideration? When the Indians' land was at stake, it was an easy transition from the speculative appraisal of the Indian to the summary conclusion that "the only good Indian is a dead Indian." And this became the determining ideology, which almost denuded the country of its aboriginal peoples. The process would be repeated with adaptations with the Mexican nationals. The desire for more and more territory grew more and more insatiable as we flexed between two oceans we had come to covet as the "natural" boundaries of our new democracy. The Christian community that had originally been conceived as a New Jerusalem, a city set on a hill for the glory of God and the demonstration of the superlative value of all human life, had deteriorated into a chauvinistic rationale for territorial aggrandizement, the repercussions of which still aggravate the racist melanoma of our social consciousness.

Economics as a source of American racism

The building of an empire requires labor. Intensive labor. Whether such an undertaking is perceived as a demonstration of the community of faith, as in the case of a New Jerusalem, or whether it is merely a challenge to the human spirit to pursue the extraordinary in creative expression, someone has to provide the labor by means of which creative ideologies take on materiality. The more magnificent the dreams, the less likely it is that the dreamers are prepared to do the labor required to make their dreams substantial. The great pyramids of Egypt, the magnificent cities of the Aztecs, the plantations, and the railroads required billions of man-hours and buckets of sweat. The hot and the heavy and the dirty labor that went into the making of America are cases in point. It was not the dreamers who did the work, but those who had their own dreams deferred to give reality to the dreams forced upon them. As the New Jerusalem concept extrapolated itself into visions of empire, a reliable source of cheap and ready labor had to be found at the expense of other visions of other people who dared to have visions of their own.

The Indians were already here, and they had already been declared beyond the pale of divine interest and proper human consideration. So it seemed "logical" to enslave the Indians. And that was tried. But Indian slavery proved impractical. The Indians who were set to work at the White man's tasks either died of melancholia or escaped into the surrounding forests at the first opportunity. They were at home where all of the support systems of tribe, family and terrain worked to their advantage, and the efforts to build on the back of Indian labor were soon aborted.

African labor, the primary source of racism

With the failure of Indian slavery and the steady expansion of the western frontier, the escalating influx of European colonists in America found it feasible to look to the continent from which they had come to fill the persistent labor vacuum. While there was no major traditional devaluation of selective human beings on the basis of "color" or "race" as we perceive it today, there were rigid class distinctions. Perhaps the enslavement of the poor and the indigent might be justified if it were temporary, and if it provided an opportunity for their rehabilitation through Christian oversight and self-help? This rationale when codified in a labor arrangement called "indenture" seemed consistent with the colonists' theology and understanding of the day, which made a virtue of work and a responsibility of oversight. Under indenture the distressed poor of Ireland, the homeless and the unprotected roaming the streets of London, and the defaulted in debtors' prisons provided a steady supply of candidates willing or unwilling to be sold into indenture in America for "a term of years." But all of these laborers were Europeans, and all of them were White.

The traditional patterns of indenture were broken after 1619 when the first Africans were bartered away at Jamestown, Virginia. For the first time Black people were incorporated into the prevailing system of "indentured servants." But as the slave trade escalated, the system was modified in ways that made the pervasive racial prejudice inevitable. Indenture was dismantled in favor of abject human chattelry, and the African people became the designated source to bear the onus of the new tradition.

The usual "term of years" an indentured servant was required to serve was seven, at the satisfactory conclusion of which the servant was released and given a few acres of land or other gratuity to help launch his or her independence and responsibility. Since indenture implied a "class" rather than a "racial" distinction, intermarriage between European and African servants was common and not in violation of law or public policy. However, as labor needs intensified, the practice of keeping the Africans in indenture for indefinite periods beyond the legal term of seven years became a pernicious, commonplace corruption of the system. Europeans whose terms were violated could appeal to the British Crown or to influential advocates back home for relief. Africans had no such recourse, and in due course Africans were required to serve, not for "a term of years," but dura vita, which is to say, for life. The institutionalization of African slavery was complete. An interesting fallout was that interracial marriages, which were previously optional to the parties involved, were now frequently forced. Since all children sired by an African male would inherit the civil status of the father, they would be slaves. And (following English common law) they would be the property of whomever owned the slave who fathered them. By the middle of the 18th century "slave" and "African" were practically synonymous in meaning.

Politics as a source of racism in America

The founding fathers who came to America to build a New Jerusalem under God eventually established a civilization they triumphantly hailed as a "democracy." It was, they said, "a government of the people, by the people, for the people." It was not the New Jerusalem originally envisaged, but it was a refreshing stride in the right direction and a significant improvement over what most of the world had to offer to buffer the human predicament at that time. Nevertheless, the new government was flawed, perhaps not intentionally so, but seriously enough to require continuing vigilance in the interest of making the democracy they intended more true to its own ideals than its practices. In the first place, the prevailing model for the governments of Western Europe had been patriarchal for as long as anyone could remember – the occasional ascent of a woman to the titular head of government notwithstanding. A patriarchy concentrates the critical distribution of political power in the hands of an exclusive oligarchy of males in which age (or tenure) is likely to be a critical factor. In short, in the classical patriarchy, older men have more power, younger men have less power, and non-males have little or no power at all. When this model (which is undoubtedly a survival of the primeval structure of the human family) is extrapolated as the system of government for a whole nation or society, it is obviously incompatible with the notion of a government of, by and for the whole people. Hence the best intentions of the American founding fathers to establish a true democracy were inhibited to the degree that they also sought to preserve the privileges of patriarchalism which were deeply embedded in English law and tradition.

Resistance and protest against injustice and exploitation is an integral aspect of the human endowment.

The pitfalls were not immediately apparent because there were no women present at the Constitutional Convention to raise the issue of their exclusion from the full benefits and responsibilities of the democratic ideal. In Europe, classical patriarchalism had successfully avoided the problems of gender since medieval times by an elaborate system of parallelism called, "chivalry." Chivalry effectively disfranchised women and precluded their political involvement in exchange for the security of male intervention or championship on their behalf. An exaggerated system of honor, manners and other social emoluments were reserved for the "ladies" of the men who shaped and directed the common destiny, encouraging the notion that power could (or should) be a male responsibility. This system of gender glorification in return for non-participation was an integral part of the traditional culture brought from Europe. In the South, which was to become the primary situs of the African American experience in racism, the crinoline and lace of the White southern belles not only marked the exaggerated continuation of a tradition of civil and political non-involvement, it also co-opted the latent psychology of the system as a formidable weapon of African control and denigration.

The exclusion of women reserved the privilege of patriarchalism – which is to say political power – to men. But the vast majority of Africans imported for slavery in America were men, and thereon hung a worrisome contradiction. The ever-increasing numbers of African males caused some uneasiness among those who dared to look beyond the apparent control of things as they appeared to be to a time when things might change. For example, while gender was an effective bar to White women who might challenge the patriarchal hold on political participation, what was to restrain Black men except slavery? For a thousand years, the English common law had presumed the priority of males in the inheritance of titles, property and social and political privilege in general. Though it is unlikely that color or race were anticipated as factors of consequence in the original determination of such conventions, history was capable of developments that were scarcely discernable in the cavalcade of events which were even then restructuring English life in America. For example, whenever there has been human bondage, there has been sexual contact between those who anointed themselves "masters" and those who were designated "slaves." This ancient inevitable relationship can be as formal as the ownership of wives and concubines (and sometimes children), or as informal as the presumption of privilege, which made Black Sally Hemmings the mother of Thomas Jefferson's children without the benefit of clergy. Such miscegenation was common in America from the beginning. Indeed, the sexuality of African women figured prominently in the market value of slaves sold at the auction block, as it did in role and work assignments once they were incorporated into plantation life.

However, as is usually the case, there were unanticipated consequences to the sexual liaisons outside the bounds of marriage. In the first place, they were a constant source of friction, suspicion, frustration and self-doubt experienced by the White "mistress" whose "ladyship" was often translated into a lonely shadow-life that was both sterile and meaningless. In counterpart, the role of the Black male in his own "family" was unauthenticated and undefined. He was made an expendable appendage to the woman who bore his children (and perhaps those of the "master"). But he had no significant powers of decision or control over anything, including his own body.

The consequences of the "master's" personal laissez faire sexual unrestraint, which were most feared, were more threatening than real. But they were of a potential magnitude, which if realized, could in time bring down the world the slaveholders had built like a house of cards. They were 1) miscegenation (or "mongrelization") and 2) legal recognition of Black sons of White fathers to "take" or inherit according to the established conventions of the British Common Law. It was these two concerns which became the overwhelming focus of White racism in its unrelenting effort to demonize and denigrate the African American male in the eyes of the White woman and the society at large. Hence, any opportunity to portray Black males as ignorant, lazy, savage, brutal, bestial, dirty, thieving, lying or otherwise unattractive and unreliable were seized upon for the arsenal of African degradation. To preclude the benefits of law should the day ever come when some Black son of a White father should sue for legal recognition, most states passed laws to the effect that "the father of a slave is unknown," (i.e., a slave is nullius rilius, the son of nobody; or a slave is nullius populi, the son of the people), and therefore unable to establish a claim in the traditional line of descent from father to son.

Such were the principal origins of anti-African racist ideology in America. We turn now to an examination of resistance.

Resistance and protest

Before the fall

The interpretation of biblical history makes much of the exalted status of humankind before the "fall" of man into the oblivion of his sinfulness. From that oblivion there could be no rescue except through the unmerited intervention of divine grace. For millions of Africans entrapped in the merciless mandibles of the slave trade, the "fall" into oblivion and depersonalization was subject to no agency of recall or recuperation the African had heard about. Slavery meant the fall of an impenetrable curtain that separated those enslaved from their families, their cultures, their gods, their systems of truth and perspectives on reality. Forever. It was an assignment to death that was worse than death, and resistance before the curtain of institutional slavery could fall was often a compelling index of what the captured Africans knew intuitively awaited them beyond the "middle passage" across the ocean to America.

It was common for Africans whose villages had been decimated to refuse to march in the "coffles" that chained them neck to neck, hand to hand, and ankle to ankle for the overland march to the slave barracoons or "factories" in the harbor to be warehoused until the next slave ships arrived. Some refused to eat and died of starvation in the coffles. Some slashed their own throats with their fingernails and bled to death. Some deliberately provoked their coffle drivers and were killed for delaying the delicate passage through hostile territory. Aboard the stinking ships of the middle passage, the full extent of the murder and mutiny and self destruction that took place is an untold chapter in the malevolent murkiness which clouds the horrors of human procurement for human aggrandizement. Romanticized stories like that of Cinque and the Amistad mutineers can only suggest the tip of an iceberg whose depth has yet to be fully plumbed.

Survival

Once the slave ships arrived in America the curtain came down with a clanking finality. From that point on, Africa did not exist– except as a production unit for the perpetual replenishment of virile, Black uncompensated labor. There was no hope or expectation that the African Motherland would, or could, offer any hope for the relief or the rescue of the African diaspora whose members had disappeared behind the curtain of abject servitude in America. In America, slavery had become an institution, nurtured, protected and extolled by all of the sub-structures significant cultures employ to preserve what they perceive as their vital interests: education, law, economics, religion, myth, public policy, and so on, ad infinitum. Protest in such a climate must be both secretive and discrete if it is not to be dysfunctional or self-defeating. To the great credit of the Africans, their first protests were summed up in one word: survival. The lesson is clear. The "Indians" fought valiantly, and often to the last man, to preserve their possessions and their identity. But power concedes nothing. Would-be conquerors concede even less, and, when the last battle cry was heard in America, the Native Americans were all but extinguished. Those who survived were on reservations. It is a sad commentary on our national history, but it is a lesson African Americans took to heart. Survival is the value in the absence of which all other values are moot.

Survival protests took a variety of forms, which when fit together, made possible a continuity of personal and cultural existence which, considering the multiform stresses of slavery, has been nothing less than astonishing. From "cutting the fool," or amusing the White man to stave off punishment, to eating the most nutritious foods that could be secreted from the Big House kitchen or smoke house, to resting instead of working, to disinformation and clever deception, in a thousand ways did the African slave manage to stay alive. One of the cottontail stories of the slave era told of two rabbits trapped inside a hollow log surrounded by a pack of hounds. "Our strategy," the male rabbit said to his companion, "will be to just sit tight in here until we outnumber them. Then we'll see!"

Active protest on the plantation

Mere survival is sterile unless it anticipates change. If survival is the first law of nature, then self-expression must be the second. "Survival for what?" is the question every human being must confront at one time or another. And if there are no clear answers, it is doubtful that the game is worth the candle by which we struggle to maintain it. Man is a creative being, and the spark of creativity that distinguishes humankind from all other forms of life is the innate initiative and desire to expand his universe of reality by something more than mere biological procreation. The metaphor about leaving "footprints on the sands of time" is a fair expression of the human need to create, to be relevant, to make a difference in the otherwise senseless flux of history. When the creative initiative is stifled or truncated or abjectly denied, then the human potential to become, itself, is short-circuited and human life is fraudulent, wasted and counter-productive. Slavery is the supreme suppression of the human initiative; racism is its selective, calculated counterpoint in denial. African Americans have never been free of one or the other, or both since they first came to America to labor in the White man's initiative some four centuries ago. The creative energy that should have gone into making this society and the world a more beautiful and inviting place for human occupancy and development has been largely usurped by the resistance and protest necessary to stay alive and retain one last clutch on human dignity which separates humans from the yawning abyss of nothingness.

If someone calls himself your "master" and strips you summarily of all the rights, attributes and emoluments of the human endowment, then what "truth" can you possibly owe him?

Resistance and protest against injustice and exploitation is an integral aspect of the human endowment. It is never a question of whether men and women who perceive themselves within the God ordained human confraternity will resist dehumanization, but only of what form that resistance will take at a given time in history. On the plantations of the South, resistance took a variety of forms in the context of the opportunities the culture afforded. At one extreme was revolt, insurrection and selective assassination. While the instances of armed insurrection have been grossly under-reported, they are finally finding their way into the more authoritative works on the slave-holding South. Assassinations are considerably more difficult to document. But they did occur, and their sometimes cryptic mention in oral histories and family anecdotal traditions suggest that they were not as infrequent as the ruling hegemony was prepared to admit. Many "masters" lived in perpetual fear of being poisoned, and indeed poisoning was a favorite means of dispatching a cruel "master" or "mistress" to a more innocuous existence. Many of the slaves knew how to brew various combinations of "yarbs" or poisonous weeds which produced death suddenly, or over a period of time. Poisonous snakes or scorpions were hidden in places likely to be frequented by an offensive overseer; pulverized glass was a favorite and deadly potion when mixed in small doses with the food of the intended victim until it accumulated in the stomach or intestine, where it produced irreversible bleeding and death.

Less consummate forms of resistance included the maiming of livestock, the burning of crops, barns, storehouses, and occasionally the Big House itself. Fences were broken so that livestock could get at the corn and other crops. Growing crops were neglected, over-fertilized, under-fertilized, or improperly harvested. Hogs, cows, chickens and other food animals were permitted to wander off and disappear into the mysterious realm of fates unknown. Such protests, of course, required a measured sense of self preservation. There was a certain symbiosis in the plantation economy, which could not be ignored. "We had to all eat off the same hog," as my great-grandmother used to put it. "The White man, he ate high on the hog, and the rest of us ate what was left." This meant in translation that if there was no hog, nobody ate. It is in this context that protest and survival had to ally themselves with each other, and the decimation of the plantation produce had to be tempered by the common need to survive.

Lying, stealing and taking

There are few descriptions of African Americans offered by plantation era Whites, which do not include "lying" and "stealing" as cardinal aspects of African American character. Those perceptions persist today in the racist catalogue of pejoratives with all the vehemence of convention. But the problem is not that the African American has a greater proneness to lie or to steal than the White man, but that the White man has worn convenient blinders to his own perfidy for so long he has forgotten where and why the prevarication began. If someone calls himself your "master" and strips you summarily of all the rights, attributes and emoluments of the human endowment, then what "truth" can you possibly owe him? Indeed, what is "truth" in so degraded a condition? And why should you be expected to be "moral" when all of your other human attributes are denied? It would seem that the first lie which denies your humanity precludes all other possibilities. This is the way it seemed to the slave. "Lying," or dis-information was merely one more weapon in the arsenal of resistance.

So it was with "stealing." There is an old slave saying that "you can't steal from the stealer." The most you can do is take back some of what he stole from you. But you'll never get it all. To the African, the White man had stolen his body, his identity, his labor, his future none of which he could "steal" back. Hence, the conviction that "you can't steal from the White man because whatever he has or will have, he stole from you." This conviction remains deeply embedded in the subconscious of many African Americans and has been subliminally responsible for behavior that might otherwise seem baffling to those outside the circle of its understanding. On the plantation it was not only acceptable, it was often a deliberate form of protest to "take" from the "master" whatever could be managed without detection and punishment. Slaves could "steal" from each other, but stealing from the master was a contradiction in terms.

Residual resentments crop up in strange places from time to time. In Atlanta a few years ago, an African American was arrested for shoplifting some cheap trinkets in a downtown department store. When he was taken to jail it was discovered that the shoplifter was not only well educated and professional, but that he had almost $2000 in his wallet at the time of his arrest. A search of his home turned up dozens of cheap trinkets similar to those for which he was arrested. None had been used. His explanation revealed the deep-seated resentment he continued to harbor for the racism that robbed his future 150 years before he was born. Said he, "I look at all that stuff in these stores, and I see my grand-daddy's sweat all over it. I just had to take some of it back. It was the only thing I could do." It was a symbolic protest affirming his own estimate of his humanity.

African Americans on welfare have often expressed a similar line of reasoning which made them beneficiaries of a kind of reparation they considered theirs "by right" and long overdue. "They stole everything from me for 350 years to support the White man and his family in high style and comfort," they reasoned. "What's so wrong with taking a little of it back to help me and our children survive, now that he doesn't need us anymore in the world he created for himself on our labor?" The vast majority of African Americans who were on welfare were in fact in desperate need of such assistance as a practical matter of survival, but for many of them there was something more than abject survival at stake. Welfare was a form of "taking." It provided a limited opportunity for retrieval that was substantial rather than merely symbiotic. And it was the "legalization" of a continuing protest against a demeaning and dehumanizing system of racism, which now forced a race-oriented culture to penalize itself for its ancient indiscretions.

Running away, passing and suicide

Running away, passing and suicide were extreme forms of protest or resistance in which the persons who were the objects of racism reassumed or took control of their own lives and bodies. During slavery, although there were many Africans who were physically capable of "passing" as White, the risks involved did not favor the odds for success. The plantation system was too insular, and unauthorized movement was severely restricted. And even when the ordinary physical indexes relied upon for racial identification were diluted or not apparent, the intimacy of the plantation community presented few secrets of such significant magnitude. In consequence, "passing," as protest, usually involved escape to more congenial territory. Outside the rural South "passing" has been widely practiced as protest and as opportunity to regain unrestricted human recognition ever since the Civil War. Thousands of "Blacks" have become "Whites" by the simple expedient of a change of address and the change of public social or cultural affectations. Jobs and accommodations, which were previously unavailable, meant new access to the American Dream, as well as new satisfaction in the reaffirmation of personal worth.

Running away was such a persistent form of protest against slavery that it was thought to be a disease and was called "monomania." Tens of thousands of Africans were "infected," and the apprehensions and recapture of runaway slaves spawned a dubious profession dominated by the propertyless class of "poor Whites" who were otherwise destined to scratch out a desperate living on the hardscrabble fringes of the slave holding plantations. To the planters, running away was considered the most serious and unforgivable act of resistance a slave could perform. In a single act, it severely diminished the "master's" most critical property holdings, and it exposed to other slaves the vulnerability of the elaborate security system by which the slaves were controlled. Only suicide, which was defined as "the willful self-destruction of the master's property," was considered more heinous and unacceptable. Punishment for running away was summary and harsh. Repeaters were whipped to the point of death, branded on the cheek or forehead, and "sold down the river" into the "Lower South" of Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia and Louisiana as "incorrigible." There they would live out their remaining days under conditions designed for the maximum extraction of labor at the minimum cost per unit. Nevertheless, resistance and protest by the absenteeism of self-removal had become a major tactic in the strategy of freedom by the onset of the Civil War.

Black religion in resistance and protest

The Black church is credited as the first viable organization to offer sustained resistance to the dehumanizations of racist ideology. This conviction is both well placed and understated, but the advent of the Black church as an "independent" local entity was delayed until the middle of the 18th century, and the Black church as a unified cultural institution would not appear until the first quarter of the 19th century. Africans were routinely denied access to the gospel and to the saving grace of the Christian religion until 1701, when a contingent of missionaries sent to the "pacified" Indians by the Anglican Church sought permission to Christianize the slaves after they were rebuffed by the Native Americans. After some extended skirmishes with the planters, who did not want the delicately contrived slave arrangement tampered with, the missionaries were permitted to "exhort" the Big House slaves gathered from time to time under the magnolias of the plantation compound. In due course, favorite personal slaves– valets, nannies, wet nurses, and other Big House retainers– were permitted to attend churches with "masters" and "mistresses." The Africans were confined to segregated seating along the walls of the sanctuary or in the rear of the church behind the White congregation. As their numbers increased, galleries called "nigger heavens" were built for the Blacks high up under the rafters in the rear of many churches. The sermons they heard were addressed to White hearers and White interests. White church wardens stood watch among the Black worshippers to make certain that the service was not disturbed by the shouting, wailing or other emotional outbursts from the Black Christians, who heard the faith turned upside down to accommodate the monstrousness of a doctrine of human servitude under God. The first protest was the spiritual rejection of so callous a rendering of divine turpitude. No God of mercy and justice and fair play could at the same time will for His children made in His image so degraded a subservience to His other children made in His image.

The Africans extracted from the White man's preachments those truths that were consistent and universal and privately rejected the rest. In time they would confront their abusers with the same truths surreptitiously gleaned from a doctrine which had been originally and malevolently contrived to reinforce the bands of their spiritual and physical captivity.

Selected Black worshipers in selected White churches became a normative feature of Black-White relations, but Black participation was at first limited to the Black Big House retainers. As late as 1750, the Blacks who worked in the fields were almost entirely without access to Christian comfort or community. In an occasional instance where by happenstance a few African Muslims where thrown together, Islam was practiced in such rudimentary forms as circumstances would permit. Voodoo and other syncretistic expediencies remembered from previous cultures were also relied upon to keep the transplanted African in touch with a past that was rapidly eroding under the horrendous stresses of isolation and depersonalization in America. Almost everywhere, any religious practice outside the White man's church was forbidden. Drums, which were an integral part of the African's religious paraphernalia, were absolutely forbidden, and any unauthorized "assemblage under cover of religion" was punishable by whipping or banishment. Nevertheless, there was a counterpart Black Christian community to that in the White churches developing in the remote swamps and bayous and other inaccessible locations far away from the prying eyes of the "master" or his overseer. This was to become the "Underground Church" which became the backbone of slave resistance, shepherding many thousands of Black men and women from slavery to freedom. The Underground Church was the primary organizing unit and staging depot for the Underground Railroad, a labyrinthian secret network of Black resistance, which stretched from the Deep South into Canada. Helped along by Quakers and other abolition-minded Americans, the Underground became the principal symbol of hope through resistance that fueled the Black captives to strike on their own behalf. Success was visible, tangible and sweet. With daring and determination, evil could be overcome.

By the last part of the 18th century, a scattering of local Black churches had broken through the stringent prohibitions, which had truncated and suppressed the African's spiritual libido since his coming to America. Most of the early Black churches were Baptist– 35 in Virginia alone before the turn of the century and others in South Carolina and Georgia. All of these early Black churches were monitored by White men to see that no teachings or practices inimical to slave holding interests were introduced in ritual or worship, and more especially to make certain that resistance or revolt was not "hatched under cover of religion." This monitoring failed on all counts, for the slaves wove cryptic communication signals into their prayers, songs and sermons, and most of the uprisings that did take place had religious overtones whether or not the churches were directly involved. Nat Turner's rebellion and Denmark Vesey's insurrection were prominent cases in point.

There were numerous individuals such as David Walker, Sojourner Truth, and Morris Brown, who symbolized Black discontent by personal protest and resistance, but the first organized resistance was probably the Free Africa Society organized by Richard Allen and his friends in Philadelphia in 1787. The original Free Africa Society, though composed of dedicated Black Christians whose primary interests centered on religious fellowship, was also distinguished by an activist social consciousness from its inception.Counterpart Free Africa Societies spread quickly across the northern tier of states whenever there were sufficient numbers of unshackled Blacks to maintain them. Their secular concerns grew in intensity as the onerousness of racism became more pronounced, and, like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which they presaged by a century, they were never far from the spirit and influence of the Black church.

But it was the Black church itself that provided the critical opportunity for the Africans in America to assume true and final responsibility for their own destiny. Slavery is the summary usurpation of personal will and personal responsibility. Religion is the ultimate effort to influence human destiny with the help and approbation of a power or powers not subject to the limitations that define mortality. In consequence, throughout human history, religion has been pressed into the breech of desperation (or the postern of opportunity) in the relentless effort of some who would enhance their personal perception of destiny at the expense of others. It is not religion which is at fault, but rather religion which has been co-opted in the pursuit of more dubious values. The captivity of the church in America is a painful illustration of what can happen when faith yields to casuistry, and spiritual integrity is abandoned in favor of the tawdriness of an alleged racial supremacy.

The Africans extracted from the White man's preachments those truths that were consistent and universal and privately rejected the rest.

In spite of the human proclivity for moral stealth and secret lack of compassion, there seems to be inherent in the human predicament an element of moral restitution which chastens, then ultimately retrieves us from our own weaknesses and from the consummate viciousness of those who plot our discomfort or destruction. The Black church-in-the-White church, for example, was from its outset a contradiction which could not survive under the constraints and contradictions which gave it birth. Obviously, Black Christians and White Christians can worship the same God, belong to the same church, practice the same rituals, and sing the same songs in union and fellowship. If they share a unity of belief about themselves, each other, and the God they worship in common. A religion or church that does not represent a common worldview for a common community will inevitably become exploitative. It is not a question of whether, but, at most, it is a question of how long the hypocrisy can be masqueraded before the abused and the abusers under "acceptable" spiritual cover. When Richard Allen and Absalom Jones, devout and patient Christians though they were, could no longer suffer the indignities of abject racism in the White church they attended in Philadelphia, they walked out of Saint George's Methodist Church, and a new era in African American resistance and protest was born. It was this departure that spawned the first Free Africa Society in 1787 and had its epiphany in the establishment of the Black church as a self-responsible, independent, spiritual entity as the African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME) in 1816.

It was not the sectarian distinctiveness of the AME Church that was important. From a doctrinal point of view, it could just as well have been Baptist, or Episcopalian, or even Quaker. What was of critical significance was that for the first time in America, a consortium of Black churches had formalized themselves into a viable union and assumed responsibility for their own common worldview and their own spiritual destiny. An earlier attempt to achieve this unprecedented milestone had been attempted by the African Union Church Incorporated in Wilmington, Delaware in 1807. But the African Union Church did not thrive, even though it merged with the First Colonial Methodist Protestant Church in 1866 to become the African Union First Colonial Methodist Protestant Church of America. It was Richard Allen and his motley detachment of faith-filled Christian expatriates who launched the African sub-culture on its mission of promoting the dignity of Blacks. During the Civil War the battle cry addressed to the tens of thousands of Blacks holding segregated status in White churches was the same heard from the independent churches, AME and AMEZ (African Methodist Episcopal Zion) alike: "Come out from among them! Be men! Be African!" And they did come out in droves. The focus on freedom recognized no dividing line between the spiritual and the human. To be a person was to accept no allegations of limitations except those clearly ordained by God and common to all humankind.

The arena of conflict had been defined, and the stage for conflict had been set. Over the succeeding years, every possible strategy from education to politics to legal action to non-violent protest would be employed to resist racial chauvinism and abuse. The NAACP became the symbol of legal resistance. Martin Luther King, Jr. became the guru of non-violent Christian protest. It cost him his life. There were others less committed to Christian restraint, like the Black Panthers and the Black Muslims, whose brooding presence served as a constant reminder of what resistance could become. But there were still believers like the men and women in the Congress of Racial Equality who crossed the lines of religion and race to mix their bodies and their lives in an attempt at reconciliation. The promise of our protest and resistance to God and ourselves is that "we shall overcome!" It is a promise to take back the dignity without which the human endowment is a farce and a fraud. No human assignment could possibly be more compelling.

The Black church comes of age

Institutions, like the cultures which produce them, build on experience or they die. But experience is difficult to sort out and to evaluate in the absence of a clear understanding and acceptance of identity. In its zeal, and in its will to believe itself an undifferentiated part of American Christendom, for the greater part of its existence, the resistance of the Black church to racial tyranny was conditioned by these considerations. But the denigration of the Black church and its leadership was no less consummate than the contempt for Black individuals. Hence, the prolonged efforts of Black Christians to find meaningful and dignified inclusion inside the White Christian establishment, its tightly knit organizations and its spiritual brotherhood met with summary rejection. But more than that, resistance against the racist systems controlled by the Whites the Blacks perceived as Christians brothers and sisters was perplexing, confused and patently divisive. There was a scattered handful of Blacks in some of the White denominations whose presence there made Black resistance even more delicate.

After World War II and a more intensive exposure to the diversity of the human predicament, the self-perception of the Black church began a reassessment and clarification. It began slowly and tentatively at first and then burst with full illumination like a light that had been there unseen all the time. The prevailing stigma alleging the "illegitimacy" of Black religion vanished in the rising tide of cultural and spiritual nationalism. Black people were God's children–independent of White approval or conditions. The aspersion of illegitimacy had been both painful and cruel, for with Black Christians effectively barred from the "established" White churches by an alleged racial insufficiency, they were left without viable options within the only faith they knew. It was now clear that their first liberation would have to be a liberation from spiritual dependency that would go far beyond the relatively modest initiative of Richard Allen in the 18th century. Since that time the established church had shown little evidence that it intended to distinguish itself and its people of faith from the common run of racial oppression and denigration.

In the face of this new illumination, the Black overtures for inclusion in the White church were gradually reduced to the level of courtesy. It was replaced by a dramatic infusion of self confidence and self awareness which fueled the civil rights movement and demonstrated to the whole world the legitimacy and the viability of the Black church. It is the same church that produced and nurtured Martin Luther King, Jr., James Farmer, Ralph Abernathy, Andrew Young, Leon Sullivan, Joseph Lowery, Rosa Parks and a legion of other Christians fired by their faith. They took on the perils of active protest against a deeply entrenched system of racial and economic abuse and exploitation. In the fury of retaliation, their houses were bombed, their churches were burned and their jobs were sacrificed. Many were murdered. But things changed. Often the changes were only cosmetic, but any change seems better than none at all when oppression is routine. And any degree of change suggests that more change is possible if the determination for change is unswerving.

By the end of the Sixties, after more than two decades of intensive involvement in resistance and sacrifice, the Black church had come fully of age. Proud of its independence, both spiritual and structural, and confident of its mission of Black liberation, it was no longer confused about its identity. It could rely on its own inner resources; and it had become an important symbol of effective denial and resistance to the grisly racial behemoth that continues to stalk the defenseless and the vulnerable. Moreover, the Black church resistance was quite literally "by the book." Nonviolent resistance to consummate evil, love for those who hated, abused, and oppressed. Reconciliation and forgiveness, dignity and mutual respect. That is always the corollary of human recognition. The established church was a major beneficiary of the saga of the Black church's confrontation with evil, for it provided a chance to re-learn what Christianity is all about. It also gave contemporary Christianity in America its first true Christian martyrs.

New visions of responsibility

Unfortunately, the easing of 300 years of segregation and other forms of racial abuse produced by the Black church and its allied institutions was not comprehensive. It fractured the scaffolding of American apartheid, but it barely touched the mean existence of many African Americans who remained anonymous entries in the statistics of social change. Some of the most prominent of the Black civil rights leaders continued their resistance on the local or national political scenes. Some went into professions or found placement at levels of corporate America normally closed to all people of African descent. A Black middle class suddenly found a grudging recognition. This new phenomenon is frequently used to "prove" that justice had been done, and that all those who truly want to improve their lives can do so through the "American system" of hard work and self denial.

The murder of Martin Luther King, Jr. and the death of Roy Wilkins, the NAACP's venerable leader, were highly disconcerting to many who were exhausted by more than two decades of constant stress in the trenches of civil rights. From the beginning, the Black church and the NAACP had maintained a singularly productive rapprochement which laid successful siege to both the laws and the practices which reduced Black Americans to non-entities. With Wilkins gone, the NAACP lapsed into a holding pattern with no apparent vision beyond reflection on yesterday. This scenario persisted until this world-respected civil rights organization was rescued by fresh new leadership addressed to a wide range of economic and other humanitarian interests that had escaped emphasis while the structural laws of segregation were being dismantled. In the meantime, there was no respite for the Black church. Coming of age meant among other things, the recognition of extended responsibility. If Black people were going to be truly free, they would have to accept the onus of freedom. If they wanted equal opportunity, they would have to prepare for it. Black youth needed counseling and direction. Black children needed better schools instead of academic holding pens. The Black poor and elderly needed housing. Most Blacks needed jobs and incentives (like promotional opportunities) to stay with them.

A key element in the strategy of Black containment was the system of public assistance called "welfare." Welfare provided unemployed Blacks with subsistence incomes, which often functioned to keep them out of the job market. It also discouraged many from any real effort to improve their education or to learn the skills that would theoretically make them employable, but with few prospects for employment. The vast majority of the Black unemployed were truly in need of assistance. However, because of the racial insularity of the American economic system, many considered welfare a kind of overdue "reparations." But the welfare system created jobs for a vast bureaucracy of mostly White administrators and managers, who begrudgingly doled out the tax dollars of all Americans, including those of the Black underclass they served in such contempt. The warehousing of the Black poor in designated areas of the inner city created a lucrative, captive clientele for White merchants and landlords. They could be readily identified statistically by political interests, and they could be conveniently monitored by "the law," all at a fraction of what it would cost to properly educate them and prepare them to compete in the normative pursuit of the American Dream like other Americans. The constant burden of such denigration and related stress spawned a fatalistic Black subculture with values at extreme polarity with conventional Black religion. Moreover, it took its toll on health and fitness. The suicide rate for young Blacks has increased by 300% in the last two decades. And the Black prison population claims about 25% of all African American males before they are 30 years old.

The new responsibilities of the Black church would seem to be obvious, and there are encouraging signs that significant and imaginative efforts are being made to meet the evolving needs of a people who have yet to experience their full quantum of the blessings of liberty. This is not a new role for the Black church. Rather it is a more comprehensive resumption of responsibilities the church identified itself with from its inception-looking after its own when every Black American had no place else to look for sympathies or succor. The Congress of National Black Churches, an ecumenical umbrella representing the major Black denominations, is a prominent case in point. The advent of desegregation was inevitably accompanied by the withdrawal or the further downgrading of public support for "special" programs for Blacks involving schools, health services, welfare, etc.

A key focus of continuing resistance by the Black church is the economic development of Black resources centered in the Church itself. Despite the fact that every Black person is no longer considered a de facto member of the Church, the Black church remains the one institution to which most African Americans feel some emotional ties and allegiance. Black religion is also the biggest "industry" by far owned and controlled by Black people. More than 90% of all African American philanthropy is funneled through the church, and its holdings in real property and furnishings suggest ideal investment potential. Many of the megachurches have invested in housing, parochial schools, recreation centers and similar projects to service their constituencies. A few have invested in business enterprises such as fast food franchises as a means of providing jobs as well as earning dollars for other non-profit services like drug counseling or health clinics. Still others have ventured into credit cards, insurance and other economic enterprises, which usually require large amounts of capital or credit, supplied by standard corporations as partners in economic development.

In the last 20 years, many Black churches were destroyed by arson– usually by "persons unknown." Most of the destruction was interpreted as the continuing manifestation of racial hatred still focused upon the most prominent symbol of African American protest. Millions of dollars went into the re-building of these institutions, not only as a necessary convenience to the community of faith, but also as a reminder to the world that the Black church would continue to be in the forefront of the fight for freedom and justice as a part of its Christian responsibility as long as the need is there. Ironically, the pride, determination, and self confident rejection of second class status by Black Christians has made them suddenly acceptable to the White church in ever-increasing numbers. Mainline White denominations have "apologized" for past oppressions and exclusions, compelling the conclusion that the surest way to open the door to inclusion is to successfully defy rejection on principle, but without losing sight of your own worth and integrity.

There seems to be a lesson implicit in the Black church experience we might well ponder in the continuing struggle for true freedom for the free.

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Successes and Challenge Relations Between African Americans and Latinos

By Rosa Davila and Nestor Rodriguez

Introduction

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complicate the dimensions of intergroup relations. The axes of intergroup relations, which now go far beyond the Black-White plane, include immigrant status, varying by legal condition, nationality, in addition to race and ethnicity, among other social identities.

Intergroup relations between African Americans and Latinos, United States and foreign born, stand out as a critical case because of the two groups' growing demographic dominance in major urban settings and because of the subsequent institutional encounters the two groups are expected to experience. The United States Censuses between the years 2000 and 2050 are expected to show a transposition of the African American and Latino populations: by the year 2000 African Americans will barely outnumber Latinos; by the year 2010 Latinos will barely outnumber African Americans; and by the year 2050 Latinos will outnumber African Americans by over 20 million (United States Bureau of the Census, 1995, table 12). In some urban areas with large concentrations of both populations, the projection for the year 2010 has already occurred. In Houston, for example, the number of Latinos surpassed the number of African Americans in the mid-1990s. Houston is a particularly instructive case, since it has the largest African American population of all southern cities.

The growth of the African American and Latino populations, especially in large urban areas, raises pressing questions about the nature of their intergroup relations in various arenas of social life and about strategies to lessen intergroup tension and promote accommodation. These issues are the focus of our paper. First, we describe existing conditions of convergence where the two groups jointly undertake common pursuits or at least maintain stable settings of coexistence. Secondly, we describe conditions of divergence (competition and conflict) between the two groups in various arenas and settings across the country. Thirdly, we describe promising community efforts to improve intergroup relations. Fourthly, we discuss the prospects for conditions of divergence and convergence under specific settings and issues and the effects of the White dominant group on relations between African Americans and Latinos. Finally, we offer several suggestions for building stronger community relations between African Americans and Latinos in the United States.

Where African Americans and Latinos come together

Although high levels of segregation persist for poor African American communities and for particular groups of Latinos (i.e., Puerto Rican communities), the transformation of the sociopolitical landscape over the last few decades has increasingly juxtaposed the day-to-day lives of African Americans and Latinos in the United States. The changing patterns of social intersection have been precipitated by the recent demographic shift in population composition noted above and by the increased "incorporation" of minorities into various social spheres brought about by civil rights legislation and affirmative action. This transformation has necessitated negotiation or renegotiation of "shared" social space and the development of innovative strategies for securing social benefits and political empowerment for African Americans and Latinos.

"Shared" social space

In many of the large urban centers such as Chicago, Los Angeles, and Houston, historically Latinos and African Americans have resided within clearly defined settlement boundaries. Sociologists term this condition of segregation the "American apartheid" (Massey and Denton 1993) and the American legacy of "residential apartheid" (Bullard et al. 1994). In the last two decades, however, these boundaries have become increasingly blurred. Large-scale immigration significantly altered the urban social landscapes in the 1980s. In large urban centers, Mexican and Central American immigrants settled outside the traditional established Latino barrios. They settled in and culturally restructured neighborhoods established by long-term African American residents and prédominantly Anglo sectors. South Central Los Angeles and Houston's Fourth and Fifth Wards and Gulfton area are prime examples of this social restructuring. In places like Miami and New York, Black Latinos from the Caribbean Islands, who in the United States find themselves exposed to both racial and ethnic discrimination, have in many instances chosen to settle in low-income African American communities. In other urban areas, the movement of African Americans and Mexican Americans across previously established residential boundaries has created new, diverse communities.

The transformation of these inner-city neighborhoods into multi-racial environs has often resulted in intergroup tensions and conflicts. The riots that took place in Los Angeles in April of 1992 after the not-guilty verdict in the case of the police officers who beat Rodney King are a dramatic example (MultiCultural Collaborative 1996; Ransford 1994). In his interpretation of the largest civil disturbance in recent United States history, Ransford states:

> *Many may have assumed that blacks were most involved given the fact that the Rodney King incident involved the beating of a black male. Recent statistics of 6,000 arrestees indicate that both blacks and Latinos*

> *were highly involved, reflecting the demographic changes ... These are important data. They indicate that the disorder was more a minority protest than a black-white confrontation. (Ransford 1994:106-7)*

According to the MultiCultural Collaborative's (MCC) report on responses to human relations conflict in the Los Angeles area, this incident and other recent events "demonstrate a reluctance to view America's racial dilemma through anything other than a Black/White paradigm. Despite the existence of large populations of Asian Pacific Americans and Latinos, opinions and views coming from these communities are all too often simply ignored" (MCC 1996:3).

Yet, some diverse multicultural communities have managed to negotiate a relatively non-conflictual co-existence. A recent study commissioned by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (Nyden et al. 1996) examined the emergence of stable, racially and ethnically diverse urban communities. Conducted in nine cities–Chicago, Denver, Houston, Memphis, Milwaukee, New York, Oakland, Philadelphia, and Seattle–the study analyzed the ways in which social, political, and economic factors facilitated or hindered the development of such communities. In the communities studied, two models of urban diversity were identified–"diversity by direction" and "diversity by circumstances" (Nyden et al. 1996:7-8). In communities which followed a process of diversity by direction, diversity-focused community organizations, social networks, and institutional accommodations were developed that "were intended to welcome the new minorities into the community, while attempting to ensure that existing White households did not panic and to minimize forces that might undermine community stability" (Nyden et al. 1996:7). In the second type of community, diversification has not been actively sought out, but has come about due to varied economic and social restructuring processes, including:

> *gentrification, a stalled or poor real estate market, transition resulting from the aging of a community, revitalization of areas adjacent to a community resulting in increased investment, establishment of a community as an immigrant port-of-entry, development of affordable housing projects, and a stand-off between affordable housing advocates and developers promoting middle-income housing projects. (Nyden et al. 1996:8)*

Although in these instances diversity did not result from any consciously driven effort of residents or community organizations, the study found a potential within these communities for development of an appreciation for diversity. The study also found that the communities that had "sustained diversity the longest were those that had become 'integrated' as an outgrowth of the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s" (Nyden et al. 1996:7).

The legacy of the Black and Chicano movements for civil rights and political empowerment in the 1960s and 1970s brought African Americans and Latinos together in educational, occupational, political, and other public institutional settings. Although the convergence of these two groups in these settings has not always been smooth and harmonious, the results have created potential opportunities for interaction, shifts in intergroup perceptions, and collaboration between African Americans and Latinos.

The influx of immigrant students into public school systems has added a new dimension to the nature of intergroup relations in these settings. The student populations of inner-city schools in many urban areas are composed primarily of minority students–African Americans and Latinos, both immigrant–and United States-born residents. A recent study, which examines promising school-based practices in intergroup relations, contends that the arrival of newcomer students into our schools "highlights the persistence of old tensions in American society that persist in the context of unrealized dreams of many of our citizens," rather than bringing new tensions into focus (Pompa 1994: 136).

African Americans and Mexican Americans have a long history of discrimination, oppression, and marginalization within the United States. Historical revisionism and the creation of university ethnic studies programs are part of the legacy of earlier movements that have afforded new frameworks for African Americans and Latinos to learn about themselves and each other. For example, in a recent course taught by one of the present authors, following a film presentation on the Chicano movement, several African American students commented on their newfound revelation of past Mexican American struggles. One student remarked, "I'm sitting here and my mind is blowing. I had no idea you guys went through the same thing we did." Another student stated that "I have lived with this group all my life, yet their struggle is a rather silent one." And a third student made the following comments: "The ethnocentrism of the American culture emphasizes the struggle between Blacks and Whites...[This] allows me to see Hispanics in a different light. Minorities have a common bond of past hurt, [so] that we will forever be linked together."

Common problems and priorities

The acknowledgment of shared interests, common problems and priorities (jobs and economy, education, crime, political empowerment, discriminatory housing practices, neighborhood revitalization, etc.) can motivate the construction of coalitions between African Americans and Latinos to address these issues. In a Houston study, Romo et al. (1994) found that the top three concerns for both African Americans and Latinos were 1) jobs and the economy, 2) education, and 3) crime. Additionally the issues of "leadership and community development" and the "well-being of family and children" were critical concerns of Latinos and African Americans, respectively. The study also found that in 1990 over half of African Americans (54.4%) and United States-born Latinos (54.9%) and close to three-fourths (72.6%) of Latino immigrants rented rather than owned their own housing. In comparison, only about one-third (36.6%) of Anglo residents were renters. Low income and discriminatory housing practices also place African Americans and Latinos at higher risk of poor housing conditions, e.g., physical dilapidation, lack of sanitation, infestations of roaches and rodents, etc. (de la Garza et al., 1993).

The experience of dual oppression of being a woman and a person of color in this country has brought African American and Latina feminists into greater affinity.

Two current major socio-political issues which are of concern to African Americans and Latinos are immigration reform and legislative challenges to affirmative action. Substantial division exists between and within these two communities in terms of how these issues are viewed, and significant differences also exist depending on whether community people or community leaders are polled (Klineberg 1996; Mindiola et al. 1996; Romo et al. 1994; The Washington Post et al. 1995). Still, in many urban settings, coalitions of African American and Latino organizations, leaders and activists have conducted press conferences, demonstrations, marches, and other advocacy activities in support of immigrant rights and affirmative action policies.

In response to recent anti-immigrant legislation, such as California's Proposition 187, many African Americans, including NAACP leaders, unionists, and the Reverend Jesse Jackson have participated in Latino led marches and demonstrations to protest the restriction of immigrant rights. Almost three decades prior, Rodolfo "Corky" Gonzales and Reís Lopez Tijerina, leaders in the Chicano Movement, were invited by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. to participate in the Poor People's March on Washington, D.C. Word of Dr. King's assassination reached the Latino contingencies en route to Washington. The March, which continued after Dr. King's murder, brought together African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans in collective social action. One cannot help but wonder, had Dr. King not been assassinated, how the socio-political destinies of African Americans and Latinos in this nation might have become intertwined, and what the present-day socio-political landscape might look like racially and ethnically.

In some instances African Americans and Latinos also have joined together to address issues of discrimination and social justice involving gender and media issues. Whereas each of these issues contains its own unique historical dynamics of oppression and disenfranchisement, there runs through them the common thread of "silencing." Ana Castillo, a Chicana writer, discusses the conditions of powerlessness and voicelessness:

> *Being placed at the bottom of society's social strata, we are dependent upon representatives who may or may not make authentic statements about our lives. But the statements are made only if our reality is perceived at all and considered noteworthy. (Castillo 1994:212)*

Many African American and Latina feminists, view the United States' women's movement as inexorably linked with White women of upper and middle-class status. Feminists of color, such as African American feminists of the Rio Combahee Collective, strongly rejected early White feminism's comparison of "sexism" with "racism" (Castillo 1994:33). However, whereas the early feminists of color had to educate White feminists on their political, cultural, and philosophical differences, the United States women's movement is "now incorporating a more expansive vision that includes the unique perceptions and experiences of all peoples heretofore excluded from the democratic promise of the United States" (Castillo 1994: 41).

The experience of dual oppression of being a woman and a person of color in this country has brought African American and Latina feminists into greater affinity. This is expressed in literary discourse and in supportive social actions. For example, in the fall of 1995, African American women in Houston and Los Angeles joined Latinas in public protest following the sexual assault by armed men of a Latina serving as the official United States representative to the Zapatista movement in Mexico. Incidentally, these events received very little coverage in local and national media.

In a national study of intergroup relations between new immigrants and established residents, Bach found that throughout several sites, the local media played a "surprisingly ambivalent, if not counterproductive, role in relations among newcomers and established residents" (1993:69).

A study by Romo et al. (1994) found that many African Americans and Latinos feel that the English-language media portray minorities negatively and do a poor job of covering minority issues. Various coalitions of African Americans and Latinos have concerned themselves with critical examination of the degree of incorporation and quality of portrayal of minorities in the media, as well as the media industry's "responsibility for its power to improve or incite racial conflict" (MultiCultural Collaborative 1996:13). For example, in July of 1994 Native American, Asian, African American, and Latino national journalists associations held a joint conference in Atlanta to address the need for greater racial and ethnic diversity in the news media industry.

What divides African Americans and Latinos

The history of United States intergroup relations contains many examples of the use of conflict as means through which institutional resources (e.g., jobs, political positions, housing, and school funding) were inequitably allocated among different groups in multi-racial/ethnic settings (Bayor, 1988). Social protest and legal challenges have removed the most prevalent de jure means of social exclusion at formal, institutional levels (such as in government, schools, and businesses); social conflict, however, continues to characterize some cases of intergroup relations at interpersonal and inter-community levels, at times creating significant social division (e.g., see Horton, 1995; Feagin and Sikes, 1994). To an extent, conflict characterizes some levels of relations between African Americans and Latinos: social conflict between African Americans and Latinos persists in settings where intergroup prejudices prevail, where ethnic politics are still perceived as a zero-sum game, where a group perceives its expected rise to power threatened, and where immigration dramatically increases a group's population growth.

In a 1935 pamphlet, "The Tragedy of the Puerto Ricans and the Colored Americans," author Frank Martinez blamed "prejudice, jealousy, pessimism, sectarianism and individualism" as a cause of political division among African American and Puerto Rican leaders in New York City (quoted in Bonilla, 1993). While African Americans and Latinos have enjoyed closer political alliance since Martinez's commentary (e.g., see Torres, 1995; Green and Wilson, 1992) significant degrees of intergroup prejudices still persist between the two groups. A statewide California poll in 1988, for example, showed that, like Whites, a majority of African American (67 percent) respondents worried about the changing makeup (more Latino and Asian) of the state's population (Johnson et al., 1996).

Surveys conducted in Los Angeles and Houston in the 1990s indicate that mutual intergroup stereotypes and preferences for social distance exists among segments of the African American and Latino populations. A survey conducted in Los Angeles in 1992 (Bobo, Zubrinsky, Johnson, and Oliver, 1995) found that when Latinos were asked to rate African Americans and Latinos across several scales, almost a third of Latinos rated African Americans to be less intelligent and over half rated African Americans to be more welfare-dependent and harder to get along with. On the other hand, almost a third of African Americans viewed Latinos to be less intelligent than African Americans and about a fourth of African Americans viewed Latinos to be more welfare dependent and harder to get along with.

A survey conducted in Houston in 1996 (Mindiola et al., 1996) found that when Latinos were asked to describe African Americans, 38 percent of the words given by the United States-born Latino respondents were negative (stereotypical) and 47 percent of the words given by foreign-born Latinos were negative. On the other hand, 25 percent of the words used by African Americans to describe Latinos were negative. While a large majority of African Americans and Latinos stated they did not mind working or residing next to a member of the other group, the level of expressed social distance grew sharply when it concerned their children. Only about six out of every 10 African American and Latino respondents were willing to send their children to a school that was predominantly composed of children of the other group. Social distance increased further among both groups when respondents were asked if they approved of their children marrying a member of the other group, with Latinos expressing the largest social distance. According to some social analysts, the country's increasing racial and ethnic heterogeneity will only produce more intergroup intolerance (Tilove, 1996:2).

Institutional power and intergroup tension

Across several United States urban areas, many African American and Latino leaders perceive that their communities are contending against each other for space and influence in institutional arenas. Some African American leaders believe that Latinos undeservingly derive benefits from accomplishments produced by years of Black struggles, while some Latino leaders feel that African Americans receive preferential treatment from government programs. According to these views, the social mobility of one group is made at the expense of the other group. Yet, the point of reference is not the same. For African Americans, gaining city council and school board seats and municipal jobs and contracts is obtaining something that was long deserved but unjustly denied; for Latinos, obtaining similar institutional mobility is what should be equitably expected given the prominent growth of their Latino population.

Strife between African Americans and Latinos in Oakland, California exemplifies the perceived intergroup contention. A lawsuit filed in 1996 on behalf of Asians and Latinos contends that the city was planning employment and contracting goals to favor Blacks at the expense of Asians and Latinos. According to the leader of the Latino city employee's organization, "Oakland is a multicultural city. It just got stuck thinking it was a black city" (Tilove, 1996:6). For some African American leaders, the lawsuit was an act of intergroup war. According to the head of the Oakland NAACP, the lawsuit "was a line drawn in the sand." "If that is the way it's going to be, let's get it on," was the NAACP leader's response (Tilove, 1996:9).

According to some social analysts, the country's increasing racial and ethnic heterogeneity will only produce more intergroup intolerance.

In Houston and Dallas heated conflict over school system control characterized relations between African Americans and Latinos during part of the 1990s as Latinos became the largest student population of both school districts. In Houston, Chicano educational activists responded heatedly after a White superintendent was replaced with an African American school board member without a formal search for a new candidate, a process that Latinos hoped would consider Latino candidates. When the Latino activists demonstrated vigorously and attempted to block the appointment of the African American superintendent through a court challenge, a major African American leader in the city publicly characterized the Latino activists' actions as a "political lynching."

In Dallas the roles were reversed. When a school board selected a Mexican American woman to head the areas' largest school system, African leaders and New Black Panther members stormed out of the board meeting and complained bitterly of injustice at the hands of Latinos. The head of the Dallas NAACP described Latinos as "vultures" who "feast on the results of our efforts" (Tilove, 1996:7). One Dallas Latino leader offered a Latino perspective of the conflict: "The thief judges by his own standards. They [Blacks] have excluded us, and they think we will exclude them" (Tilove, 1996:7).

Educational conflict between African Americans and Latinos concerns more than just who is selected to lead a school system. The conflict also involves the distribution of educational resources. Some African American leaders see new bilingual educational programs and new school buildings in fast-growing Latino areas as spending made at the expense of hard-won programs for Black students (Guevara, 1996:30). Needless to say, conflict between African American and Latino leaders can affect relations between the student populations of both communities.

Ethnic politics and intergroup division

In their initial incorporation into the United States political system, all ethnic groups have pursued the model of ethnic politics (Feagin and Feagin, 1993). According to this model, political goals are defined and pursued first, and sometimes only, from the perspective of what benefits one's group. This served as an especially useful model for the political incorporation of racial and ethnic minority groups in the days when Whites acted to maintain social privileges through the political exclusion of other groups. Racial and ethnic minorities slowly made political advances through internal unity and hard-nosed intergroup negotiations characteristic of ethnic politics. While the Rainbow Coalition brought a new intergroup political model in the mid-1980s, its stage was the national political arena, not the sometimes rough-and-tumble local settings of city, county, and school politics.

The comments of a Mexican American political strategist in Houston's 1991 mayoral race illustrated the working of the ethnic model of political contention. A White candidate faced a Black opponent in a runoff election in which both enjoyed strong voter support from Whites and Blacks, respectively. It was an opportunity for the smaller group of Latino voters (mainly Mexican Americans) to demonstrate the importance of their electoral power. The Latino strategist, who helped deliver over 70 percent of the Latino vote to the victorious White candidate, commented as follows on a political power strategy for the growing Latino population in the Houston area:

Right after the mayoral election, someone called me and said we [Latinos] should coalesce with Blacks. I said that the Arabs are sitting down with Israel now

> *because Israel kicks their ass. We need to kick some ass. It's important we start demonstrating power, and let people come to us, not us to them. (Gurwitt, 1993:36)*

While a Mexican American state representative openly endorsed the Black candidate, other established Latino leaders celebrated his defeat. Far from exemplifying the solidarity value of the Rainbow Coalition, the Latino leaders viewed the mayoral race as a struggle between Blacks and Latinos to determine who would gain the spoils of appointments made by the mayor for the city government's vast bureaucracy and commissioned bodies. Undoubtedly, many African American leaders also shared this perception of Black-versus-Brown ethnic politics.

Voting for a member of one's racial or ethnic group alone is not the defining characteristic of the model of divisive ethnic politics. What truly marks this political ideology is the definition of the political situation. The key belief is that the political mobility of one's group can only be achieved through the defeat of other groups or through intergroup negotiations where the interests of one's group are the highest priority - not some universal value of political equity. It is also important to understand that the leaders of the ethnic model of divisive politics engage in a variety of racial or ethnic communication to portray their group as threatened by opponents with insidious intentions. Political warfare is given as the only means of survival.

Latino immigration's impact on intergroup relations

Since the early 1980s the United States has experienced an unprecedented immigration of people from Latin America. The majority of these immigrants come from Mexican urban and rural communities and from the various Central American countries. While United States employers have recruited Mexican migrant labor since the early 1900s, the volume, diversity and extra-legal self-organization for the new Latino immigration represents a new chapter in the country's immigration history.

Needless to say, the settlement and labor market participation of Latino newcomers is seen by many as a direct threat to the stability of African American working-class communities, a threat particularly for lower-income Black families (e.g., see Johnson et al., 1996; Briggs, 1992). Latino immigrant workers are seen as economic competitors, not only for the low skill, low-paying jobs they take, but also for the housing and social welfare services they use. Moreover, Latino immigrant culture, e.g., the use of Spanish, also is seen as a threat to African American traditions. Local and national surveys show that large proportions of African Americans see immigration as a disadvantage rather than an asset for their communities (Johnson et al., 1996; Mindiola et al., 1996).

According to the description by Johnson et al. (1996), Compton, California, a suburb of Los Angeles, illustrates the immigration-induced tension between African American and Latinos in the mid-1990s. In the 1970s Compton became the largest urban setting west of the Mississippi where African Americans, "refugees from the Jim Crow South," gained political dominance. Latino immigration since the 1980s transformed Compton into what is now considered to be a Latino-majority city. The attraction of landlords to multi-income earning Latino families and the immigrants' use of public services has created suspicion and resentment toward Latino residents among some of the city's Black population. Some African Americans consider immigrants using public social services as "free-riders," unduly drawing benefits from social programs gained by Black struggles. When Latinos complain of being left out of municipal jobs, Black leaders respond with characterizations of Latino activists as "outside agitators." In Compton schools, Latino students complain of a "misguided" Africa-centered education that does little to enhance Latino cultural awareness, while many Black administrators and teachers oppose bilingual education, fearing it as a threat to their jobs (Johnson et al., 1996).

A Compton resident's video taping of a Black police officer beating a 17 year old Latino youth on July 29, 1995, increased tensions between African Americans and Latinos, though many in the African American community joined the Latino protests. Latinos compared what happened to the Latino youth to the beating of Rodney King by White officers of the Los Angeles Police Department and depicted the incident as the product of discriminatory system in which Blacks keep Latinos out of public service jobs. "This is racism perpetuated by one minority group against another," a Latino activist charged. Reflecting on Compton's setting of Black political empowerment and recent Black-Brown tensions, an African American leader in the Los Angeles chapter of the NAACP commented, "The Latino community wants to have their cake and eat it, too, and Black people are not having it" (Johnson et al. 1996:71).

Promising community-based efforts in intergroup relations

The complexity of intergroup relations between African Americans and Latinos presents a serious challenge for United States communities. However, recent innovative, intergroup organizational and grass-roots efforts in some United States communities have created opportunities and mechanisms for African Americans and Latinos to come together in common pursuit to develop effective coalitions that serve the interests of both groups.

Three major national projects focusing on the relationships between new immigrants and established residents, i.e., the Ford Foundation's "Changing Relations Project," The National Immigration Forum's "Community Innovations Project," and "Looking for America," a project of the National Coalition of Advocates for Students, have provided case studies of such efforts taking place in various urban centers across the nation. Also, in at least two cities, Los Angeles and Houston, diverse groups of community leaders have established collaborative human relations coalitions. The following are a sample of some of the more promising community-based intergroup efforts among African Americans and Latinos.

In Chicago, African American and Latino parents and community leaders formed the first neighborhood-based Latino/African American coalition, the Lawndale Coalition, to address violent incidents between African American and Latino youth, develop better intergroup understanding, and foster positive interrelationships by addressing common community concerns. In the Pilsen neighborhood, the Multicultural Family Literacy Program brings African American and Latina women together to discuss women's issues and community concerns. And in the Uptown/Edgewater district, one of the most diverse neighborhoods in the country, the Organization of the Northeast (ONE), has united a variety of organizations, including ethnic and community organizations, and public institutions such as banks and schools, to collectively promote ethnic and economic diversity, bring new resources into the area, shape public policy positions, and develop grass-roots community interactions.

Los Angeles also has developed many successful African American and Latino collaboratives. Among these is the New Economics for Women Program, an innovative housing development for a diverse group of African American, Latino, and Asian female-headed families. This coalition of Latinos and African Americans obtained the City Council's approval of legalized street vending districts. Another coalition composed of members of a Latino organization, the Watts/Century Latino Organization, and two African American organizations, Cross Colors Foundation, and the NAACP, joined forces to address issues of crime, youth gangs, and intergroup relations in the Watts neighborhood. A coalition of African Americans and Latinos in South Central formed the Campaign to Rebuild South Central Without Problem Liquor Stores.

In Washington D.C., the Washington Inner-city Self-Help Coalition (WISH) and the Tenants and Workers Support Committee (TWSC) bring African American, Central American, and African tenants groups together to advocate for decent, affordable housing. In New York, the Central Brooklyn Federal Credit Union, established by African American, Caribbean and African newcomers, has provided new resources for economic and housing development in the Crown Heights. And in several United States cities, the Looking for America project has identified promising school-based practices in intergroup relations.

The MCC and the Inter-Ethnic Forum of Houston (IEF) are two rather unique, proactive approaches to improving intergroup relations and facilitating intergroup organizing. Following the 1992 Los Angeles riots, leaders from diverse communities founded the MCC, a coalition of organizations that set out to develop more effective approaches to human relations conflict, organizational collaboration, and grassroots support for such efforts. Toward this end, the MCC began by assessing the existing "human relations infrastructure" in the Los Angeles area and making recommendations about what was needed to secure social and economic justice. In a report of their findings and recommendations, the MCC leaders note that:

> *the time has come to move beyond individual commitment to principles of inter-ethnic cooperation. Without bridging the gap between institutions, established leadership, civic organizations and grassroots communities, the prospect of improving relations in the city is unlikely. (MCC 1996:4)*

In Houston, the IEF evolved from the Houston Evaluation of Community Priorities project which assessed common needs and priorities among Houston's diverse racial/ethnic communities. IEF was formed to address identified needs and priorities through intergroup collaboration. Since its inception in the fall of 1995, IEF's activities include the convening of several forums on social issues which have brought together diverse sectors of the community, facilitation of a forum of African American and Latino researchers to discuss the potential benefits of forging a common research agenda, and development of a Youth Summit on racism.

Discussion

As described in the sections above, conditions of both intergroup cooperation and division characterize relations between African American and Latinos in areas where the two groups reside jointly. In large urban centers like New York, Los Angeles, and Houston, the potential for intergroup harmony between the two groups thus exists alongside the potential for intergroup conflict. Which potential reaches a higher level of actualization depends on the specific locality, issue, and on the influences of dominant group members.

Variation in intergroup relations by locality

While settings with African American and Latino residents contain instances of both intergroup collaboration and conflict, no two settings are identical. Each is colored by its unique social history of economic change, institutional development, and community growth. And each of these dimensions, in turn, varies by the degree to which they are affected more by impersonal structural forces (e.g., global market trends) or by the human agency of ordinary people and their leaders.

In the decade of the 1980s, massive Latino immigration during the decline of California's cold war-driven industries may have stressed intergroup relations between Latinos and other groups in that state in ways that did not materialize in other settings. For example, when immigration began to dramatically increase the Latino population and pressure African Americans in the Los Angeles suburb of Compton in the late 1980s, in New York City Latinos in large numbers supported the Black mayoral candidate, helping him become the city's first African American mayor. While New York State faced greater economic stress, i.e., unemployment and poverty, than California in the late 1980s (United States Bureau of the Census, 1993), a different set of historical circumstances propelled intergroup relations in New York City than in California's metropolitan areas.

In his study of African American and Puerto Ricans in New York City, Andres Torres (1995) refers to "mosaic" relations as the outcome of an evolving mutual understanding of interdependence. Torres comments about relations between African Americans and Latinos in New York City as follows:

> *[S]ince the 1950s, Blacks and Hispanics– particularly Puerto Ricans– have been drawn together into an alliance of survival. From the early years of postwar migration through the War on Poverty of the 1960s and succeeding years of backlash and insurgency, the two groups saw their fortunes as mutually linked.*

Yet, in a different setting, Miami, where Cuban Americans are the dominant Latino population, African American-Latino relations only became further strained when Cuban American leaders slighted Nelson Mandela's visit because of his support for the Cuban government. All specific cases demonstrate the varying nature of relations between Blacks and Latinos and how the particular exigencies of each setting may act differently from circumstances in other settings to affect the intergroup courses of the two groups.

Variation in intergroup relations by issue

Variation of relations between African Americans and Latinos by locality sometimes reflects individual issues that are prominent in different areas. Some issues bring the two groups together, while other issues drive them apart. For example, the Miami area case indicates that in that setting, international relations affect Black-Latino relations more than in other settings. In addition to the social-class divide between many Cuban Americans and Blacks in the Miami area, Cuban anti-communists will remain distant from African Americans who embrace leaders of third world liberation movements. African Americans on the other hand may be distrustful of Cuban Americans for these Latinos' support of the Republican Party.

While international relations lose saliency for Black-Latino relations outside the Miami area, the issue of school control is one issue that is fairly constant across major settings where both groups reside. In many areas, African Americans feel threatened by a growing Latino presence in school systems, and, in turn, the latter feel blocked by what they perceive to be intransigent Blacks. What is it about school issues that produces tension and hostilities across major urban settings in ways that health care, housing or other social issues do not?

Schools differ in two important ways from other core institutions. They have the principal responsibility for the socialization of children, and they have a permanent physical presence in a neighborhood. The social and cultural representation of neighborhood schools is central to a community's identity. For African Americans educational battles for school desegregation and control were some of the hardest fought in the struggle for racial equality (Feagin and Feagin, 1993). The battles involved more than allowing Black children to attend schools with White children. In many major cities, the struggles also involved a desegregation of faculty and administration (sometimes, as in Atlanta, without seeking a racial balance school plan). Having Black trustees, administrators, and teachers made community control of schools more complete for African Americans.

Community control is also central to the educational struggles of Latinos but from a different perspective. While many Latino areas experienced a de facto version of school segregation, in numerous major cities large numbers of Latino students have immigrant parents who did not experience educational exclusion in the United States. For new immigrant parents and their children, educational issues do not evolve predominantly from an historical experience of institutional exclusion, but rather from the goal of having one's culture (language and ethnic subculture) equally valued in schools.

Hence, while African Americans and Latinos share the goal of educational equality, they come at it from different perspectives. African Americans see issues of school control from the perspective of civil rights struggles, while many Latinos see educational issues more from the perspective of cultural pluralism. The fact that school issues directly affect a community's youth and that schools are also major employers makes these issues all the more sensitive and volatile.

While African Americans and Latinos share the goal of educational equity, they come at it from different perspectives.

Influences of the dominant group

It is important to put cases of conflict between African Americans and Latinos into perspective. As earlier examples illustrate, conflict between the two groups is generated mainly by competition for space in the mainstream institutional sector. That is, conflict and tension evolve mainly from heated competition, rather than from a long history of intergroup racial conflict. Undoubtedly many African Americans and Latinos have long-held mutual prejudices, but neither group evolved and developed in the United States through systematic exploitation of the other. African Americans never subordinated Latinos, and Latinos never subjugated Blacks. While the two groups may occasionally lapse into intense rivalry, they have no history between them of the type of social oppression that both groups experienced at the hands of Whites.

The quality of relations between African Americans and Latinos is not completely of their own making. Historically, actions of the White dominant group have affected relations between African Americans and Latinos. Through their control of core social institutions, Whites have affected attitudes and behaviors between Blacks and Latinos. Institutional examples are bountiful. When Whites controlled school systems and failed to implement educational programs to increase mutual intergroup understanding, they contributed to the maintenance of social distance between African Americans and Latinos, de jure and de facto segregative practices being extreme policies that kept both groups physically apart. This applies even to colleges and universities, settings where predominant White trustees, administrators, and faculty often only half-heartedly support ethnic studies programs.

In the economy, the actions of White employers have often pitted African American and Latino workers against each other. The importation of Mexican and Caribbean contract labor during lengthy time spans in the twentieth century contributed greatly to the development of segmented labor markets that keep African American and Latino workers apart (Rodriguez, 1995). In some areas of the United States, the use of low-wage undocumented Latino labor is a present-day continuation of this experience. In the economy's housing sector, practices of institutional discrimination kept African Americans and Latinos apart when the former faced more rigorous requirements for mortgage loans or for rental housing. Some of these discriminatory actions work at subtle levels. For example, when one of the present authors was looking for a house to buy in Houston in the mid-1980s, he asked a White realtor if he ever sold homes to Blacks in a fashionable middle-income neighborhood near the city's downtown. The realtor responded that "Blacks don't hold down a job long enough to be able to pay a mortgage."

When one of the present authors later interviewed White managers in apartment complexes for a Houston housing study, he found that some managers disqualified potential Black tenants through rigorous credit record checks, which apparently were not conducted with Whites or higher-income Latinos. According to the apartment managers, allowing Black tenants into their apartment complexes would "scare away" White middle class tenants. In some cases, Black tenants were rented units mostly in the back sections of apartment complexes to reduce their visibility to prospective White tenants.

The nature of United States race relations has shifted away from the widespread blatant racist practices of earlier times. In many settings, Whites, and other non-African American or Latino groups have become equal partners in efforts to promote intergroup equality and harmony. This has occurred in some cases because persons sincerely have internalized the values of social justice and equity; in other cases it has occurred because the alternative of a strife-ridden society would make the setting for continuing economic development untenable. Today, the latter motivation undoubtedly influences the decisions of many major corporations to actively support community collaboratives seeking greater intergroup understanding, such as between African Americans and Latinos. As African Americans and Latinos increasingly dominate the urban settings of major businesses, the quality of social relations between the two groups will have greater significance for maintaining a stable and productive business environment.

Recommendations for strategies to construct sturdier intergroup bridges

Relations between African Americans and Latinos are multi-dimensional, vary by locality and over time, and are influenced by a host of factors. Attempts to build intergroup bridges between the two groups, whether at a neighborhood, city, or national level, must carefully examine these factors and be guided by a clear understanding of the particular social worlds of the groups involved.

In developing recommended strategies for the construction of sturdier bridges between the African American and Latino communities, we relied heavily on the knowledge and experience obtained from the previously mentioned community-based efforts in intergroup relations. The following list of recommendations is not meant to be exhaustive. As Goode and Schneider (1994:260) noted, "developing a multicultural community is an ongoing, evolving process that will continually change as the many factors influencing the social structure continue to evolve."

> *Both structural inequality and intergroup perceptions must be addressed in order to relieve the intergroup tensions...*

Both structural inequality and intergroup perceptions must be addressed in order to relieve the intergroup tensions that exist among African Americans and Latinos. Human relations action strategies need to move beyond what Goode and Schneider (1994) term "culture at a distance" approaches such as diversity workshops and events celebrating cultural pluralism. These strategies tend to ignore the structural bases for conflict, the social and economic causes of intergroup and racial conflicts. According to Noel (1968), racial stratification occurs as a result of three primary conditions: ethnocentrism, competition for resources, and differential power. Furthermore, identity components of race, ethnicity, gender and class are as much a result of socialization processes and political-historical constructions as they are of subgroup membership.

Strategies should be inclusive, representative of the racial, ethnic, and linguistic diversity within the particular community of context and should ensure cooperative, equal-status participation for all groups.

As the work of the MCC and others has shown, "forming a viable multiracial alliance means steadfast commitment to the principles of equity, mutual respect, cultural integrity, and democratic values" (MCC 1996:4). This entails moving beyond the Black/White paradigm of race relations, giving voice to Latinos and other groups historically excluded from the democratic promise of this nation, accommodation of linguistic, cultural, and class differences, incorporation of immigrant newcomers, and respect for and appreciation of diversity.

Despite differences in ideologies, based on diverse histories, African Americans and Latinos share many common goals and issues. Strategies should focus on bringing these two groups together on an ongoing basis to address specific social conditions (e.g., jobs and economy, education, crime).

Historically, neither government nor the private sector have acted sufficiently to alleviate adverse social conditions experienced by many groups in the nation. Their lack of action necessitates a need for local intergroup initiatives that address community issues. Projects involving common community priorities are more likely to actively engage participants from diverse groups than some global construct such as "peaceful co-existence." The development of collaborative approaches require long-term, sustained efforts on the part of all those involved.

Political coalitions between African Americans and Latinos require innovative leadership and supportive organizations which can envision and enact a new type of politics stressing racial/ethnic collaboration rather than competition.

As a result of demographic transformation, our urban centers are experiencing and will continue to experience a shift in racial/ethnic make-up, so that the definitions of "minority" and "majority" are no longer viable. With the prospect of increasingly diminishing public resources, ethnic politics that perpetuate the notion of a "zero-sum game," the guarantee of privilege for one group must give way to greater intergroup collaboration to ensure social benefits and empowerment for all groups. Shared agendas and persistent negotiative frameworks must guide and sustain these alliances when particular conflicts of interests arise.

Strategies to improve relations between African Americans and Latinos must also target youth and schools where much of the intergroup tension and conflict in this country is being played out.

African American and Latino youth constitute the majority of student populations in many of the urban public school systems. The conditions of prejudice and violence present in communities are also reflected in our public schools and greatly affect the lives of our youth. School-based efforts to promote intergroup communication, cooperation, and appreciation are essential to our nation's future. Rather than engaging in competitive struggles for control and allocation of resources in school systems, African American and Latino leaders must collaborate to ensure benefits for all students.

There is a need to increase the development of community conflict resolution strategies involving coordinated efforts between municipal institutions, the African American and Latino communities, and their grass-roots organizations.

In many instances, arbitration of racial and intergroup conflict is mediated through law enforcement interventions and the legal system. The study conducted by the MCC found that comparatively little funding issued from either the private or public sectors for the development of community-based mechanisms to "peacefully resolve inter-ethnic conflicts or cooperatively address the conditions at the root of such conflicts" (MCC 1996:8). Effective intergroup dispute resolution and conflict mediation strategies require collaborative efforts of community leadership, institutions, and civic and grassroots organizations. These efforts should not solely be crisis-driven, but should proactively address social and economic conditions which underlie many intergroup conflicts.

Efforts should focus on monitoring and improving the quality of media coverage of intergroup relations and minority communities and their interests. The media play a key role in shaping public understanding and reactions regarding diverse groups in the community, in improving or inciting inter-ethnic tensions. In many instances, the media have framed the debate on "cutting edge issues" which affect African Americans and Latinos, i.e., affirmative action, welfare reform, immigration, and crime (MCC 1996:89). Many African Americans and Latinos feel that the mainstream media portray minorities negatively and pay little or not attention to their needs or concerns. Increased incorporation of African American and Latinos in the news media industry is a major step toward improved media coverage of these two communities and their issues.

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A Framework for Good Intergroup Relations in the United States: The African American and Latino Case

By *Antonia Hernandez*

Southern California today mirrors the America of tomorrow. Its ethnic diversity is truly amazing. Every corner of the world is represented. Its burgeoning multicultural and polyglot population positions this metropolis as a leader in anticipating the global technological, economic changes of the 21st century. Caught in the transition from the old to the new, California struggles with an age-old American problem, race relations, grappling to recast and redefine itself and American society.

In recent times, California has been at the center of some of the most contentious race questions in America. Initiatives dealing with language, immigration, and affirmative action are but a few of the issues that have arisen as Americans haphazardly continue the dialogue of who is an American. Efforts to expand the dialogue from a Black-White paradigm to a more inclusive and current multicultural discussion have been welcomed by some, but more often than not, rejected for fear that expanding the debate will divert the discussion away from addressing the plight of Black Americans. As a Latina who has spent the last 25 years in the national civil rights struggle, my experiences, observations and perspectives offer a more inclusive discussion on race relations in America.

In thinking about race relations in America, one must first address certain historical misperceptions. America has always been a multicultural nation. There are the American Indians who called America their home long before the Northern Europeans arrived; then there were the Spaniards, the Mexicans, and the French who occupied and exerted their influence on the emerging American experience. Yet to the European immigrant, these communities were not incorporated or accepted because none were White and of Northern European origin. Since Europeans came to America, discrimination has taken different forms and was inflicted on minority groups in different ways. The African Americans were brought as slaves

348

the Native Indian community was conquered and abandoned; the Chinese were brought over to build the railroads; and the Mexican American community was incorporated through conquest. The common thread that all these communities share is that none were White nor considered truly American. Thus it was acceptable to discriminate and to distinguish. This resulted in the creation of different classes of Americans. Since then, it has taken a Civil War and 100 years for this country to begin in earnest to attempt to deal with race relations in America. Real progress is a recent development, most occurring in the last 40 years.

> *As we move into the 21st century, the discussion of race is still premised on old misconceptions and paradigms.*

The notion that the United States is a country of immigrants and that it is inclusive is premised on the belief that there were no existing settlers in the land worthy or equal to the European immigrants, who shared a common set of values and to some degree a common language. Within this definition of America, White Americans see themselves as inclusive. Even when we look at American history text books, we see that history begins with the pilgrims landing on Plymouth Rock. All history prior to the arrival of the English settlers is ignored. The immigrants who were accepted were those who came from certain parts of the world and were Caucasian, and, if, you accepted the established American ideal, you were allowed into the melting pot. Thus, the current debate of race, immigration, and language is laced with fears that we are losing the established American way of life and that things are changing for the worst. The increase in Asians, Latinos, and other immigrants that do not resemble past waves of immigrants, who were more European and Caucasian, is at the heart of the debate today.

As we seek to share our history and experience with other countries with similar race issues, we need to share the totality of the American experience, for I believe that we have a great deal to share, and, notwithstanding our painful history, we have made progress. There is no other place on earth where every corner of the world is represented, all seeking the American ideal, and finding commonalities that transcend race and ethnicity.

As we move into the 21st century, the discussion of race is still premised on old misconceptions and paradigms. Yes, we must acknowledge the history of slavery, the Civil War and the treatment of Blacks throughout American history, but the discussion must not stop there. The discussion must incorporate the current and past diversity of this country. For to understand America, we must acknowledge and understand all of the parts that have made this country unique and strive to reach the ideal of a society in which all are bound by the American experience. Race, ethnicity, and language have played important roles in forming the American experience. One cannot have a discussion about race and discrimination without understanding where we have been.

In this paper I will attempt to expand the race debate by providing a perspective that sees race, gender and ethnicity differently. To move the discussion beyond race, I will expand on the Latino experience. This experience is rich and varied. To succeed in America, Latinos have had to negotiate co-existence with the dominant society, as well as with the African American community, and other ethnic groups. I will then explore ways in which we can move the debate forward and offer possible solutions to improving race relations in America.

Multiculturalism and mestizaje

While America is moving toward and attempting to understand the concept of multiculturalism and *mestizaje*,[1] Latinos have been living as mestizos for centuries. There are about 27 million Latinos in the United States today. Of that total, Mexican Americans make up about 60 percent of the population or about 13 million people. The great majority of Mexican Americans live in the Southwest: in my home state of California, in Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico and Texas. A percentage of Mexican Americans trace their origins to ancestors who occupied the Southwest before the pilgrims landed in New England or they most certainly arrived before the 1846 US-Mexican war. Like most Latinos, these individuals are intensely proud of their lineage and refer to themselves generally as Latino/a, Chicano/a, or simply Mexican American.

The history of Mexican Americans consists of interesting contrasts, beginning with the early migrations of Asiatic man to the Western Hemisphere; the development of Indian civilizations in MesoAmerica; their defeat by Spanish conquistadors and the blending of the Indian and Spanish cultures to form the Mexican; early expansion to what we know today as the Southwest; and Mexico's independence from Spain in the early 19th century. And although Mexicans did not experience as much mixing with the African slaves as did Cubans and Puerto Ricans in the Caribbean, there are still some traces of Black influence in Mexico. This mix of racial backgrounds outlines why Latinos cannot categorize themselves as Black, White, or Asian. In reality we are an ethnic group created of all three.

Following its independence from Spain in 1810, Mexico enjoyed its freedom for a short time but was soon embroiled in a war with the United States. The war ended with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, when Mexico lost half her territory to her neighbor to the north. This ceding of territories, which included California, Texas, Arizona, New Mexico and parts of Utah, set the basic framework for contemporary race relations and racial antagonisms in the Southwest. Just as African Americans are viewed as less American because their history is based on slavery, Latinos are seen as less American because we are viewed as a conquered people.

Like Latinos, many African Americans are of a "mixed" racial makeup. They also come from a diverse historical background evident in the light skinned, green-eyed individuals in contrast to the Black skin and coal-Black eyes of others found within the Black race. Society has not permitted African Americans to acknowledge their mixed heritage. America's long history includes the race-mixing that took place when slaveholders impregnated slaves. Anyone with any African ancestry has been labeled Black and treated in a discriminatory manner. Unfortunately, within the African American community, there is still some resentment around the issue of skin color and better treatment of lighter skinned African Americans traceable back to slavery when the lighter skinned slaves worked indoors in the master's house, while the darker skinned slaves worked outdoors under the worst conditions.

The mixing of races is even more relevant when we begin to look at the number of interracial marriages in the country. As a result of the nation's diverse population, it is natural for there to be more contact between races leading to more opportunities for interracial relationships. As a result of interracial marriages we are seeing a growing population of children of mixed backgrounds. We are not only seeing ethnic minorities getting married to Whites, but also we are increasingly seeing people of different ethnic minorities marrying another person of an ethnic minority. In a recent article in U.S. News Magazine, Jerelyn Eddings described this growing phenomena, "The number of mixed marriages has grown from 15,000 in the 1960s to more than 1 million in 1990 - and the number of racially mixed children is now roughly 2 million."

A question of color

Within the Latino and African American communities, we have grown accustomed to hearing and seeing what is considered the acceptable color scheme in our society. We have not necessarily accepted that scheme, but we have, at times, tried to emulate it. Those with lighter skin and perhaps the lighter hair are generally accepted as being prettier or more attractive, not only by general society but also by individuals within our own groups. Latinos have words in Spanish which categorize these individuals based on skin, hair and eye color: "hueroz" for those on the light side, "moreno" for those who are darker skinned, and "prieto" for those who are darker still. It is not uncommon for children to grow up with the nickname that corresponds with their coloring and, in a society which bases so many judgments on color, this raises questions about how such attitudes affect the opportunities made available to individuals who do not fit the acceptable color scheme. In a society where blonde hair and blue eyes are the accepted standards and definition of an American, Latinos and African Americans are excluded.

Not only does skin color play an important role in what is socially accepted, but even more importantly, it dictates upward social mobility. We know that in most societies, and within the various ethnic subgroups, the color of one's skin has a great deal to do with the acceptance levels of an individual. The Cuban American community has been evidence of the role skin color plays in social and economic stratification. In 1959, when Fidel Castro took control of Cuba, the population most affected was the Cuban elite which fled Cuba by the masses. That influx of political refugees were mostly upper middle class and Caucasian. This demonstrated that in Cuba the wealthier class was White, while the poorer masses were mulatto and Black.

The Americans' acceptance of the whiter Cubans also illustrated how race determines social acceptability and upward mobility. Making Miami, Florida their number one destination, the wealthy Caucasian Cubans were welcomed by the American government. Social programs were created to help them with their transition into this new country. Twice-daily flights from Miami to Cuba brought hundreds of thousands of Cuban immigrants to Miami's shores. In 1992, Lisando Perez wrote in the book, Miami Now:

[redacted]

> *The United States government facilitated their entry by granting them refugee status, allowing them to enter without the restrictions imposed on most other nationality groups. This favored treatment continued until shortly after the termination the 1980 boatlift.*

By the 1970s, the number of Cubans immigrating reduced dramatically, but by 1980 the pressures for emigration forced the Cuban government to open a port for unrestricted emigration. The name of the port was Mariel. The Mariel boatlift changed the perception Americans had of Cubans. Lisando Perez also described the media's coverage of the incident as a contributing factor to the negative perception:

> *Media coverage of the sudden arrival in Miami in the spring of 1980 of tens of thousands of Cubans (some of them with criminal backgrounds or mental health problems) as a result of the Mariel boatlift undoubtedly tarnished the public image of what might otherwise have been considered the "model minority."*

The majority of the Cubans known as Marielitos, that arrived with the Mariel boatlift, were no longer Caucasian. Instead, they were Black and mulatto. It is my belief that race was a key factor to explain why Americans rejected this new population of Cubans, the same way they had refused to give Haitians political asylum in 1964 when they were welcoming the Caucasian Cubans. This discriminatory situation helped build bridges between the Latino and African American communities. The African American community saw the discriminatory impacts of immigration laws through the Haitians and the treatment of Black Cubans, and they began to understand the discrimination that Latinos had suffered as a result of being perceived as immigrants.

Tensions between ethnic minorities

Ethnicity and racial characteristics are deeply intertwined with socioeconomic status and social inequities within the system, creating a more complex structure which is sometimes completely ignored in terms of what that means for individuals living in these ethnic communities. This is true for the African American and Latino communities whose members often live in low socioeconomic areas where any demographic change dramatically alters the delicate balance of that community. Increased tensions among African Americans and Latinos are due, in part, to the fact that Latinos and African Americans sometimes perceive each other as economic and political "competitors" in the battle over dwindling resources, rather than as neighbors with common interests, issues or bonds.

Los Angeles is a good example of why African Americans and Latinos perceive each other as direct competition. Latinos have always outnumbered African Americans there, but until recently we were the silent minority. Throughout history, African Americans have been the ethnic minority most researched. Until the 1970s, many texts on minorities either overlooked or barely mentioned Mexican Americans. Regardless of the large Latino population, Latino political evolution lags about ten years behind African Americans. For example, there has never been a Latino mayor or Latino chief of police in Los Angeles, yet there have been both an African American mayor and African American chief of police. Also, it was African Americans who first founded the Congressional Black Caucus in the early 1970s. Seven years later the Congressional Hispanic Caucus was formed, again illustrating that we are about a decade behind African Americans in obtaining political representation.

This has been changing. Latinos have been voting in record numbers in recent elections. This can be attributed to several factors: the increase in grass-roots organizing; non-US born Latinos applying for citizenship; recent initiatives that have a direct negative impact on the Latino community; and an increase in the anti-immigrant sentiment that does not distinguish between documented, undocumented and United States-born Latinos, resulting in the increased political awareness of the Latino community. It is justifiable then to assume that African Americans feel threatened by this new Latino political consciousness because they are outnumbered and may fear losing some of their political muscle. For example, in South Central Los Angeles, which historically has been predominantly African American, Latinos now make up 51% of the population. Now that Latinos are more politically active, African Americans may feel their political representation threatened.

The media also plays a critical role in determining how ethnic groups perceive each other. The media in the United States perpetuate negative stereotypes of the different ethnic groups and encourage separatist behavior. Media misinformation and generalization can inflame conflicts and efforts for community development or improvement. (The role of the media and how it relates to race relations will be discussed in more detail later in this paper).

For example, as a result of the constant message from the media that Latinos are an immigrant population, one of the key complaints African Americans have of the growing Latino population is that immigrants are taking over their economic opportunities. They sometimes attribute their high unemployment rate to this misperception. Contrary to popular belief, foreign-born Latinos only make up one third of the total Latino population in the United States. Yes, there has been a surge of immigration in the last 20 years, but that does not define the entire Latino community. The growing population of Latinos in the United States is attributed to native births, and not just immigration. In addition, foreign-born Latinos have a disproportionate representation in low-wage jobs with the lowest median household income at $18,596 in comparison to $29,182 for United States-born Latinos and $27,940 for African Americans. Immigrant status, the inability to speak the English language, and other cultural barriers keep Latino immigrants from competing in the same job market as United States-born Latinos and African Americans.

Common bonds

As a result of discrimination, Latinos face many of the same problems their African American counterparts do within general society: in employment, we have higher unemployment rates than the White population; in education, we struggle to increase the educational attainment levels of our children; in political access, we are striving to flex our political muscle and ensure that our voice is heard in the political arena; in health, our families often receive less than adequate health care; in access to justice, our communities are disproportionately represented in the criminal justice system, in our jails and prisons; and we have higher poverty rates than the rest of the population. The positive side to this "common ground" is that Latinos and African Americans have an opportunity to get to know each other better and to understand our common dilemmas. If we can work collectively and proactively to solve our problems, the acceptance and collaborative levels between the two groups will increase.

Unknown to the general community is the good news.

History has proven that Latinos and African Americans alike will learn from each other when they see a positive outcome. During the Civil Rights Movement, the Latino community turned to the African American community for a model to follow. Latino author and political analyst, Rudolfo de la Garza, wrote in 1977, that it was:

> *...clear to Mexican Americans that a conventional approach to social and political change produced little benefit to them. On the other hand, it seemed that the civil rights movement and black militancy were achieving a great deal. To many aware and concerned Mexican Americans, therefore, it made sense to emulate the black example. Thus was born the Chicano Movement.*

Therefore, as a result of our socioeconomic commonalties and our ability to emulate each other's strategies in the political arena, it is not surprising that we can be twice as effective and strong if we work together and develop common goals.

The media perpetuate false images and hostilities between groups

The role of media is very important when dealing with issues of race, discrimination, and a dialogue on race. And in order to play a proactive role in establishing positive change, the media need to do away with hyping the tension and creating fear between racial/ethnic groups. The role of the media also needs to change to fit the new paradigm of a multicultural society. Most people recognize and appreciate the potential of the media to set the public agenda, but we sometimes forget how much influence media can have on our daily lives and on how the media can skew our perceptions. The media can inform, motivate, organize, empower, and set new trends. It can help bring about positive change in a community or it can encourage negative reactions and responses to events occurring within it.

Latinos, African Americans, and Asians have the same misperceptions of each other because the media feed into the stereotypes, and we buy into those misperceptions. To add to this layer, the media have taken a special interest in focusing on the conflict within the various racial or ethnic groups, particularly the tensions within the Latino and African American communities. If you ask media representatives why their coverage of the diverse communities within a particular city seems to convey an unbalanced portrayal of friction and strife among different groups, they will tell you that conflict is interesting, it is human, it is emotional, it is powerful, it is news. I would admonish them that this coverage is insensitive, it is inflammatory, it is inaccurate and it is destructive to the communities the media purports to serve.

Unknown to the general community is the good news. The media do not inform the public of the strong and successful collaboration between various ethnic communities. The MultiCultural Collaborative (MCC), a multiethnic cross section of community-based service and advocacy organizations seeking solutions to interethnic conflict in Los Angeles, states in its January 1996 publication, Race, Power and Promise in Los Angeles, that "for every mediatouted story of ethnic/racial strife, there is a behind-the-scenes story of multiethnic or biracial coexistence – and often cooperation." The MCC report goes on to list several examples of different groups working together: individuals organizing across ethnic lines in Monterey Park to address a sensitive issue between White residents and Chinese newcomers relating to a preponderance of Chinese-language business signs; new community coalitions that emerged in Houston to help undocumented workers apply for legal status under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986; and White, African American and Latino neighbors coming together in a poor part of Boston to successfully rebuild their "forgotten" community.

While positive activity is occurring among different groups, the media still do not accurately cover multiracial communities. Consequently, it is up to Latinos and African Americans to be united in their efforts to hold the media accountable when they insist on covering only the negative incidents that occur within our communities. We must work together to turn media away when they call looking for a provocative statement or response which will only make a bad situation worse. And we must hold the media accountable for their coverage, correct them when they are wrong and continually provide them with alternative story ideas.

The role of the church

The Civil Rights Movement was born out of the African American church. Some of the key civil rights leaders in the African American community had and continue to have strong religious affiliations (i.e. Reverend Jesse Jackson, Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.). Katherine Tate, an African American political analyst, writes:

> *Black political organizations and institutions, including the Black church, have been identified as crucial to the success of the modern-day black civil rights movement. While these organizations gave structure to the protest movement, many, operating well before the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, also helped register and mobilize black voters.*

Even in days of segregation, the Black church was seen as the substitute for a town hall. This is where people gathered and talked about the issues affecting the Black community. If anyone wanted to get a message out to the African American community, they would do it through the church. In the 1960s, and to a lesser degree in the 1990s, the church has been the key component in community organizing.

For Latinos, the role of the church has been different. Historically, the Catholic Church provided some social upward mobility to Latinos by providing a Catholic education. Prior to the Civil Rights Movement, Catholic schools were one of the few vehicles out of poverty for Latinos. High schools in Los Angeles like Loyola High, Don Bosco High, Cathedral High, Cantwell High, and Sacred Heart of Mary provided Latino students with the quality education that was only available to White students.

In the last thirty years, the Catholic Church has increased its role in community mobilization and political activity. For example, the Church was very supportive of Cesar Chavez and the United Farm Workers grape boycott in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In addition, there has been a growing number of priests and nuns becoming involved in community organizing. For example, Father Greg Boyle is locally known for his work with at-risk Eastside youth in Los Angeles. In addition, the Catholic Church is also a key investor of inner-city neighborhoods throughout the country. One of the ways the Catholic Church invests its dollars in the inner-city is that it loans money to revolving community development loan funds (below market rate), and, in turn, the loan funds lend these dollars to low-income business owners in the inner-city.

The organized religious community also struggles to redefine itself as it attempts to deal with the issue of race and ethnicity. As the largest religious institution in the United States, the Catholic Church must navigate a balance between its current established order dominated by the Italian and Irish and its fastest growing members – Latinos and Filipinos. The debate over Proposition 187 was a clear example of the struggle within the Catholic Church. The Church's membership was divided with Italians and Irish in favor of Proposition 187, and Latinos and Filipinos opposing the passage of Proposition 187.

It is important that all churches preach self-empowerment and the importance of community revitalization, but, above all, churches need to begin to address the issues of tolerance and acceptance of different cultures and religions. The church can play a critical role in breaking down the stereotypes and building bridges between ethnic groups. While there is a growing number of Latinos joining the Catholic Church, many other Latinos have been leaving the Church in search of a more inclusive, altruistic alternative. For example, there have been a growing number of Latinos converting from Catholic to Protestant. The Protestant Church (i.e. Baptist, Lutheran, Pentecostal) has been considered, for the most part, an African American and White religion. The emergence of Latino followers in these churches can be perceived as an opportunity for interaction and common interests between African Americans and Latinos.

The role of gender in race relations

Until fairly recently, the issue of gender has been ignored in the discussion of race and ethnic relations. Asians, African Americans, and Latinos have not always treated women of color[1] as equal partners. The contributions of women of color have not been recognized throughout history. Women have played a key, but silent, role in the mobilization of ethnic communities. For example, Harriet Tubman's involvement with the "Underground Railroad" that helped hundreds of Blacks escape slavery was not recognized until recent years. Regardless of race, women have had to deal with living in a patriarchal society, but for women of color, oppression has a double edge because we are discriminated against by the dominant society and often marginalized and isolated by our ethnic communities.

The Women's Movement that emerged in the 1960s was not inclusive and did not incorporate nor reflect the experience of women of color. As a Latina whose first major case involved the mass sterilization of Latinas by doctors practicing in a county hospital, I was struck by how foreign the rhetoric of the Women's Movement was to me. I clearly did not see myself nor the experience of Latina women in that movement. As I began to meet African American women leaders, I discovered that many felt the same way I did.

> *We must give up our old concepts of power, our old ideas that only one group can be in charge because if we believe that, then we are saying that another group must be excluded.*

Things are slowly changing. In the last couple of decades women of color are beginning to have their contributions recognized and valued: Dolores Huerta, Vice President of the United Farm Workers; Gloria Molina, Supervisor for Los Angeles County, Elaine Jones of NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; Linda Wong and Linda Griego of Rebuild Los Angeles; and Julie Su, an attorney working to defend the rights of Thai garment workers in El Monte, California, have been pioneers in the advancement of ethnic minorities. It is also women of color who are increasing the awareness that there is strength in multicultural collaboration. Although the progress is slow, I am heartened by the emergence of strong women of color who are taking their place in the struggle for civil and human rights. I see women of color as the natural bridge between our communities.

Signs of change

I often am told that I am an idealist, and I will admit that I am. I hear more and more ways that communities are coming together to work toward common goals, and I am hopeful that these efforts will increase in the future.

Latinos and African Americans must engage in honest and proactive dialogue on difficult and sometimes uncomfortable issues that must be addressed such as sharing the power and the wealth. It is not just sharing the power and the wealth between the two groups, but also with other groups such as the growing Asian community. I am heartened to know that dialogue is occurring within various communities across the country. Elected officials are beginning to assert their leadership in their cities in order to bridge the gap that exists between communities, but more must occur.

Our challenge then lies in how to replicate the progress we have made in smaller groups in the larger communities. We have learned to discuss this subject rationally with colleagues and friends over coffee, in staff meetings, and in seminars and conferences, but we have not yet mastered how to take that dialogue, that understanding and duplicate it a million times beyond our professional friends and colleagues to the individuals in the grassroots communities. We must learn how to do that.

We must capitalize on the commonalities between the Latino and African American communities and society as a whole, instead of focusing on the differences. I believe that the state of race relations is much improved. The more we talk about it, the better it will become. There must be continual dialogue at all levels. White America needs to engage in an honest open dialogue on race and discrimination. The dialogue cannot occur only after each racial confrontation or incident. The nerves are too frayed and the sensitivities too raw to allow for calm and deliberate action during those emotional times. The dialogue must occur when people can speak honestly and without fear of repercussion because a relationship exists, the understanding is there and the desire to move forward is present.

Moving forward/opportunities for collaboration

Perhaps we need a new dictionary of terms that more clearly state what we are all about and what we are trying to accomplish. We have too many negative associations with many of the terms or phrases we use today.

"Mainstream" has become known as the "dominant culture" which suggests the power of one over the other and causes us to respond in a defensive manner. For many, "assimilation" has come to mean giving up one's native language or culture and elicits an equally negative reaction. We need to find a way to create a society that is united by a set of common values and recognizes individual and cultural diversity.

We also must give up our old concepts of power, our old ideas that only one group can be in charge because if we believe that, then we are saying that another group must be excluded. Unfortunately, once those who did not have power, get it, they often will emulate those who excluded them. We must recognize that it is in the long-term self-interest of our society that the sources of power be shared. We must learn that sharing power yields greater returns for both the individual and the community.

While the issue of race relations is a complex matter, I think some of the solutions to the problem are very basic. Basic does not translate into simplicity or ease of achievement, but I believe we could better address the race relations issue if we seriously and aggressively put our collective and creative minds to it. We certainly have the ability to resolve the issue but we also must have the commitment on the part of government elected and community leaders, the business community and educational reformers to make this issue the number one priority for the future of this country.

We must elect representatives who have the interests of our communities at heart. We cannot support individuals who attempt to pit one ethnic or racial group against another playing on the uncertainties of our time. We must reject racial politics at every turn, be it from the Latino community, from African Americans, Asians or Whites. We must move away from polarized racial voting. We need to have elected officials that will truly voice and address the needs of the communities they represent, regardless of their race or ethnicity.

Concurrently, both Latinos and African Americans must join together in encouraging their communities to become actively involved in the political process, to register to vote, and to vote on election day to demonstrate that we are true players in the political arena. The number of Latinos voting in the last general election was at an all time high and we are hopeful that this increased participation will continue. African Americans, Asians, and Latinos joined forces to vote against Proposition 209, and while the proposition passed, the final tally was very close due to the collaborative efforts of Latinos, Asians, African Americans and other groups to defeat the measure.

I would propose that we have much more in common than we realize. Commonalities are not based on color but on the American mind-set and what we hold true and dear to our hearts: our individual freedoms of religion and speech, principles of equity and mutual respect, our democratic values. To be an American is to have these rights protected by the United States Constitution. These are the ideals we cherish. They are what makes this country unique. They are what makes us strong. They are what will allow us to become stronger than we are today.

The first step is to understand the differences among us and not let them hold us back from finding the commonalities. We are different, but different does not have to mean inferior. We have to boldly identify the problems and create solutions to the problems that divide our ethnic communities.

- We also must provide increased opportunities for ethnic groups to interact with each other more frequently because studies have shown that frequent interaction provides an important basis for mutual understanding and cooperation. Naturally, there is a greater likelihood of mistrust between groups of people who do not know one another or who do not interact with one another on a regular basis. This is why we must concentrate some of our efforts in desegregating our schools and more fully integrating the work place. The classroom is where our children may first begin to learn about people different from themselves, and they must be taught to respond to these differences.
- Public education is the greatest equalizer and the most effective vehicle for Americanization. It is public education that creates, builds, and molds the American mind-set and that has been the vehicle for upward mobility and, to some degree, acceptance of African Americans and Latinos by the greater society. Schools need to teach children the philosophy of the "e pluribus unum," that from many we are one, and that together we define an American. Educators must recognize that diversity in the schools is a permanent factor within the schools and they must be a part of the process that develops programs which help administrators, faculty, students and parents work together on a continuous basis to bring the various groups together through a common thread, a common ground.
- We need to recognize the social and cultural distance between foreign-born Latinos and African Americans that may also contribute to the misperceptions that foreign-born Latinos have of African Americans and vice versa. Despite the cultural distance, 53% of African Americans voted against the passage of Proposition 187. This illustrated that despite the

media's constant effort to isolate the two communities, African Americans were sympathetic and understanding of the discriminatory attack against Latinos.

- During the past decade, the growth of both African American and Latino businesses has increased dramatically. African American businesses generated $3.6 billion in revenues and Latino-owned businesses generated $7.8 billion. We should increase the dollars that are invested in the inner-cities that are populated mostly by African Americans and Latinos. We should utilize and develop more efficient and extensive networking and support groups to encourage business growth by supporting each other's businesses.
- African Americans and Latinos and all racial and ethnic groups must accept the challenge of reconciling ethnic organizational interests with the broader goals of an interethnic agenda. We must develop public policies that take into consideration the diverse needs of all our communities and toss out old loyalties. This means that each community, each constituency must come to the table with an open mind and outstretched hands to accept new ideas and new approaches. We must come to grips with the dilemmas of inner-city residents and provide genuine solutions to urban problems. We must understand the communities we are trying to serve and be sensitive to the dynamics of change within a socioeconomic context. Latinos and African Americans are an urban population, and it is in our best interest to revitalize our cities.
- We must continue to fight together to ensure that affirmative action programs are not eliminated. Latinos and African Americans must work together to hold onto the gains we have made in recent years. As stated earlier, Latinos, African Americans, Asians, and other ethnic groups worked together to try and stop the passage of Proposition 209. We need to ensure that programs like procurement set-asides are not eliminated because this would not allow small fragile minority owned businesses to compete with the larger contracting corporations for government contracts.
- We must invest time and resources in developing the leadership skills of mid-career professionals as well as grassroots community leaders and parents. We need to cross train these leaders to understand our respective differences and commonalties. We must develop a cadre of community leaders who are capable of working cooperatively for the good of their communities and across ethnic lines.
- We must hold the media accountable for their coverage of our communities and more aggressively monitor their actions. We must make the media more aware of their responsibility of providing accurate coverage of race relations and counter their reporting of distortions and disproportionate coverage of conflict and violence. We need to educate the media and have them change the negative stereotypes they portray of our respective communities.

The Black-White paradigm, although an important beginning, does not present an inclusive picture of race relations in America today. In Los Angeles, everyone is a minority, including Whites. We need to start looking at race relations through a different lens. A lens that includes a color spectrum. A lens that includes men and women alike. And we, Latinos and African Americans, who have experienced discrimination and racial animosity, have a unique lens by which to view racism. Our challenge is not to emulate history, but to lead with a new more inclusive solution.

Mestizaje is the mixing of different racial groups.

Proposition 187 is an anti-immigration initiative in California that denies health care, education, and social services to anyone suspected of being an undocumented immigrant and would mandate reports of such suspicions to the INS by public servants and health care providers.

Women of color refers to women who are of an ethnic minority in the United States.

Proposition 209 is an initiative that adds a provision to the California Constitution prohibiting "preferential treatment" on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in state public education, employment, and contracting.

Refer to endnote 2.

[redacted]

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Excerpts From: Globalization and Its Impact on Race Relations and Divisions in the United States

By James Jennings

Introduction

There are at least two general observations that can be asserted regarding economic and racial developments in the international arena today. One is that national economies are becoming more internationalized than in earlier periods, thus the term "globalization." The other observation is that in many societies, racial and ethnic divisions and tensions continue to be a significant facet of social and human relations. An examination of how globalization may be contributing to the improvement or deterioration of racial and ethnic relations is, therefore, timely and significant.

The nature of the relationship between race and globalization was posed as a major concern at a conference sponsored by the Comparative Human Relations Initiative of the Southern Education Foundation in Atlanta, Georgia in 199[illegible]. The Conference, Beyond Racism: Brazil, South Africa, and the United States, was guided by the following query: "What do structural changes in the world economy and the economies of nations portend for relations between the Whites and Blacks, laborers, and the poor and elites in the U.S.?"

The issue of racial divisions in the international arena today invites reconsideration of W.E.B. Du Bois' observation in 1900:

In the metropolis of the modern world, in this the closing year of the nineteenth century, there has been assembled a congress of men and women of African blood, to deliberate solemnly upon the present situation and outlook of the *darker races of mankind. The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line, the question as to how far differences of race– which show themselves chiefly in the color of the skin and the texture of the hair– will hereafter be made the basis of denying to over half the world the right of sharing to their utmost ability the opportunities and privileges of modern civilization.*[1]

Du Bois was touching on the issue of racial divisions, not simply as a problem of ignorance and misunderstanding, but more fundamentally of power utilized to maintain colonialism and a racially defined world order. Du Bois' statement is important for two reasons. First, it identifies the fact that, as suggested by the meeting of Southern Education Foundation, the "color line" continues to be a significant issue in the international arena.[2] Second, it suggests that the nature of this division is not simply one of attitudes, or individual prejudices between groups of people, but, instead a reflection of power and skewed distribution of social, economic, and cultural resources.

> *The increasing competition among nations has led in many instances to corporate behaviour that results in less investment in social and human capital.*

There are essentially three scenarios that summarize possible relationships between globalization and race relations. In one scenario, globalization limits national economic growth, generates domestic fiscal crises, and thereby contributes to racial and ethnic tensions.

Another scenario suggests that globalization does not necessarily contribute to or reduce divisive race relations in a particular society. Rather, the economic and racial arenas are seen as separate from each other.... Racial divisions are presumed to be determined by political, social, or cultural factors endemic to domestic societies rather than by the impact of international developments.

In the third scenario, globalization is believed to contribute to the capacity of domestic societies to respond to racial and ethnic problems and divisions by expanding the economic pie. And, concomitantly, if there is some dislocation of workers and loss of jobs, then domestic economies can re-train workers and equip them to compete more effectively in the global market. This is part of the rationale that was used to generate political support for the adoption of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and especially to neutralize the opposition of organized labor in the U.S.[3]

Globalization, race and ethnic relations

The relationship between globalization, race and ethnic relations is not particular to the three societies mentioned above. As observed by scholars Rita Jalali and Seymour Martin Lipset, race and ethnicity continue to be significant factors in determining status in many nations, as well as the quality of international relations. Despite earlier assumptions by both Marxist and non-Marxist scholars that "industrialization, urbanization, and the spread of education would reduce ethnic consciousness, and that universalism would replace particularism...," Jalali and Lipset write, "It is now clearly established that the assimilation assumptions are not valid. Most parts of the globe have been touched by ethnic conflict."[4] Economist Michael L. Wyzan reiterates, "Few problems are as ubiquitous, as persistent, or as daunting as those concerning the relations among ethnic groups within nations. Virtually no society has been immune to ethnic tension. At any given moment, ethnic civil wars, possibly leading to the destruction of the nation itself, rage in... diverse settings."[5]

The status and causes of racial and ethnic tensions and their relationship to communities of color is particularly important for the United States, Brazil, and South Africa. In each, there is increasing racial and ethnic diversity and continuing, if not widening, social and economic divisions. Globalization has a direct impact on the opportunities and well-being, not only for communities of color, but also working-class people of all races. The contours that such impact will take in the long run, however, are not yet clear.

There is a strong basis for comparing these three nations. Dr. George Reid Andrews writes, for instance, that:

The Brazil/United States comparison has compelling logic. The two countries are the largest multiracial societies in the Americas. They share a history of plantation slavery, which extends into the second half of the 1800s. And over the course of the 1900s, both societies have confronted the legacy of slavery in the form of deeply entrenched racial inequality.[6]

Additionally, these three societies have varying degrees of democratic government; each has significant human and material resources, as well as a large racially, ethnically, and culturally-diverse population; in each, persons of African descent have been segregated for long periods even after emancipation, or continue to be segregated informally, if not officially. And, Blacks comprise a disproportionately large percentage of the poverty-stricken population.

The term "globalization" has been utilized in various ways. Basically, it suggests a growing internationalization of national economies and concomitant growth in the influence of global economic interests. Professors Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson argue that this term has been overly utilized and "mythologized":

> *[T]he level of integration, interdependence, openness, or however one wishes to describe it, of national economies in the present era is not unprecedented. Indeed, the level of autonomy under the Gold Standard up to the First World War was much less for the advanced economies than it is today. This is not to minimize the level of that integration now, or to ignore the problems of regulation and management it throws up, but merely to register a certain skepticism over whether we have entered a radically new phase in the internationalization of economic activity.*[7]

These two authors add that the influence of multinational corporations is also over-rated. Sociologist William Robinson, however, disagrees, believing that: "a new social structure of accumulation is emerging which, for the first time in history, is global."[8]

While the claim that this development is completely new could be debated, the fundamental point is well-taken: economic boundaries, unlike political boundaries, are becoming less distinctive between nations. Doug Henwood, author of the book, Wall Street, argues, for example, that while globalization is not a new development in the sense that nations have always been linked economically,[9] what is new is the fact that relatively few multinational corporations are wielding enormous influence on international economic developments.[10] The increasing mobility of capital across international boundaries is also a characteristic of globalization according to William Greider, author of *One World, Ready or Not.*[11] Another observer, Hector Figueroa of the Service Employees International Union in Washington D.C., believes that a sustained period of slow economic growth and declining living standards is a major characteristic of globalization:

> *Globalization matters not only because international trade and investment and multinationals have become more important to the economy since World War II, but also because these changes have coincided with a period of slow economic growth and declining living standards. While globalization is not necessarily the cause of either, the temptation to extract profits by cheapening the cost of labor and penetrating new markets is greater in a period of slow growth. Wages are driven down further by the higher level of unemployment that results from the replacement of workers by technology or imports.*[12]

In *The Global Political Economy From Bretton Woods to the 1980s*, political scientists Michael Stohl and Harry R. Targ note that the United States' economic interests remain powerful, although clearly, there are now other powerful players as well.[13] Without underestimating the influence of the United States, author Kevin Phillips points out in *The Politics of Rich and Poor,*[14] that the United States must now share the economic stage with other nations which have also effectively acquired assets and markets. An examination of the proportionate weight and growth of United States trade with other nations, including imports and exports, illustrates this point clearly: according to the Organization for Economic and Community Development, for example, in 1960 U.S. trade (import and export) was about 6% of the nation's total Gross Domestic Product (GDP); by 1988, trade grew to close to 18% of the GDP.[15]

The increasing competition among nations has led in many instances to corporate behavior that results in less investment in social and human capital. According to one study,

> *...corporate strategies to meet international competition have resulted in disinvestment, descaling, relocation abroad, and retreat into financial rather than productive activities. These changes, undertaken in part to deal with the pressures of globalization, are only temporary responses to longer-term, more ominous global economic trends. The changes are private, uncoordinated, conflictive, and unsuccessful. The strategies themselves have generated new difficulties, like fiscal crises for particular places and massive unemployment for certain social groups within the United States.*[16]

The changes, although *ad hoc* and unplanned, are massive in their impact and determine how people in many societies will live and die.

At the same time that the United States' corporate sector seeks to enhance its economic position in response to greater international competition, the distribution of wealth in America is also becoming more unequal. According to a study of the Michael Harrington Center for Democratic Values and Social Change in New York City, "The share of wealth owned by the top 1% has gone from 22% in 1979 to 42% in 1992."[17] And a report published by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities in Washington D.C., points out that "the growth in the incomes of the richest one percent of Americans has been so large that just the increase between 1980 and 1990 in the after-tax income of this group equals the total income of the poorest 20 percent of the population..."

If globalization means that inequitable distributions will increase as a result of technology or other economic dynamics in the international arena, then the scenario for domestic economies described briefly by Robert Fisher is valid. He notes: "As capital flow increasingly supersedes state control in the global economy, the welfare state faces increasing fiscal crises in a world characterized, according to a recent report of Human Rights Watch, by increasing racial and ethnic divisions." Globalization of national economies may widen these divisions, thus producing more, rather than less social and violent tensions in the next millennium.

There is a lack of attention to human rights, poverty, and certainly racial and ethnic divisions and how such might be exacerbated by globalization's effects.

Unchecked or ignored, this kind of development will tend to exacerbate racial divisions in the United States. The concentration of wealth means less resources for Blacks, Latinos, poor people and working class people and less resources for the places where these groups live, contributing to the potential for increased scapegoating based on race and ethnicity. In turn, such racial scapegoating would prove useful to efforts to maintain policies that result in greater concentration of wealth in a relatively few hands.

Greater racial and ethnic tensions do not necessarily reflect political manipulation on the part of interests benefiting from the internationalization of domestic economies, although this has occurred in many, past instances. But multinational economic interests that ignore the history of racial and ethnic tensions and violence in domestic arenas, as well as the causes for continuing divisions, are a major problem associated with globalization.

The focus of recent international agreements facilitating economic globalization is on increasing profits and enhancing the mobility of capital across national boundaries. Generally, there is lack of attention to human rights, poverty, and certainly racial and ethnic divisions and how such might be exacerbated by globalization's effects.

This failure is encouraged by a belief that the impact of globalization is not subject to responsive or preventative national political actions. Or, as noted in a recent report of the Council on Foreign Relations: "Because globalization is not an issue that lends itself to organized political action, none of the known models of successful minority interventions in foreign policy seem to apply."

Hirst and Thompson take issue with this fatalistic approach regarding the political possibilities for mitigating the effects of globalization. These authors write that globalization has been presented as an image "so powerful that it has mesmerized analysts and captured political imaginations. But is it the case?" They express a "mixture of skepticism about global economic processes and optimism about the possibilities of control of the international economy and viability of national political strategies."

Carol Bellamy, Executive Director of UNICEF, recently noted that, "In some ways, with the globalization of the economy, the focus has been on economic development... There's more wealth in the world today but with that great wealth comes greater diversity... What's getting worse is the disparity between those that have, and those that do not have." William Robinson goes further, claiming that the process of globalization "is a war of a global rich and powerful minority against the global poor, dispossessed and outcast majority." Adding urgency to the concern raised by Bellamy, Robinson states that "in today's global economy, capitalism is less benign, less responsive to the interests of broad majorities around the world, and less accountable to society than ever before." And as reported by David Vidal of the Council on Foreign Relations,

> *[O]n the one hand, globalization holds the promise of long-term growth and prosperity for all working people, not just those in the United States. This would especially benefit the regions of the world, including Asia, Africa and Latin America, to which minorities are linked by ancestral or family ties, and would also increase demand for minority talent at home to deal with these emerging markets. For minority communities, these are welcome developments. On the other hand, economic globalization is creating within these very same communities a class of economic "losers."*

The impact of globalization on domestic economies and local capacity to respond effectively to poverty and related problems is observed by Professor Lou Kushnick of the University of Manchester. He states: "The major economic restructuring which is following globalization is having disproportionate consequences for people living in the inner-cities of both countries. There have been significant job losses, particularly for unskilled and semi-skilled workers and those without higher education qualifications. These patterns of unequal outcomes are built upon previous patterns of inequality in terms of allocation of public resources ..." Another observer notes that international economic pressures are limiting the political capacity of South Africa to respond to racial and ethnic divisions and poverty built earlier on the system of apartheid. As Nancy Murray, a civil rights activist in the United States writes:

> *[T]he ANC, pressured by advisors from the old regime, economists from the World Bank and IMF, experts from the business community, and by the volatility of the South African currency, stepped back from ... emphasis on social spending as a way of beginning to overcome the huge economic disparities which were apartheid's legacy and providing millions of poor people with houses, water, electricity and sewage.*

As nations seek to respond to economic pressures to increase their competitiveness, earlier racial and ethnic divisions may neutralize politically those sectors interested in managing or controlling the effects of globalization arising from the concentration of international wealth. To underscore this point, let us turn briefly to a review of how racial divisions in the U.S. historically have served to mute political and social opposition to the concentration of wealth and constriction of social welfare policies.

Racial hierarchy in the United States

The concept of "racial hierarchy," as distinct from the more narrowly conceived terms, "bigotry" and "racism," is important for studying and understanding the relationship among the rapid increase in wealth inequality in the United States, globalization and the particular state of race relations in this nation. Racial hierarchy involves a pervasive system of caste based on race and racial features. While bigotry and discrimination typically feature "horizontal" racial relations, racial hierarchy reflects a "vertical" order of power, wealth and social domination. Racial hierarchy is a fundamental feature of multiracial societies, for as sociologist H. Edward Ransford writes, "In most multiracial societies, racial groups are found in a hierarchy of power, wealth, and prestige." Consideration of the continuing existence of racial hierarchy is key for analyzing the nature of relationships between race relations and growing inequality in the United States, as well as in understanding how international developments influence these factors.

Racial hierarchy is the social situation where Blacks continually and consistently occupy positions lower in status than Whites, regardless of social, political, or economic advances that have been realized by Blacks, individually or collectively. This idea is similar to that used by political scientist Herman George, "racial subordination," as a set of political-economic relationships... "characterized by four features: economic exploitation, racism, cultural hegemony and political exclusion." Thus, racial hierarchy, or racial subordination, is fundamentally a power relationship, reflected in different social arenas, and involves a system of control of people facilitated by institutionally-determined benefits correlated with racial categories.

Entrenched racial divisions continue in the United States, despite major advances in the democratization of the nation. This means, simply, that White life continues to enjoy a higher social and cultural prestige and economic status, than Black life. There is little social or economic evidence indicating the abatement of this kind of racial order for Blacks as a community.

Racial hierarchy is manifested economically, educationally, culturally, and politically. Even when certain social and class factors are controlled, such as schooling level or income, there is strong evidence of racial hierarchy in social arenas. This means that even poor Whites—because they are White—are much better off than comparable poor Blacks; working-class Whites as well as middle-class Whites are much better off and enjoy a higher status than their respective Black counterparts on the basis of social and economic indicators.

Historically, as well as in the contemporary period, ethnic groups other than Blacks have also enjoyed benefits based on where they stand in the nation's racial hierarchy and the degree to which they look "White" or "Black." This is evident among some Latino groups in the United States. In the case of Puerto Ricans, a racially-mixed ethnic group, for example, sociologists Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton point out that:

> *Among all groups in the United States, only Puerto Ricans share blacks' relative inability to assimilate spatially but this disadvantage stems from the fact that many are of African origin. Although white Puerto Ricans achieve rates of spatial assimilation that are comparable with those found among other ethnic groups, those of African or racially mixed origins experience markedly lower abilities to convert socioeconomic attainments into contact with whites. Once race is controlled, the "paradox of Puerto Rican segregation" disappears.*

They state additionally that this situation is not unique, but observable in metropolitan areas across the United States:

> *The New York metropolitan area houses the largest single concentration of Caribbeans in the United States. Here white Hispanics are moderately segregated from whites, whereas those who are black or racially mixed are highly segregated... Similar patterns are replicated in all of the other metropolitan areas, a contrast that persists even when adjustments are made for socioeconomic differences between racial categories.*

These instances describe facets of racial hierarchy, a dynamic that is fundamentally different and more institutionalized and culturally-ingrained than bigotry or racial discrimination.

Is there a basis for believing that globalization could result in the more hopeful scenario?

The concept of racial hierarchy is applicable to other societies. Political scientist Ronald Walters argues that vertical structures of power, paralleling race, have been characteristic of the international arena for a significant period of time. Professor William C. Thiesenhusen has examined Brazil and other nations in Latin America and concluded that

> *[T]he closer to European stock, the more apt a population cohort is to have a high income level, and education; the closer the relationship to indigenous [Indian] or African stock, the more apt the group is to lack land, to have a low income level and little schooling, and to suffer discrimination in the workplace, in schools, and at sites where public services are dispensed.*

Colonial powers utilized racial and ethnic rivalry to maintain political and cultural power. Such racial and ethnic rivalries were fueled by economic and social disparities, as well as territorial aggression, triggered and maintained by colonial powers.

The existence of racial hierarchy gives rise to certain ways of thinking about people of color generally, and Blacks in particular, which make it difficult for society to eliminate the practice and effects of racial discrimination simply on the basis of legal endorsements and instruments. Many White Americans, even if they never practice individual acts of bigotry or racial discrimination, nevertheless express beliefs in the genetic, cultural, or intellectual inferiority of Black people. In a widely cited survey sponsored by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago in 1990, for example, respondents were asked to compare Blacks with other ethnic groups. A majority (62 percent) of the White respondents believed that Blacks are lazier than other groups; a slightly smaller proportion, but still majority of White respondents (56 percent) felt that Blacks were more prone to violence; a majority (53 percent) also saw Blacks as less intelligent, and 78 percent of all the White respondents believe that Blacks are less self-supporting and more likely to live off welfare, to a larger extent than other groups.

Racial hierarchy is evident in Brazil and South Africa, as well. In terms of the latter nation, Valerie Moller of the Center for Social and Development Studies at the University of Natal in South Africa, reported that "Black South African households, on average, earn approximately 2.3 times less than colored, 4.5 times less than Indian and 6.2 times less than white households. Africans have nearly twice the unemployment rate of colored, more than three times the unemployment rate of Indians, and nearly 10 times the unemployment rate of whites." And Rebecca Reichmann describes a similar situation for Brazilian Blacks who systematically occupy lower status in many arenas of social, economic, and political life in their country. This is also the opinion of Jalali and Lipset, who point out that "Latin American scholars have argued that their societies are not racist and that class rather than ethnic cleavages predominate. Yet in spite of racial and ethnic pluralism, stratification correlates with racial ancestry in almost all of the nations of the region. The privileged classes are largely of European background and/or are lighter skin-colored than the less affluent strata."

The distribution of economic, social, and cultural benefits reflects a social and cultural order of race and skin pigmentation or, as noted by writer Ellis Cose, "the economic hierarchy is racially skewed." Historian Iris Berger makes a similar argument in her article, *Solidarity Fragmented: Garment Workers of the Transvaal, 1930-1960,* reviewing how racial and ethnic divisions exploited by wealthy and managerial classes divide the working class in South Africa over several decades.

While the United States may have a head start in terms of legal policies aimed at ensuring that institutional policies reflect racial equality, it has yet to develop effective practices aimed at racial integration within a context of groups sharing social, cultural, and economy power. This presents a paradox for the United States according to political scientist Howard Winant. He observes that "[O]n the one hand, race continues to structure everyday life, social practices of all types, and the personal – indeed even the unconscious – dimensions of everyone's identity. On the other hand, the susceptibility of race to further state intervention or political action beyond that deriving from the moderate egalitarianism of the civil rights movement is denied, not only on the racial right, but also among many on the left." [43]

Using race to make economic inequalities in the United States invisible: historical examples

In the United States racial hierarchy serves to help concentrate wealth among the richest groups by neutralizing political and social challenges based on class tensions. As long as poor people and working-class people who are not Black blame their circumstances on Black scapegoats, they may not choose to challenge policies that increase or skew the distribution of wealth and goods at the expense of their own economic interests. In other words, racial divisions and tensions are functional for diffusing class tensions.

The exploitation of racial divisions to protect economic policies and institutional practices aimed at managing and concentrating wealth from populist challenges has been utilized extensively in the United States. W.E.B. Du Bois, for instance, in Black Reconstruction, described how relatively wealthy Southern landowners utilized various government mechanisms to divide the incipient alliances between former slaves and White peasants in the South after the Civil War. In another classic work, Southern Politics, political scientist V.O. Key repeated some of DuBois' observations in his study of Southern life and politics in the decades preceding the Second World War.[44] A description and analysis of how issues, including racial issues, are presented to the public in ways that predetermine political reactions was provided by E.E. Schattschneider in his work, *The Semi-Sovereign People.*[45] Other historical examples showing how movements for social change and democracy were sidetracked by the exploitation of race, and the failure of white liberal allies to understand this dynamic, are reviewed in the work of Robert Allen, *Reluctant Reformers.*[46]

Generally, for example, White Americans' view the expansion of certain kinds of social welfare as beneficial to Blacks, and thus ignore such policy and legislative actions or support political leaders that call for greater cuts in social welfare, even if they, too, suffer from these kinds of actions. This view is supported by recent studies and surveys indicating that if Whites perceive Blacks as benefiting from government activity, Whites will tend not to support it. This is precisely why the prominent sociologist William J. Wilson called for a "hidden agenda," in responding to the needs of United States cities.[47] While acknowledging that national economic transformation and restructuring has been especially harmful to Blacks and Latinos living in urban places, this scholar also admits that policies and programs to rectify this situation would not be politically feasible because of association with the idea that such would benefit Blacks. Thus, Wilson calls for a "hidden agenda" that would include universal policies of benefit to all groups, but presumably also help Blacks.

The argument that race and racial divisions obscure class interests and responses is supported by a recent finding of political scientist Martin Gilens, who begins his study with the query:

> *Political issues such as crime and welfare are now widely viewed as "coded" issues that play upon race (or more specifically, upon white Americans' negative view of blacks) without explicitly raising the "race card"...But does whites' desire to get tough on crime or their opposition to welfare really stem from their dislike of blacks? Are crime and welfare not pressing problems about which Americans rightly should be concerned, quite apart from any associations these issues may have with race?*[48]

His conclusion: "I show that whites' welfare attitudes are indeed strongly influenced by their views of Blacks ... I find that the perception that blacks are lazy has a larger effect on white Americans' welfare policy preferences than does economic self-interest, beliefs about individualism, or views about the poor in general."[49] Further, he writes: "Racial attitudes are a powerful influence on white Americans' welfare views... racial considerations are the single most important factor shaping whites' views of welfare."[50]

The relationship between globalization and race hierarchy in the United States

As pointed out by Dr. Nestor P. Rodriguez, globalization is molding race relations in the United States in various ways:

The late twentieth century has witnessed an increasing globalization of racial and ethnic relations in the United States. Since the mid-1960s, world developments, transnational migration, and the emergence of binational immigrant communities have significantly affected the character of intergroup relations in U.S. society. Perhaps not since the initial European colonization of the Americas has the global context been such a prominent macrostructural background for evolving racial and ethnic relations in the United States. [31]

In other words, the increasing interdependence and integration of national economies in the international arena is having an impact on immigration and how receiving societies react politically and socially to immigration. While Rodriguez focuses on the United States, the impact of immigration associated with the globalization of national economics is occurring in many places, including Brazil and South Africa, of course. Immigration is a potentially problematic issue for societies that are undergoing economic contraction or increasing wealth inequality.

Certainly racial hierarchy is not presented as the response by globally oriented economic interests! Rather, globalization is presented as an inevitable strategy that will expand the economic pie for all nations. If this means greater concentration of wealth, and policies that benefit global corporations, even at the expense of responding to poverty, then so be it, since in the long run all groups will benefit.

It is important to digress here in order to explain that rationales for increasing wealth for the richest are based on theories of 'supply side' economic growth. This includes assumptions that the more income and wealth available to the rich and the corporate sector, the greater will be the rate of savings and investment to increase economic growth. The belief is that generally, therefore, taxation should be reduced because it limits and discourages the rich and wealthy from investing.

The economic history of the United States illustrates, however, that strategies and policies to enhance national economic growth alone cannot overcome the problem of domestic poverty nor develop fully effective mechanisms for integrating racially and ethnically diverse groups into the nation's social and economic mainstreams. As one indication, note that between 1980 and 1988, the GDP of the United States increased by 29.2 percent; but the White poverty rate actually increased during this period by 5.1 percent, while the Black poverty rate increased by 13.7 percent, and the Latino poverty rate also increased by 50.2 percent. [illegible] In the midst of economic growth, and prosperity for some, therefore, poverty increased for many others.

Consistent with supply side economic theory, the corporate sector's response to globalization has included the reduction and redeployment of the labor force, shutdowns, and layoffs. Corporate leaders have supported tax policies aimed at increasing financial profits through speculation, rather than productive investments, and urged the de-regulation of industrial and corporate development, as well as reorganization of labor-management relations and arrangements. The federal government has supported with this response by reducing assistance to cities and poor people at the same time that it facilitates the attainment of greater degree of de-regulation and resources for the corporate sector. Thus, again an observation of the Michael Harrington Center is apt: "At the same time that corporations are shedding workers, Congress is attempting to…reduce the benefits available to those affected by economic fluctuations and layoffs." [illegible] Government sacrifices public funding for education and social welfare in response to the needs of the corporate sector and as a way to discourage capital mobility. Since this posture causes social tensions, especially along racial lines, relatively large amounts of fiscal resources are devoted to crime prevention and imprisonment rather than investment in economically-productive ventures.

Responding to globalization and improving race relations

Is there a basis for believing that globalization could result in the more hopeful scenario? The possibility of a more hopeful scenario requires the elevation of human rights in domestic societies and effective anti-poverty measures. These issues should not be step-children to pursuit of profits for their own sakes. Broadly speaking, the hopeful scenario requires that nations and international bodies challenge the continuing existence of racial hierarchy and poverty as fundamentally contradictory to human rights and to the possibility of economic growth and productivity. [illegible]

While in earlier periods international bodies exhibited a weak, if not mixed record of protecting the human rights of workers and poor people throughout the world, as well as responding ineffectively to racial and ethnic conflict, globalization may lead to a situation where such bodies are strengthened and give voice more effectively to workers and poor people across national boundaries. In order for this to happen, a number of approaches must be considered.

Eliminating racial hierarchy in the United States and its accompanying racial beliefs of Black inferiority requires the elevation of Black life and community in the psyche of Whites and others in this society. This is not simply a call for the holding of Black and White hands. The call here is similar to William Robinson's call for addressing "the deep racial/ethnic dimensions of global inequality, starting from the premise that, although racism and ethnic and religious conflicts rest on material fears among groups whose survival is under threat, they take on cultural, ideological and political dynamics of their own which must be challenged."[55]

Effective challenges to racial and ethnic divisions in the United States and other societies require responses that range from educational strategies that celebrate the nation's multi-racialism to the adoption of political practices that seek to ensure the full participation of Blacks and other people of color in the electoral, social and economic arenas. In part, this implies that Black communities in the United States must be transformed into places that do not overwhelmingly carry the burden of dilapidated housing, unemployed workers, or poverty-stricken individuals and families. And the problem of poverty must be acknowledged as significant and requiring international cooperation. The problem of poverty in each of these societies cannot be resolved in isolation. As Blakeley and Goldsmith conclude:

Three features dominate the current situation: America is less influential in worldwide economic affairs; the international economy itself is less stable; and the landscape of domestic industry has been transformed. In these circumstances, and given the more complete integration of U.S. and world markets, it would be almost impossible to eradicate poverty by relying on the usual domestic economic policies, employment and training programs, or efforts that focus on jobs alone.[56]

This is a sobering message – and warning – for the United States, as well as Brazil and South Africa.

In summary, as proposed by C.B. MacPherson, the call for and pursuit of economic justice and democracy, which emerged as a result of changing global conditions in the 19th century, must be strengthened and revived.[57] As globalization intensifies, such calls will increase. Policies that should be considered by national governments include greater investment in the education of workers in order to enhance collective quality of the workforce. Improving living conditions for workers, whether in the form of higher real wages or provisions like free and accessible basic health care or decent housing will reduce racial and ethnic tensions and violence. Such policies, adopted across international boundaries, may also mean greater economic productivity shared by more people. Rather than encouraging or protecting greater concentrations of wealth, governments should focus on technological innovations, the improvement of living conditions that can help elevate the productivity of people, and new and socially-balanced business investments.

These measures may be costly for profits in the short-run, but will prove to be beneficial for racial and ethnic harmony, economic growth, and social stability in the long run – which is only around the corner.

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AQUALTUNE
RACISMO NO BRASIL É...
20 DE NOVEMBRO ZUMBI
DIA NACIONAL ... CONSCIÊNCIA NEGRA
CONTRA A DISCRIMINAÇÃO RA

Excerpts From: International Remedies for Racial Discrimination and Race-Based Inequalities

By Lennox Hinds

> *The abstract and transient fact of slavery is fatally united to the physical and permanent fact of color.*
>
> *– Alexis de Tocqueville,*
> *Democracy in America, New York (1945) at 372*

On their face, United Nations conventions and initiatives to combat racism and violations of human rights should provide recourse for people of African descent in the United States, Brazil and South Africa. There are several:

1945 – *The Charter of the United Nations*, adopted in San Francisco on June 26, 1945 and in force on October 24, 1945. All State members of the United Nations pledged adherence to its principles. It reaffirms, in the Preamble, faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of human beings.

1948 – *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, adopted by the General Assembly on December 10, 1948 as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, states in the preamble that "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, [illegible] and peace in the world."

1958 – *The Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (No. 111)*, adopted by the International Labour Conference of the International Labour Organisation.

1960 - *The Convention against Discrimination in Education,* adopted by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).[4]

1963 - *The United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,* adopted by the General Assembly on November 20, 1963.[5]

1965 -*The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,* adopted by the General Assembly on December 21, 1965, came into force on January 4,1969. Finally, in 1994 the United States became a party to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination adopted in 1965, in force since 1969. It has 142 signatories including Brazil and, most recently, South Africa.

1966 - *The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,* adopted by the General Assembly on December 16,1966, came into force on January 3 and March 23, 1976, respectively. The Covenants put into binding legal form the rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[6]

1973 -*The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid,* was adopted by the General Assembly on November 30, 1973 and came into force on July 18, 1976.[7]

The Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination was established in 1973 and in a resolution adopted on November 15, 1979, the Assembly approved a program for the remaining four years of the Decade designed to accelerate progress towards the elimination of racial discrimination.

The Second World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, was held at Geneva from August 1 to 12, 1983 to evaluate the activities undertaken during the previous Decade.[8]

The Second Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, 1983-1993, was proclaimed by the General Assembly on November 22 to begin on December 10, 1983.[9]

The Third Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, 1993-2003 was proclaimed by the General Assembly on 22 December 1993.[10]

The apparent intent of United Nations' efforts to combat racism, racial discrimination and their institutionalized legacies attracted the attention of African American activists immediately upon the establishment of the United Nations. W.E.B. DuBois, then serving as Director of Special Research for the NAACP, and other NAACP personnel prepared a lengthy *Appeal to the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations,* which was presented in the fall of 1947. The NAACP sought not only to expose the extent of racist oppression confronting African Americans in the United States, but also to generate "corrective action" by the international body.[11]

In 1952, William L. Patterson, on behalf of the Civil Rights Congress, presented an even lengthier and more detailed *Report to the UN in Geneva seeking intervention: We Charge Genocide.*[12] As but one consequence of Mr. Patterson's uncompromising political positions, his passport was confiscated upon his return to the United States from Geneva.[13]

In 1964, Malcolm X advocated a UN sponsored investigation of American racism.[14] In the late 1960s the Black Panther Party proposed a UN referendum among people of African descent living as a "colonized minority" within the United States.[15] In 1978, this author filed an extensive Petition before the Human Rights Commission under ECOSOC resolution 1503[16] on behalf of the Commission for Racial Justice, United Church of Christ; the National Alliance; and the National Conference of Black Lawyers, asserting gross violations in the United States of international covenants on human rights and against racism.[17]

None of these well-documented and unrebutted initiatives filed with the UN were able to pierce the zone of safety surrounding US sovereignty. To this day, US decision-makers are cushioned from adverse international public opinion concerning the nation's racial practices, and their insulation prevents the imposition of international legal remedies in domestic or international fora.

The efficacy of United Nations' remedies

There are inherent limitations to the efficacy of UN remedies since all international procedures designed to protect human rights are extremely convoluted and ultimately rely upon the good faith and cooperation of the accused governments.

The Human Rights Committee, the oldest and most established of the expert human rights treaty bodies, officially oversees the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Committee plays a number of different roles in the course of its work, some more subtle than others. It sets standards for interpretation of the Covenant. It draws the attention of the world community to human rights issues. It engages in a dialogue with states parties, pointing out domestic human rights issues that they may not have been aware of or that they would have rather ignored. Under the Optional Protocol, the Committee considers individual cases.[18]

One of its most important roles, however, is to urge and steer Covenant implementation by states-parties using the report system. Under this system, states-parties present a report to the Human Rights Committee every five years, informing the Committee of the domestic status of and developments with regard to issues addressed by the Covenant.

States are required by Article 2(2) of the Covenant to "adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant." However, the process of adoption can be slow and arduous or non-existent. In the initial report, states give a description of their domestic human rights protections, sometimes noting changes in domestic laws that they made upon ratification of the Covenant. The initial report shows the commitment of the state to human rights, both prior to ratifying the Covenant and immediately afterwards.

There are inherent limitations to the efficacy of UN remedies . . .

In their subsequent periodic reports, states usually focus only on further developments in the legislative and judicial spheres. Since the periodic reports focus on progress made while the state has been a party to the Covenant, the ability to measure the effectiveness of the Committee and the Covenant through analysis of the changes announced in these reports is very limited. When a state itself announces that it has used the work of the Committee to improve human rights within its boundaries, then the world community may see the results of the application of the international instrument.[19]

The procedure established by UN ECOSOC resolution 1503 is intended for consideration of systematic, massive violations of human rights and involves the entire hierarchy of the UN's human rights organs: the General Assembly, ECOSOC, the Commission on Human Rights, and the Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. It is intended to identify and correct, if possible, "situations which appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights." Although communications which allege individual violations may be taken as evidence of such patterns or practices if they are received in sufficient quantity, they will not be treated as cases for remedial action in and of themselves.

The confidential[20] 1503 procedure is often selected by individuals when it is believed that the accused government may be embarrassed by, and therefore, responsive to an international complaint. The substantive requirements for the communication are extensive, very detailed and difficult for lay complainants.[21] The scope of 1503 subject matter is not precisely defined in the resolution, which refers to "gross and reliably attested violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including policies of racial discrimination and segregation and of apartheid."[22]

Formal requirements

Communications may be addressed to any organ or body of the United Nations, though it is recommended that they be addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in care of the Human Rights Centre (formerly the Division of Human Rights), Geneva, Switzerland.[23]

Resolution 1503 cases are considered by previously established organs of the United Nations. Preliminary review of each communication is by a five-member working group of the Sub-Commission, which meets immediately prior to each August session and receives summaries of communications, arranged by rights, throughout the year.

The cases initially deemed acceptable are then reviewed by the full Sub-Commission, a body of independent experts who serve in their individual capacities. The Sub-Commission decides whether to refer each situation to the Human Rights Commission, a 43 member organ composed of governmental representatives.

The Sub-Commission's working group makes a determination, based upon the content of the communication and the reply (if any) of the state complained against as to whether there are "reasonable grounds to believe that the communication reveals a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms." This decision is reached by majority vote of the working group, which meets in closed sessions.

While no rule prohibits the working group from requesting additional information from either the government involved or from the author of the communication, complainants have no right to a hearing or even to information as to the course of the proceedings. This near total confidentiality is

[redacted]

one of the often criticized characteristics of the 1503 procedure, and, once the author of a communication receives an acknowledgment that the communication has been received, all correspondence concerning the procedure ceases.

If the working group recommends further consideration, the communication and state's reply is forwarded to the Sub-Commission in confidential reports. The Sub-Commission decides, based on the communications and other "relevant information" transmitted by the working group, which situations "appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights requiring consideration by the commission." Thus, several communications regarding the same country may be considered together as constituting a single "situation."

There is no definition of what constitutes "relevant information." The author of a communication or an NGO intending to present such information cannot assert any right to do so. The Sub-Commission is not obligated to forward complaints to the Commission; it may hold over a case for consideration at the following session, or it may request that the working group reexamine a communication. If the Sub-Commission does decide to forward a complaint to the Commission, the state involved– but not the author of the communication– is notified and invited to present written comments to the Commission. Neither the Sub-Commission's findings nor its recommendations are published.

Prior to consideration by the full Commission, a communication essentially passes through several different decisions on admissibility, although there must be at least a *prima facie* showing of the merits of the complaint. Although there are not findings on the merits prior to action by the Commission, nevertheless, the referral of a situation to the Commission by the Sub-Commission is often interpreted as at least demonstrating that the allegations in a communication have some merit.

Enforcing international human rights law in United States courts

The principles, rules and problems governing the enforcement of international human rights law, both conventional and customary (*jus cogens*), in US domestic courts generally establish the standard for plaintiffs seeking redress in domestic courts elsewhere in the world since, until the South African elections, the United States was considered to be in the forefront of developments in this area.

Article VI, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides that "All Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Under this constitutional provision, uniquely referring to the relation of international law to domestic law in U.S. courts, a self-executing treaty, (or a non-self-executing treaty when implemented by Congress) supersedes all inconsistent state and local laws.

The other major source of international law, customary international law, is not mentioned in the Constitution, but the Supreme Court has ruled that it is "part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination." Like treaty law, it supersedes all inconsistent state and local laws and, at least in principle, all earlier inconsistent federal laws.

Under this theory of international law, subsequent federal laws will prevail in a domestic forum over both conventional and customary international law when a conflict arises. Thus, the United States may breach an international obligation and be held responsible internationally, as it was when Congress enacted the Byrd Amendment which, pursuant to the "last-in-time" rule (a self-executing treaty supersedes earlier inconsistent federal laws) required the President to violate United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia, and yet not be answerable for such a breach in US courts.

By other criteria, the UN Charter, having been ratified by the United States, is the supreme law of the land since under article 44(c) the United Nations has the duty to promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Under article 56, all members of the United Nations "pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55."

Under the early principles enunciated in *Foster v. Nielson,* the status of the human rights clauses of the UN Charter in US law turns upon whether or not they are self-executing, since "[i]t is only when a treaty is self-executing, when it prescribes rules by which private rights may be determined, that it may be relied upon for the enforcement of such rights." *The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States* (Revised), states that "[i]n the absence of special agreement, how the United States carries out its international obligations is ordinarily for it to decide. Accordingly, the intentions of the United States determine whether an agreement is to be self-executing in the United States or should await implementing legislation."

Since US courts have held that the human rights clauses of the UN Charter are non-self-executing even if the "intentions" of the United States are not stated, they have been held to vest no enforceable rights in individuals. The leading case is *Sei Fujii v. California*[34] in which an intermediary appellate court in California struck down a provision of the state's alien land law, under which land transferred to an alien not eligible for citizenship escheated to California. The challenge was premised on the grounds that the racially motivated statute was contrary to nondiscrimination provisions found in article 55(c) of the UN Charter.

The California Supreme Court, while affirming the judgment, did so exclusively on the ground that the statute violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth Amendment. It specifically rejected the lower court's reasoning, observing that there was nothing in articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter to indicate that these provisions were intended to become rules of law for the courts of this country upon the ratification of the Charter.

[Articles 55 and 56] lack the mandatory quality and definiteness which would indicate an intent to create justifiable rights in private persons immediately upon ratification....

The charter represents a moral commitment of foremost importance, and we must not permit the spirit of our pledge to be compromised or disparaged in either our domestic or foreign affairs. We are satisfied, however, that the charter provisions relied on by plaintiff were not intended to supersede existing domestic legislation, and we cannot hold that they operate to invalidate the alien land law...."

The finding that the norm of nondiscrimination found in article 55(c) does not provide a rule of law for U.S. Courts has been followed uniformly in subsequent cases. In *Diggs v. Dent*, a federal district court ruled that, while the Charter imposed "definite" international obligations on the United States,

...treaties do not generally confer upon citizens rights, which they may enforce in the courts. It is only when a treaty is self-executing that individuals derive enforceable rights from the treaty, without further legislative or executive action....The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations are not self-executing and do not vest any of the plaintiffs with any legal rights which they may assert in this court."

The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that even if the Charter imposed a binding international obligation on the United States, "that obligation does not confer rights on the citizens of the United States that are enforceable in court in the absence of implementing legislation."[37]

A more expansive reading of the Charter's human rights clauses, analogous to the Court's application of the "self-executing" character of the due process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, finds support in the Supreme Court holding in *Asakura v. Seattle* that "[t]reaties are to be construed in a broad and liberal spirit, and when two constructions are possible, one restrictive of rights which may be claimed under it, and the other favorable to them, the latter is preferred."[38]

The *Fujii* principle established in 1959, holding the Charter's human rights clauses too vague and indefinite to establish binding legal obligations enforceable in U.S. courts, should be untenable in the contemporary world. Any vagueness which may have characterized articles 55 and 56 in the 1940's or 1950's "has been eliminated in large measure through subsequent adoption by the United Nations of various international human rights instruments that give juridical content to [these articles]."[39] Specifically, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, now widely regarded as containing a universally recognized catalog of the human rights the members of the United Nations deem fundamental, should provide an authoritative interpretation of the Charter. This is so particularly since the human rights guaranteed in the Charter are in any event "no vaguer than a number of well-known constitutional and statutory expressions which have been left to the Courts to apply."[40]

Even if one were to believe that the language in articles 55 and 56 is too general to be self-executing as to all the rights guaranteed by the Universal Declaration and the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the universal acceptance of the non-discrimination norm contained in article 55(c) should be evidence of an international consensus supporting a rule of law prohibiting discrimination. This is so even if other human rights with less universal support cannot be protected solely on the basis of the Charter.[41]

In a case particularly pertinent to this discussion, the International Court of Justice, in its Advisory Opinion in the *Namibia Case*, noted that signatories of the Charter had pledged themselves "to observe and respect in....[territories] having an international status, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race," and that to deny human rights on the basis of race was "a flagrant violation of the purpose and principles of the Charter."[42] Some jurists still believe, reasoning from the Advisory Opinion, that the basic non-discrimination norm contained in the Charter is general in nature and should be binding on all states.

Whatever human rights norms are generated by the Charter can be given effect domestically only by member states, including the United States, if they are to fulfill their legal obligations under the treaty."[43]

Almost 150 years ago, Secretary of State Livingston stated in a letter that "[t]he Government of the United States presumes that whenever a treaty has been duly concluded and ratified by the acknowledged authorities competent for this purpose, an obligation is thereby imposed upon each and every department of the government, to carry it into complete effect, according to its terms, and that on the performance of this obligation consists the observance of good faith among nations."[44] Thus, U.S. courts, should be one of the "departments" of government obliged to construe articles 55 and 56 so as to render them effective, i.e., to regard them as self-executing.

At the time of adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United States made it clear that it did not deem the Declaraton a treaty and that it gave rise to no binding legal obligation.

One relatively recent federal court decision concerning the enforceability of international law in U.S. courts could pave the way for an eventual rejection of the *Fujii* rationale by the Supreme Court, if the political will to do so were present. In 1974, in *People of Saipan ex rel Guerrero v. United States Department of Interior*, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted a more sophisticated test for determining whether a treaty is self-executing. In holding that the UN Trusteeship Agreement over Micronesia provided the plaintiffs with "direct, affirmative, and judicially enforceable rights" to challenge the execution of a lease purported in violation of that agreement, the Court of Appeals noted that:

[t]he extent to which an international agreement establishes affirmative and judicially enforceable obligations without implementing legislation must be determined in each case by reference to many contextual factors: the purposes of the treaty and the objectives of its creators, the existence of domestic procedures and institutions appropriate for direct implementation, the availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement methods, and the immediate and long-range social consequences of self-or non-self-execution."[45]

This holding provides strong support for the assumption that articles 55 and 56 are self-executing. Even if it were impossible to prove the "intent of the parties" to the UN Charter, under article 1(3), one of the major "purposes" of the Charter is to "[promote] and [encourage] respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."

Notwithstanding, the prevalent legal construction in U.S. courts continues to be that the UN Charter's human rights clauses are non-self-executing and impose no duty on domestic courts. This construction seriously weakens enforcement of internationally recognized human rights in the United States.

Under *Saipan*, someday a court could reject *Fujii* and conclude that the Charter grants individuals a sold base of judicially enforceable human rights. Since most lower court judges display indifference if not disdain toward international law in general, under the current political climate, it is doubtful that in the near future a contemporary U.S. court will hold that the human rights clauses of the UN Charter are self-executing, even with respect to the basic nondiscrimination norm contained in article 55(c). Therefore, realistically, at this time race-based discrimination cannot be effectively challenged in U.S. courts under principles of international law.[46]

The United States' reluctance to permit the application of international standards to proscribe race based discrimination as well as other human rights violations has been of long duration. For example, the United States has an exceptionally poor record of ratifying other international human rights treaties. The Genocide Convention languished in the Senate for more than three decades, as did the ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the American Convention on Human Rights submitted to the Senate by President Carter in 1978 and ratified only in 1996.

Aside from the Refugee Protocol and the Protocol of Buenos Aires,[47] the other international human rights treaties ratified by the United States have not been applied or become the subject of judicial interpretation as to their self-executing nature.

Customary international human rights law under U.S. law

Treaties, rather than custom, have been the principal source of international human rights law in the United States. Currently, since the international law of human rights is becoming increasingly important, binding all states rather than only those parties to a particular treaty, its role in the United States as a remedy for race-based wrongs must be examined. As noted above, international law forms part of U.S. law and can be applied by the courts in making decisions.

At the time of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United States made it clear that it did not deem the Declaration a treaty and that it gave rise to no binding legal obligations. In the years since its adoption, however, "[t]he Declaration has been invoked so many times both within and without the United Nations that lawyers are not saying that....[W]hatever the intention of its authors may have been, the Declaration is now part of the customary law of nations and therefore is binding on all states." This view, first advanced solely by politically progressive legal scholars, but subsequently supported by resolutions of international conferences, states, and even court decisions, should have achieved widespread acceptance. Indeed, it has been suggested that the Declaration has the attributes of *jus cogens*, i.e., establishes peremptory norms of international law. The United States explicitly stated that at least parts of the Declaration reflect customary international law in the U.S. Memorial to the International Court of Justice concerning U.S. diplomats, and consular staff held hostage in Tehran. The Memorial concluded:

> *It has been argued that no such standard (an international obligation to observe minimum standards in the treatment of aliens) can or should exist, but such force as that position may have had has gradually diminished as recognition of the existence of certain fundamental human rights has spread throughout the international community. The existence of such fundamental human rights for all human beings, nationals and aliens alike, and the existence of a corresponding duty on every state to respect and observe them, are now reflected,* inter alia, *in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and corresponding portions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights....*

Since the United States agreed that it, as well as Iran, has an international obligation to comply with these provisions, this obligation should be enforceable in domestic courts, as well as international fora. This approach negates the need to determine the self-executing or non self-executing nature of the Declaration which is not a treaty, but turns upon whether the Declaration or parts thereof, are evidence of customary international law, and therefore can be used in U.S. courts either to supplement or to invalidate state or federal statutes.

The major breakthrough in the use of customary international human rights law occurred in 1980 when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit handed down its historic decision in *Filartiga v. Pena-Irala*. In *Filartiga*, two Paraguayan plaintiffs brought an action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against another citizen of Paraguay for the torture and death of their son and brother, basing their claim on the Alien Tort Claims Act, a federal statute dating back to the original Judiciary Act of 1789. That Act provides that "the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." The plaintiffs did not argue that their cause of action arose directly under a treaty to which the United States is a party. Rather, jurisdiction under the statute turned upon whether or not torture now violates "the law of nations," i.e., customary international law. The district court held that it did not.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that "an act of torture committed by a state official against one held in detention violates established norms of the international law of human rights, and hence the law of nations." The right to be free from torture, said the court, "has become part of customary law, as evidenced and defined by the Universal Declaration . . . which states, in the plainest of terms, 'no one shall be subject to torture.'" The court also cited the UN Declaration on Torture (1975), stating that "U.N. declarations are significant because they specify with great precision the obligations of member nations under the Charter." On the basis of an extensive examination of the sources from which customary international law is derived, the court concluded that "official torture is now prohibited by the law of nations. The prohibition is clear and unambiguous, and admits of no distinction between treatment by aliens and citizens." But as the author of the *Filartiga* opinion cautioned in a subsequent magazine article, the case's holding that torture is a violation of customary international law for federal questions purposes is a relatively narrow one. It should not be misread or exaggerated to support sweeping assertions that all (or even most) international human rights norms found in the Universal Declaration or elsewhere have ripened into customary international law enforceable in U.S. courts.

Subsequent cases indicate the possibilities and pitfalls of invoking customary international human rights law post-*Filartiga*. *Fernandez v. Wilkinson*, involved a Cuban refugee from the "freedom flotilla," whom the INS had determined was ineligible for admission into the United States because he had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. When he sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his confinement pending possible return to

Cuba violated his constitutional rights, the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas, after surveying the cases interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions, observed that, although Fernandez's confinement constituted "arbitrary detention....[D]ue to the unique legal status of excluded aliens in this country, it is an evil from which our Constitution and statutory laws afforded no protection." The Court then proceeded to break new ground by holding that "[customary] international law secures to petitioner the right to be free of arbitrary detention and that this right is being violated."

The *Fernandez* holding that, under customary international law, arbitrary detention may be prohibited, has not been specifically applied to race-based discrimination, which although violative of the United States Constitution, has never been held to be remediable under international law. The *Fernandez* court held that even though the indeterminate detention of an excluded alien cannot be said to violate the United States Constitution or statutory laws, it was found to be judicially remediable as a violation of international law. Accordingly, the United States was ordered to terminate petitioner's arbitrary detention within ninety days.

> *Ultimately, the obvious technical problems that impede the use of existing UN instruments for addressing contemporary race-based injuries . . . are less about the intrinsic limitation of international law than about domestic political considerations . . .*

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit did not directly address the district court's holding, instead determining that U.S. statutory law afforded a remedy on due process grounds for Fernandez's continued detention. Noting that "[d]ue process is not a static concept," the court thought it proper "to consider international law principles for notions of fairness as to the propriety of holding aliens in detention. No principle of international law is more fundamental than the concept that human beings should be free from arbitrary imprisonment." The court, citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights in support of this observation, noted that its construction of the statute in question "is consistent with accepted international law principles that individuals are entitled to be free from arbitrary imprisonment." Thus, while it did not apply customary international law directly, it applied it indirectly in determining the protection afforded by U.S. statutory law.

In *re Alien Children Education Litigation*, in addition to arguing that article 47(a) of the Protocol of Buenos Aires was self-executing, plaintiffs asserted that this and similar provisions in other international human rights instruments reflected an emerging rule of customary international law guaranteeing children free elementary school education. Although acknowledging that "[t]hese human rights instruments recognize the right of all persons to literacy or to a free primary education" the District Court concluded "that the right to education, while it represents an important international goal, has not acquired the status of [customary] international law."

The failure of the *Alien Children* court to build upon the *Filartiga* decision and to confirm these plaintiffs rights under article *26(1)* of the Universal Declaration has put a damper upon the development of international human rights.

From a contemporary perspective, it is doubtful that in the foreseeable future, a U.S. court will hold that the human rights clauses of the UN Charter are self-executing or that a particular article of the Universal Declaration reflects customary international law. But creative attorneys should consider the possibility that a court will regard them as infusing U.S. constitutional and statutory standards with their normative content. This "indirect incorporation" of the Charter and Declaration and other international human rights instruments, as well, warrants greater attention than it has received to date. Professor Schachter astutely observed over forty five years ago that "it would be unrealistic to ignore the influence. . . of the Charter as a factor in resolving constitutional issues which have hitherto been in doubt."

In another neglected precedent, in 1948, *Oyama v. California*, two justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, in a concurring opinion in a case striking down a portion of the California Alien Land Law as contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment, remarked that the statute's "inconsistency with [article 55(3) of] the Charter, which has been duly ratified and adopted by the United States, is but one more reason why the statute must be condemned." Two other justices observed that the United States could not "be faithful to [its] international pledge" . . ."if state laws which bar land ownership and occupancy by aliens on account of race are permitted to be enforced." Indeed, a district court judge later concluded, that "the fact that an article of the United Nations Charter is incongruent with a state law is an argument against the validity of such law."[69] In a similar case decided in 1949, the Supreme Court of Oregon, in *Namibia v. McCourt,* held the Oregon alien land law violative of the equal protection clause relying upon the Fourteenth Amendment. In its holding, the court declared that "significant changes. . . in our relationship with other nations and other people as a factor" affected its decision.[70] Article 55 of the UN Charter, was one of the factors it had taken into account in reaching its decision.

Although the Universal Declaration was invoked in direct fashion to help establish rules of customary international human rights law in both *Filartiga, supra,* and *Fernandez v. Wilkinson,*[71] the principle usefulness of these cases may be to provide U.S. courts a legal basis upon which to determine the content of constitutional and statutory standards so that domestic courts can enforce international human rights law. As a remedy for race-based injuries, whether directly or indirectly, these cases provide an area of human rights advocacy that should be explored. But they present many procedural difficulties including standing,[72] sovereign immunity,[73] acts of state,[74] and the political question doctrine.[75] These technical problems would also face plaintiffs seeking to invoke international human rights law to redress race-based injuries in the domestic fora.

Conclusions

Ultimately, the obvious technical problems that impede the use of existing UN instruments for addressing contemporary race-based injuries in the US and, no doubt, in Brazil, are less about the intrinsic limitations of international law than about domestic political considerations, especially in the face of documented, persuasive proof of "consistent patterns of racism" throughout each nation's history.

In international fora, if the accused is a powerful nation like the United States, those sitting in judgment are vulnerable to economic and political coercion. The struggle against apartheid presents an instructive lesson in the power of political action in contrast to law. International acceptance of colonialism as a viable political alternative prevented popular support for the struggles of the indigenous peoples of Africa until after the establishment of the United Nations in 1945. However, the Charter expressly condemned and repudiated colonialism and imperialism and established a long term timetable for the liberation of certain colonies. Although the impact of imperialism, particularly in Africa and Asia, had been historically ignored, the mass political resistance and global turmoil initiated by resistance movements like the Mau Mau, Frelimo, the African National Congress, SWAPO, and others seeking to liberate themselves from the continuing economic exploitation and political control of the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Portugal, and Germany. Such resistance forced international responses to these struggles.

But the legal racism, known most recently as apartheid in the Republic of South Africa, was declared a "domestic problem," rather than race-based discrimination in violation of international law. In the United States de jure and de facto segregation were similarly characterized as domestic issues and, therefore, outside the scope of international intervention.

Finally, in the case of South Africa, the internal resistance struggle buttressed by an international support movement, which included material assistance from certain nation states, political and economic sanctions imposed by governments and finally, the transnational corporate sector, ultimately made apartheid unprofitable. The linkage of NGOs throughout the world, using UN Covenants and Accords as the springboards of legitimacy and moral direction, supported this political process.

Now the less dramatic but essential work begins in South Africa to meet the basic needs of the South African people. The description of the contemporary conditions of the indigenous peoples of South Africa post-apartheid sadly echoes the conditions of most African peoples in the United States and Brazil to this day.

Poverty is the single greatest burden of South Africa's people and is the direct result of the apartheid system and the grossly skewed nature of business and industrial development which accompanied it. Poverty affects millions of people, the majority of whom live in the rural areas and are women. It is estimated that there are at least 17 million people surviving below the minimum living level in South Africa, and of these at least 11 million live in rural areas. For those intent on formenting violence, these conditions provide fertile ground.

It is not merely the lack of income which determines poverty. An enormous proportion of very basic needs are presently unmet. In attacking poverty and deprivation, the South African government aims to set South Africa firmly on the road toward eliminating hunger, providing land and housing, access to safe water and sanitation, affordable and sustainable energy sources, literacy and education and training, and improving health services for all of South Africa's people.

With a per capita gross national product (GNP) of more than R8 500, South Africa is classified as an upper middle income country. Given its resources, South Africa can afford to feed, house, educate and provide health care for all its citizens. Yet apartheid and economic exploitation have created gross and unnecessary inequalities. Unlocking existing resources for reconstruction and development will be a critical challenge during the process of reconstruction."

For all the reasons discussed in this paper, it is this author's conclusion that international law in the absence of political will and power cannot provide remedies for the consequences of racism and racial oppression in South Africa or the United States and Brazil.

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[1] Chapter 1 states that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

[2] Article 1 states that "all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." Article 2 declares that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration "without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."

[3] State parties "undertake to pursue a national policy to promote equality of opportunity and treatment in respect to employment and occupation, with a view to eliminating any such discrimination."

[4] State parties "undertake to apply a national policy that tend to promote equality of opportunity and treatment in the matter of education."

Affirms that discrimination between human beings on the grounds of race, color or ethnic origin is "an offense to human dignity, a denial of Charter principles, a violation of the rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and an obstacle to friendly and peaceful relations among peoples."

It calls for an end to racial discrimination in all its forms. Racial discrimination is defined in the Convention as "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life." State parties to the Convention undertake to pursue a policy of eliminating racial discrimination and promoting understanding among races.

[7] States parties to the Covenants undertake to guarantee that the rights set forth in them will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. The two Covenants (including the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, constitute the "International Bill of Human Rights."

It provides that international responsibility for the crime of apartheid shall apply to individuals, members of organizations and institutions and representatives of a State, whether living in the State in where the acts are perpetrated or elsewhere. Persons charged can be tried by any State party to the Convention.

[8] Among its findings was that "in spite of the efforts of the international community during the Decade, at the national, regional and international levels, racism, racial discrimination and apartheid continue unabated and have shown no signs of diminishing." The Conference adopted a Declaration and a Programme of Action.

[9] On the recommendation of the Second World Conference, the Assembly also approved a Program of Action for the Second Decade, offering proposals for action to combat apartheid; action in the areas of education, teaching and training, as well as in the dissemination of news and information, to create an atmosphere for the eradication of racism and racial discrimination; action by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to combat racism; and suggestions for other forms of international co-operation in this field.

[10] The Program of Action for the Third Decade focuses on recommendations to the States to adopt emergency measures to end acts of racism and racial discrimination against migrant workers and refugees. It also recommends looking closely at women belonging to ethnic or racial minorities who are victims of double discrimination based on gender and on ethnic or racial identity and encourage recommendations for action by NGOs.

[11] See *The Autobiography of W.E.B. Dubois: A Soliloquy on Viewing My Life from the Last Decade of its First Century* (New York, 1968) at 332 - 333.

[12] Patterson, William L., ed., *We Charge Genocide* (New York Civil Rights Congress 1961).

[13] The passports of W.E.B. Dubois along with internationalist Paul Robeson were also confiscated at this time.

[14] Bratman, George, ed. *By Any Means Necessary, Speeches, Interviews and a Letter by Malcolm X* (New York, 1970), 57-67; 152-156.

[15] Seale, Bobby. *Seize the Time: The Story of the Black Panther Party* (New York, 1979), 63-39.

[16] UN Economic and Social Council Resolution 1503 (XLVIII) 1970 is designed for consideration of systematic massive violations of human rights.

[17] Hinds, Lennox S., *Illusions of Justice* (1978).

[18] For a comprehensive analysis of the committee's work under the Optional Protocol, see DeZayas, Moller, Opsahl, "Application of the International Covenant on Human Rights Under the Optional Protocol by the Human Rights Committee," 28 *Germ. Y.B. Int'l L.* 9-64 (1985) (Reprint No. 1 available from the United Nations Center for Human Rights).

[19] See, Cohen, Cindy A., "The Early Harvest: Domestic Legal Changes Related to the Human Rights Committee and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," *Human Rights Quarterly* 13 (1991), 295-321.

The total confidentiality of the 1503 procedure means that the Secretariat will not even inform the author of the petition if a communication is under consideration.

Who may file. Any individual or group may submit communications. It is not necessary for the author to have been a victim or even to have firsthand knowledge of violations. "Direct and reliable" knowledge is sufficient, provided it is accompanied by *clear evidence.* A communication will not be considered if it appears to be based exclusively on newspaper or other mass media reports, although such reports may contribute to the proof offered.

There is no requirement that the complainant be a national of the state complained against, but the communication must be attributed to someone; anonymous communications cannot be accepted. The author may request that his or her identity be concealed from the government and others during the proceedings. Any country, even if it is not a member of the United Nations, may be the subject of a complaint/communication under the 1503 procedure.

The phrase "gross violations" may have a qualitative as well as a quantitative aspect, particularly insofar as the resolution distinguishes "gross" and systematic violations. Thus, the commission or subcommission may refuse to consider a situation that they do not deem sufficiently serious in terms of the rights allegedly violated or which is not "systematic" because it relates to only a few individuals or was imposed only for a comparatively short period of time.

It is the Centre, that part of the UN Secretariat specifically concerned with human rights, which initially processes the complaints. The Centre summarizes the communications in a confidential list, which is circulated to members of the Human Rights Commission, the sub-Commission, and the state against which the communication is directed. The communications themselves are placed in a confidential file.

A description of the rules to be followed in considering 1503 communications is set forth in Sub-commission Resolution 1 (SSIV) (1971). Complaints may be submitted in any language and must contain "a description of the facts and must indicate the purpose of the petition and the rights that have been violated."

Communications must be submitted within a "reasonable time after exhaustion of domestic remedies," provided such remedies are effective and not unreasonably prolonged. The exhaustion requirement is a common procedural barrier, based on the presumption that there are effective domestic remedies available to the individual claimant and the belief that a state should be given the opportunity to remedy violations before such questions are dealt with internationally. Clearly where a challenged government policy is expressed in legislation, domestic remedies will normally be inadequate unless the state's judiciary has the power to invalidate a law on constitutional grounds (as has been argued in respect to the United States). If the alleged practice is so widespread that government officials must be aware of it, its continued existence may imply that the authorities cannot or will not remedy the situation. Evidence of exhaustion of domestic remedies or the ineffectiveness of such remedies must be included in a communication, although the burden of proof to establish failure to exhaust domestic remedies is on the country concerned.

As thousands of communications are received each year, preliminary screening must be done by the Secretariat. It is unlikely that the Sub-commission's working group would recommend that more than 10 to 20 situations be referred to the commission in any given year. The Sub-Commission may not actually transmit more than a dozen of those situations to the Commission.

At the Commission level, Resolution 1503 offers several alternative courses of action. First, the Commission may terminate consideration, either through finding that no gross violation has occurred or that other circumstances require discontinuance of the procedure. Second, the Commission may continue consideration of a case until a later session. Third, it may decide to initiate a "thorough study" of the situation, with or without the consent of the government involved. The procedures involved in undertaking "thorough studies" are within the discretion of the Commission, which not long ago decided to make public one such study in the case of Guinea, despite the confidentiality requirements of Resolution 1503. Finally, *with the consent* of the government concerned, the Commission may make an investigation through an ad hoc committee. Such a committee would have power to receive communications and hear witnesses, although its procedures would be confidential and its meeting private.

Lillich, Richard B., "The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing International Human Rights Law" in Hannum, *Guide to International Human Rights Practice*, University of Pennsylvania Press (1986), 223.

See, *Asakura v. Seattle*, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924); *Ware v. Hylton*, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236-37 (1796).

The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).

Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) § 135 (1), Reporters' Note 1 at 68 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Restatement]. But see Murphy, "Customary International Law in U.S. Jurisprudence: A Comment on Draft Restatement II," *Int'l Practitioner's Notebook*, no. 20 (Oct. 1982), 17.

See, *The Over the Top*, 5 F.2d 838, 842 (D. Conn. 1925), and Restatement § 135 (2).

Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 465-67, *passim* (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973). See Restatement § 135(3).

27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (U.S. 1829).

Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976). While there is general agreement about the effect of a self-executing treaty, there is considerable confusion about the criteria to be used in determining whether a treaty is self-executing in the first place. Discussion of the problems involved may be found in Riesenfield, *The Doctrine of Self-executing Treaties and U.S. v. Postal: Win at Any Price?*, 74 Am.J. Int'l L. 892 (1980).

Restatement § 131(4) comment h at 46.

97 A.C.A. 154, 217 P.2d 481 (1959), aff'd, 38 Cal.2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).

38 *Cal.2d* at 722-25, 242 P.2d at 621-22. See also *Sipes v. McGhee*, 316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W.2d 638 (1947), rev'd 334 U.S. 1 (1948) in which the Supreme Court of Michigan noted that "pronouncements [of the Charter] are merely indicative of a desirable social trend and an objective devoutly to be desired by all well-thinking peoples." *Id.* at 628, 25 N.W.2d at 644.

Civil No. 74-1292 (D.D.C. 14 May 1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 797, 804 (1975), *aff'd sub nom. Diggs v. Richardson*, 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir., 1976).

555 *F.2d* at 850. For commentary on the Diggs case, see Newman & Burke, "Diggs v. Richardson: International Human Rights in U.S. Courts," 34 *Nat'L Law. Guild Prac.* 52 (1977); Comment, Public Interest Litigation and United States Foreign Policy, 18 *Harv. Int'l L.J.* 375 (1977).

265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924). See also *Kolovrat v. Oregon*, 335 U.S. 187, 193 (1961): "This Court has many times set its face against treaty interpretations that unduly restrict rights a treaty is adopted to protect."

Sarosdy, "Jurisdiction Following Illegal Extraterritorial Seizure: International Human Rights Obligations as an Alternative to Constitutional Stalemate," 54 *Tex. L. Rev.* 1464 (1976).

Schachter, "The Charter and the Constitution: The Human Rights Provisions in American Law," 4 *Vand. L. Rev.* 643, 655 (1951).

— I. Brownlie, *Principles of Public International Law* 596-98 (3d ed. 1979); M. McDougal, H. Lasswell & L. Chen, *Human Rights and World Public Order* 581-611 *passim* (1980).

Advisory Opinion on the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), [1971] I.C.J. 16, 57.

During the Ford and Carter Administrations, the United States generally took the position that the human rights clauses of the UN Charter had legal effect and should be complied with by all countries, including the United States. Thus, Acting Legal Adviser of the Department of State, George Aldrich, observed in 1974 that "members of the United Nations have a legal duty to promote respect for and protection of human rights around the world. . . . The Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are the basic texts in their field. I would point, in particular, to Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter. . . . The United States recognizes these obligations and is determined to live up to them." [1974] Digest of United States Practice in International Law 125 (1975). But subsequent administrations have abandoned these "obligations."

Letter from Secretary of State Livingston to Mr. Serurier, 3 June 1833, reprinted in 2F. Wharton, *Digest of the International Law of the United States* 67 (1866).

502 *F.2d* 90 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975). Most significantly, the Court of Appeals noted that "the substantive rights guaranteed through the Trusteeship Agreement are not precisely defined. However, we do not believe that the agreement is too vague for judicial enforcement. Its language is no more general than such terms as due process of law, seaworthiness, equal protection of the law, good faith, or restraint of trade, which courts interpret every day." Id., 113-14.

Human rights clauses are non-self-executing, *Lareau v. Manson*, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1187-88 n.9 (D. Conn. 1980), aff'd, 651 *F.2d* 96 (2d. Cir. 1981).

See, in Kramer, "Due Process Rights for Excludable Aliens Under United States Immigration Law and the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Statutes of Refugees: Haitian Aliens, A Case in Point," 10 N.Y.U. J. *Int'l L. & Pol'y* 203 (1977), and Lieberman & Krinsky, Political Asylum and Due Process of Law: The Case of The Haitian Refugees, 33 *Nat'l Law. Guild Prac.* 102 (1976).

See 3 U.N. GAOR 934, U.N. Doc. A/177 (1948).

Humphrey, The International Bill of Rights: Scope and Implementation, 17 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 527 (1976). Humphrey himself had observed that the Declaration "is part of the customary law of nations and there is binding on all states. The Declaration has become what some nations wished it to be in 1948: the universally-accepted interpretation and definition of the human rights left undefined by the Charter," *Id.*

Memorial of the United States at 71, "Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran)" (International Court of Justice, Jan. 1980).

630 *F.2d* 876 (2d Cir. 1980). See also Schneebaum, The Enforceability of Customary Norms of Public International Law, 8 *BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.* 289 (1982).

630 *F. 2d* 876 (2d Cir. 1980).

Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976)).

630 *F.2d*, 881.

630 *F.2d* 883.

Id., 884.

Kaufman, "A Legal Remedy for International Torture?," *New York Times Magazine*, Nov. 9, 1980, § 6, 44.

505 *F. Supp.* at 795.

Id., 798.

654 *F.2d* 1390.

501 *F.Supp.* 544, (S.D. Tex 1980) (aff'd 5th Cir. 198), 102 S.Ct. 2382 (198).

Idem.

Idem., 590.

See Bilder, Integrating International Human Rights Law into Domestic Law - U.S. Experience, 4 *HOUS. J. Int'L L.* 1 (1981); Christenson, "The Use of Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation," *id.* at 39 (1981), "Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal Protection Analyses," 52 *U. Cin L. Rev.* 3 (1983); Louden, "The Domestic Application of International Human Rights Law: Evolving the Species," 4 *Hastings Int'L & Comp. L. Rev.* 161 (1981); Martineau, Interpreting the Constitution: The Use of International Human Rights Norms, 4 Human Rights Q. 87 (1983); and Paust, "Human Rights: From Jurisprudential Inquiry to Effective Litigation" (Book Review), 56 *N.Y.U.L. Rev.* 227 (1981). Cf Oliver, "Problems of Cognition and Interpretation in Applying Norms of Customary International Law of Human Rights in United States Courts," 4 *Hous. J. Int'L L.* 59 (1981).

Schachter. The Charter and the Constitution: The Human Rights Provision in American Law. 4 *Vand. L. Rev.* 643, 658 (1951).

332 U.S. 633 (1948).

332 U.S. 673 (1948) (Murphy, J. & Rutledge, J., concurring).

Idem at 650 (Black, J. & Douglass J. concurring).

United States v. Vargas, 370 F. *Supp.* 908, 914-15 (D.P.R. 1974), vacated and remanded, 558 F.2d 631 (1st Cir. 1977).

185 Ore. 579, 604, 204, P.2d 569, 579 (1949).

654 *F.2d* 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).

The leading standing case is *Diggs v. Shultz*, supra, where Congressman Diggs and other plaintiffs sued for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment that the Byrd Amendment, permitting the United States to resume the importation of chrome from Southern Rhodesia, in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 232, was null and void. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the district court's determination that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the action, holding that they were "unquestionably within the reach of [the] purpose [of Security Council Resolution 232] and among its intended "challenged [congressional action." 470 *F.2d* at 464. The U.S. subsequently argued, that on this point *Diggs v. Schultz* "was wrongly decided." *Diggs v. Richardson, supra,* at 850. The two cases are discussed in Lillich, "The Role of Domestic Courts in Promoting International Human Rights Norms," 24 *N.Y.L.S.L. Rev.* 153, 165-68, 172-76 (1978).

The leading sovereign immunity case is *Letelier v. Republic of Chile,* 488 *F. Supp.* 665 (D.D.c. 1980), a suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia arising out of the assassination in Washington, D.C., of former Chilean Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier. The Chilean government, who the plaintiffs alleged had ordered the assassination because Letelier openly opposed the ruling junta, claimed that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, (FSIA) 28 U.S.C. § 1602-11 (1976), deprived the court of jurisdiction. The court, disagreed. 488 *F. Supp.* at 673. Also see Note, 21 *Va Int'l L.* 291 (1981). The FSIA was not designed to thwart adjudication of cases arising out of human rights violations and should not be so construed. *Cf. Youngblood,* 1980 Survey of International Law in the Second Circuit, 8 *Syr. J. Int'l. L. & Com.* 159, 203-4 (1980).

In *Filartiga,* the defendant argued on appeal that "if the conduct complained of was the act of the Paraguayan government, the suit was barred by the Act of State doctrine." 630 *F.2d* at 889. The Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to decide the question, but expressed doubt "whether action by a state official in violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Paraguay, and wholly unratified by that nation's government, could properly be characterized as an act of state." *Id.*

The Act of State doctrine was also analyzed in *Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino,* which, contrary to the New York Court of Appeals in *New York Times Co., v. City of New York,* Commission on Human Rights, 41 N.Y. 2d 345, 352, 361 N.E. 2d 963, 972, 393 N.Y.US. 2d 312, 317 (1977), held that the Act of State doctrine does not preclude U.S. courts from adjudicating cases involving human rights violations by foreign government officials. See, Lillich, *supra,* at 159-62.

The political question doctrine remains the most serious obstacle in many cases to persons seeking to litigate international human rights law issues in U.S. courts. *Cf. Diggs v. Richardson, supra,* at 851. See Gordon, "American Courts, International Law and Political Questions Which Touch Foreign Relations," 14 *Int'l Law.* 297, 312 (1980), who criticizes blind adherence to traditional and outmoded precedents.

Reconstruction and Development Programme, *supra,* 14.

[redacted]

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Public Sector Interventions in Combating Racism in South Africa

By Mandy Taylor

"We, the people of South Africa
Recognise the injustices of our past...and
Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity."

So begins the Preamble to South Africa's new Constitution. Although the phrase "the injustices of our past" refers to a variety of wrongs, few would dispute the centrality of racism. South Africa pre-1994 was characterized by state sponsored racism which expressed itself in institutional structures, in the allocation of resources, and attitudes.

The Preamble indicates that it is a recognition of this reality that underlies the entire Constitution and underpins the framework around which the new South Africa is being crafted – and being crafted it is. With a recognition of the racism of the past our leaders, with our consent, are starting anew. Nothing can be taken for granted. New structures based on new values are being developed. Old structures are being transformed, and the South African public is being encouraged, cajoled or bullied into the new reality. This process of crafting a new reality is based on recognition of South Africa's racist past. Combating racism is therefore a central task.

The public sector, broadly defined, is both the object and agent of this restructuring process. The Constitution established new public institutions, it demanded the transformation of old public institutions, it established a new set of values for the public sector, and it gave the public sector the key role in the transformation of society.

In reviewing public sector interventions in combating racism, this essay will examine:

- the relevant Constitutional provisions;
- the process of transforming public institutions;
- how public resources are being reallocated to reflect the non-racism of current South Africa; and
- steps being taken to regulate society to effect racial equality.

The public sector is used in this paper as an all encompassing phrase that includes the three spheres of government - local, provincial and national; the different branches of government - the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, as well as various Constitutional institutions.

The Constitution

The primary step that expressed both the symbolism and practicality of the task of combating racism was South Africa's first non-racial elections in 1994. The second most significant step was the adoption of the new Constitution, which established a framework for South Africa as a non-racial and non-sexist society.

> *Given the institutionalization of racism in the past, combating racism involved the transformation of public structures . . .*

The Constitution, which came into effect on February 4, 1997, established a new set of values for South Africa. It developed structures to give effect to those values, and sought to regulate society to give expression to those values. All of this was done, not only with an eye to the future, but also a keen eye to the past.

Combating racism in South Africa in perpetuity was therefore a primary task of the Constitution. Importantly, the Constitution sets out an understanding of equality that encompasses both formal and substantive equality. Section 9 of the Constitution proclaims formal equality in its statement that everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. It proclaims substantive equality by acknowledging that steps need to be taken to counter the effects of past discrimination. It authorizes measures, including legislative measures, designed to promote the achievement of equality.

The Constitution, however, does not promote a picture where race has ceased to exist or have relevance. On the contrary, it specifically acknowledges the importance of diversity by giving equal rights to the 11 languages most commonly used in South Africa and ensuring that other languages used by smaller South African communities, such as Tamil or German, are respected; protecting the rights of cultural, religious or linguistic communities and establishing a Commission to oversee the needs of these communities; promoting language and cultural rights; recognizing traditional leaders; and recognizing the notion of self-determination for any community that shares a common cultural and language heritage.

The Constitution does much more than establish values and rights. It also defines how South Africa is to be governed.

Overview of public institutions and their role in combating racism

Former Homelands

Given the institutionalization of racism in the past, combating racism involved the transformation of public structures to reflect, amongst other things, South Africa's commitment to racial equality. Transformation had to happen at the most fundamental level by restoring South Africa's boundaries, abolishing the apartheid homeland system, and then resolving internal provincial borders.

The homeland system was established by the former government to give expression to its ideal of keeping the races separate. The policy of granting quasi-independence to homeland areas involved forcibly removing people from their homes and resettling them in homeland areas, taking away the citizenship of all Black South Africans, who were to exercise franchise and other rights in their designated homeland, and setting up and financially supporting bureaucracies in each homeland.

Unraveling this racist puzzle has been a complex and ongoing task that has involved redrawing provincial boundaries to express geographical rather than racial realities; repealing laws that were in operation in the former homeland areas; extending South African laws to also cover these former homeland areas; resolving the various citizenship questions that arose from abolishing the homelands - most important of which was confirming the South African citizenship of Black South Africans; and paying the debt incurred by these homeland areas. It has also meant that the new government inherited a system where a variety of different administrations governed, for example, service delivery, education, and the provision of health care. There was huge disparity in the ability of these different administrations to deliver and this has had ongoing consequences for direct and indirect racial discrimination.

Local Government

Homelands were only part of the labyrinthine system developed to express the apartheid ideal of keeping different races apart. In urban areas outside of the former homelands, strict residential segregation was prescribed by the Group Areas Act with separate municipalities being established for White and Black areas (White Paper on Local Government 1998, 1).

Local government's primary source of revenue has historically been property taxes and payment for the delivery of services. This suited White municipalities that had small populations to serve and large concentrations of economic resources to tax, but it was disastrous for Black municipalities. According to the White Paper, financial shortfalls were built into local government for Black areas. Retail and industrial developments were largely prohibited in these areas, limiting the tax base and forcing residents and retailers to spend most of their money in White areas (White Paper on Local Government 1998, 2).

The lack of investment in Black municipalities and their inability to raise funds had the effect of depriving millions of people of access to basic services, including water, sanitation, refuse collection and roads. This was true of both urban and rural areas. As a result, "water and electricity were supplied to white residents in rural areas at enormous cost, while scant regard was given to the needs of the rural majority" (White Paper on Local Government 1998, 2).

A transformation process was established in the Local Government Transition Act, 1993 (LGTA) – a process that is to be finally realized during 1999 with the adoption of various pieces of new local government legislation. Until this legislation is passed and the LGTA is repealed, local government remains in an "interim phase" with many of the laws and regulations of the old system still in effect.[8]

A vital part of the transformation process has been the amalgamation of previously divided jurisdictions. This has meant that formerly well off municipalities that serviced largely White areas now also include Black township areas. They, therefore, service a substantially larger population without a corresponding increase in the tax base. It has proved difficult to extend effective property taxation to the former township areas (White Paper on Local Government 1998, 8).

On an administrative level, the systems and structures of the better established municipal administrations (usually former White municipalities) were often adopted and extended to absorb staff from the small and usually Black administrations. While this minimized the administrative disruption, it did not facilitate transformation (White Paper on Local Government 1998, 91). The old system placed formal qualifications over job experience, and this meant that the staff of former Black Local Authorities were often disadvantaged. The result: many municipalities are still largely run by White males with women and Black people being represented only in the lower echelons of the new structures.

Not unexpectedly, local government finances are in crisis. Rent and service boycotts became an integral part of the anti-apartheid struggle, and this trend of not paying for services has been difficult to reverse. The White Paper on Local Government estimates that about a third of all municipalities are facing serious financial or administrative difficulties (at page 12). Similarly, a survey conducted by the Department of Constitutional Development concluded that debt in the amount of about R$8 billion was owing to the 393 municipalities that responded to the survey.[9] This represents 32 percent of total annual turnover of the local governments concerned, far in excess of the accepted norm of 11–15 percent. Small rural towns on average are able to collect only about 42% of amounts owed (Solomon 1998).

The scenario outlined above represents a huge challenge to South Africa. Local government has a key role in the delivery of services, and until this sphere of government is running efficiently, millions of Black South Africans will continue to be without basic services.

In meeting this challenge, municipalities will have to find ways of redistributing resources. A recent Constitutional Court case[10] had to consider whether a property levy on wealthier substructures within a metropolitan area could legitimately be used to subsidize poorer substructures within the same metropolitan area. Although the 10 member court was split, with five judges finding in favor of the applicants and five against, the Court was unanimous in its finding that "it is a legitimate aim and function of local government to eliminate the disparities and disadvantages that were a consequence of the policies of the past and to ensure, as rapidly as possible, the upgrading of services in previously disadvantaged areas so that equal services will be provided to all residents" (p. 1488 of the judgment).

The Cape Town Council has recently proposed an alternative basis for differentiated rates, which it hopes will not be susceptible to this kind of court challenge. The proposal is aimed at "enhancing equity within the City of Cape Town" (*Cape Times*, April 1, 1999) and is based on a sophisticated system of property valuations which will mean rates hikes for some areas and rate decreases for others.

Finally, the White Paper also speaks of the need for spatial integration as both a developmental imperative and a nation building imperative (p.24). Apartheid's ability to survive was partly based on spatial separation. Spatial integration will lead, amongst other things, to more integrated schools, businesses, and churches, and this is likely to have a significant effect on building racial understanding and tolerance.

The Legislature

Transformation was perhaps easiest to achieve in the legislature, as the nature of legislatures is that of changing faces with each new election. Thus the 1994 elections saw the coming into operation of a representative national legislature and nine representative provincial legislatures.

Although the task of making the legislature representative was easier than in other branches of government, the task given to the legislature was not. The National Legislature, particularly, faced the daunting prospect of rewriting the South African statute book not only to give effect to the new values expressed in the Constitution, but also to deracialize past legislation.

> *A structured affirmative action policy benefiting Blacks, women and the disabled is an explicit part of recent policy . . . .*

Overview of legislation passed between May 1994 and December 1998

Most of the more notorious pieces of apartheid legislation were repealed prior to the 1994 elections,[11] making the task of the new government to painstakingly go through old legislation to ensure the deracializing of all the detail. A review of all legislation passed between May 1994, when the new parliament began, and December 1998, reveals that about a third of the approximately 492 Acts passed have in some ways contributed to combating racism in South Africa.

Fifty-eight Acts dealt with unraveling the homeland system (repealing homeland legislation and extending South African legislation to those areas formerly covered by the ex-homelands). Many of these Acts are described as "Rationalization Acts" and they effectively bring the legislation of a number of departments and homelands under one umbrella Act.[12]

Twenty-four Acts dealt with issues of representativeness of public boards or governing bodies, in particular university structures and various medical councils. Universities went through a process of consultative transformation that resulted in, among other things, changes to university governing structures to ensure that they were more representative of the university community.[13]

Similarly the various medical councils went through a process of first establishing interim councils– which were generally an amalgamation of the various existing councils established either for different race groups or for homeland areas– and then establishing new and more representative permanent councils, most of which include community representation.[14] Other bodies that have been made more representative are: the Estate Agents Board,[15] the Agricultural Research Council,[16] and the Tourism Board.[17]

Eighteen Acts set up new institutions, many decreed by the Constitution, which have played a role in combating racism. Included in this category are the various Acts setting up new local government structures, as well as Acts establishing bodies such as the Office of the Public Protector, the Human Rights Commission, the Council of Traditional Leaders, the Volkstaat Council, the National Economic, Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), the Pan South African Language Board, and the Public Service Commission.

Thirty-nine Acts dealt with socio-economic rights, the realization of which will have a significant impact on combating direct and indirect racism. Some of the most important of these Acts are detailed below.

The Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994 established a process for dealing with land claims that arose from the policy of previous governments to reserve about 82 percent of the land for White ownership and to forcibly remove Black people from land reserved for Whites. Millions of people were dispossessed of their land, and this Act instituted a process for restitution. It established the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights and the Land Claims Court. Other land acts have sought to protect the rights of labor tenants who live and work on farms[18] and to provide occupiers of rural land with greater security of tenure.[19]

The South African Citizenship Act, 1995, as amended, restored South African citizenship to Black South Africans who had effectively been stripped of their South African citizenship when they became, by compulsion, "citizens" of a former homeland.

The South African Schools Act, 1996, created a unified national school system. It prohibits schools from conducting admission tests; it allows learners to receive education in the language of their choice as long as no racial discrimination is practiced; it provides that parents must make up the majority of voting members on school governing bodies; and it allows for the registration of independent schools as long as they don't have a racist admission policy.

The South African Qualifications Authority Act, 1995, enhances access to education and training across all sectors and all levels of education by emphasizing outcomes rather than formal qualifications.

The Labour Relations Act, 1995, among other things, extended the protection of labor legislation to categories of workers who had previously been excluded (in particular, domestic workers and farm laborers). It also extended workers' rights to strike and to engage in collective bargaining; provided for compulsory consultation with a workforce over a number of crucial areas, including retrenchments; and made dismissals based on any form of discrimination automatically unfair. Such dismissals carry a harsher penalty for the employer concerned than other dismissals.

The Telecommunications Act, 1996, sought to encourage ownership and control of telecommunication services by historically disadvantaged people.[20] Similarly, the Competition Act, 1998, sought to open the economy to a greater number of South Africans and to encourage competition from historically disadvantaged people.

The Welfare Laws Amendment Act established racial equity in certain welfare grants. Various housing and water acts have given effect to the government's commitment to provide houses and accessible water for all.

Twenty Acts dealt with racism in other ways, such as making professions more representative, or developing sport, art and culture in previously disadvantaged areas.[21] Included in this category are acts dealing with issues such as the recognition of traditional leaders, the recognition of customary marriages,[22] the establishment of a Volkstaat Council, issues around establishing common public holidays,[23] and geographical place names,[24] and providing protection and respect for the various languages in South Africa.

A number of Acts have sought to make the legal profession more accessible by abolishing Latin as a requirement, doing away with the 'split bar' which prevented attorneys from appearing in the High Court, introducing the concept of lay assessors, and making the requirements for access to the attorneys' or advocates' professions less stringent.[25] The review of the judiciary below indicates the importance of this step.

There are also a number of Acts which seek to extend funding and support for sport, art and culture to previously disadvantaged communities.[26]

In President Mandela's farewell speech to Parliament, he, too, reviewed "the 100 laws on average that have been passed by the legislature each year." We can conclude with him that:

> *These have been no trivial laws nor mere adjustments to an existing body of statutes. They have created a framework for the revolutionary transformation of society and of government itself, so that the legacy of our past can be undone and put right. It was here that the possibility was created of improving the lives and working conditions of millions.*[27]

The Executive

Change in the executive arm of government, or the public administration, had to be more incremental than elsewhere as the interim constitution included a "sunset" clause that guaranteed that public servants of the old regime would not lose their jobs.[28]

Nonetheless, the Constitution dictates that the public administration "must be broadly representative of the South African people" (section 195(i)). This presented the Public Service with an enormous challenge as indicated by the figures below which provide a 1994 profile of the Director to Director-General level of management of the former Public Service by population group and gender. This was prior to the amalgamation of various homeland administrations.

1994 - In Percentages

	African	Colored	Asian	White	Male	Female
% of Management Echelon	**2.0**	**1.0**	**3.0**	**94.0**	**95.0**	**5.0**
National Population (CSS mid-1995 Estimate)	76.0	8.0	3.0	13.0	49.0	51.0

Source: Office of the Public Service Commission

Dr. ZST Skweyiya, Minister of Public Service and Administration, has said that "the transformation of the Public Service is the reason for the existence of my ministry and constitutes the mission of the Department of Public Service and Administration" (Press briefing, 1). It is therefore useful to focus on policy initiatives from this department in reviewing executive efforts to combat racism.

A structured affirmative action policy benefiting Blacks, women and the disabled is an explicit part of recent policy documents from this department. The White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service, published in November 1995, stressed the need "to create a genuinely representative public service which reflects the major characteristics of South African demography, without eroding efficiency and competence" (p.15). It sees achieving representativeness as "a necessary precondition for legitimizing the public service and driving it towards equitable service delivery" (p. 52), and it proposed that by 1999 all departmental establishments should be at least 50% Black at management level (p. 55).

In 1997, three significant policy documents published by the Department confirmed the government's commitment to affirmative action as outlined in the White Paper on Transformation, but also criticized it for lacking precision. According to these documents, there was a need to switch from a numbers driven process to a more contextualized process. The previous policy provided an inadequate definition of representativeness. There were no programs established to manage the change required by affirmative action, and the process was not sufficiently related to the service delivery obligations of the public service.[7]

Some of the proposals included in these papers were to:

- review the criteria for defining job posts and to move away from a reliance on formal qualifications;
- include the element of 'potential' in recruitment practices;
- review job advertising practices; and
- emphasize staff training.

A specific obligation was placed on national departments and provincial administrations to develop a recruitment strategy that sought "to maximize recruitment from historically disadvantaged groups" and to set targets for achieving a representative workforce.

The White Paper on Human Resource Management argues that diversity plays an important role in service delivery as it enables the public service to be more responsive and customer focused. Public servants who can communicate in the language of those being served and who can relate to the diversity of South Africa's population will greatly improve the image of the service. In addition "an environment in which differing cultures are valued is likely to improve employee morale and contribute to increased job satisfaction and thus to increased productivity"(p. 26).

It is beyond the scope of this paper to review the progress in implementing the government's affirmative action policy across all 26 national government departments, as well as the numerous provincial administrations. The Presidential Review Commission (PRC) also declined to detail the transformation process in each department, but it said the following:

With respect to the racial and gender composition of the management echelon (Director to Director-General), the Commission's investigations revealed:

- *That a number of departments (particularly Education, Health and Welfare) and provinces had made quite encouraging progress towards the targets laid down in the WPTPS,[8] as well as towards the introduction of the kind of holistic and integrated strategies for affirmative action recommended in the White Paper;*
- *That a number of departments and provinces had made much less progress in this regard (particularly the Departments of Home Affairs and Justice, and the South African Revenue Services, and especially the Department of Housing which remains, disturbingly, an exclusively male and predominantly white preserve at the management levels) (PRC 1998, chapter 4).*

The PRC presented the following figures in selected departments and in all nine provinces (see page 88).

According to the PRC, progress towards representativeness in the professional and technical ranks of the public service has been even slower than in the case of the management echelon.

Some of the explanations given to the PRC for the slow progress with regard to affirmative action included: the lack of appropriately skilled and qualified Black and female applicants for posts, financial constraints (in terms of establishing new positions), and fears about "lowering standards."

A successful constitutional challenge[9] to the Department of Justice's affirmative action policy by the Public Servants' Association of South Africa is an indication of some of the complexities involved in this process. The Court found that the policy which determined that White males would not even be considered for certain earmarked positions, irrespective of their experience or the quality of other applicants, lacked rational basis in that it did not balance the need for affirmative action against the need for an efficient public service. The Court held that "representivity" was not an isolated principle which "implied that the efficiency of the public administration could not be compromised for the sake of promoting representivity." Measures adopted

Profile of Management Echelon in the Public Service by Population Group and Gender 31.10.97

(Selected Departments and All Provinces) - In Percentages

Department / Province	African		Colored		Asian		White		Race		Gender	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	B	W	M	F
Departments												
Education	28.0	8.0	8.0	4.0	8.0	4.0	36.0	4.0	60.0	40.0	80.0	20.0
Foreign Affairs	**21.3**	**6.6**	**1.6**	**0.0**	**6.6**	**1.6**	**57.4**	**4.9**	**37.7**	**62.3**	**86.9**	**13.1**
Health	23.1	23.1	0.0	7.7	0.0	0.0	38.5	7.78	53.2	46.5	61.5	38.0
Home Affairs	**46.7**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**53.3**	**0.0**	**46.7**	**53.3**	**100**	**0.0**
Housing	21.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	78.6	0.0	21.4	78.6	100	0.0
Justice	**19.6**	**1.5**	**0.8**	**0.0**	**1.2**	**1.9**	**71.5**	**3.5**	**25.0**	**75.0**	**93.1**	**6.9**
Labour	17.4	0.0	4.3	0.0	4.3	4.3	56.5	13.0	30.5	69.5	82.7	17.3
DPSA	**38.5**	**15.4**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**7.7**	**15.4**	**23.1**	**61.5**	**38.5**	**61.5**	**38.5**
Public Works	16.7	25.0	8.3	0.0	8.3	0.0	41.7	0.0	58.3	41.7	75.0	25.0
Safety & Security	**16.4**	**0.0**	**2.5**	**0.3**	**2.3**	**0.3**	**75.6**	**2.8**	**21.2**	**78.8**	**96.6**	**3.4**
Revenue Services	1.4	0.0	1.4	0.0	1.4	0.0	88.9	6.9	4.2	95.8	93.1	6.9
Welfare	**11.2**	**22.2**	**0.0**	**22.2**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**22.2**	**22.2**	**55.6**	**44.4**	**33.4**	**66.6**
Provinces												
Eastern Cape	**74.1**	**12.1**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**12.1**	**1.7**	**86.2**	**13.8**	**86.2**	**13.8**
Free State	**18.0**	**4.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**76.0**	**2.0**	**22.0**	**78.0**	**94.0**	**6.0**
Gauteng	17.4	5.8	2.2	1.4	3.6	1.4	63.0	5.1	31.9	68.1	86.3	13.7
KwaZulu-Natal	**37.3**	**1.3**	**1.3**	**0.0**	**4.0**	**1.3**	**52.0**	**2.7**	**45.3**	**54.7**	**94.7**	**5.3**
Mpumalanga	58.6	20.7	6.9	0.0	6.9	0.0	6.9	0.0	93.1	6.9	79.3	20.7
Northern Cape	**20.0**	**10.0**	**25.0**	**0.0**	**5.0**	**0.0**	**40.0**	**0.0**	**60.0**	**40.0**	**90.0**	**10.0**
Northern Province	84.9	7.5	0.0	0.0	1.9	0.0	5.7	0.0	94.3	5.7	92.5	7.5
North West	**53.3**	**16.7**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**1.9**	**0.0**	**26.7**	**0.0**	**73.3**	**26.7**	**83.3**	**16.7**
Western Cape	0.0	0.0	23.4	2.1	8.5	0.0	57.4	8.5	34.1	65.8	89.4	10.6
All Departments & Provinces	**23.4**	**3.8**	**2.8**	**0.7**	**2.8**	**0.7**	**61.8**	**4.0**	**34.2**	**65.8**	**90.8**	**9.2**

M = Male F = Female B = Black W = White

Source: Statistical Analysis of Personnel in the Public Service in Africa, PRC 1998

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by the Department were "haphazard, random and over-hasty," and they failed to meet the requirement of being "designed" measures. Their effect, said the Court, was, therefore, to unfairly discriminate against the applicants.

The Judiciary

Similarly, the Judiciary required and continues to require extensive transformation. The apartheid legacy meant a judiciary made up primarily of White males at both the levels of High Court judges, as well as magistrates. In a submission to the TRC, the General Bar Council said the following:

> *As regards race and the judiciary, it is an undoubted fact that, until the permanent appointment of Judge Mahomed, the Bench in South Africa was entirely White and, with two exceptions, entirely male. (General Council of the Bar 1997).*

An unrepresentative bench has significant implications for the credibility of the judiciary.

Righting this situation has not been an easy task, firstly, because of the security of tenure given to judges[12] and secondly, because the system also produced mainly White senior advocates and to a lesser extent White prosecutors from whose ranks judges and magistrates, respectively have traditionally been chosen.

A 1997 study by O'Regan, now a Constitutional Court judge, highlighted the extent of this problem. She found that 88 percent of partners in large law firms were White male, 6.5 percent were White female, 5.3 percent were Black male and 0.3 percent were Black female. The figures at the level of state advocates were: White male, 59 percent; White female, 24 percent; Black male 13 percent; Black female, 4 percent. Figures for senior advocates at the Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria and Pietermaritzburg bars were: White male, 92.6 percent; White female, 1.5 percent; Black male, 5.4 percent; Black female, 0.5 percent. Junior advocate figures were: White male, 74.9 percent; White female, 12.3 percent; Black male, 10.2 percent; Black female 2.5 percent (O'Regan 1997).

The Constitution requires that when judicial officers are appointed, the need for the judiciary to reflect broadly the racial and gender composition of South Africa must be considered (section 174). This task falls largely to the Judicial Services Commission (JSC) which advises the President on the appointment of judges.[13] In order to fulfil its Constitutional mandate to make the bench more representative, the JSC has looked beyond the ranks of senior counsel with a number of recent appointments being drawn from the attorney's profession or from the legal academic world.

Figures provided by the Ministry of Justice indicate that as at the end of May, 1999, of the 183 permanent judges, there were 138 White male judges (75.4 percent); 8 White female judges (4.33 percent); 33 Black male judges (18.03 percent); and 4 Black female judges (2.1 percent). This represents an improvement on the 1997 figure of only 12 percent of judges being Black (Jacobs 1998, 49).

Although the steps to make the judiciary more representative have been relatively modest, they have also been very controversial as evidenced by the opposition of judges themselves to the appointment of Judge Mohamed as Chief Justice[14] and to the recent appointment of two Black Judge Presidents.[15] All of these appointments were followed by protest resignations from White judges.

In the Magistrates' Court, the issues are similar. According to a study by the Law, Race and Gender Unit of the University of Cape Town, in January 1997, 68 percent of all magistrates were White, with the percentage of White magistrates being even higher at the levels of regional, senior and Chief Magistrates (Jacobs 1998, 48-49).

An unrepresentative bench has significant implications for the credibility of the judiciary. The recent six year jail sentence for fraud meted out to Rev. Allan Boesak, an anti-apartheid hero in the eyes of many, came on the same day that a White farmer was given a suspended sentence for shooting a Black child. White judges delivered both judgements. The juxtaposition of the two sentences elicited widespread comment on the racial ramifications of a largely White bench, indicating how closely related is the question of "representivity" to the question of judicial credibility.

The situation is further complicated because the majority of people standing trial for criminal offences in South Africa do not have legal representation. Unrepresented accused people (who are largely Black) are faced with an alien and intimidating justice system run largely by Whites. The result is not only questionable justice, but ongoing racial mistrust.

Various Commissions

Given the enormity of the task facing South Africa, the Constitution also established various "state institutions supporting constitutional democracy,"[16] a number of which play a role in combating racism. It is within the Public

Protector's brief, for example, to investigate complaints of improper racist conduct by government officials; the Gender Commission's work amongst rural women has the effect of empowering those women all of whom are Black; and the IBA has played a crucial role in facilitating greater Black ownership of the airwaves. The Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities may, when it is eventually established, play a significant role in facilitating greater racial and cultural tolerance. Of all these bodies, however, the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) is currently most directly involved in combating racism.

South African Human Rights Commission

The Human Rights Commission must promote, protect and monitor human rights in South Africa. It has investigative powers and can take steps to secure appropriate redress for human rights violations, including taking court action either on its own behalf or on behalf of others.

Too many prefer to deny the existance of racism or presume a superficial tolerance.

Combating racism is a key priority for the Commission. It operates largely by receiving and dealing with complaints and by far the majority of complaints received deal with racial discrimination.[9]

The Commission not only deals with individual complaints but also uses complaints as a way of determining systemic problems. In the past year complaints from schools exceeded complaints from other sources and consisted in the main of allegations of racism and unjust procedures. The Commission responded by commissioning a study of "racial intolerance and discrimination in South Africa's public high schools" (SAHRC newsletter, 1).

Questionnaires were sent to learners and managers of 90 schools, 10 from each province. The results were startling. Almost two-thirds of the students interviewed acknowledged that racial incidents had occurred at their school. According to the investigation report: "while this study unsurprisingly shows that subtle racism is ubiquitous and has the ability to mutate and adapt in post-1994 South Africa; it has also revealed shockingly stark and crude practices of racism, all the more startling because of its prevalence" (Study of Racism in Schools 1999, 2).

In his preface to the report drawn up on the investigation, Commission chairperson, Barney Pityana says:

> *Schools continue to be characterized by racial separation and discrimination. Efforts at racial integration have not achieved the desired results, in part because learners approach school with the prejudices imbued in their home environments and the schools have no mechanisms to challenge and stimulate the unlearning of ingrained prejudices, as well as transform the minds of learners. Educators exhibit little or no commitment to constructing a learning environment free from discrimination and prejudice. Too many prefer to deny the existence of racism or presume a superficial tolerance. Some prefer to have their schools as laboratories for cultural assimilation where Black learners are by and large tolerated rather than affirmed as of right. Four years since the miracle of 1994, school playgrounds are battlefields between Black and White school-goers. Formerly White schools have become theaters of struggle for transformation as Black parents demand access for their children. In a real sense the real task of education and learning has ceased to take priority. In the longer run, our country will pay the price.*

Some of the recommendations in the report are:

- Immediate action where blatant racism has been identified;
- Establishing an independent consultative body to develop a strategy for addressing racism in education;
- Obliging schools to develop anti-discrimination policies;
- Providing anti-racist training for school managers, teachers and learners.

Importantly, the 90 schools chosen for the above study were all formerly White, Indian or Colored schools. Desegregation has only happened in these schools, while African township schools and ex-homeland schools, which cater to the overwhelming majority of learners in South Africa, remain almost wholly racially exclusive and under-resourced. According to the investigation report, only about 5000 schools out of a total of 27,864 schools in South Africa have undergone any form of desegregation.

Racism in the media is another systemic investigation being carried out by the Commission.[10] The Commission's goals for this inquiry are broader than simply exposing racism in the media. The Commission also hopes the investigation will serve to generate debate and dialogue about racism among South Africans and that it will help journalists and editors understand the racial impact of their work (SAHRC Newsletter April 1999, 5).

The Commission receives many complaints of racism in the South African Police Services (SAPS), but has decided to deal with the issue on a case-by-case basis rather than as a systemic problem, as the Minister of Safety and Security has convened his own investigative team to consider racism in the police (SAHRC Annual Report 1997/98, 27).

Reallocation of Resources

Racism in apartheid South Africa showed itself overtly in the enormous disparity in resource allocation between different racial groups. The legacy of this is that poverty in South Africa has strong racial dimensions with nearly 95 percent of South Africa's poor being African (Liebenberg and Tilley 1998, 8).

The racial disparity in government spending was evident in every area of life including education, in health facilities, in welfare grants, and in municipal services. One of the major tasks facing the new government was to find ways of allocating public resources equitably.

As expected, this has been a very complex process that has not involved simply redrawing the budget. The issue facing the government has been how to achieve equity with limited resources. Inevitably the process has meant downgrading facilities for some groups so that facilities for other groups can be upgraded.

Granting equal rights to health care facilities, for example, had to involve more than doing away with hospitals that catered for specific races. It also involved ensuring that there are equal facilities available to every community. With the largest and best resourced hospitals being located in urban areas and often in locations more easily accessed by Whites than Blacks, a whole shift in health care policy was required with the emphasis in funding priorities now being on primary health care. This has had very negative implications for some of the larger teaching hospitals (Pulse 1998, 75-76).

Although correcting racial disparity in resources is being carried out in every government department, this paper will focus on two areas which provide an indication of some of the steps being taken by government, and some of the complexities that have surrounded these steps. The first example will be welfare grants and the second the public funding of schools.

Welfare Grants

During apartheid, 14 different departments for different racial groups and homelands administered the welfare system (White Paper on Welfare). This resulted in fragmentation, inefficiency, and often in racially skewed take-up rates of various social grants. Thus, although discrimination in grants has not been legally sanctioned since 1994, administrative barriers and lack of knowledge of the various grants have continued to obstruct the attainment of equal access to social welfare.

Referring to the previous state maintenance grant system (SMG), for example, the Lund Committee on Child and Family Support said: "In the former welfare administrations serving African people there was little consistency in what happened to the SMG. Some administrations did not award them at all; some had them in the regulations but in fact did not apply them; some awarded only the child part of the grant, and not the parent part."

Racial disparity in grants in South Africa has a long history, with either no allocation of a grant to certain race groups or a much lower grant than for Whites. African old age pensions, for example, amounted to only 16% of White pensions in 1972. By 1993 African old age pensions had increased to 85% of White pensions, with parity eventually being achieved in 1994 (Liebenberg and Tilley 1998, 6).

Sadly, parity in social spending levels has occurred by reducing the benefits to people who are already vulnerable and marginalised. Pension equalization, for example, involved increasing Black pension benefits and seriously eroding real White pensions. The maximum real value of the pension for a White recipient decreased from R$430 in 1980 to R$234 in 1996 while an African recipient received a real increase from R$132 in 1980 to R$234 in 1996 (van der Berg, 485-486).

Similarly, old age homes are largely occupied by Whites and, according to the White Paper on Social Welfare, this focus on institutional care is unaffordable (at page 49). Although the White Paper adds that "any planning concerning equity of services will be deeply sensitive to people's diverse values and traditions," a recent television documentary indicated the catastrophic effects closing certain old age homes will have on some residents.

The issue of childcare support presents a similar example. In 1987 African grants were 17 percent of White grants and the 1990 take-up figures were:

- 48 out of 1000 Colored people
- 40 out of 1000 Indian people
- 2 out of 1000 African people
- 15 out of 1000 White people

In order to establish equity, the old maintenance grant system was abolished and replaced with a new child support system that cut levels of the grant substantially and limited the grant to children younger than 7 years of age.

The former state maintenance grant system, however, played an important role in keeping many Colored households above the Household Subsistence Level (Liebenberg and Tilley 1998, 14). It was predicted that the effects of the reduction of the grant on Colored households in the Northern and Western Cape would be disastrous. According to one researcher, "a massive downwards trend on the poverty scale among children and even starvation are to be expected, if no measures are taken to support these communities in other ways than by maintenance grants" (Haarmann 1998, 208).

Public Funding of Schools

Education is another area where there was huge racial disparity in public funding. During apartheid, schools were fragmented into 19 different education departments and funding varied on the basis of race. In 1986 per capita subsidies for Whites were R$2365 compared with R$572 for Africans. In homeland areas, these subsidies were even lower with Kwazulu-Natal being the lowest at R$262 per child (i.e., about 10 times less than the amount being spent on a White child). Between 1985 and 1992, there was an increase in real spending per pupil and a move towards closing racial gaps in funding. Nevertheless, in 1992, four times as much public money per capita was spent on White pupils than on Africans. In 1993, average spending on pupils was R$4700 for Whites, compared with R$1440 for Africans (SAHRC Study into Racism at Schools 1999, 10).

> *Combating racism in South Africa required and continues to require drastic steps to remedy the past and to create a new non-racial society.*

The Department of Education has recently adopted a policy that will have the effect of making more money available to disadvantaged schools and less money available for advantaged schools.[7] According to the policy, schools will be ranked from the most wealthy to the poorest and divided into five groups of roughly 20% of the school-going population. The richest 20% of schools will receive 5% of the resources available to the provincial education department, and the poorest schools will receive 35%. School fees will be a matter for the school parents to decide, except that parents whose combined income is less than 10 times the annual school fee will be exempted from paying fees, and those earning less than 30% of their children's annual fees will qualify for a partial exemption.

The Constitution is one of the most progressive in the world in its inclusion of socio-economic rights. It provides justiciable rights including the right to housing, health care, food, water, social security, education, and a healthy environment. Children have the right to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services.[8] Meeting these needs is not only a Constitutional requirement, it is crucial for long term stability in South Africa. Given the racial face of poverty, it is also an integral part of creating a non-racial society. Yet the government has to do this on limited resources and has to find ways of remedying years of disparate resource allocation. This is perhaps the greatest challenge facing the government.

Regulating Society

The Constitution applies to private as well as to public relationships and actions. Thus one's rights to equality, dignity, and fair labor practices, among others, are enforceable against individuals and the private sector, as well as against the public sector. The role of the public sector is to regulate society in such a way that these rights are realized.

Some of the most significant regulatory mechanisms dealing with racism are contained in the Employment Equity Act, the National Empowerment Fund Act, the clause dealing with "hate speech" in the Film and Publications Act, and the proposed Prevention and Prohibition of Unfair Discrimination Bill.

The Employment Equity Act, 1998, which came into effect in 1999, seeks to address the inequitable distribution of jobs and incomes. It goes beyond the removal of formal barriers by not only prohibiting discrimination but also obliging certain employers to implement affirmative action programs.

The prohibition against unfair discrimination refers to recruitment, conditions of employment, facilities, training and disciplinary measures. The section of the Act prohibiting discrimination applies to all employers and prohibits discrimination on a wide range of grounds.

The section in the Act that deals with affirmative action programs applies only to "designated employers," which means employers with over 50 employees or with a turnover greater than a specified amount for their sector.[9] In effect the Act obliges such employers to implement an employment equity plan in respect of Black people, women and people with disabilities. Importantly, the state is also defined as a designated employer which means that municipalities and all organs of state will be obliged to develop, implement and report on their employment equity plans.

The National Empowerment Fund Act, 1998, will provide historically disadvantaged people with the opportunity of acquiring shares in commercial enterprises owned or controlled by the state. In a recent interview, Deputy Trade and Industry Minister, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, said that the fund, due to be launched before the June elections, could benefit millions of people (Business Day 29th March, 1999). The fund is expected to start with over R$2.2 billion in assets. It will buy shares in privatized utilities from government at a discount of up to 20% and resell them to historically disadvantaged people.

The Films and Publications Act, 1996, restates the Constitutional proviso that freedom of expression does not extend to "advocacy of hatred based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion which constitutes incitement to cause harm." It makes it an offence to distribute or present publications, films or entertainment that amount to such advocacy of hatred. It is a defense if the publication is a bona fide discussion on a matter pertaining to religion, belief or conscience or a matter of public interest.

Equality legislation is required by section 9(4) of the Constitution, which says: "No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone….National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination."

Drafting the legislation has been a joint project of the Human Rights Commission and the Ministry of Justice. At the time of this writing, only an initial and very unfinished draft of the legislation was available and what follows is based on that draft.

The Bill deals not only with racial discrimination but also with all the Constitutional 'equality' grounds listed in section 9 of the Constitution. The Bill's purpose is to promote equality through positive measures to eliminate unfair discrimination, and to prohibit unfair discrimination.

The Bill sets out a number of areas for regulation and in each section it stipulates prohibited actions and then provides permissible defenses. For example, in the section on education, discrimination in admission policies is prohibited, although it is a defense to say that the school is a single sex school or that admission was restricted on the grounds of religion, language or culture.

In a lengthy section on health care, unfair discrimination is prohibited in relation to access to services, access to health resources, rights of privacy, and rights to information. A section on land, housing and accommodation prohibits discrimination in purchasing or leasing property, or in the occupation or use of property. This does not apply if the owner or a close relative of the owner lives on the property and less than three rooms are offered for accommodation to the public.

Unfair discrimination in supplying goods, services or facilities is prohibited, and the only defense listed is in the provision of insurance, if the discrimination is based on a reasonable reliance on actuarial data.

A member of a partnership may not discriminate in any way, including in determining who should be invited to become a partner. Similarly, professional bodies may not unfairly discriminate against people who wish to become members unless there is a law regulating membership.

At this stage, the only remedy proposed by the Bill is civil action.

Conclusion

Apartheid took racism to new and bizarre levels. It entrenched in law the notion that races were unequal and could not live together and implemented those laws with ruthless determination. The boundaries of the country were redrawn to present the apartheid ideal of different area allocations for different groups: urban areas were strictly segregated, and, perhaps worst of all, the Black majority, comprising about 80 percent of the population, was systematically deprived of its share in the country's resources.

Combating racism in South Africa required and continues to require drastic steps to remedy the past and to create a new non-racial society. It is hoped that this overview of steps taken by government to combat racism will instill in South Africans a sense of pride at how much has in fact been achieved against so many odds. President Mandela's farewell speech to Parliament sums up well where we have come from and how far we still have to go.

The world admires us for our success as a nation in rising to the challenges of our era. Those challenges were: to avoid the nightmare of debilitating racial war and bloodshed and to reconcile our people on the basis that our overriding objective must be together to overcome the legacy of poverty, division and inequity. To the extent that we have still to reconcile and heal our nation, to the extent that the consequences of apartheid still permeate our society and define the lives of millions of South Africans as lives of deprivation, those challenges are unchanged.

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[1] The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996.

[2] Chapter 9 of the Constitution establishes various state institutions supporting constitutional democracy. These are: the Public Protector, the South African Human Rights Commission, the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities, the Commission for Gender Equality, the Auditor-General, the Electoral Commission, and an Independent Authority to regulate broadcasting.

[3] The Constitution was drafted and adopted by a Constituent Assembly made up of the two Houses of Parliament sitting jointly. It was a lengthy process that dominated and disrupted the first two years of the new parliament's life.

[4] Section 6 of the Constitution.

[5] Sections 11 and 185 of the Constitution.

[6] Section 211 of the Constitution.

[7] Section 235 of the Constitution.

[8] Clause 26 of Schedule 6 (Transitional Arrangements) of the Constitution.

[9] The current 'interim' system of local government comprises 843 municipalities.

[10] *Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater JHB Transitional Metropolitan Council* 1998(12) BCLR 1458 (CC).

[11] For example, the Group Areas Act, the Separate Amenities Act and the Population Registration Act.

[12] For example, Mineral and Energy Laws Rationalization Act, 1994; the Integration of Labor Laws Act, 1994; the Safety Matters Rationalization Act, 1996.

[13] University of Durban-Westville (Private) Amendment Act, 1996; University of Port Elizabeth (Private) Amendment Act, 1996 University of Transkei (Private) Act, 1996; University of Venda (Private) Act, 1996; University of Zululand (Private) Amendment Act, 1996.

[14] Pharmacy Amendment Acts, 1995 and 1997; Nursing Amendment Acts, 1995 and 1997; Chiropractors, Homeopaths and Allied Health Service Professions Amendment Acts, 1995 and 1997; Social Work Amendment Acts, 1995 and 1998.

[15] Estate Agents Amendment Act, 1996.

[16] Agricultural Research Amendment Act, 1996.

[17] The Tourism Amendment Act, 1996 replaces the South African Tourism Board with "Tourism South Africa."

[18] Land Reform (Labor Tenants) Act, 1996.

[19] Extension of Security of Tenure Act, 1997.

[20] The phrase, "historically disadvantaged" people or groups is used in many pieces of legislation to denote, generally, Black South Africans.

[21] This review was carried out using the "Statute Book" series (volume 1–3) and the PIMS Monitor, which together provide summaries of all legislation passed by the new Parliament. All are published by Idasa.

[22] Customary marriages are recognized in: the Aliens Control Amendment Act, 1995, the Births and Deaths Registration Amendment Act, 1996; the Child Care Amendment Act, 1996; and the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, 1998.

[23] Public Holidays Act, 1994.

[24] South African Geographical Names Council Act, 1998.

[25] See the Admission of Advocates Amendment Act, 1994; the Admission of Legal Practitioners Amendment Act, 1995; the Right of Appearance in Courts Act, 1995; and the Magistrates' Courts Amendment Act, 1998.

[26] See the National Arts Council Act, 1997; the National Film and Video Foundation Act, 1997; the Culture Promotion Amendment Act, 1998; the South African Sports Commission Act, 1998; and the National Sport and Recreation Act, 1998.

[27] Mandela's speech appeared in the *Saturday Argus* newspaper of March 27-28, 1999.

[28] Paragraphs 236/7/8 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993. These sections continue in force in the 1996 Constitution (Schedule 6 para 24 sub-sections 1/2/3) unless they are amended, repealed or inconsistent with the new Constitution. Nor are any proclamations issued under these sections affected unless they are likewise amended, repealed or inconsistent.

[29] The Green Paper on a Conceptual Framework for Affirmative Action and the Management of Diversity in the Public Service; the Green Paper on a New Employment Policy for a New Public Service; and the White Paper on Human Resource Management in the Public Service.

[30] The White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service, 1997.

[31] The Court's ruling was in terms of the Interim Constitution.

[32] See the Judges' Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act No. 88 of 1989 (as amended) and section 176 and 177 of the final Constitution.

[33] Established by the interim Constitution as a 17 - 19 member Commission, the final Constitution confirmed its role and expanded its membership to 23-25 members, with the additional members being drawn from the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces.

[34] Judge Mohamed was the first Black appointee to the then Supreme Court. His appointment was preceded by "one of the most divisive rows to hit the judiciary since the 1950s" with more than 100 judges, including, it seems, all but one Appellate Division judge, backing Judge van Heerden against Judge Mohamed. It is believed that five out of nine of the judge presidents called meetings of their members to lobby for Van Heerden (Mail and Guardian September 20, 1996).

The JSC had to decide on three new provincial judge presidents and in all three provinces Black candidates stood against White candidates who had considerably more experience than their Black counterparts. The controversy was the most public and acrimonious in Kwazulu-Natal where judges took the unprecedented step of petitioning against the Black nominee.

Chapter 9 of the Constitution is titled, "State Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy." They are: the Public Protector; the South African Human Rights Commission; the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities; the Commission for Gender Equality; the Auditor-General; the Electoral Commission; and the Independent Broadcasting Authority.

A report in the commission's 1997/8 annual report indicates the success the commission often enjoys in following up on complaints of racism. Complaints of racism related to promotion, access to equipment and generally racist treatment by the more senior officers were received from Black ambulance workers stationed at the fire station in the small town of Brits. A meeting was held between the commission and the town council, which resulted in a transformation process being put in place and a Black officer being appointed to head a new unified protective services department. The SAHRC was asked to assist the head of Brits community services both with advice and in running workshops to sensitize staff members to human rights issues (SAHRC Annual Report 1997-1998, 28).

This investigation arose from a complaint lodged against two particular newspapers by the Black Lawyers Association, and the Association of Black Accountants of South Africa.

The 'National Norms and Standards for School Funding'.

Chapter 2 of the Constitution.

Other employers may elect to become designated employers or may agree to become designated employers as a result of a collective bargaining process.

The schedule to the Constitution dealing with transitional arrangements determines that this legislation must be enacted within three years of the Constitution coming into effect (i.e. by 4th February 2000).

Section 9 of the Constitution prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.

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Ricardo Funari / RF2

Forms of Black Political Response in Brazil

By George Reid Andrews

[illegible] know, Brazil is not, and never has been, a racial democracy. On the contrary, on most social and economic indicators, Brazil is a country of marked racial inequality, and has been so for the last 500 years. Slavery lasted longer in Brazil, and [illegible] more Africans than in any other country in the Americas; racist images and stereotypes pervade Brazilian culture at both the popular and elite levels; and gaps between Black and White achievement in education, earnings, life expectancy, and other [illegible] are large and widespread.

[illegible] have responded to these inequalities, and to their generally subordinate position in Brazilian life, in a variety of [illegible]. [illegible] explained in part by historical changes over time, and by the differences in conditions of Black life in the [illegible], and the 1900s. But equally important in explaining different forms of Black response are variations and differences within the Black population itself. As a social group, Afro-Brazilians are far from monolithic; rather, over time they have [illegible] population divided along numerous dimensions: by class, by gender, by national (African or Brazilian) [illegible] Brazil, geographic residence, and even by color between "Browns" and "Blacks."

[illegible] that have prevented the realization of a goal often articulated by Afro-Brazilian activists [illegible] of a united Black political movement [illegible]. [illegible] the Black population as a whole [illegible]

Black and Brown Brazilians have participated in more than just racially defined movements, however. They have also joined in mobilizations and protests organized not around race but around issues of class, region, political ideology, or other concerns. We can thus distinguish between two types of Afro-Brazilian political response, which we might tentatively label as "racial" mobilization and "non-racial" mobilization. Of those two, non-racial forms of mobilization have undoubtedly had greater impacts on Brazilian politics in general. Somewhat surprisingly (given that this is not their primary area of interest), they have also had greater impacts in the racial arena as well, particularly in terms of reducing racial inequality over time. Thus, this essay will argue, it is non-racial movements (usually class-based) that actually offer the greatest possibilities for successfully combating racial inequalities in present-day Brazil.

Both racial and non-racial political mobilization, however, tend to be undercut by a third form of Afro-Brazilian response, which is to try to escape the effects of poverty and marginalization by cultivating patron-client ties with powerful elite protectors. This survival tactic is a bedrock feature of Brazilian society and politics and is actively pursued by members of the White working and middle class, as well as by Afro-Brazilians. But it is particularly pervasive among the Black population, in part because of widespread poverty and powerlessness among Afro-Brazilians, and in part because patronage and clientelism are direct historical legacies of slavery.

Black responses to slavery

More than any other country in mainland North or South America, Brazil's history was shaped and determined by the experience of African slavery. Between 1550 and 1850, Brazil received more slaves from Africa than any other New World society: between 4 and 5 million, nearly ten times as many Africans as came to the United States. By the end of the colonial period (1822) Brazil's population was two-thirds Black and mulatto, and less than one-third White (Indians accounted for the remaining 3 percent).[3]

Despite constituting the majority of the national population, people of African ancestry occupied a position of acute social and economic inferiority in Brazil. Most people of color were enslaved, and even those who were not remained subject to Portuguese "caste" laws that severely restricted the rights and freedoms of non Whites. The economic structures of plantation agriculture further oppressed the Black population, both slave and free, by concentrating wealth and political power in the hands of a small landowning and mercantile elite, the members of which were almost entirely White.[4]

As we will see, many slaves sought to escape or overturn slavery through flight or violent rebellion. Most escapes ended in recapture and punishment, however; and all rebellions ended in defeat. As a result, most slaves – indeed, most Brazilians, regardless of race – concluded that the most effective way to improve their lot in life was not by mobilizing against their masters, but rather by cultivating good relations with them and appealing for their help and protection. Good relations with one's master could make life under slavery somewhat more bearable; and it was an essential precondition for legally "escaping" from slavery by obtaining a grant of freedom, which could only come from one's owner. Slaves who accumulated enough money (usually by working for cash during their "free" time) theoretically had the right to buy their freedom. But hostile masters could fight such a purchase in the courts, delaying it for years; so slaves pursuing this route to freedom were well advised to remain on good terms with their master.

Even after gaining freedom, most former slaves continued to cultivate such ties. Indeed, by law, freedmen and women were required to show "respect" for their former owners at all times; if they failed to do so, they were subject to re-enslavenent. In practice, this clause of slave law was seldom, if ever, enforced; but there were other good reasons for former slaves to maintain patron-client ties with former masters. The world of the rural and urban poor was not an easy one, and help and assistance from a former master or the master's family could make an enormous difference in the daily struggle for survival. And for advancement upward in the society, it was absolutely essential. As historian Emilia Viotti da Costa observes, in 19th century Brazil "politicians did not succeed in their careers, writers did not become famous, generals were not promoted, bishops were not appointed, entrepreneurs were not successful[,] without the help of a patron."[5] None of the successful Afro-Brazilian figures of the 19th century (of whom there were many, in the arts, the professions, and in national politics) could have risen as high as they did without the help of powerful friends and protectors.[6]

Every society has its own version of patron/client ties through which elites offer protection and "favors" to their clients in return for reciprocal "favors" and loyalty. But as a result of Brazil's intense experience with slavery, hierarchical social relations of this sort became a fundamental organizing principle in Brazilian society, in which "the favor is our nearly universal mediation."[7] One effect of such vertical social networks (i.e., networks extending from the top of society down to the bottom) is to discourage the formation of horizontal social and political mobilizations. Clients pledge primary loyalty to their patrons rather than to mass-based social movements, and political and social competition is then fought out among competing clienteles, rather than, for example, among movements based on social class. And while those struggles can advance the interests of individual patrons and their clients, they leave untouched the structures of privilege and inequality that consign most clients to poverty.

Certainly this was the case under slavery, which flourished in Brazil for more than 300 years, longer than in any other New World society. Slavery survived so long in part because of constant vigilance and repression carried out by slaveowners and the state; but slavery's longevity was also in part the consequence of divisions within the Black population itself, and the resulting inability of that population to unite effectively against the institution. One such division was that between slaves and free people of color, many of the latter of whom were themselves slaveowners and thus had a direct stake in the continued exploitation of the slaves.

> *By now we all know:*
> *Brazil is not,*
> *and never has been,*
> *a "racial democracy."*

This division between slaves and free Blacks in turn tended to parallel, and be reinforced by, the division between Africans (most of whom were "Blacks" and slaves) and native-born Afro-Brazilians (most of whom were racially mixed "Browns," or mulattos, and free). But the division between Africans and Afro-Brazilians was defined by more than just legal status (slave or free) and color. Afro-Brazilians, whether slave or free, were far more closely connected to Portuguese culture, religion, and language than were Africans, who even after arrival in Brazil continued to speak their own languages, worship their own gods, and sing and dance to their own distinctive music. Furthermore, while the native-born Black population had a normal gender balance (i.e., a slight majority of females), the African population was overwhelmingly male. The ships of the African slave trade brought approximately twice as many males to Brazil as females; most of those males were adolescents or young adults, all of them angry and unhappy about their deportation to Brazil, and many of them with previous military experience in slaving wars in Africa.[8]

Because of their familiarity with Brazilian culture and their knowledge of how to work within its confines, Afro-Brazilians were much more likely than Africans to follow the classically Brazilian "vertical" strategy of cultivating powerful patrons. Africans, by contrast, were more likely to organize "horizontally" against slavery and to engage in more violent and radical forms of resistance. One such form was the clandestine settlements (known in Brazil as mucambos or quilombos) created by runaway slaves as shelters and refuges. The largest and best-known such settlement was Palmares, a federation of West African-style villages in the mountainous interior of Alagoas province. Created by slaves who had escaped from the sugar plantations of Pernambuco and Bahia, Palmares came into existence at the beginning of the 1600s and grew by mid-century to more than 10,000 people. During the second half of the century, the Portuguese sent repeated military expeditions against the villages; not until the 1690s were they finally taken and destroyed.

No other *quilombos* achieved the size or duration of Palmares; most were small (100-200 people or less) and lasted just a few months or years. But they proliferated by the hundreds in the plantation zones of the Northeast and Rio de Janeiro, in the gold mining areas of Minas Gerais, and even in the Amazon Valley.[9] Present-day Black activists look back to them as heroic examples of Black struggle against oppression, which indeed they were, and as models for present-day Black mobilization.[10] But though colonial and 19th century slave-owners and authorities took them quite seriously, and expended considerable effort in combating them, the quilombos did not pose a major threat to the slave regime and played little role, if any, in bringing slavery to an end. Some historians have even suggested that the quilombos may have unintentionally reinforced the slave regime by providing an "escape valve" for those slaves most inclined to violent resistance. Such individuals could "infect" (from slaveowners' point of view), or inspire, other slaves with their rebellious spirit; thus the slave regime actually benefited by the removal of these potential rebels from the plantations. Escaped slaves did represent a financial loss to owners, as did the periodic thefts and raids of the runaways. But slavery as a system proved able to absorb those costs, as well as the costs of hunting down runaways and destroying the settlements, while still remaining profitable and continuing to grow.

Another early form of Black mobilization, that of slave rebellion, had somewhat greater impacts on slavery. During most of the colonial period, such revolts were small, generally confined to individual plantations, and quickly repressed. As the numbers of Africans imported into Brazil increased during the late 1700s, so, too, did the frequency of such rebellions. And as slave imports reached their highest levels ever, between 1800 and 1850 (1.7 million Africans arrived in Brazil during that half-century, the same number as during the entire 1700s), the plantation zones of the Northeast were swept by a wave of slave uprisings, many of them large in size and involving slaves from multiple plantations. Between 1807 and 1835, the Northeastern province of Bahia was shaken by no fewer than 15 such uprisings, the last of which was a full-scale assault by Yoruba Muslims on the capital city of Salvador. In Maranhão, Pernambuco, and Pará, thousands of slaves rose up during the 1820s and 30s as part of a wave of republican uprisings that swept through the Northeast at that time. And though the inland province of Minas Gerais was for the most part spared such incidents, its slaveowners had some nervous moments in 1822, when 15,000 slaves marched on the provincial capital of Ouro Preto to demand their freedom, which they assumed would be granted them as part of Brazil's declaration of independence.[11]

Like the earlier rebellions of the 1700s, these slave revolts (or, in the case of Minas Gerais, mass demonstrations) of the early 1800s were quickly put down. Their only immediate impact on slavery was to further tighten the vigilance of authorities and overseers. Recent research, however, has suggested that these early 19th century rebellions did in fact play a role in the 1850 abolition of the African slave trade to Brazil, the crucial first step in the eventual abolition of slavery. Slaveowners and policymakers couldn't help noticing that slave rebellion had intensified during and immediately after the decade in which the largest number of Africans ever had arrived in Brazil: the 1820s, during which 430,000 Africans entered the country. After a lull in the slave trade during the 1830s, imports of Africans increased again in the 1840s (to 378,000). Brazilian lawmakers now began to worry about another wave of possible African-based rebellion; and these fears, combined with diplomatic and military pressure from Great Britain, led the Brazilian Parliament in 1850 to finally end the importation of slaves from Africa.[12]

Abolition of the slave trade was an essential first step in the eventual elimination of slavery; in provoking that first step, African slave rebellions did have an impact on the institution that they were struggling against. But that impact was by no means immediate, and took over half a century to have its effect. In the meantime, all the rebellions of the 1820s and '30s were ruthlessly put down, in large part because they received support only from the African slave population. Native-born Brazilians, whether White or Black, found the explicitly African content of these rebellions alienating and frightening. Free Afro-Brazilians actively opposed them; and even slave Afro-Brazilians tended to hold back from them, sometimes informing on the Africans' conspiracies to the authorities.[13]

The African rebellions thus failed, in part, because they did not represent the Black population as a whole, or even the slave population as a whole. As a result, though the rebellions did play a role in bringing slavery to an end, that role was indirect and long-term rather than immediate. Slavery was finally eliminated in the 1880s, not through "racial" mobilization, but rather through a multi-class, multiracial, mass-based mobilization: the abolitionist movement.

Based in major towns and cities, the abolitionists drew their support from the urban middle and working classes and from Whites (both native-born and immigrant), free Blacks and Browns. Under pressure from abolitionist agitation (as well as from Emperor Don Pedro II, who was openly abolitionist in his sympathies), Parliament passed a law of gradual emancipation in 1871, under which the children of slave mothers would obtain their freedom upon reaching the age of majority. But this was as far as the landowners who controlled Parliament were willing to go; so during the 1880s, the abolitionists followed an increasingly radical approach, moving outside the formal political system to agitate directly among the slave population. Abolitionist agents circulated through the plantation zones, urging slaves to flee their owners and make their way to towns and cities, where members of the movement would shelter them and protect them from the authorities. During 1887 and early 1888 tens of thousands of slaves fled their plantations in Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Bahia. Faced with the de facto collapse of slavery, Parliament approved final abolition on May 13, 1888.[14]

This was an absolutely revolutionary achievement, as most of those involved recognized. Not only had Brazilians done away with the institution on which the country's society and economy had been based for the previous 300 years, but they had done so as the result of a mass-based social movement bringing together slaves, Whites, and free Blacks. "Quite rare in our land, the executive branch being the mere executor of a decree by the people," noted a São Paulo newspaper the day after abolition.[15] So remarkable was this achievement that it moved landowners to band together the following year, in 1889, to overthrow the monarchy and replace it with a republican form of government in which landowners wielded even greater power than before. But that is another story. For our present purposes, what is important to note is that slave mobilization alone had been insufficient to overturn slavery. Rather, it had taken a multiracial, cross-class movement to achieve this goal, and in so doing to produce the greatest social, racial, and economic reform of Brazil's 19th century. Multiracial movements would prove to be similarly powerful in the 1900s as well.

Black responses to freedom

During the 1800s slavery had been the central challenge confronting Brazil's Black population, and, indeed, Brazilian society as a whole. That issue having been resolved in 1888, the challenge now shifted to defining the

terms on which Afro-Brazilians would take part in national life. As they organized to confront these new conditions, people of color again faced the choice between racial and non-racial forms of mobilization.

Probably the best-known examples of racial mobilization during the 1900s have been the Black civil rights movements of the 1920s and 30s (most notably the Frente Negra Brasileira), and the larger such movements of the 1970s, 80s, and 90s. The earlier movements had no impacts whatsoever on national politics, and only modest impacts even within the Black population. The more recent movements have had considerably greater repercussions, forcing a nation-wide debate on the concept of "racial democracy," and then lobbying successfully for the adoption of anti-racist legislation at the federal, state, and local levels. Federal, state, and municipal governments also created a number of programs and agencies aimed at promoting the integration of the Black population into national life.[16]

Despite these achievements, even the Afro-Brazilian activists themselves have concluded that their movements fell far short of their original goals and that much of the official state effort against racism remains at the level of rhetoric rather than concrete action. Thus, for example, the federal Palmares Foundation, created in 1988 with the goal of increasing "the Black presence in all the sectors of leadership in this country," has been hamstrung by its miniscule budget and staff; the greatly strengthened penalties for racial discrimination incorporated into the Constitution of 1988 have been applied in only a handful of cases; and President Cardoso's recent (1996) proposals for federal affirmative action programs have been ignored by Congress and are unlikely ever to be enacted into law.

. . . [E]ven among middle-class Afro Brazilians, attitudes toward civil rights are very mixed.

These shortcomings reflect in part the tremendous resistance of the Brazilian political system, even under current conditions of electoral democracy, to meaningful social reform. But they also reflect the weakness of the Black civil rights movement itself, and its failure to attract popular support beyond a very small constituency based mainly in the Afro-Brazilian middle class. This class is not numerically insignificant: by the late 1980s, almost 3 million Afro-Brazilians had graduated from high school (a relatively high level of educational attainment in Brazil), and another half million from college. Almost three million people of color worked at professional or white-collar positions.[17] Studies of vocational and earnings inequality in Brazil have shown that it is these middle-class Afro-Brazilians who face the most systematic and overt forms of discrimination. As they try to make their way upward in the Brazilian class structure, they run repeatedly into racial barriers that simply do not apply to Whites of comparable education and experience. As a result, it is among members of the Black middle class that the civil rights movement finds its strongest support.[18]

But that middle class constitutes only about 10 percent of the total Black population; and even among middle-class Afro-Brazilians, attitudes toward the civil rights movement are very mixed. Many upwardly mobile Blacks, having achieved a certain measure of success in Brazilian society, have no desire to jeopardize that success or to call attention to themselves by loud and vocal protests. In the words of one such individual, a former São Paulo city councilman, "I'm not going to upset a situation that, for better or worse, is good."[19]

Among poor and working-class Afro-Brazilians, attitudes are much less ambivalent: the overwhelming majority know nothing about the civil rights movement and its work and, to those who have heard of the movement, its concerns and rhetoric seem largely irrelevant to their daily lives, in which problems of poverty, crime, and inadequate public services loom much larger than the vaguer, more diffuse problem of racism. In confronting these challenges, lower class Afro-Brazilians are more likely to turn, not to a weak and powerless Black movement, but rather to movements and institutions that can provide concrete assistance in helping them meet those daily problems.

The most important of those movements, I would argue, and the one that has had the greatest impact in reducing levels of racial inequality in 20th century Brazil, is the labor movement and the political parties based on that movement. Unlike their counterparts in the United States and South Africa, Brazilian unions and labor activists recognized quite early the necessity of organizing Black and White workers together in a common, cross-racial cause. To do otherwise by excluding or privileging either group would provide employers with a divisive wedge that they would not hesitate to use; so from its very beginnings at the turn of the century, unions and organizers in Brazil actively sought the inclusion of Blacks and Whites in a mass-based, multiracial movement.[20]

Unions wielded little effective power in Brazil until the 1930s, when President Getúlio Vargas openly recruited worker support for his populist regime with a wave of reforms– collective bargaining, a minimum wage, social security, state-provided medical care, paid vacations, and other social programs– unprecedented in Brazilian history.[21] As Vargas' Brazilian Labor Party sought to further expand social services during the 1950s and '60s, Black and White workers benefited accordingly. Vargas himself was acclaimed by workers as "the Father of the Poor," and, since Afro-Brazilians were more likely than Euro-Brazilians to be working-class and/or poor or to have come from such a background, they developed a particularly strong identification with him and his regime. Polls taken in Rio de Janeiro in 1960 showed not only higher levels of support for the Labor Party among Black workers than among White workers, but also higher levels of support for the party among members of the Black middle class (61 percent of whom favored the Labor Party) than among members of the White middle class (only 29 percent of whom favored the party).[22]

The success of the labor movement at obtaining state benefits for its constituents, and possibly even the beginnings of a modest redistribution of wealth in Brazilian society, were part of the motives for the military overthrow of electoral democracy in 1964 and the installation of the authoritarian dictatorship that lasted until 1985.[23] During that 21 year period the military government intervened directly in the labor movement and subjected it to strict state control. In response, workers in the industrial zones of the Southeastern states created an independent "new union" movement during the late 1970s. These independent unions in turn formed part of a larger nation-wide campaign for a return to democracy; and as Brazil made its gradual transition back to democratic rule in the early 1980s, the "new unions" came together to create a new labor-based party, the Workers Party. At the same time, the old Labor Party, banned in 1964, reappeared in the form of the Democratic Labor Party. In keeping with the longstanding multiracial character of the labor movement, both parties placed racial equality high on their list of policy priorities. It is no coincidence that the most prominent Afro-Brazilian politicians of recent years– e.g., Alceu Collares and Albuino Azeredo, former governors (1990-94) of Rio Grande do Sul and Espírito Santo; or Benedita da Silva and Abdias do Nascimento, former senators from Rio de Janeiro– are almost all members of those two parties.

> *. . . [M]ost Black and Brown Brazilians have refrained from joining racial movements . . .*

Nor is it coincidental that, as a group, successful Afro-Brazilian politicians tend not to have close ties to the Black civil rights movement. Of those just mentioned, only Senator Nascimento had a career of civil rights activism. Senator da Silva does maintain close ties to the civil rights movement, but Collares and Azeredo do not; nor does former governor of Alagoas (1990-94), João Alves, or recently elected (1996) São Paulo Mayor Celso Pitta, both members of right-wing parties. These politicians recognize that the Black movement can deliver few if any votes or any other form of political support. At the same time, identifying with the Black movement can cost Black politicians significant support among voters already disinclined to vote for Black candidates and further alienated by what they perceive as racial militance violating the spirit of Brazil's "racial democracy."

Past, present, future

Thus in the 1900s as in the 1800s, movements ostensibly representing the Black population, as a whole, in fact represented specific sub-groups of that population– though, interestingly, subgroups at opposite ends of the social spectrum. In the 1800s, quilombos and slave rebellions drew their support from the lowest stratum of the Black population: African slaves. In the 1900s, by contrast, racial movements have been drawn mainly from, and have appealed mainly to, the most educated, upwardly mobile members of the Black population.

Both in the 1800s and in the 1900s, however, most Black and Brown Brazilians have refrained from joining racial movements and instead have been more likely to take part in multiracial movements, parties, or other forms of protest. This has made those movements far more powerful than racially defined organizations and in turn has enabled them to have far greater impacts on Brazilian society and politics.[24] And as the labor movement in particular has promoted programs and policies aimed at improving the lives of poor and working-class Brazilians, Afro-Brazilians have benefited disproportionately, for the simple reason that they are disproportionately represented among the poor and working class.

Thus the interests of the great majority of Brazil's Black population, I believe, will be more effectively served by a close association with the labor movement and other class-based movements than by joining racially defined organizations. This is not to say that there is no place or no need for continued racial mobilization. The grievances of the Black middle class are real, not imaginary; and members of that class need a champion to speak out on their behalf. Furthermore, just as the slave rebellions of the 1800s played an indirect, long-term role in the eventual abolition of slavery, so, I believe, has the Black movement of the late 1900s helped alter the future of Brazilian race relations by forcing a national critique and rejection of the myth of racial democracy. For decades that myth played a central role in obscuring the true nature of race relations and racial inequalities in Brazil. The national debate that has taken place in recent years over whether Brazil is in fact a racial democracy has led to the inescapable conclusion that it is not; this in turn has led to discussion of how Brazil might set about creating real racial democracy and equality, which in turn creates the possibility of genuine change and transformation in the years and decades to come. And just as the Black movement's agitation and demands were the necessary motive force behind that debate, so will its continuing presence be necessary to keep the question of race on the national political agenda.

But like the gradual abolition of slavery, the gradual transformation of Brazilian race relations will be a long (longer than abolition, most likely) and extremely difficult process, with few if any immediate, tangible rewards. In the meantime the classically Brazilian (and Afro-Brazilian) response to inequality, the cultivation of patron-client relations, will remain very much in effect, undercutting both forms of Black mobilization, racial and non-racial. Poor and working-class Afro-Brazilians must meet their needs for food, jobs, housing, health care, education, and other public goods now, today, not in some distant future. For these people, concludes a recent anthropological study of a majority-Black favela in Pernambuco, "poverty and chronic scarcity make individually negotiated relations of dependency on myriad political and personal bosses ... a necessary survival tactic." Under these "relations of dependency," clients deliver their votes to their patrons in return for jobs, food, medicine, or other "favors." Since, patrons who cannot deliver those goods are of no use to clients, the faveladols consistently side with those candidates who look most likely to win, regardless of their party affiliation and platform, and "avoid association with likely losers, even if the 'weaker' candidate has expressed solidarity with their class. As [one informant] qualified her support of local political leaders, 'If you're going up, I'll tag along with you. If you're going down, *adeus*, you can go without me.'"

Particularly in rural areas and the Northeast, poorer regions of the country where the population is disproportionately Afro-Brazilian, parties, politics, and voting continue to be organized, not around programmatic platforms or promises of reform, but rather around the distribution of "favors" and pork-barrel benefits to ones clients. And because of its immense effectiveness, this conservative, patronage-based style of politics dominates Brazilian politics, not just at the regional level, but at the national level as well. All three presidents elected since 1985 (indeed, since 1965) – José Sarney, Fernando Collor, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso – owed their elections to votes provided by the patronage machines of the Northeast. Their resulting indebtedness to those conservative interests and the strength of those interests in Congress effectively undercut the social and economic reforms proposed by the "new social movements" of the 1980s – including the Black movement – and incorporated in the Constitution of 1988. Though nominally the law of the land, these reforms were systematically gutted by subsequent enabling – or disabling – legislation, by lack of appropriations, or by simple lack of enforcement.

As already suggested above, conservative, patronage-based politics work to reinforce the very inequalities of wealth and opportunity that Afro-Brazilians are struggling so hard to escape. The only hope for overturning those inequalities, including racial inequalities, lies in a rejection of clientelism and the creation of a new, class-based politics free of control by traditional elites. The obstacles standing in the way of such a political project are enormous. But the historical record of the abolitionist movement in the 19th century, and the labor movement in the 20th, proves that mass-based social movements of this sort are not impossible, and that, when realized, they have the potential to bring profound changes to Brazilian politics and society. The historical record also suggests that poor and working-class Brazilians have been much more willing than their United States or South African counterparts to join together across racial lines in the construction of such movements. In this sense Brazil has proven itself to have at least some of the elements of a genuine "racial democracy." If Brazilians can continue to come together to create new multiracial movements in the future, perhaps they will succeed in becoming the most truly "racially democratic" of the societies examined in this volume.

See, for example, Pierre-Michel Fontaine, ed., *Race, Class and Power in Brazil* (Los Angeles, 1985); George Reid Andrews, *Blacks and Whites in São Paulo, Brazil,* 1888-1988 (Madison, 1991); George Reid Andrews, "Racial Inequality in Brazil and the United States: A Statistical Comparison," *Journal of Social History* 26, 2 (1992), 229-63; Cleusa Turra and Gustavo Venturi, eds., *Racismo cordial: A mais completa análise sobre preconceito de cor no Brasil* (São Paulo, 1995); France Winddance Twine, *Racism in a Racial Democracy: The Maintenance of White Supremacy in Brazil* (New Brunswick, 1998).

The name of the most important Black political organization of the 1980s, the Unified Black Movement (Movimento Negro Unificado-MNU), embodies this goal. But the MNU, like other Afro-Brazilian organizations created at that time, proved to be weak and marginal, exercising very little influence either on Brazilian politics or among the Black population.

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On the African slave trade to Brazil, see Philip D. Curtin, *The African Slave Trade: A Census* (Madison, 1969); Robert Conrad, *World of Sorrow: The African Slave Trade to Brazil* (Baton Rouge, 1986); David Eltis, *Economic Growth in the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade* (New York, 1987). Population figures from Dauril Alden, "Late Colonial Brazil," in Leslie Bethell, ed., Colonial Brazil (Cambridge, 1987), 290. By way of comparison, the population of the United States in 1820 was 82 percent White and 18 percent Black and mulatto. Ira Berlin, *Slaves Without Masters: The Free Negro in the Antebellum South* (New York, 1974), 136, 397, 399.

On Brazilian slavery, see Stuart B. Schwartz, *Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society: Bahia, 1550-1835* (Cambridge, 1985); A.J.R. Russell-Wood, *the Black Man in Slavery and Freedom in Colonial Brazil* (New York, 1982); Robert E Conrad, *Children of God's Fire: A Documentary History of black Slavery in Brazil* (Princeton, 1982); Katia Queiros de Mattoso, *To Be a Slave in Brazil* (New Brunswick, 1986).

Emilia Viotti da Costa, *The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories* (Chicago, 1985), 190; see also Richard Graham, *Politics and Patronage in Nineteenth-Century Brazil* (Stanford, 1990).

Gilberto Freyre, *The Mansions and the Shanties: the Making of Modern Brazil* (rpt., Berkeley, 1986), 354-99; Herbert S. Klein, "Nineteenth-Century Brazil," in David W. Cohen and Jack P. Greene, eds., *Neither Slave nor Free: The Freedmen of African Descent in the Slave Societies of the New World* (Baltimore, 1972), 309-34.

Rôberto Schwarz, *Ao vencedor as batatas* (São Paulo, 1977), 16.

On these African/Creole divisions within the slave population, see Schwartz, *Sugar Plantations*, 330-53; João José Reis, *Slave Rebellion in Brazil: The Muslim Uprising of 1835 in Bahia* (Baltimore, 1993), 139-59.

João José Reis and Flávio de Santos Gomes, eds., *Liberdade por um fio: História dos quilombos no Brasil* (São Paulo, 1996).

See, for example, the films *Ganga Zumba* (1963) and *Quilombo* (1984); or Abdias do Nascimento, O quilombismo (Petrópolis, 1980). On the national commemoration of the 300th anniversary of the fall of Palmares, see *Questões de Raça* 4 (June 1996).

Clóvis Moura, *Rebeliões de senzala* (3rd ed., São Paulo, 1981 [1957]), 85-162; Reis, *Slave Rebellion in Brazil* 40-69; Costa, *Brazilian Empire*, 140. In addition to the 15,000 slaves at Ouro Preto, another 6,000 marched on the mining town of São João del Rei.

Dale Graden, "An Act 'Even of Public Security': Slave Resistance, Social Tensions, and the End of the International Slave Trade to Brazil, 1835-1856," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 76, 2 (1996), 249-82.

Reis, *Slave Rebellion in Brazil*, 141-46.

Robert Conrad, *The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery*, 1850-1888 (Urbana, 1972); Robert-Brent Toplin, *The Abolition of Slavery in Brazil* (New York, 1971).

Andrews, *Blacks and Whites in São Paulo*, 41.

On the movements of the 1920s and 1930s, see Florestan Fernandes, *A integração do negro na sociedade de classes* (3rd ed., São Paulo, 1978 [1965]), vol. 2, 7-115; José Correia Leite and Cuti [Luiz Silva], ... *E disse o velho militante José Correia Leite* (São Paulo, 1992); Jeferson Bacelar, "A Frente Negra Brasileira na Bahia," *Revista Afro-Asia* 17 (1996), 73-86. On the more recent movements, see Michael Hanchard, *Orpheus and Power: The Movimento Negro in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, Brazil*, 1945-1988 (Princeton, 1994); George Reid Andrews, "Black Political Protest in Brazil, 1975-1990," in George Reid Andrews and Herrick Chapman, eds., *The Social Construction of Democracy*, 1870-1990 (London and New York, 1995), 218-40.

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On how racism and discrimination affect members of the Black middle class, see Peggy Lovell, "Racial Inequality and the Brazilian Labor Market" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida, 1989); Neusa Santos Souza, *Tornar-se negro: As vicissitudes da identidade do negro brasileiro em ascensão social* (Rio de Janeiro, 1983); and the interviews in Haroldo Costa, *Fala*, crioulo (Rio de Janeiro, 1982).

Andrews, *Blacks and Whites in São Paulo*, 176. For survey data showing high rates of opposition to the Black movement among well educated and well-to-do Blacks, see Ana Lúcia Valente, *Politíca e relações raciais: Os negros e as eleições paulistas de 1982* (São Paulo, 1986), 135.

June Hahner, *Poverty and Politics: The Urban Poor in Brazil, 1870-1920* (Albuquerque, 1986), 98-105, 223-24; Andrews, *Blacks and Whites in São Paulo*, 60-66.

On these reforms and Vargas's labor policies, see John D. French, *The Brazilian Workers ABC: Class Conflict and Alliances in Modern São Paulo* (Chapel Hill, 1992).

Amaury de Souza, "Raça e política no Brasil urbano," *Revista de Administração de Expresas* 11, 4 (1970), 61-70.

On this period, see Thomas Skidmore, *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil*, 1964-1985 (New York, 1988).

This is why, to quote Brazilian sociologist Florestan Fernandes, Brazilian elites regard racial movements as "the worst kind of protest, after worker protest ..." Florestan Fernandes, *Circuito fechado* (São Paulo, 1977), 78; emphasis added.

Nancy Scheper-Hughes, *Death Without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil* (Berkeley, 1992), 472-73. Another Afro Brazilian worker in Bahia describes her reasons for not supporting the PT: It is "one of the parties that wants to help ... but it's too weak to compete with the others and always loses, doesn't it?" Another reports that he never votes by party identification, but rather "for individuals that he knows and with whom he maintains a personal relationship." Regina Helena Gonçalves Pires, "Curuzu: Caminhos e descaminhos na construção do si mesmo e do outro" (unpublished MA thesis, Universidade Federal da Bahia, 1992), 92, 99.

Frances Hagopian, *Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil* (Cambridge, 1996); Scott Mainwaring, *The Party System Democratization in Brazil* (Stanford, forthcominq); Peter R. Kingstone and Timothy J. Power, eds., *Democratic Brazil* (Pittsburgh, forthcoming).

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Elisa Larkin Nascimento

Reflections On The Afro-Brazilian Movement, 1938-97

By Abdias do Nascimento and Elisa Larkin Nascimento

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Black press, Brazilian Black Front, Afro-Campinas Congress

To begin this text with the Black Experimental Theater would be inadmissible, since we can understand that movement only as the heir and continuum of a struggle already in motion from the first moments of Brazil's formation. Indeed, Brazil never existed without Africans,[2] nor did Africans exist in Brazil apart from their struggles against slavery and racism. Afro-Brazilian activism was founded in the *quilombo*[3] tradition that crosses through the entire colonial and imperial[4] periods of Brazilian history, battering the slave economy's foundations until they crumbled (Larkin-Nascimento, 1980; Nascimento, 1989; Moura, 1972; Freitas, 1982, Pinaud et.al., 1987; Lima, 1981; Cuti, 1992). It continued in the abolitionist activism of Africans like Luiz Gama (Larkin-Nascimento, 1985; Lima, 1981; Pinaud et. al., 1987), and was expressed in the early decades of this century in the form of religious brotherhoods and recreational associations. In the early years of this century, the "Revolt of the Whip," led by the sailor João Cândido, shook the Navy for its racist tradition. This revolt was carefully omitted or obscured in official versions of Brazilian history, a fact denounced by Edmar Morel (1979) in his groundbreaking work on the episode.

> *. . . Brazil never existed without Africans, nor did Africans exist in Brazil apart from their struggles against slavery and racism.*

Already in the teens, there appeared a Black press that remained very active, especially in São Paulo, with newspapers like *O Menelike, O Kosmos, A Liberdade, Auriverde,* and *O Patrocínio*. In 1920, *O Getulino* was born, founded by Lino Guedes to deal with matters of interest to the African community of Campinas, a growing industrial center in the interior of São Paulo State. *O Clarim d'Alvorada,* founded by José Correia Leite and Jayme de Aguiar in 1924, already heralded the cry of protest that was to crystallize in 1931 with the foundation of the Brazilian Black Front. The Front was a mass movement that protested against the racial discrimination excluding Blacks from the newly industrialized economy, and it spread to several corners of the nation's territory. Segregation in cinema and dramatic theaters, barbershops, hotels, restaurants, indeed, a whole series of centers of Brazilian life barred to Blacks, was the priority target of the Brazilian Black Front.

The Front continued its activism until 1938, when the New State dictatorship made all political activity illegal. But shutting down the Black Front did not mean paralyzing Afro-Brazilian protest. A year later, the São Paulo police chief banned the traditional "footing," a Sunday stroll of African Brazilians on the sidewalks and streets adjacent to Direita Street in downtown São Paulo. White merchants, shopowners on this important commercial artery were complaining about the "Negro crowds" that blocked the view of store windows, and Commissioner Alfredo Issa issued an order banning this weekly Black entertainment. A commission of African Brazilians went to Rio de Janeiro in protest: Fernando Goes, the poet Rossini Camargo Guarnieri, a carnival organizer called Galdino, and me–Abdias do Nascimento. Since the press was under rigid censorship, there was little repercussion. The only indictment to get past the State censors was made by Osório Borba, in the *Diário de Notícias* of Rio de Janeiro.

Protesting against the New State regime, I was condemned by the National Security Tribunal in Rio de Janeiro, and, on leaving prison in April 1938, I went to the town of Campinas with a fellow prisoner, Geraldo Campos de Oliveira, to help organize the Afro-Campineiro Congress, along with Aguinaldo de Oliveira Camargo, Agur Sampaio, Jerônimo the typographer, and José Alberto Ferreira, among others. The goal of this Congress[5] was to fight the racism and traditional segregation in that city and to evaluate the general situation of Blacks in the country. During one full week, we analyzed various aspects of Black Brazilians' living standards: economic, social, political, cultural. In one session, the organizers made an oath to return to Africa, to contribute to the fight for freedom in the Black continent, our ancestral land.

To cite only a few examples of other Afro-Brazilian organizations of the time, in Rio de Janeiro, there was the Brazilian Movement against Racial Prejudice, and in Santos, the Association of Colored Brazilians. Nationally, there existed the National Union of Colored Men. In 1942, E. Franklin Frazier published a message of this last group to its colleagues in the United States, calling for "a more intimate cultural community with our North American brothers" and making a moving indictment of the state of abandonment of Black Brazilians.[6] In 1941, the José do Patrocínio Association was founded; it constituted the base from which the small Afro-Brazilian Education and Culture Movement (MABEC) was founded. This organization remained active until the end of the fifties. São Paulo witnessed the creation of the Negro Cultural Association, which promoted cultural activities with a message in favor of the fight against racial discrimination. These activities were complemented by the traditional religious brotherhoods, Afro-Brazilian religious communities, and recreational associations.

The Brazilian Black Front embodied, without doubt, the major expression of Afro-Brazilian political consciousness at that time. Moving against the most obvious aspect of racism, the systematic exclusion of Blacks on the basis of race, it was an integrationist consciousness, seeking for Black people a place in "Brazilian" society, without questioning the Eurocentric parameters of that society or claiming a specific cultural, social or ethnic identity.

Black Experimental Theatre

At that time racial discrimination reigned absolute, and Blacks did not set foot in Brazilian theaters to watch plays or to act on stage. They entered the empty theater only at one time: to clean up after the all-White cast and audience. The Black Experimental Theater (TEN) was created to contest this discrimination, train Black actors and playwrights, and rescue and reconstruct a cultural tradition whose value had always been denied or relegated to ridicule: African heritage in its Brazilian expression.

Thus, TEN continued the tradition of protest and sociopolitical organization, but brought to it a new dimension: the demand of difference. No longer did Blacks seek only integration into "White" ruling society, assuming as their own the European cultural baggage imposed as "universal." TEN emphasized the need to recognize the value of African heritage and of Afro-Brazilian personality, valuing specific identity and demanding that difference be respected without being transformed into inequality. This new dimension of struggle was expressed in the slogan of "*negritude*." This was a reference not only to the French-language, African poetic movement, but to the whole idea of identification with African origin in the Brazilian context.

I once (1968:37,51) explained this double cultural and political dimension of TEN in this way:

> *When I founded the Black Experimental Theater in 1944, I intended to organize a kind of action that would at the same time have cultural meaning, artistic value and a social function. ... To begin with, there was the need to rescue Black culture and its values, attacked, denied, oppressed and distorted. ... Black people did not want isolated and paternalist help, as a special favor. They wanted and claimed a higher status in society, in the form of collective opportunity, for everyone, for a people with irrevocable historic rights ... the opening of real opportunities for economic, political, cultural, social improvement for Blacks, respecting their African origin.*

This vision implied a gigantic task. Where to start?

> *We started from scratch: we organized literacy courses in which factory workers, domestic servants, favela dwellers without definite professions, low-level civil servants and unemployed office boys held meetings at night, after their work days, to learn to read and write. Using the stage as a tactic in this process of educating Black people...under the efficient guidance of Professor Ironides Rodrigues...the TEN made its first members literate and at the same time offered them a new attitude, a criterion of their own that could help them seek, discover the space they occupied, within the Afro-Brazilian group, in the national context. (Nascimento, 1978: 257).*

A small group, resolute and determined to begin the work of the Black Experimental Theater, decided to open with a production of that same play, The Emperor Jones. Unanimously, critics and "friends" counseled a more modest piece, a play that would not demand so much effort, dramatic expression and sophistication from a cast of newcomers, and, worse, Negro ones at that!" Nevertheless, we opened with Aguinaldo Camargo playing Brutus Jones, hero of The Emperor Jones. Critics, who had been skeptical about the production of such a difficult play, unanimously confessed their surprise at the artistic quality of the show; the newspapers from the time record the avalanche of praise heaped on the Black Experimental Theater.

TEN produced many other shows, always with the same standard of artistic quality. It also stimulated the appearance of Black playwrights and of plays with Afro-Brazilian themes, heroes and protagonists."

The true heroes were TEN's members. With no means to sustain this activity, they donated their efforts, energy and talents, in a word, their axé, to make possible the birth of a Black theater. The dedication and sacrifice invested by domestic servants, drivers, office boys, and working people who composed TEN's ranks are worthy of historic record, although space limitations prohibit their specific mention here.

Complementing its theatrical work, the TEN also organized visual arts contests, one of them on the theme of the Black Christ (1955), as well as beauty contests exalting Afro-Brazilian aesthetic standards. It sponsored several sociopolitical events of the Black movement and published the newspaper, Quilombo, each issue of which opened with a statement of "Our Goals." Item no. 5 reads thus: "to demand that the crime of racial and color discrimination be defined in our codes of law." Other items of TEN's program included free schooling for all Brazilian children; subsidized admission of Black students in secondary schools and universities, where Blacks were barred by discrimination and poverty resulting from their ethnicity; the fight against racism by means of cultural and educational action; and correction of distortions inherent in the Eurocentric image of Africans and their history.

Afro-Brazilian Democratic Committee

Around the end of the war, TEN was operating out of borrowed space in the Flamengo Beach headquarters of the National Student Union, UNE, in Rio de Janeiro. But we needed a tool of political participation, so Aguinaldo Camargo, Sebastião Rodrigues Alves and I founded the Afro-Brazilian Democratic Committee (1945). It was a broad organization, including Whites and Blacks (most of the Whites came from UNE), but with the explicit statement of an Afro-Brazilian perspective. Our first goal was to fight for amnesty of political prisoners of the new state dictatorship.

This position, emphasizing Afro-Brazilian values, caused irritation among certain groups and individuals. We had the vigorous support of the leftist UNE members in our activities for the cause of amnesty and the restoration of democracy. However, when amnesty was finally won and the political prisoners (almost all of them White) were freed, UNE leftists refused to be involved in work specifically in favor of the Afro-Brazilian community; they said this would constitute "reverse racism." We, the founders, were accused of racism and expelled. The Committee soon disintegrated, with no more cause to exist.[9]

The Left, in sum, enthusiastically accepted an Afro-Brazilian Democratic Committee that could be used for its political ends but rejected it as "racist" when it attempted to work toward the ends for which it was created. They could not accept the idea that Blacks have their own specific problems, independent analyses, and their own struggles within Brazilian society. In their view, we would have to bend to the guidance and direction of people unfamiliar with our situation and needs.

Not much later, a group of African Brazilians would engage in the founding of a department for Black community matters within the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) of Guanabara State (now Rio de Janeiro State). This attempt at autonomy within a political party, entirely unprecedented, did not succeed at the time.

The National Convention of Brazilian Blacks and the Afonso Arinos Law

In 1945, TEN promoted the National Convention of Brazilian Blacks, which held its first meeting in São Paulo, and a second in 1946 in Rio de Janeiro. It was a community event of a political nature, without academic pretensions: a forum for Black people to deal with their emergent, socio-economic needs. In São Paulo, some 500 people attended; in Rio de Janeiro, more than 200.

At the end of discussions, the Plenary Assembly approved and published a Manifesto to the Brazilian Nation, containing six concrete demands. Among them was subsidized admission of Blacks in secondary and university educational institutions and the formulation of an anti-discrimination law, accompanied by concrete measures to prevent its becoming simply an empty and meaningless juridical proclamation.

The Manifesto was sent to all the political parties, and the Convention received the formal support of National Democratic Union, the Democratic Social Party, and the leader of the Communist Party, Luís Carlos Prestes. Based on the Manifesto, Senator Hamilton Noqueira brought a bill before the National Constituent Assembly of 1946 that would have put the prohibition of racial discrimination in the nation's Constitution. The position of the Communist Party was then made clear: Claudino José da Silva, the only Black representative in the Assembléia and a federal Congressman representing the Communist Party, made a speech opposing the measure.[10]

The Communist Party was now against the measure on the grounds that it would "restrict the broader sense of democracy." What kind of restriction the antidiscrimination law would impose on the broader sense of democracy, they did not make clear. They also alleged a "lack of concrete examples" of discrimination to justify such a law. Daily incidents against Blacks were so normal and commonplace that they received no attention from the press, and Brazilian society remained charmingly convinced that racial discrimination did not exist in Brazil. One year later, the Black North American anthropologist, Irene Diggs, was barred from the Serrador Hotel in Rio de Janeiro. This "example" merited some attention. It was reiterated in 1949, four years after the publishing of the Manifesto, when a group of actors from TEN were barred from a celebration at the Glória Hotel, despite holding invitations from the Brazilian Artists' Association (sponsor of the ball) and from the hotel's owner. Our insistent protest moved newspapers to cover this incident. But only in 1950, when the famous African-North-American choregrapher, Katherine Dunham, and the prodigious soprano, Marian Anderson, were barred from the Esplanada Hotel in São Paulo, would Brazil's "national leadership" begin to perceive the existence of "concrete examples." The National Black Convention's proposal, published five years earlier, was unearthed, and the legislation passed in Congress, ironically baptized with the name of Afonso Arinos, a White Congressman from one of the traditional families of the Brazilian national élite.

Afonso Arinos law, racism and "racial democracy"

In the form it was written and approved, this law had no value whatever in the sense of preventing racial discrimination. On the contrary, it contributed to the legitimation of the officially proclaimed Brazilian "racial democracy" by making an official legal statement of anti-racism.[11] An important aspect of its domesticating role lies in the fact that it has been characterized as a benevolent concession of White legislators and not as the fruit of a long struggle of Black people organized politically. This fact is characterized by the discourse of the bill's author himself, who censures the very existence of Afro-Brazilian organizations struggling for their rights. In the same year the law was passed, then Congressman Afonso Arinos stated the following (Última Hora, 14.12.1951) on the question of race relations in Brazil:

> *I've already had occasion to state my opinion on this particular aspect of the racial problem... the appropriateness of officializing the existence of Negro organizations or associations of Negroes. During the parliamentary debates of my bill, I sought to show the pernicious side of such congregations, the spirit of which the bill opposed with its concern to establish more positive foundations for integration of the black element in Brazilian social life.... the insistence on creating groups of colored men is the reverse side of the coin, for this will be, in the last analysis, a manifestation of black racism.*

Another spokesman of "racial democracy," then Congressman Gilberto Freyre, declared to the Tribuna da Imprensa (19.07.1950), just after Katherine Dunham was barred:

> *It is clear that two kinds of racism are arising in Brazil, as rivals: the "racism" of Aryanists who, in general, are under the pressure of the current supremacy of Anglo-Saxon paragons in half the world, and the "racism" of those who, for political or party-related ends, seek to oppose the racism of the "Aryanists" with that of a Brazilian Negro caricatured as North American. This second "racism" is, in general, inspired by individuals who are under the pressure, in Brazil, of the Communist mystique, not always easy to separate from the power of a Russia like Stalin's, as imperial as that of the United States.*

This accusation of "reverse racism" would never stop pursuing us, from the left and from the right. To this day, the allegation of an imaginary Black racism serves as a slogan of those who seek to demoralize or delegitimize our struggle. Indeed, this is not only a Brazilian problem: it exists in Africa and the Diaspora, on the international level as well (Padmore, 1972; Nascimento, 1980; Larkin-Nascimento, 1981).

Brazilian Negritude

During the period in question in Brazil, this accusation was directed more keenly against TEN's almost unique position valuing the specific identity and cultural values of African origin. As the highest expression of this position, the theme of Negritude symbolized this stance, and its defenders were denounced as racists. Certain segments of the Afro-Brazilian movement that aligned with the left, and for that very reason had (and still have) much more visibility in the media and in the historical record, labelled us fascists, resorting to the classic allegation that to work for Black peoples' rights was to divide the working class. Almost entirely isolated, we of TEN were left in a very uncomfortable position, for the building of alliances always turned on the expectation that we should give up the affirmation of our own identity and specific struggle.

The National Conference of Blacks

The Black Experimental Theater organized the National Conference of Blacks (Rio de Janeiro, May 1949), with representatives from the country's various regions, to deal with concrete matters concerning the Black community and to raise the general consciousness with respect to the racist nature of conventional anthropological and sociological theorizing about Blacks, represented particularly in the Afro-Brazilian Congresses of the preceding decade.[12] The Conference was also a preparatory event for the First Congress of Brazilian Blacks.

First Congress of Brazilian Blacks

The objectives of the First Congress of Brazilian Blacks, organized in 1950 by TEN, were clearly articulated "to give a very special emphasis to the practical and current problems of our people. In studies that have been performed about Blacks, the obvious purpose or the poorly disguised intention has always been to consider them something distant, almost dead, stuffed and displayed like a museum piece."[13]

The discussions focused on several different themes: the need to organize and codify the work of domestic servants; proposals to organize literacy campaigns in the Black community, and especially in the favelas; and papers of varied nature on the forms racism takes in different parts of Brazil. The stenographic record of the debates portrays vividly the active participation of people from all different strata and sectors of the country's Black population, from marginalized factory workers to liberal professionals with advanced degrees, totalling 200 to 300 participants.

There is no doubt that the First Congress of Brazilian Blacks constituted an event of extreme importance to the history of Afro-Brazilian struggle, involving countless Black organizations in a broad forum of discussion and analysis of problems confronting the Black community. In particular, it was a landmark response by Black activists to the academic posture of researchers who saw in Black people nothing more than an object of scientific curiosity. In answer to this, the Congress focused not on academic niceties, but the need to attend to the immediate problems of our life."[14]

Blacks in the Dictatorship

During the military dictatorship, activism of any sort was considered subversive and violently repressed; yet the Afro-Brazilian voice was not entirely silenced. In 1965, UNESCO and the Brazilian government sponsored an International Seminar on African Culture, held in Rio de Janeiro. Consistent with its tradition of racial exclusion, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry (Itamarati) denied African Brazilians the opportunity to speak for themselves. The traditional, all-White official "spokesmen" for Black culture were the chosen delegates to the Seminar. But the Afro-Brazilian position was made known to the plenary, at my request and that of Marietta Campos. The great poet Aimé Césaire of Martinique, co-founder of the French-language poetic movement of *Négritude* and one of the foreign delegates, addressed the meeting on this strange Brazilian "anti-racism," which barred Black people from that very forum.

In a rarely explicit show of its normally better-disguised hypocrisy, Brazil hosted a Seminar Against Apartheid, Racism and Colonialism in 1966, and at the same time officially received a Minister of the South African apartheid regime. The TEN held a public protest rally in the Santa Rosa Theater of Rio de Janeiro.

The São Paulo University Faculty of Law's student union invited me in 1968 to speak on the subject of Negritude. On the day of the conference, the Faculty Director barred us from the auditorium. We held the event in the internal patio, under the constant threat of repression. After this incident, a group of African law students was formed, among them Fidelis Cabral, later Justice Minister of Guinea Bissau.

In 1968, the hardline coup within the military regime and intense repression forced me to leave the country. The racial question was designated a matter of national security, and its discussion was banned. My name was included in several military police investigations, under the strange allegation that I was in charge of liaison between the Black movement and the Communist. A supreme irony: I, who had been denounced by the Communists as a fascist and reverse racist! I left for the United States, where I would stay for thirteen years. For me, exile would represent another phase of the struggle, on the international and Pan-Africanist front. In Brazil, during this period a new phase of the Black movement would begin.

The international scenario of Black struggle: 1968-81

In 1968, when I arrived in the United States, it was the peak of a new Afro-American consciousness, the era of Black Power. I was received by the Panthers at their Oakland headquarters. Their President, Bobby Seale, was very receptive and offered to do what he could to support the Afro-Brazilian struggle. I also went to Newark, where I visited poet and dramatist Leroi Jones (Amiri Baraka) in his Spirit House and also came to know South African poet Keorapetse Kgotsisile. This was an encounter charged with *axé*: Brazilian, South African and African-North-American activists together. Over thirteen years, I visited countless other Black institutions.

The United States experience in no way affected my position on racism and the Black struggle in Brazil. It was an extremely rich encounter with an activist community whose freedom of expression permitted a radical use of language. Only on this point was there a true difference from Brazil: Africans in the United States could speak their piece, directly stating their independent positions, while in Brazil there was always the need to moderate, make use of metaphors, engage in the so-called "jogo de cintura," take great care with verbal and written expression. Even so, we were still accused of being racist radicals by our own people. I did not learn anything new from Blacks in the United States, but I certainly felt more at ease to develop my own thinking, free of the gag of "racial democracy," from the right or the left, that always binds us in Brazil.

I was able to take the Afro-Brazilian message to international forums like the Sixth Pan-African Congress (Dar-es-Salaam, 1974). I attended its preparatory conference in Jamaica (1973), noting the lively interest in Brazil of a man far ahead of his time: C.L.R. James, an African revolutionary from Trinidad, who insisted Brazil should send a full delegation, being the largest Black country outside Africa. At the Congress itself, however, I and others from multiracial countries in the African diaspora felt the pressure of the Marxist-Leninist ideological line that prevailed due to governmental sponsorship of the Congress (Nascimento, 1980).

This ideological position also pressured the Black movement in the United States, South Africa, and the African world as a whole. But there was a difference in our experiences. As much as this correct-line ideology insisted on the primacy of class struggle, there was no way to deny the specific need of Africans in explicitly segregated societies or in African countries to fight for their rights. In Brazil, and in the so-called "Latin" countries of America in general, theories of harmonious congeniality among the races, exalting ethnic and cultural miscegenation, led to denial of the very need for anti-racist struggle. When the "social question" was resolved, discrimination would magically disappear, and anyone who didn't believe this was a reverse racist.

The building of true democracy depends, necessarily, on the effective experience of multiculturalism and compensatory policies or affirmative action . . .

In Nigeria, in 1977, the Brazilian military dictatorship tried to silence me. I was invited to present a paper to the Colloquium, intellectual forum of the 2nd World Festival of Black and African Arts and Cultures, held in Lagos. The Brazilian government, through the Foreign Ministry, tried to veto my participation by all means, including tired and tattered tactics borrowed from the CIA (Nascimento, 1981). They managed to exclude me from the Colloquium as an invited guest, but I registered as an observer. With the support of diaspora delegations and African intellectuals and press, as well as Nigeria's Minister of Education and Coordinator of the Colloquium, Colonel Ali, I made my contribution denouncing racism in Brazil (Nascimento, 1977).

While still in Nigeria, I received an invitation to participate in the First Congress of Black Culture in the Americas, organized by the valiant African-Colombian anthropologist and physician Manuel Zapata Olivella and held in Cali, Colombia, in August 1977.[15] In Panama (1980), the 2nd Congress of Black Culture in the Americas was held, and Brazil was the elected venue for the 3rd Congress.

Returning to Brazil in 1980, we founded the Afro-Brazilian Studies and Research Institute (IPEAFRO) at the Catholic University (PUC) of São Paulo. This Institute organized the 3rd Congress of Black Culture in the Americas, held in São Paulo, at PUC, in August of 1982.[16] These Congresses constitute a landmark in the history of international African diaspora consciousness, for in all countries of Central and South America with important African populations there exist ideologies like "racial democracy," masking Black peoples' identity and tradition of struggle. In the three Congresses of Black Culture in the Americas, representatives of these populations came together for the first time to discuss their collective situation. They concluded that specific responses were needed for our problems, identities, and aspirations.

Contact with leftist fellow exiles showed that, although they considered themselves extremely progressive on the racial question, most remained contaminated by the ideological excesses that prevented them from understanding that conclusion.

Re-democratization and Black movement in Brazil

In July 1978, still in the midst of the military regime, I had come back to Brazil for a brief visit and participated in founding the Unified Black Movement Against Racism and Racial Discrimination (MNU).[17] It was at once a beginning and a culmination, for the MNU gave expression to a new wave of Black activism developing since the 1970s.

In the context of resistance to the military regime, Black activists still confronted the opposition of leftist groups that denied the legitimacy of our struggle. Afro-Brazilian movements were harnessed, in a sense, to expectations from the left. As a result, they were not guided by the history of earlier periods, basing their action on or giving continuity to preceding generations' experience. In these circumstances, under the tutelage of the left, the Black movement was being reorganized as a sub-utopia, since the victory of the broader revolution would automatically solve problems of racial exclusion.

Nevertheless, a clear sign of the Black movement's growth and strengthening at this time was the institution of the National Black Consciousness Day on 20 November, the anniversary of the death of Zumbi dos Palmares. First raised by Oliveira Silveira, of the Palmares Group in Rio Grande do Sul, the proposal became a major project of the Afro-Brazilian movement as a whole. Over time, it gained the attention and recognition of the media and society in general. Today, the date is commemorated in all of Brazil.

Among the richest experiences of this time was the founding of the Zumbi Memorial, a national organization of Black movements, the academy and certain government agencies[18] with the goal of creating at the site of Palmares, Serra da Barriga, a pole of Afro-Brazilian liberation culture (Nascimento, 1982: 36-45).

Political liberalization and the formation of political parties (1979-1982)[19] witnessed growing participation of organized Blacks. In the Democratic Labor Party (PDT), we created the Secretariat of the Black Movement with the explicit goal of dealing with the specific needs of our community. In other parties, there were also attempts at organized mobilization of Blacks.

A certain immaturity of the movement led to unnecessary divisions reflecting political party commitments. Linked to this problem was the accusation of racism, still thrown against us from the left and the right. The left, increasingly more open to the racial question, still did not assimilate the basic need for independence of the Black movement to seek and define solutions for its specific problems.

Quilombismo: an Afro-Brazilian political proposal

At this time, precisely in order to call attention to the need for independence of Black movement's thought and action in relation to its specific problems, I launched the book, *Quilombismo* (1980). The thesis of *Quilombismo*[20] seeks in the roots of the historical experience of African struggle in the Americas, and particularly in Brazil, the model for articulation of an ideology to guide our political action. *Quilombismo* is a political proposal not only for Blacks, but for the Brazilian nation. The idea is that of a state concerned with creating egalitarian living conditions for all components of our population, preserving and respecting different identities and the plurality of cultural matrixes. The building of a true democracy depends, necessarily, on the effective experience of multiculturalism and compensatory policies or affirmative action to make possible the full citizenship of groups that are subject to discrimination. The independence of these groups in articulating their own forms of community action is a fundamental requisite for a true democracy. Over time, these postulates of *Quilombismo* have clearly demonstrated harmony with the practical evolution of the Afro-Brazilian movement and those of other groups that are discriminated against, especially Indians and women.

First Afro-Brazilian mandate in the Congress, mobilization and the new republic

On assuming office in the federal Congress in 1983, as the dictatorship declined, I was the first and only Afro-Brazilian to systematically defend, in the National Congress, the human and civil rights of Blacks in Brazil. In the legislature that preceded the Constituent Assembly of 1988, I believe I developed a political and didactic agenda that prepared the way for the Afro-Brazilian victories inscribed in the 1988 Constitution. My activity in the Plenary of the House of Deputies aimed to show the true dimensions of racism and racial discrimination as a national question, one of citizenship, rather than a so-called "Black problem." Exposing abolition of slavery as nothing more than a "civic lie," one of the Afro-Brazilian movement's main ideas, I proposed the creation of a Black People's Commission in the House of Deputies.[21] Pointing out the importance of Zumbi of Palmares as a national hero, I also proposed making National Black Consciousness Day a national holiday[22] and defining racism as a crime against humanity.

One of the most important measures of my term was to create the precedent in Brazil's National Congress of debate on affirmative action, or compensatory action in the language of proposed law. This bill establishes mechanisms to compensate Afro-Brazilians after centuries of discrimination, among them the reservation of 20% of places for Black women and 20% for Black men in civil service job screening; subsidized educational opportunities; 40% of jobs in the private sector and incentives to corporations that contribute to eliminating the practice of racial discrimination; incorporation in the educational system of textbooks and children's literature with a positive image of the Afro-Brazilian family, as well as the history of African civilizations and of Africans in Brazil.

I also dedicated my Congress activities to the questions of Brazil's relations with South Africa's apartheid regime, self-determination of Namibia and of the Portuguese-speaking African countries, and solidarity with African peoples' freedom struggles.

The growing and ever more effective mobilization of the Black movement made itself felt in the process of consolidating democracy in the so-called New Republic. Black organizations proliferated and gained visibility through their clear and forceful action. The maximum expression of this development was embodied, perhaps, in the National Encounter of Black Activists, held in 1984 in Uberaba, during the administration of Mayor Wagner do Nascimento. As federal Congressman, I had the opportunity to present the document elaborated at this event to future President Tancredo Neves,[23] and later to re-address the demands it contained, in encounters with President José Sarney and his ministers.

As a result of these and other developments, initial acceptance of the idea of administrative policy geared toward attending specific needs of the Afro-Brazilian population began to evolve in certain government agencies. This tendency was made concrete through the creation of consultative bodies within government agencies, the first being the Council on Participation and Development of the Black Community, instituted by Governor Franco Montoro of São Paulo State. In the cultural area, it was expressed in specific proposals elaborated by Afro-Brazilian delegates to the National Forum on Cultural Policy (*I° Encontro Nacional de Política Cultural*, 1985:193). They were translated into public policy by some state and municipal governments through the creation of consultory bodies, divisions, programs and departments of Afro-Brazilian culture, beginning with the Culture and Education Secretariats of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo (Larkin-Nascimento, 1993, 1994; GTAA/SEC/SP, 1988). In the federal government, the Ministry of Culture created an Advisory group on Afro-Brazilian Affairs and a Commmission for the Centennial of the Abolition of Slavery.

Constituent Assembly, the abolition centennial, and the Palmares Foundation

In the 1986 elections, Afro-Brazilian representation in the Congress increased, although it was still far behind significant, much less proportional, representation. I believe that my own parliamentary action helped clear the way for approval of Constitutional measures proposed by Black members of the 1988 Constitutional Congress, House members Benedita da Silva, Carlos Alberto de Oliveira Caó, and Paulo Paim. These provisions announced the pluri-cultural and multi-ethnic nature of the country (Art. 215, para. 1), established racism as a crime without bail or statute of limitations (Art. 5°, sec. XLII), and determined the lands of contemporary Quilombo communities (Art. 68, Disposições Transitórias). These victories demonstrate, in the first place, the mobilization of the Afro-Brazilian community, which participated in parliamentary committees and other activities in the effort to guarantee these victories. One example is the State and Regional Encounters of Black Organizations, held in several states and in the regions of the North-Northeast and South-Southeast at the end of the eighties, culminating in the First National Encounter of Black Organizations (ENEN), held in São Paulo in 1991.

After the Constituent Congress concluded the country's federal charter, the constitutional process continued in the states and municipalities, where it also witnessed an effective mobilization of the Black movement, through which many victories were assured in state and local constitutions.

Another dimension of this mobilization is seen in the activities of the Zumbi Memorial, which consolidated the proposal of the Black movement to celebrate November 20th as National Black Consciousness Day, sponsoring annual pilgrimages to the site of Palmares. Out of efforts for the Zumbi Memorial and the Commission for the Celebration of the Centennial of the Abolition of Slavery, in the Ministry of Culture (a process made possible by the competence of the President of that Commission, Dr. Carlos Moura) was born the Palmares Cultural Foundation. This represented an eminent victory of Afro-Brazilian activism.

Secretariat of Defense and Promotion of Afro-Brazilian Populations and the Senate

In a gesture unprecedented in Brazilian politics, Governor Leonel Brizola of Rio de Janeiro State created in 1991 the State Secretariat for the Defense and Promotion of Afro-Brazilian Populations (SEAFRO),[24] the only first-level state agency created as yet to deal specifically with the creation and implementation of public policy for the Afro-Brazilian community (SEDEPRON, 1991).[25]

Predictably, the tired and tattered accusation of reverse racism was launched against the Secretariat, demonstrating vitality despite the democratic advances won by the movement which, evidently, were not yet assimilated by Brazilian society. The administration succeeding Brizola in 1995 summarily extinguished the Secretariat.

Independent activism of ngos

The independent activism of Afro-Brazilian non-governmental organizations (ngos) over the entire country evolved in a significant way in the '80s and '90s. In part, these ngos fill the gap left by the State, which administers virtually no public policies directed to this population. Ngos work in different areas, notably human rights and health. Education is also a good example. Unable to find support in the academy for introducing into school practice curricular content and methods adequate to the transformation of racist education, the Afro-Brazilian community and activists have developed their own intervention through the creation of community schools (Luz, 1989), extracurricular teacher training courses like IPEAFRO's Sankofa (Larkin-Nascimento, 1994), debates and seminars (Triumpho, 1991; Silva, 1997), and cultural events and activities in schools.

In universities, creation of research centers at the graduate and undergraduate levels, a demand of the Black movement, has resulted in a proliferation of Masters and Ph.D. theses which have created a superior data base of interest to the Black community. Studies of public policy and affirmative action are also in vogue. Among the most important developments in the area of education is the creation of the university admissions preparation courses for Blacks and poor people, a movement that is spreading in many different states and municipalities with the goal of increasing access of young Afro-Brazilians and poor people to higher education. This movement is explicitly committed to the principle of maintaining its financial autonomy by not accepting external funds. This attitude not only underlines the communitarian origins of the movement, a grassroots initiative, but also reflects the desire to ensure the continuity of its work independent of the considerations that concern funding sources.

Trade Unionism and the Black Movement

Afro-Brazilian organization within political parties matured and strengthened with the Afro-Brazilian movement itself. The number of Black candidates increased significantly, pointing to the end of an era in which Black political participation had been limited to getting out the vote for White candidates. With parties giving greater attention to the racial question and with Black activism on the increase in party contexts, there arose a particularly significant phenomenon in the beginning of the '90s: growing articulation of the Black movement with workers' unions related to certain political parties, making alliances and overcoming the old discourse that decreed the fight against racism divides the proletariat. This development made itself felt in the March on Brasília in 1995. Consciousness-raising among workers' unions and their increasing sensitivity to the racial question may lead to developing future concrete action toward equal remuneration and other specific demands of Black workers.

The Movement for Reparations

Another landmark of this decade is the international movement for reparations, indemnification of African descendants for the damage suffered during generations of slavery and the greatest holocaust in the history of mankind. This demand was taken up in Brazil at the end of the 1980s. Today, reparations are seen not as a financial reward to individuals, but the creation of different kinds of collective compensatory action. Congressman Paulo Paim presented one idea to create funds for development programs benefitting poor Afo-Brazilians.[illegible]

Rural communities/quilombos

One of the most important dimensions of Afro-Brazilian struggle in the '80s and '90s is the mobilization of rural Black communities, labelled in legal jargon the "remainders" of quilombos, which are found all over the country. They are organizing to defend their integrity against the aggression of those who covet their land, to struggle for their human and civil rights in general, specifically for the implementation of Article 68 of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution which guarantees their right to occupation of the lands. The First National Meeting of Rural Black Communities, held in Brasília in 1995, developed from movements on the regional level. Support work carried out by researchers shows a radical change in the relation between subject and object of study in the direction of solidarity and cooperation.

International organization in the Americas: "Latin"?

If the Congresses of Black Culture in the Americas were the starting point of an organized movement of African-Americans in the region of Central and South America and the Spanish-speaking Caribbean, the continuation of this movement is to be found not only in the activity of countless organizations in the region, but in the foundation of international organizations. One example was the Human Rights Seminar held in Lima in 1990, organized by the Manuel Congo Movement, which brought delegates from several countries of the region to discuss questions of common interest.

This continued legacy of the Congresses of Black Culture in the Americas calls for more profound thought on the question: is this region really "Latin"? The phrase "Latin America" reflects the domination of a White, European minority elite over majority Indian and African populations and constitutes a grotesque distortion of the region's demographic, social and cultural reality.

Black women

Since the '70s, Black women's involvement in the feminist movement has been growing. Today, the women's movement recognizes, generally, that to deal with women's matters is to consider the racial question. African-Brazilian women are organized in specific groups[7] and they attended the 1995 world women's conference in Peking. On the international level, organizations like the Network of Black Women in Latin America and the Caribbean have appeared.

Third centennial of Zumbi of Palmares and creation of the GTI

The Afro-Brazilian community demonstrated its maturity and advanced level of organization in 1995, the year of the third centennial of the immortality of Zumbi of Palmares, when all over the country there were rallies, cultural festivals, public demonstrations, seminars, congresses and other national and international events. This effervescence culminated in the Zumbi of Palmares March on Brasília against Racism, in Favor of Citizenship and Life. The Program to Combat Racism and Racial Inequality presented to the President by the March's Executive Committee stands as a basic synthesis of the Black community's demands. The goal of implementing public policies specific to the Afro-Brazilian population gained force and concrete expression through the formation of the Interministerial Working Group for Valuing the Black Population (GTI). This federal government consultative agency was created by Presidential Decree on the day of the March on Brasília, 20 November 1995. The President of the Republic, in an unprecedented statement in July 1995, had officially recognized the existence of racism in Brazil and the need to create policies to fight it. The GTI was given the task of formulating the ways and means of creating such policies.

. . . Afro-Brazilians have always struggled for their survival and for human rights . . .

During the Third Centennial, the Palmares Cultural Foundation printed notebooks and published a textbook for distribution in public schools on the history of Zumbi of Palmares; it also produced several educational television programs.

Federal Senate

On the Democratic Labor Party's (PDT) slate, I was elected in 1990 along with Darcy Ribeiro and Doutel de Andrade to the Senate and took office during a brief period in 1991.[8] In March 1997, on the death of our well-loved comrade Darcy Ribeiro, I took office and had the pleasure of joining a Senate that boasts the fine political action of two Afro-Brazilian women, Senators Benedita da Silva (Rio de Janeiro) and Marina da Silva (Acre). To date, I have presented four bills of law. One[9] defines the crime of racism.[10] Other proposals[11] are to establish affirmative or compensatory action measures to work toward equality of opportunities for Blacks; create punitive measures against individuals and corporations that practice or support racist practices; create a civil action against persons or corporations that attack the honor and dignity of racial, ethnic or religious groups; and, in the most audacious and groundbreaking provision, provide that organizations of civil society are competent to bring lawsuits for that purpose. My parliamentary initiatives in the Senate are recorded in the journal, *Thoth: African Peoples' Thought*, a forum of debate on themes of interest to the population of African origin in Brazil and the world.

On taking office in the Senate, the situation was very different than in 1983, when I arrived at the National Congress. This difference was symbolically portrayed as I witnessed the official inscription of Zumbi of Palmares' name in the memorial book of the Pantheon of National Heroes, a monument in Brasília where, until May 1997, the only name inscribed was that of Tiradentes, the 18th century independence hero. This victory arose from the proposal of Senator Benedita da Silva, who also sponsored a bill of law setting forth the regulations implementing Article 68 of the 1988 Constitution's Transitory Provisions, which guarantees the quilombo communities the demarcation and occupation of their lands. Indeed, I was taking office in a context in which Afro-Brazilian activism had arrived at the federal legislature, although the number of Congress members is still minute in relation to African Brazilians' weight in the national population. It is clearly a context in which we are ever broadening the spectrum of action to benefit ourcommunity.

Today, a new phase

Consolidating its victories and reaching new levels of discussion of the racial question in its national dimension, the Black movement today articulates its own initiatives, builds alliances and develops independent action. The movement's evolution is expressed, among other ways, in its

[redacted]

growing maturity with respect to the question of political parties. Activists' work within political parties no longer implies rivalry and disunity, a fact that strengthens the movement as a whole. Members of Congress exemplify this trend, to the extent that we are organizing to work together. African-Brazilian members of Congress, from the House of Deputies and the Senate, have been working on supra-party positions in favor of the Afro-Brazilian population. Discussion, formulation and implementation of public policy at the municipal, state and federal levels have also gained ground and merited attention. Without the slightest doubt, the movement has advanced enormously in the last two decades.

Conclusion

Racism in Brazil, characterized by high degrees of intolerance and perversity, used all possible resources to annihilate Afro-Brazilian men and women in their existential dimension, seeking to liquidate their memory, identity, body and spirit. But Afro-Brazilians have always struggled for their survival and for human rights in the most simple and universal expression– that of life in its totality.

After all these years of insistence on this struggle, I have the firm conviction that Brazil, as an inevitable fact of this political process, will one day be governed by an administration constituted in its majority of African Brazilians. If all ethnic segments that compose the Brazilian population truly believe in the path the nation chose to organize its institutional life– the path of democracy– then being a majority, African Brazilians will assume power in this Republic. This is not some kind of messianic idea or poetic utopia. It is a reality on the horizon, just as in South Africa. However, the fundamental pivot of this transformation lies more in the type of political institutions to be created than the simple substitution of White rulers with African descendants. For a democracy can only be legitimate if it effectively promotes the elevation of all Brazilians' standards of living, promoting equal access to an education that respects cultural identities, a more just income distribution and an economy whose priority is human beings rather than profit or financial speculation. This is the proposal of Quilombismo, inspired in the phenomenon of enslaved Africans building their sovereign life in freedom, a proposal of political organization for the Brazilian Nation.

As long as this vision does not materialize, organization of the Afro-Brazilian movement contributes fundamentally to the building of a true practice of democracy in the country, for its action points to the need for inclusion of all social and cultural groups and classes, maintaining and respecting specific identities. In its democratic practice, the Black movement lives and materializes Quilombismo, in the authentic continuance of the tradition of Afro-Brazilian struggle inaugurated with the very foundation of Brazil.

While the text is jointly written, certain events are narrated in the first person because they deal with the personal experience of Abdias do Nascimento.

Before the advent of the Portuguese, the land was not Brazil, but a conglomeration of diverse Indian nations. From the beginnings of colonization, the building of Brazil was based on African labor.

Quilombos are maroon societies, organized communities built by Africans in Brazil who rejected slavery and often fought long sagas of resistance wars against Portuguese rulers.

In 1822, upon independence from Portugal, the Portuguese royal family itself set up the Brazilian Empire, which lasted until the proclamation of the republic in 1889.

Organized with the help of normal school students of Professor Nelson Omegna, Campinas Institute of Science and Letters.

Phylon, III (1942), 284-286 apud. Degler, 1971: 180-181.

See, for example, R. Magalhães Júnior, "Um grande artista," Diário de Notícias, 25.03.1952, in which the author recalls his own reaction: "What? *The Emperor Jones*? But this is an extremely difficult play... You need a great actor to recreate, in Brazil, the part that was played by Paul Robeson... [The small, delicate figure of Aguinaldo before me] was not convincing. In my heart, I still found the attempt absurd."

Of O'Neill's work, we produced *All God's Chillun Got Wings*, *The Dream Kid*, and *Where the Cross is Marked*. Other productions included several poetry festivals, a Shakespeare festival and plays written and produced by Black playwrights or on Afro-Brazilian themes, published in the anthology *Drama para Negros e Prólogo para Brancos* (Nascimento, 1966).

Black novelist Raimundo Souza Dantas, later named Ambassador to Ghana, declared publicly that he had been sent to join the Committee in order to recruit Black people into the Communist Party. Some time afterward, Souza Dantas would abandon the Communist Party ranks, refusing to be manipulated.

Later, he would confess, in a National Black Convention assembly in Rio de Janeiro, that he acted under explicit Party orders, against his personal convictions.

When African Brazilians took complaints to court based on the Afonso Arinos Law, they were countersued and indicted for slander and libel, which constitute criminal infractions under Brazilian law.

"Conferência Nacional do Negro," *Quilombo*, 1:2 (May 1949), 1.

[13] "1º Congresso do Negro Brasileiro", *Quilombo* I:6; Editorial, *Quilombo* II:5.

[14] The controversy around the study carried out by sociologist L. A. da Costa Pinto, who misappropriated the Annals of the Congress for his UNESCO-sponsored study, is a good example of this clash. Responding to the criticisms of Afro-Brazilian sociologist Guerreiro Ramos, Pinto declared (*in* Nascimento, 1982: 62): "I doubt that there has ever been a biologist who, after studying, let's say, a microbe, has seen this microbe become incensed and come out in public writing nonsense about the study in which it participated as laboratory material."

[15] Sebastião Rodrigues Alves, Mirna Grzich, and Eduardo de Oliveira e Oliveira were the only Brazilians able to get through the dicatatorship's blockade of mandatory money deposit for permission to travel.

[16] For a detailed account of the Congress, see *Afrodiaspora* I:2,3,4 (1983-1985). IPEAFRO's first research project was on the question of contemporary Quilombos, a subject that since then has gained attention in academic and activist circles. In 1984, IPEAFRO began its extracurricular teacher-training course, Sankofa, which continued at Rio de Janeiro State University through 1995, and organized the International Seminar 100 Years of Struggle for the Independence of Namibia (Rio de Janeiro, 1984). IPEAFRO also published the journal *Afrodiáspora* (1983-1987), and other works (Larkin-Nascimento, 1981, 1985; Nascimento, 1985).

[17] The public rally on the steps of São Paulo's Municipal Theater was unforgettable, as were meetings in Salvador, Bahia, in Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, and São Paulo to consolidate the movement.

[18] Linked to the Service for Protection National Historical and Artistic Heritage (SPHAN).

[19] The year of the first federal and state elections.

[20] Presented initially at the 2nd Congress of Black Culture in the Americas (Panama, 1980).

[21] House Resolution Bill No. 58-A, 1983.

[22] Bill of Law No. 1550 (1983) and Bill of Law 1661 (1983), respectively.

[23] The text of the Uberaba document and of the speech in which it was presented to President Tancredo Neves are transcribed in the book *Povo Negro: a Sucessão e a Nova República* (Nascimento, 1985).

[24] The title of the Secretariat originally used the word Black (Negras) in place of Afro-Brazilian, and the acronym was then SEDEPRON. This is the same agency as SEAFRO.

[25] In the space of this essay, it is not possible to detail the Secretariat's work. Among its activities are the constitution of a Specialized Police Agency for Crimes of Racism, a public service for attending complaints of victims of racism, workshops and technical training for the Military Police in diversity sensitivity, the Strength of Youth project of professional training for adolescents, and teacher training programs in different regions of the State for affirmative educational policy with respect to African and Afro-Brazilian history and culture. The Secretariat published the second edition of *Africa in the Brazilian Schools* (Larkin-Nascimento, 1993) and *Sankofa: Afro-Brazilian Culture* (Larkin-Nascimento, 1994), for distribution in state and municipal schools, libraries, and teacher training programs.

[26] Bill of Law No. 1239, 1995.

[27] Examples are Geledés and Fala Preta, in São Paulo, and Criola in Rio de Janeiro.

[28] During that period, Nascimento's Senate office published the books *Africa in the Brazilian Schools* (Larkin-Nascimento, 1991) and *The Afro-Brazilian Struggle in the Senate* (Nascimento, 1991).

[29] Senate Bill No. 52, 1997.

[30] The need for this legislation arose because the current law, while establishing racism as a crime, does not define what constitutes racism, thereby leaving enforcement to the whim of police commissioners with no notion of what constitutes discrimination, who generally classify the infraction as libel or slander.

[31] Senate Bills No. 75, 73 and 114, 1997, respectively.

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Lynn Huntley

Director
The Comparative Human Relations Initiative

INITIATIVE PUBLICATIONS

The Comparative Human Relations Initiative has developed a number of linked publications that amplify on the themes and ideas set forth in this volume, drawing on original sources, and in the voices of the people in these three countries. Reports include:

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- ***In Their Own Voices***, a topically organized reader featuring articles, quotable quotes, and excerpted speeches by participants in Initiative meetings such as Ellis Cose, journalist; Frene Ginwala, speaker of the South African Parliament; Alex Boraine, vice chair, South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission; Emmett Carson, president, the Minneapolis Foundation; Gloria Steinem, contributing editor, Ms. Magazine; Mahmood Mamdani, professor, University of Cape Town; Njabulo S. Ndebele, vice chancellor, University of the North; Susan V. Berresford, president, the Ford Foundation; and many others.

- ***Color Collage***, occasional papers on issues such as the origins of racism, globalization, economic inequality, the religious community, among others, by authors such as George Reid Andrews, professor, University of Pittsburgh; C. Eric Lincoln, professor emeritus, Duke University; Abdias do Nascimento, professor emeritus, State University of New York at Buffalo, and former Federal Senator and Secretary for Human Rights and Citizenship, Rio de Janeiro State; Elisa Larkin Nascimento, co-founder, Afro-Brazilian Studies and Research Institute (IPEAFRO); Gloria Ladson BIllings, Professor, University of Wisconsin; Lennox Hinds, Esq., Stevens & Hinds; and many others.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

George Reid Andrews is a professor at the University of Pittsburgh in Pennsylvania, USA.

Gloria Ladson Billings is a professor in the Department of Curriculum and Instruction at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, USA.

Emmett D. Carson is the president of the Minneapolis Community Foundation in Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA.

Rosa Dávila is the research coordinator of the Inter-Ethnic Forum in Houston, Texas, USA.

James Jennings is a professor at the University of Massachusetts in Boston, USA.

Antonia Hernandez is the president and general counsel to the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund in Los Angeles, California, USA.

Lennox Hinds is a lawyer with the firm of Stevens and Hinds in New York City, New York, USA.

Lynn Huntley is the director of the Comparative Human Relations Initiative of the Southern Education Foundation in Atlanta, Georgia, USA.

C. Eric Lincoln is the William Rand Kenan Jr. professor emeritus at Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA.

Abdias do Nascimento is professor emeritus, State University of New York at Buffalo, and former Federal Senator, and Secretary for Human Rights and Citizenship in Rio de Janeiro State, Brazil.

Elisa Larkin Nascimento is co-founder of the Afro-Brazilian Studies and Research Institute (IPEAFRO) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Nestor Rodríguez is a professor at the University of Houston in Houston, Texas, USA.

Mandy Taylor is an attorney with the firm of Cheadle Thompson & Haysom in Cape Town, South Africa.

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

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Racism

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THE COMPARATIVE HUMAN RELATIONS *Initiative*

The primary focus of the Comparative Human Relations Initiative, [illegible] a unique collaboration [illegible] of contemporary power relations between [illegible] European or African descent [illegible] the United States [illegible] In 1995, the Initiative [illegible] and inequality by people from the three countries [illegible] comparative and multidisciplinary [illegible] to combat [illegible] together.

Racism [illegible] national and global responses.

THREE NA at the *Crossroads*

W[illegible]

EMBRACING AN

I

There are many lessons to be learned from comparing these nations. Below, we share a few.

Race is an idea. People often use the idea of "race" or race-related appearance as shorthand for identifying others. But most of us have no idea what "race" is or is not as a scientific matter. We prejudge others based on "race" and often give the concept meaning that it does not and should not have.

Science teaches us that there is only one real race, the human race. We are all fundamentally the same beneath the skin. Superficial characteristics such as color, hair texture or phenotype have nothing to do with intelligence or good character. The idea that some people are superior or inferior to others due to race is wrong. Nurture, not nature, creates power hierarchies and disparities among groups of people.

Race is constructed in different ways in our three countries. In Brazil, Africans were enslaved for almost 450 years. Miscegenation between Whites and Africans (primarily White men and vulnerable African women), however, was encouraged in order to "whiten" the population. Today in Brazil "good appearance"– resembling the White European ideal– is what counts. For this reason, economically and politically, Blacks and Browns occupy the same low status. Whites, as a group, are dominant.

In America and South Africa, the idea of "race" is largely tied to lineage. In the United States, for example, where slavery lasted over 240 years, considering all children of slaves to be "Black" no matter what they looked like, was a ready way to add to the slave population. Today, most African Americans are "mixed" in the sense of having forebears of different heritage. However, they are still classified as African American, no matter how little or how much African lineage they have or what they look like. In South Africa, the majority of the population is Black African, but there are also people of East Asian or mixed lineage, who are considered "Coloured" as distinct from Black.

Forms of racism differ, but consequences are the same. In all three countries, however "race" is defined, privilege and poverty are color-coded. People who look like Europeans in color and phenotype have a "skin privilege"– they are part of the group in each country that has historically enjoyed a social, political and economic monopoly of power. A color- or race-stratified power hierarchy has come into being.

Archbishop Desmond Tutu once observed that it is "difficult to awaken a man pretending to be asleep." One of the major barriers to movement beyond racism is the inclination of many people to turn a blind eye to the misfortunes or abuses of others. Racism becomes "invisible" to them. But willing racism not to exist does not eliminate it. Nor is the aspiration to color blindness an action plan to eliminate the actual and present effects of racial discrimination and disadvantage.

One need only look at apartheid's legacy in South Africa to see the consequences of unbridled racism and discrimination: injustice and inequality; poverty; an underdeveloped economy; a narrow consumer base; shortages of skilled labor; despair; and lack of governmental revenues needed to construct a social safety net. Whether it is the ghettos in the United States, the favelas of Brazil or the townships of South Africa, racism's suffering quotient and costs are too high. Racism may sometimes be advantageous for a few people, but it is no way to develop the economy or improve the wellbeing of entire nations.

What can be done to change the color-coded status quo? Many things. There are no simple prescriptions for change. Racism is a system of institutionalized power that is embedded in different

[redacted]

ways in the cultures, histories, myths, mores, policies and institutions in these countries. Responses to it must be as varied.

Dr. Gunnar Myrdal once used the metaphor of a "vicious circle" downward to describe how factors such as race, poverty, lack of education interact to oppress groups of people. But he also posited a "virtuous circle" by which a good transformation can occur. Simply, when many factors interlock, change in one may set off a chain reaction of responses in all.

This is the situation in Brazil, South Africa, the United States and around the world. People of good will are using the tools, talents and influence at hand to effect transformation. The situation is fluid and therein resides hope:

- There is an emerging consensus around the world that there are no "inferior" or "superior" races and all people entitled to fair treatment and equal rights;
- Governments, businesses and people have begun to realize that a key to national prosperity is finding ways to help people of African descent, women and other marginalized groups gain the health, skills and rights needed to be productive contributors to national life;
- People of African descent have enhanced access to political power and public resources to combat racism and to implement complementary and compensatory poverty alleviation efforts;
- There is a body of experience around the world about how to promote unity, rather than division, among peoples, that can be harvested and used to support innovation and change;
- There are more well-educated and affluent Blacks than ever before with resources and influence to counter racism;
- Freedom movements of women of all "races" and ethnicities, other minority groups and constituencies are challenging closed systems in each country that primarily benefited White males; these efforts are creating new alliances to seek transformation;
- People promoting democratization and accountability, the rule of law, and free enterprise have begun to understand the importance of helping all people, irrespective of appearance, become engaged stakeholders in their own communities and nations;
- There is a growing yearning among peoples for peace and reconciliation. International human rights groups and other such bodies concerned with the excesses of global capitalism and the impact of technology are searching for ways to create sustainable and broadened development, prevent degradation of the environment, promote the sharing of scientific and technological knowledge, and recognize the role of all peoples and nations as part of our global ecosystem.

Members, International Working and Advisory Group

The Comparative Human Relations Initiative

Peter Bell
CARE, United States

Ana Maria Brasileiro
InterAmerican Development Bank, United States

Lynn Walker Huntley
The Southern Education Foundation, United States

Wilmot James
University of Cape Town, South Africa

Shaun Johnson
Independent Newspapers Holdings Limited, South Africa

Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro
University of São Paulo, Brazil

Edna Roland
Fala Preta, Brazil

Khehla Shubane
University of Witwatersrand, South Africa

Ratnamala Singh
National Research Foundation, South Africa

Gloria Steinem
Ms. Magazine, United States

Franklin A. Thomas
TFF Study Group, United States

Tom Uhlman
Lucent Technologies, United States

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Southern Education Foundation
135 Auburn Avenue, NE, Second Floor,
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
(404) 523-0410 (phone) or (404) 523-6904 (fax).

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